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Chapter 1 discusses resources on science, technology and culture 
in America since 1920, in Mumford, XcLuhan, Fuller, Korzpbski, and 
Vhorf. Chapter 2 deals mainly with French writers since 1945, 
Foucault, Derrida, Bataille, Serres, and Deleuze and Guattari, and 
also Reich, Gramsci and Prigogine. Issues raised include 
determinism, totalisation, multiplicity, law and the exotics of 
power. 
Chapters 3-10 explore the inheritance of the Newtonian paradigm 
in nineteenth century America. Industrialisation, and its attendant 
myths of progress, emancipation and deterministic science, 
perpetuated by Jefferson and Elihu Palmer, are investigated in 
various ways by Brockden Brown (chapter 3), Poe (4), Hawthorne (5), 
Xelville (6), and Emerson (7). The building of totalising, a priori 
systems by Poe, Emerson and Louis Agassiz (8) is questioned after 
the Civil Var, under the new influence of Darwinism, by Oliver 
Pendell Holmes and Chauncey Wight (9), and by Charles Peirce and 
Henry Adams (10). 
Chapters 11-15 examine the rise of "technocracy" in twentieth 
century America. Chapter 11 discusses the monopolisation of 
capitalism, in Brooks Adams, Ignatius Donnelly, Edward Bellamy, 
Chauncey Thomas and Mark Twain. The renewed application of 
mechanistic models to society, in the "scientific management" 
theories of Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford (12), and in Veblen, 
James Burnham and B. F. Skinner (13), is also examined. Chapter 14 
discusses the linguistic bases of the modern state in theories of 
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pragmatic communication. Chapter 15 argues that the development of 
the digital computer reinforces Taylorist criteria of performatinity 
and clarity, and examines science fiction myths of electronic 
society as a magical and mystical system. 
Chapters 16-20 finds strategies of resistance to technocratic 
control in some recent American fiction: Samuel Delany, William 
Gaddis, Ronald Sukenick and William Burroughs. The variety of forms 
explored by these novelists challenges technocratic insistences on 
mechanistic determinism, rational clarity and totalisation. 
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This thesis will examine the hegemony of myths of science, 
progress, reason and truth as alibis of ruling power interests in 
America since the early Republic. The consent won by such myths must 
be placed within the cultural complexity described by Roland Barthes 
in The Fashion System (1967), as the basis of his discussion of the 
semiotics of fashion: 
the Fashion sign, like all signs produced within what is 
called mass culture, is situated, one might say, at the 
point where a singular (or oligarchical) conception and a 
collective image meet, it is simultaneously imposed and 
demanded. ' 
The intention is to place different texts, fictional and non- 
fictional, within an interactive field. The theoretical bases of 
this approach are discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2, as a 
movement of cultural studies across disciplinary boundaries. 
Statements from three recent French writers may suffice as an 
introduction to these procedures. 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Michel Foucault proposes 
a "general history" that seeks multiplicity rather than singular 
hierarchy: 
A total description draws all phenomena around a single 
centre -a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an 
overall shape; a general history, on the contrary, would 
deploy the space of a dispersion. 2 
The wide-ranging extent of this thesis is an attempt to create such 
a dispersion, thereby seeking to follow the cultural studies model 
suggested also by Felix Guattari, as an approach that would 
cross the traditional boundaries and try to work out the 
links connecting the different orders of determination - 
economic, demographic, sociological, the unconscious, etc. 
One would then no longer have to choose one plane of 
4. 
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significance over another - either the human factor or the 
economic, for instance - but could follow in detail the 
winding trail of the signifier, its crossroads, dead ends, 
ramifications, repetitions, backward turns. 3 
For Jean-Fran(roic Lyotard, in Driftworks (1984), the vital concept 
of "drift" embodies this wandering multiplicity that refuses 
totalisation into a singular unity. As he puts it, the "plural, the 
collection of singularities, are precisely what power, kapital, the 
law of value, personal identity, the ID card, responsibility, the 
family and the hospital are bent on repressing. "4 
The intention of this thesis is therefore to place a 
multiplicity of texts within specific social, historical and 
political contexts. Accordingly, although the basic form of the 
thesis may be broadly chronological, strict linearity will not 
necessarily be adhered to. Neither will the thesis be an exclusively 
biographical or literary study of particular writers, although these 
elements will not be excluded either. 
Neither can the thesis be an encyclopaedic study of science and 
technology. Instead, selections of fictional and non-fictional texts 
will be made, based on which writers, and which specific texts by 
those writers, may connote a wider field. Works and writers will be 
selected because they take part in complex and varied investigations 
of the field of science, technology and power in America since the 
nineteenth century. 
It must be acknowledged that this method risks simplification 
through an over-limitation of the field. This may occur in at least 
four areas. Firstly, writers whose work is relevant may be ignored. 
Secondly, significant works by those writers included in the thesis 
might be overlooked. Thirdly, historical events with an important 
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bearing on the thesis may be excluded or simplified. Fourthly, the 
delimitation of the field to America since the nineteenth century 
may itself be an arbitrary and restrictive action, placing certain 
areas of study beyond the scope of the thesis. For example, the 
importance of non-Western scientific "traditions" and practices, O 
and the equally suppressed role of women in scientific work, ß are 
areas of study which are not entered into in great detail. While a 
serious attempt will be made to prevent over-simplification through 
such an over-narrowing of the field, it is hoped that the problems 
raised by those areas potentially excluded by the selection process 
will be mitigated by the multiplicity and representative value of 
those texts actually included in the work. 
The thesis begins with two chapters (1-2) exploring central 
figures in cultural studies approaches to issues of science and 
technology, in America since 1920, and in France since the Second 
World War. The writers discussed in these opening chapters provide 
theoretical bases and a vocabulary field for examining those issues 
discussed in the rest of the thesis. These issues include problems 
of determinism, totalisation, multiplicity, chance and law, and the 
Brotics of power. 
The thesis proceeds in chapter 3 to discuss the application of 
Newtonian science's assumptions of generalised law and order to 
American society in the early Republic. Such notions are placed 
within debates an the development of industrial manufacturing in 
America, in Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton and Tenche Coxe. 
The next three chapters (4-6) examine issues of power in relation to 
the figure of the scientist or engineer, focussing on the 
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mythification of industrial manufacture and of scientific 
experimentation as Christian hubris, in the fictions of Poe, 
Hawthorne and Melville. 
The nostalgia for deterministic, totalising systems in Poe's 
"Eureka, " and in Emerson's 1838 "Nature" (chapter 7), is also seen 
in Louis Agassiz (chapter 8). The breakdown of such 
transcendentalist ambitions will be examined in chapters 8-10. With 
the reform of the university system by utilitarian, industrial 
interests, Chauncey Wright, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and Charles 
Peirce could introduce positivist and pragmatic revisions of 
scientific methodology. This challenge to strict determinism was 
taken further by Henry Adams, at the end of the nineteenth century, 
as he faced the prospect of a catastrophic breakdown of 
deterministic order, and the emergence of a universe whose 
constitutive elements are chaos, multiplicity and chance. 
Nevertheless, the desire for determinism, totalisation and 
mechanistic order has been maintained by power interests, which have 
consolidated under monopoly capitalism into the bureaucratic 
"technocracy" of the twentieth century state. The thesis will 
discuss major figures in these power areas, such as Frederick Taylor 
and Henry Ford, James Burnham and B. F. Skinner (chapters 11-13). 
Chapter 14 will explore the linguistic basis of technocratic rule, 
in its reduction of language and speech to pragmatic theories of 
communicative competence. The Romantic figure of the artist as a 
destabilising adventurer, in the work of Norman Mailer, for example, 
will be discussed as a strategy of resistance to the totalitarian 
scope of technocratic science and technology. 
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Chapter 15 will examine certain tendencies in American science 
fiction literature and film, which confirm the rule of technocratic 
power interests by perpetuating myths of electronic technology as a 
quasi-divine, incontrovertible source of energy and power. The 
development of the electronic computer in World War Two consolidates 
this mythical basis of hegemonic rule. 
The rest of the thesis will explore selected texts by four 
contemporary American fiction writers who, in various ways, provide 
resistances to the regimes of rationality, determinism and 
singularity promoted by ruling power interests. Samuel Delany 
(chapters 16-17), William Gaddis (18), Ronald Sukenick (19) and 
William Burroughs (20) invent fictions that involve drift, 
multiplicity, provisionality and fragmentation, so that the formal 
invention of the writing itself disrupts that reduction of language 
to codification and pragmatic clarity favoured by the technocratic 
establishment. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
This chapter will draw upon investigations into the development 
of science and technology in modern industrial society, and in 
particular on writers an cultural studies in America since the 
1920s, concentrating especially on the work of Lewis Xumford, 
Marshall XcLuhan, Buckminster Fuller, Alfred Iarzybski and Benjamin 
whorl. 
Lewis I4umford's research moves beyond commonplace utilitarian 
assumptions to explore the social and psychic effects of science and 
technology. Accordingly, his editorship and selection of Emerson's 
essays and journals in 1968 acknowledges a vital antecedent for such 
work. ' Xumford's own investigations can be seen to move from the New 
Deal reformist utopianism of his script for Villard Van Dyke and 
Ralph Steiner's film The City (1939), to his radical criticism of 
the workings of the American techno-bureaucratic war-machine in 
The Pentagon of Power (1970). His work especially faces the damage 
and fears attendant upon a highly mechanised industrial society. 2 
In The Transformations of Xam (1957), Rumford discusses the myth 
of America as the New World, a place of renewal for the productive 
energies of Europe, and of escape from the threat of poverty, 
scarcity and overcrowding in the Old World. America appears in this 
mythical view as a second chance at Eden, and promises to renovate 
the "vision of effortless plenty that Old World man had wistfully 
relegated to the long-past golden age. "*3 
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Mumford's thesis locates the destruction of such hopes in an 
over-commitment by ruling interests to quantitative growth in 
industrial and agricultural production. In an industrial America, 
official evaluations tend to suppress questions of quality of life 
beneath a manic dedication to myths of a progressive future through 
material security. 
The role of the scientist in such developments is crucial. 
Refusing official alibis of "pure" research, Mumford reveals 
scientists' findings to be immediately social. Scientists have 
replaced religious leaders as possessors of a secret knowledge, 
which gives them power to dominate and transform the lives of those 
human beings outside the elite group of leaders. 14umford places 
science and technology in a context of bourgeois power relations, as 
follows: 
The studious detachment of science, the singlemindedness of 
its search for verifiable evidence and viable truths, the 
priestly remoteness of its more dedicated members from any 
kind of sordid calculation or even sensible human concern - 
in short, its other-wordly quality - allied modern science 
to the high traditions of religion and philosophy, from 
whence it fact it had sprung. But this inner inviolacy of 
the scientist, with its tacit claim to social 
irresponsibility, rested on an illusion. From the start, 
science served warfare, engineering, industry, medicine, and 
in pursuing its own private interests inevitably widened 
their public province. Thus the ideal goals of science, 
which were wholly innocuous except in their treatment of the 
pursuit of truth itself as an absolute, acted as an 
ideological cover for the grosser realities of a mechanised 
and depersonalised scheme of life. 4 
This extract reveals the strong Romantic element in l! umford's 
attitude to technology, as he places "engineering" and "industry" in 
the same context as "warfare, " before implying that all these 
activities are symptomatic of a "depersonalised scheme of life. " A 
utopian area of total freedom, beyond technological mediation, is 
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evident in Mumford's work as a contemplative ideal, against which 
mechanisation and industrial technology tend to appear as negative 
and destructive agents. As a form of resistance to the totalitarian 
impulse of science and technology in industrial society, )tumford's 
writing emphasises qualities and values such as spontaneity, 
heterogeneity, feeling and fantasy, areas ignored or suppressed by 
the utilitarian cultural network of modern science and industrial 
technology. 
Technics and Civilization (1934) concentrates on the rise of 
modern Vestern science as a totalising and universalising impulse. 
The history of science and technology in America, in the colonial 
and post-revolutionary periods, is an extension of the mechanistic 
philosophy established in Western Europe by the end of the 
seventeenth century. 
Rumford relates the new science to the rise of capitalism in 
Western Europe. He shows how capitalist inventions such as double- 
entry book-keeping, bills of exchange, letters of credit, and 
speculation in futures were customary procedures by the middle of 
the sixteenth century, as capitalists introduced new habits of 
abstraction and calculation into the lives of urban people. These 
abstractions, such as time, money, power, production and trade, were 
mutually reinforcing: 
)ten became powerful to the extent that they neglected the 
real world of wheat and wool, food and clothes, and centred 
their attention on the purely quantitative representation of 
it in tokens and symbols: to think in terms of mere weight 
and number, to make quantity not alone an indication of 
value but the criterion of value - that was the contribution 
of capitalism to the mechanical world-picture. So the 
abstractions of capitalism preceded the abstractions of 
modern science and re-enforced at every point its typical 
lessons and its typical methods of procedure. 6 
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Crucially, it is not the procedures of abstraction, measurement, and 
quantification in themselves, but their application in a totalising 
and exclusive manner, that is the focus of Xumford's analysis in 
this passage. 
In seventeenth century European science, time and space became 
abstract, quantifiable and determined. Xumford interprets this 
deterministic aspect of science as providing an illusion of total 
control, and therefore of security and power. The mechanical clock 
invented in medieval Europe became a central model of the new 
system, helping to promote that regime of exact time-keeping which 
remains the basis of capitalist productivity: 
In its relationship to determinable quantities of energy, to 
standardization, to automatic action, and finally to its own 
special product, accurate timing, the clock has been the 
foremost machine in modern technics: and at each period it 
has remained in the lead: it marks a perfection toward which 
other machines aspire. 6 
The mechanical clock brought a new sense of time as a sequence of 
mathematically separate and measureable instants, taking place in an 
external nature governed by fixed, objective rules. This new 
scientific abstraction suppressed the heterogeneous times of the 
human body and of the daily and seasonal rhythms of the natural 
world, ignoring fluctuations, unpredictabilities and 
irreversibilities in favour of a model based on the secure order of 
rule and law: 
Within the walls of the monastery was sanctuary: under the 
rule of the order surprise and doubt and caprice and 
irregularity were put at bay. Opposed to the erratic 
fluctuations and pulsations of the worldly life was the iron 
discipline of the rule.? 
- 15 - 
Human conceptions of space were similarly transformed by the new 
emphasis on scientific abstraction, with the development of linear 
perspective as a measured, quantitative space. This rationalisation 
of time and space encouraged a belief in perfect predictability, 
according to which knowledge of the initial conditions of an 
object's motion through space and time would enable its future 
appearances to be calculated with total exactness. On a political 
level, this bTewtonian determinism enabled the territorial expansion 
of Renaissance Europe. Xumford describes the link between 
deterministic science and imperial and colonial history as follows: 
The unknown is therefore no less determinate than the known: 
given the roundness of the globe, the position of the Indies 
could be assumed and the time-distance calculated. The very 
existence of such an order was an incentive to explore it 
and to fill up the parts that were unknown... The itch to 
use space and time had broken out: and once they were co- 
ordinated with movement, they could be contracted or 
expanded: the conquest of space and time had begun. e 
Lewis Mumford's location of abstract, deterministic thought within 
the technological developments of late medieval and Renaissance 
Europe, and, more generally, his exploration of technologies as 
"transformations of man, " may be compared with the work of Marshall 
McLuhan. 
For McLuhan, every technological invention extends part of the 
human body, and produces a radical shift in perceptual sense-ratios. 
Writing in Understanding Media: The Extensions of Nan (1964), he 
suggests that the "outering or extension of our bodies and senses in 
a new invention compels the whole of our bodies and senses to shift 
into new positions in order to maintain equilibrium. 09 Technology is 
therefore not considered as simple utility in relation to fixed 
human needs. Rather, the relationship between human bodies and 
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technologies is understood to change with time, and according to 
variable social and historical circumstances. 
In The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962), McLuhan attributes the 
development of modern science to the social effects of the invention 
of moveable type. Print technology, beyond its simple use-value, 
brought with it perceptual changes that promoted a new emphasis on 
the visualization of knowledge, and consequently on those values of 
uniformity, standardization and repeatability on which both 
Newtonian science and industrial technology have depended. Print 
technology "exists by virtue of the static separation of functions 
and fosters a mentality that gradually resists any but a separative 
and compartmentalizing or specialist outlook. ' In this way, 
knowledge comes to be seen as verifiable in precise, measureable 
terms, and experience is fitted into lineal, sequential habits, and 
homogenized onto a single, uniform visual plane. 10 
The theory of representation implied by the invention of fixed 
perspective in Renaissance Europe is therefore what McLuhan refers 
to as a visual-based "matching": 
In fact, the stress on the abstract visual evoked as 
standards of truth the mere matching of object with object. 
So unconscious were people of this matching theory as being 
dominant, that when a Pope or a Blake pointed out that truth 
is a ratio between the mind and things, a ratio made by the 
shaping imagination, there was nobody to note or comprehend. 
Mechanical matching, not imaginative making, will rule in 
the arts and sciences, in politics and eduation, until our 
own time. " 
McLuhan opposes to mechanistic linearity the possibilities of field 
techniques suggested by modern electron physics. In the electronic 
era of the twentieth century, new methods for art and science, 
beyond specialisation and mechanistic separation, become available: 
- 1? - 
It is the method of the fixed or specialist point of view 
that insists on repetition as the criterion of truth and 
practicality. Today our science and method strive not 
towards a point of view but to discover how not to have a 
point of view, the method not of closure and perspective but 
of the open "field" and the suspended judgement. Such is now 
the only viable method under electric conditions of 
simultaneous information movement and total human 
interdependence. 12 
McLuhan argues for the replacement of the singular restrictions of 
"light on, " the classical rationality of a print and industrial 
culture, by a new awareness of "light through, " that allows the 
"full ratio or interplay of all the senses in concert. "13 The body 
thus moves beyond its visual bias, towards a new conception of 
health. 
In this way, XcLuhan's work investigates strategies of 
resistance to the potential tyrannies of technological change. His 
work does not consider the social effects of technologies such as 
print and electricity as unavoidably determined. Rather, they can 
and should be challenged: 
Is it not possible to emancipate ourselves from the 
subliminal operations of our own technologies? Is not the 
essence of education civil defence against media fall- 
out?... Knowledge does not extend but restrict the areas of 
determinism. And the influence of unexamined assumptions 
derived from technology leads quite unnecessarily to maximal 
determinism in human life. Emancipation from that trap is 
the goal of all education. " 
licLuhan's writings are themselves exploratory "probes" into a 
multiple field, rather than deterministic statements relying on 
Renaissance perspectival ideas of singular truth and consistency: 
I am an investigator. I make probes. I have no point of 
view. I do not stay in one position. 
Anybody in our culture is regarded as invited as long as 
he stays in one fixed position. Once he starts moving around 
and crossing boundaries, he's delinquent, he's fair game. 
The explorer is totally inconsistent. He never knows at 
what moment he will make some startling discovery. And 
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consistency is a meaningless term to apply to an explorer. 
If we wanted to be consistent, he would stay at home. 
.,, I DON'T EXPLAIN - I EXPLORE'* 
In the essay "Guaranteed Income in the Electric Age" (1965), 
McLuhan's explorations of the social effects of electronic 
automation lead him towards a theory of liberatory technology. 
Freedom may be possible in a post-industrial society in which 
politics need no longer be based on competition for scarce 
resources. For electronic technology has made possible the co- 
ordination of resources for the benefit of communities as a whole: 
The orchestration and involvement of corporate resources 
that become natural with automation, create for the 
community the kind of "leisure" that has always been known 
to the individual artist and creative person: the leisure of 
fulfillment resulting from the fullest use of one's powers. 
It is this "leisure" that dissolves the existing job 
structure with its fragmentary and repetitive noninvolvement 
of the integral power of man. The guaranteed income that 
results from automation could therefore be understood to 
include that quite unquantifiable factor of joy and 
satisfaction that results from a free and full disclosure of 
one's powers in any task organized to permit such 
activity. 16 
Automation thus becomes a key to a liberatory technology that will 
restore those qualitative, "subjective" values, including boy and 
pleasure, that distinguish human beings from the machines they 
create. 
The inclusion of XcLuhan's essay on guaranteed income in Richard 
Kostelanetz' collection Beyond Left and Rigbt: 
Radical Thought for Our Times (1968), is significant, as it 
demonstrates the vital part played by XcLuhan in questioning the 
abuses of technological power in a time of war and social conflict 
in the United States. Also included in that collection are essays by 
R. Buckminster Fuller, whose work since the 1920s has similarly 
_: 1 
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sought ways of inventing new forms of science and technology for the 
benefit of humankind as a totality. 
In "Total Thinking, " an essay written at Black Mountain College 
in 1949, Fuller sees the human being as an "evolution modifier, " 
capable of breaking historical continuities towards a progressive 
future. 17 However, the emergence of those new procedures necessary 
for a liberation of the Earth's resources has been largely prevented 
by the determinism of classical science, which has provided 
inaccurate and misleading models of the real. Fuller argues that 
such binary and linear thought techniques must therefore be 
superseded: 
Residual ignorance has employed the as-yet-primitive tools 
of mathematics in linear diametrics - in the "either yes or 
no" of two-dimensional oversimplification. Ignorance 
thinking in black-board and paper planes labors protestingly 
over the geometry of reality. 10 
Recalling Henry Adams, whose work will be discussed in chapter 10, 
Fuller calls for a genuinely contemporary education, as a key factor 
in realizing the opportunities provided by technological 
inventiveness: 
Education, in the sense of man's being educente (led out 
from) the monological fixations of ignorance, involves also 
being led into, intro-ducente, (introduced to) the new 
awareness of the dynamic fluidity of the infinite 
persistence of complex-yet-systematic interaction of 
universal principles- 19 
The new, healthy model for science is therefore relativistic, 
interactive, dynamic and non-hierarchical. As in XcLuhan, three- 
dimensional perspective, based on the power structures of 
Renaissance society, is replaced by a new awareness of plural, 
relative centres, revealed by the discoveries of modern physics: 
Realization of relativity spontaneously evokes a springing, 
to dive from a then vanishing springboard into an infinite 
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dynamic sea where man must learn to swim tirelessly, 
naturally, before he sinks, but only because what he used to 
think was that he ought to "sink" rather than be attracted 
by dominant neighbours. 
As man learns to eliminate his preposterous one, or two, 
or three dimensional a priori references to a fixed level 
planar breadth and its inherent upwardness and downwardness 
of universe and substitutes therefor the now reliable 
sensation of an inwardness and outwardness relative to 
plural of centres, he will come naturally to his new 
sustaining awareness of the impossibility of his doing ought 
but sustain his equilibrious and navigable position. If 
there is no inherent "down" in universe, man cannot 
sink. 20 
Being able to survive and prosper in a pluralistic, dynamic universe 
will depend on a new science and technology. Fuller's "synergy, " 
that is, "wholistic behavior unpredicted by parts, "2' provides 
opportunities for the planning of human societies based on a 
reformed conception of technocratic efficiency. The "comprehensive 
designer"22 will thereby challenge those restrictions placed on 
scientific activity by centuries of specialization. 
Fuller's last work, The Critical Patb (1981), continued his 
attack on archaic modes of thought and action, by probing into 
science and technology as bases of imperialist power and 
competition. The rise of capitalism, specifically in the British 
Empire, is viewed as consolidating the monopolistic domination of 
resources by one group of human beings over another: 
In 1600 Queen Elizabeth I and a few intimates founded the 
East India Company. Exercising her crown privileges, the 
queen granted the company limited liability for losses on 
the part of the enterprise backers. They could lose their 
money if the ship were lost, but they could not be held 
liable for the lives of the sailors who were drowned. While 
the owners could insure and very greatly limit the magnitude 
of their losses, the sailors and their families could not. 
"Ltd. " - limited, in England - and "Inc. " - incorporated, in 
the U. S. A. - and other similar legal definitions in all 
capitalist countries constitute "for ages uncontested" - 
ergo, custom-validated and legal-judgements-upheld - royal 
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decreed greatly savoring big-money capitalism over the 
mortal, breadwinner-loss-taking vast majority of the poor. 23 
Privately-owned enterprises, backed by imperial navy and armies, 
thus came to constitute an invisible national power structure that 
won mastery of the world's sea-lanes: 
All the other world-power-stature individuals who vied for 
supreme mastery of the world's high seas lines of supply 
also operated invisibly through monarchs and nations over 
whom they had sufficient influence. Through such behind-the- 
throne influence the influenced nation's resources could be 
politically maneuvered into paying for the building and 
operation of the navies and armies that would seek to 
establish and protect their respective privately owned 
enterprises. 24 
The conditions of scarcity on which such imperial politics are based 
led to the establishment of communism and free-enterprise capitalism 
as a duality based on Malthus-Darwinian competition for scarce 
resources. Fuller describes both these systems as assuming that the 
means of survival are inadequate for all to survive, so that "it has 
to be either you or me, " with not enough resources for both: 
For the last century these two ideologies, communism and 
free enterprise, have dominated the political affairs of 
world-around humanity. Each side says, "You may not like our 
system, but we are convinced that we have the fittest, 
fairest, most ingenious way of coping with the lethal 
inadequacy of life support operative on our planet, but 
because there are those who disagree diametrically on how to 
cope, only all-out war can resolve which system is fittest 
to survive. 026 
However, for Buckminster Fuller, this destructive bipolar political 
struggle is based on an erroneous evaluation of the Earth's 
resources, and has been superseded by the new potentialities of 
technological invention. In. a world where total energy consumption 
is "only one four-millionth of one percent of the rate of energy- 
income, M26 there is potential for global liberation through an 
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expansion of technological capabilities. Fulfilment of this 
potentiality is prevented only by present anachronistic strategies, 
which must be surrendered: 
Continuing to attempt to fit our late-twentieth-century 
astronautical man-on-loon-visiting capacity into a 
nineteenth-century horse-and-buggy street pattern, house-to- 
house-yoo-hoofing life-style (and a land baron racket) is so 
inefficient that the overall design of humanity's present 
social, economic, and political structuring and the physical 
technology it uses wastes ninety-five out of every 100 units 
of the energy it consumes. 27 
Politically, therefore, Fuller may be seen as a reformed technocrat, 
who assumes that contemporary scientific knowledge may be 
administered to improve society and redistribute wealth and 
resources on an equable basis. Accordingly, the key to social change 
for Buckminster Fuller is a technology separate from politics: 
Ninety-nine percent of humanity does not know that we have 
the option to "make it" economically an this planet and in 
the Universe. We do. It can only be accomplished, however, 
through a design science initiative and technological 
revolution. " 
"Design, " in Fuller's terms, includes an exploration of those areas 
of non-linearity and multiplicity also celebrated by 1Sarshall 
XcLuhan. For both writers, the design of each text as a piece of 
writing is itself a vital part of this revolutionary activity. The 
inventiveness of their multi-layered, defamiliarising texts shifts 
their discourses on technology away from utilitarian, pragmatic 
forms, making probes into areas ignored by such programmatic 
analyses. This exploration of language and form as revolutionary 
technique is a central issue in the invention of counter-strategies 
to technocratic control in the American fiction writers discussed at 
the end of this thesis, in chapters 16-20. 
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Buckminster Fuller's call in "Total Thinking" for a revision 
not only of semantics but also of their complex aspect as thought 
habits employed to describe experience with accuracy. .. "29 is a 
convenient bridge to the work of Alfred Korzybski. In 1938, 
Korzybski, a Polish emigre, opened the Institute of General 
Semantics in Chicago, to study links between language habits and 
neurotic effects on the human body. 
In Science and Sanity (1933), Korzybski suggested the political 
bases of his research, as a challenge to "the ignorance of those who 
control our symbolism - wards, money. "30 The mechanistic paradigm of 
science is considered in his work as a basis for neurotic 
behavioural habits. In response to this pathological system, General 
Semantics would be a "new extensional discipline which explains and 
trains us how to use our nervous systems most efficiently, " by 
replacing the Cartesian split between mind and body with an 
acknowledgement of the "organism-as-a-whole. M31 
Korzybski's revolutionary programme seeks to liberate human 
beings from the neurotic controls of Aristotelian, Euclidean and 
Newtonian procedures. Accordingly, he considered science primarily 
as a linguistic system, in that "for more than two thousand years 
our nervous systems have been canalized in the inadequate, 
intensional, often delusional, aristotelian orientations, which are 
reflected even in the structure of the language we habitually 
use. 032 The existing social system promotes an uncritical copying of 
such authoritarian structures, thereby keeping human beings at the 
level of mare animal repetition. As a result, "nearly all of us, 
even now, copy animals in our nervous responses, which copying leads 
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to the general state of un-sanity reflected in our private and 
public lives' institutions and systems. " 33 
As in McLuhan and Fuller, the reformation of language away from 
the archaisms of linearity and bipolarity is a strategy of 
resistance based on the findings of modern physics: 
Modern scientific developments show that what we label 
'objects' or 'objective' are mere nervous constructs inside 
of our skulls which our nervous systems have abstracted 
electro-colloidally from the actual world of electronic 
processes on the sub-microscopic level. And so we have to 
face a complete methodological departure from two-valued, 
'objective' orientations to general, infinite-valued, 
process orientations, as necessitated by scientific 
discoveries for at least the past'sixtp years. 34 
"Jon-j" science therefore refuses the totalising ambitions of 
deterministic order, in favour of knowledge considered as time- 
bound, partial and relativistic. Abstract generalizations can only 
be provisional, in that they may exclude some data, and may break 
down with the discovery of new, previously unknown factors: 
Through training in the consciousness of abstracting we 
become aware that characteristics are left out in the 
process of abstracting by our nervous systems, and so we 
become conscious of the possibility that new factors may 
arise at any time which would necessitate a change in our 
generalizations. 36 
Innovation is therefore enabled by the breaking of linguistic sets. 
The unfamiliarity produced by such ruptures may be a sign of 
novelty: 
The introduction of new factors may at first produce seeming 
difficulties because of the unfamiliarity of a new 
terminology which embodies the new structural assumptions 
and because of the necessity of a recanalization of our 
neuro-linguistic habits, etc. 36 
The discovery of the unknown through linguistic and formal 
innovation, extrapolated from science to art, forms a basis for the 
experimental fiction discussed in chapters 16-20 of this thesis. 
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Karzybski replaces the staticising Aristotelian "is" of identity 
with a critique of the act of definition: "In a world of processes 
and non-identity it follows that no individual, 'object', event, 
etc., can be the 'same' from one moment to the next... ""' In this 
way, he makes a vital connection between power and sexuality: 
the intensional abstract 'sex' labels a fiction. By 
extension or facts, 'sex' varies with every individual not 
only with age (dates), but in relation to endless other 
factors, and can be handled adequately only by the use of 
extensional devices. *O 
In Korzybski's analysis, therefore, philosophy cannot be mere 
intellectualisation, but has severe implications for the health of 
human beings in society. Accordingly, psychosomatic problems are 
considered as "neuro-linguistic" in origin: 
These 'philosophers', etc., seem unaware... that by teaching 
and preaching 'identity', which is empirically non-existent 
in this actual world, they are neurologically training 
future generations in the pathological identifications found 
in the 'mentally' ill or maladjusted. 89 
In this way, acts of definition and signification are seen as 
instruments of power, in a world where "any definition of words by 
words must be based ultimately on undefined terms. M4° In contrast, 
Korzybski's revolutionary strategies rely on a "multiordinality" of 
terms which remain "extremely flexible, full-of-conditionality. N4" 
Korzybski's linking of signification with power anticipates the 
reading of Nietzsche in the work of French writers such as Deleuze 
and Guattari, discussed in chapter 2. 
Korzybski's challenges to the neuroses of power have been 
largely suppressed by an American scientific orthodoxy that has 
relegated him to a position outside the guarded boundaries of 
"professional" specialism. Nevertheless, his explorations of science 
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in terms of linguistic and mental sets, within a challenge to 
linear, binary habits, forms a vital basis to the discussions of 
technology and culture in this thesis. 
Like the other writers considered in this chapter, Benjamin 
Whorf, who published his first essay in 1927, sought to improve 
scientific activity by opening up its mechanistic and deterministic 
structures to multiplicity and innovation. His essay "Language, Mind 
and Reality" (1941) analyses scientific thought as a "specialization 
of the western Indo-European type of language, " and thereby 
anticipates by several decades similar approaches by Derrida and 
Kristeva in recent French critiques of scientific rationalism. 
In Wharf's basic thesis, every language implies a cosmology, 
inherent in its formal structure, as a network of assumptions about 
the world and human society; 
every language is a vast pattern-system, different from 
others, in which are culturally ordained the forms and 
categories by which the personality not only communicates, 
but also analyses nature, notices or neglects types of 
relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and 
builds the house of his consciousness.... Each language 
performs this artificial chopping up of the continuous 
spread and flow of existence in a different way. 42 
The revolution in modern physics is again a crucial factor in 
disrupting previous assumptions about science, language and culture, 
as Vhorf describes its fragmenting of the unitary myth of science 
into a new plurality of languages. Accordingly, he considers the 
opportunity for a non-imperialistic, anti-totalitarian science in 
the Vest: 
Every language and every well-knit technical sublanguage 
incorporates certain points of view and certain patterned 
resistances to widely divergent points of view... These 
resistances not only isolate artificially the particular 
sciences from each other; they also restrain the scientific 
spirit as a whole from taking the next great step in 
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development -a step which entails viewpoints unprecedented 
in science and a complete severance from traditions. For 
certain linguistic patterns rigidified in the dialectic of 
the sciences - often also embedded in the matrix of European 
culture from which those sciences have sprung, and long 
worshipped as pure Reason per se - have been worked to 
death. Even science senses that they are somehow out of 
focus for observing what may be very significant aspects of 
reality, upon the due observation of which all further 
progress in understanding the universe may hinge. 43 
Scientific activity will be renewed by replacing "Reason, " as an 
apparently singular, non-problematic method, with viewpoints from 
outside Indo-European orthodoxy. Wharf gives as an example the Coeur 
d'Alene tribe of Idaho, whose language includes three verb-forms for 
"cause. " This notion of "triadic causality" would provide a "new 
tool for science, " if speculated upon by open-minded, non-dogmatic 
scientists. 44 
However, there are problems with Vharf's analysis, the 
theoretical bases of which tend to be staticising and deterministic. 
The "house" of consciousness, described in the earlier quotation, 
has its implication of an inflexible enclosure amplified by Vhorf's 
comparison of the human mind with a railway track, rule-bound and 
determined: 
thinking also follows a network of tracks laid down in the 
given language, an organization which may concentrate 
systematically upon certain phases of reality, certain 
aspects of intelligence, and may systematically discard 
others featured by other languages. The individual is 
utterly unaware of this organization and is constrained 
completely within its unbreakable bonds. 46 
The determinism of VhorfIs position in this essay also tends to 
ignore the existence of multi-lingual peoples, as well as the human 
capacity for learning and development in time. However, despite 
these remnants of static, perspectival thinking, Vhorf's pioneering 
analyses play a vital part in questioning orthodox power areas in 
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twentieth century America, and in challenging the racist and 
imperialist assumptions of superiority in Western (or W. A. S. P. ) 
science and technology. 
Vhorf's challenge to the centrality of Vestern science, 
conceived in terms of culturally specific linguistic practices, has 
been taken up in recent French thought by such figures as Derrida, 
Foucault and Kristeva. These developments, occuring decades after 
the American explorations into science and culture discussed in this 
chapter, will be the topic of chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
Recnurcas on science technology and culture! France since 1945. - 
This chapter will approach French writers and philosophers since 
Vorld Var Two as resources for investigations into science, 
technology and culture. The work of Derrida, Foucault, Barthes, 
Bataille, Serres, and Deleuze and Guattari may be seen as a response 
to the failures of Xarxist dialectics, seeking new possibilities of 
resistance to imperialistic state power. In order to locate such 
discussions within a wider historical context of European thought, 
similarities will be drawn with the work of Gransci and Reich, as 
antecedents for such strategies. In their reading of Nietzsche, 
contemporary French writers have introduced the notion of 
"jouissance, " as a liberation of desire, which will be seen to 
extend into areas of scientific and technological production. 
In his essay "White Xythology" (1982), Jacques Derrida exposes 
the imperialist groundings of Vestern philosophy since Plato and 
Aristotle. Based on a model of language as mimesis, this "white 
mythology" assumes the possibility of transparent, unmediated access 
to an external reality, guaranteed by the power of human reason to 
apprehend directly the fixed and universal truths of an objective 
nature. 
By repressing the fictiveness and constructed nature of language 
and philosophy, this totalising myth of truth suppresses other 
epistemological systems outside its own domain. In Derrida's words, 
the white man 
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takes his own mythology, Indo-European mythology, his own 
logos, that is, the mytbos of his idiom, for the universal 
form of that he must still wish to call Reason. Which does 
not go uncontested... White mythology - metaphysics has 
erased within itself the fabulous scene that has produced 
it, the scene that nevertheless remains active and stirring, 
inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over in 
the palimpsest. ' 
For Derrida, the emphasis on denotation and singular truth in 
Western thought, from the aletheia of Aristotelian linguistic 
theory, imposes tyrannical closure on a free-play of meaning and 
desiring production: 
Aletbela: the proper appearing of the propriety of what is, 
the entire system of concepts which invest the philosopheme 
"metaphor", burden it in delimiting it... All the onomatism 
which dominates the theory of metaphor, and the entire 
Aristotelian doctrine of simple names... is elaborated in 
order to assure harbors of truth and propriety. 2 
Derrida challenges the security provided by the absolutism of truth- 
value, as a means of liberating desire. A similar attack on an 
imperialistic totalitarianism operating under the rubric of 
scientific truth has also been made by Michel Foucault. 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault suggests that science, 
or what he calls "scientificity, " works by the application of a 
singular law, to the exclusion of other discourses: 
Only propositions that obey certain laws of construction 
belong to a domain of scientificity; affirmations that have 
the same meaning, that say the same thing, that are as true 
as they are, but which do not belong to the same 
systematicity, are excluded from this domain-3 
The hegemony of scientific values in modern industrial society, 
claiming privileged access to a universal and trans-historical 
truth, is countered by Foucault's relocation of truth-value within 
historically specific processes of mediation. In Power, Truth, 
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Strategy (1979), he describes the production of truth as a function 
of power: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" 
of truth: that is, the types of discourse it harbours and 
causes to function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true from false statement, 
the way in which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures which are valorised for obtaining truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as 
true. 4 
In modern capitalist society, the "political economy" of truth is 
based on the centrality of science, as a cultural network of inter- 
relationships: 
"truth" is centred on the form of scientific discourse and 
the institutions which produce it; it is subject to a 
constant economic and political incitation (the demand for 
truth, as much for economic production as for political 
power): it is the object, in diverse forms, of an immense 
diffusion and consumption (it circulates in apparatuses of 
education and information whose extent is relatively wide 
within the social body, not withstanding certain strict 
limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the 
control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political 
or economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, 
media... ); lastly, it is the stake of a whole political 
debate and social confrontation ("ideological" struggles). 6 
Foucault thus rejects a consolatory Marxist inheritance of 
dialectical or bipolar simplifications, such as the base- 
superstructure model. Instead, he opens up opportunities for a 
multiple, cultural studies approach to issues of power and 
technology in modern society. As its title suggests, The Archaeology 
of Knowledge explores a multi-layered, non-linear approach that 
refuses totalitarian quests for a single centre of meaning or truth. 
As Foucault puts it, in the passage already quoted in the 
Introduction to this thesis, a total description "draws all 
phenomena around a single centre -a principle, a meaning, a spirit, 
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a world-view, an overall shape, " whereas "a general history, on the 
contrary, would deploy the space of a dispersion. 06 
Foucault's dispersions challenge habitual misunderstandings of 
the modern state as a monolithic centre of power. In his complex 
archaeology, power is not simply possessed by some members of a 
society, and not by others. Neither does power simply have a 
prohibitive function. Rather, it is a multiple network that includes 
desires, permissions and pleasures: 
If power was never anything but repressive, if it never did 
anything but say no, do ydu really believe that we should 
manage to obey it? What gives power its hold, what makes it 
accepted, is quite simply the fact that it does not simply 
weigh in like a force which says no, but that it runs 
through, and it produces, things, it induces pleasure, it 
forms knowledge, it produces discourse; it must be 
considered as a productive network which runs through the 
entire social body much more than as a negative instance 
whose function is repression. ' 
State power is thus seen to be parasitical on a multiplicity of 
different power relations which involve all members of a society. 
Foucault gives two reasons for choosing this decentred model of 
power relations: 
first of all because the State, for all the omnipotence of 
its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole 
field of actual power relations, and further because the 
State can only operate on the basis of other, already 
existing power relations. The State is superstructural in 
relation to a whole series of power networks, that invest 
the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, 
technology and so forth. True, these networks stand in a 
conditioning-conditioned relationship to a kind of 
"metapower" which is structured essentially round a certain 
number of great prohibition functions; but this meta-power 
with its prohibitions can only take hold and secure its 
footing where it is rooted in a whole series of multiple and 
indefinite power relations that supply the necessary basis 
for the great negative forms of power e 
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Foucault's field model of state power recalls Antonio Gramsci's 
questioning of Marxist dialectics in his essay, "The Intellectuals" 
(1927). Gramsci's concept of "hegemony" as a force of cultural 
domination made a decisive break with Marxist views of power as 
concentrated in a single centre. For Gramsci, social domination by 
the ruling class depends on its organisation of society as a whole, 
"because of the need to create the conditions most favourable to the 
expansion of their own class... " Gramsci's language is 
multiplicatory, rather than singularising, as he writes of the 
"ensemble of the system of relations" within "the general complex of 
social relations. "'° The two major levels of society he identifies 
are involved in these complexities: 
the one that can be called "civil society", that is the 
ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of 
"political society" or "the State". These two levels 
correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" 
which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on 
the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command 
exercised through the State and "juridical" government. The 
functions in question are precisely organisational and 
connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group's 
"deputies" exercising the subaltern functions of social 
hegemony and political government. These comprise: 
1. The "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses 
of the population to the general direction imposed on social 
life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 
"historically" caused by the prestige (and consequent 
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its 
position and function in the world of production. 
2. The apparatus of state coercive power which "legally" 
enforces discipline on those groups who do not "consent" 
either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, 
constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of 
moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous 
consent has failed. " 
Gramsci's complex model of social interactions between command and 
consent is a vital antecedent to the challenges to orthodox Marxism 
made by the French writers discussed in this chapter. Roland 
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Barthes' movement out of simple left-right dichotomies, in his 
analysis of cultural signs as "simultaneously imposed and demanded, " 
quoted in the Introduction, may be seen as a comparable revision of 
dialectical simplifications. 
Another important precursor of recent French critiques of 
Marxism is Wilhelm Reich. In The Mass Psychology of Fascism (3rd. ed 
1942), Reich investigated the erotic bases of sacrifice and power in 
terms of the specific structures of twentieth century industrial 
society, asking the vital question for the future possibilities of 
freedom from sacrificial history: "What causes the human animal to 
deteriorate and become robotlite?. " Reich concludes that the 
complete identity of mechanistic natural science, mechanical human 
structure and sadistic murder' dominate the twentieth century as a 
deadly mechanical trinity. As mechanistic habits become incorporated 
biologically, human beings fatally identify themselves with lifeless 
routines of obedience and subservience. 12 
Reich locates the development of the authoritarian state in the 
twentieth century in sexual neurosis, which makes freedom 
impossible: 
Since the working man's structure and capacity for freedom 
were too inhibited to enable him to adapt to the rapid 
development of social organizations, it was the 'state' that 
carried out those acts that were actually reserved for the 
'community' of working m3n. 13 
This authoritarian state, working through family structures, 
suppresses healthy erotic life, and thereby produces human beings 
mechanically obedient to authority. Reich draws attention to the 
repressed "animal" part of the human being in the realities of "his 
body functions, procreation, birth and death, sexual urge and 
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dependency upon nature. "" Mechanistic control of the erotic body is 
never total, therefore, and resistances are both necessary and 
possible. Although Reich himself was attracted by a total system, 
based on the "orgone, " his insights into the destructiveness of 
mechanistic habits remain crucial to a complex understanding of 
power relations in modern society. 
The Nass Psychology of Fascism also challenges the use of 
mechanical or technological models to interpret human society, 
showing them as alibis to create permission for mastery and control 
by the ruling class. Intellectual models that liken human beings to 
machines perpetuate repression and slavery. In contrast, for Reich, 
the machine "will continue to be bis (man's) most dangerous 
destroyer, if he does not differentiate himself from it. "'g 
Fascism was for Reich the most extreme form of mechanistic 
deadliness and rigidity. The mysticism and sadistic violence at the 
centre of Razism is a perverted form of those bodily life functions 
repressed by mechanistic codes of behaviour and thought. For the 
authoritarian personality, 
as he denies and suppresses every aspect of this nature, he 
cannot embrace it in a rational and living way. Hence, he 
has to experience it in a mystical, other-worldly and 
supernatural way, whether in the form of religious ecstasy, 
cosmic unification with the world soul, sadistic thirst for 
blood or 'cosmic seething of the blood'... Human mysticism, 
which thus represents the last traces of vitality, also 
became the fountainhead of mechanical sadism in Hitlerism. "s 
Georges Bataille's Eroticism (1957) further explores the sexual 
bases of power. As with Reich, Bataille's analysis of human passions 
disrupts Enlightenment liberal preoccupations with rationality and 
order, as he affirms that "we must never imagine existence except in 
terms of these passions. " 17 
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Bataille's work connects eroticism, violence and death in terms 
of the desire for continuity experienced by human beings created as 
discontinuous individuals though sexual reproduction: 
We are discontinuous beings, individuals who perish in 
isolation in the midst of an incomprehensible adventure, but 
we yearn for our lost continuity. We find the state of 
affairs that binds us to our random and ephemeral 
individuality hard to bear. Along with our tormenting desire 
that evanescent things should last, there stands our 
obsession witha primal continuity linking us with everything 
that is. 's 
This nostalgic desire for continuity will recur throughout this 
thesis, in the totalising projections of scientific and technocratic 
systems-builders. The search for continuity produces a history of 
sacrifice: 
A violent death disrupts the creature's discontinuity; what 
remains, what the tense onlookers experience in the 
succeeding silence, is the continuity of all existence with 
which the victim is now one. '" 
For both Reich and Bataille, therefore, violence and totalitarian 
desires for unity are symptoms of erotic neurosis. 
The recent work of Xichel Serres may also be seen as an 
exploration of possibilities of ending such sacrificial repetitions. 
Serres' history of science explores the possibility of pleasure and 
play within science, following the breakdown of Rewtonian obsessions 
with rationality, universal truth and determinism. However, Serres' 
work also tends to enphasise the militaristic bases of scientific 
order as an authoritarian power system that reaches into the very 
methodological practices of science itself. 
Serres is wary of basing his arguments about power in terms of 
"legitimation, " asserting instead that, "A11 powers seek to be 
legitimate since, abusive by nature, they always lack legitimacy. *20 
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This abusiveness of power is the basis of a global history of war 
and sacrifice. As in Foucault, Western science's claim to exclusive, 
universal truth dominates and controls the production of knowledge, 
so that manias for militaristic dominance, exploitation and 
destruction inform modern science, from its acceleration in the 
sixteenth century. For Serres, this science implies relationships 
between the human and non-human based not on mutuality and respect, 
as in an ideal contract, but rather on war and competitive struggle. 
Scientific method is no longer a contract but a strategy, a tactic 
and not a pact, a fight to death and not a coitus. "2' 
However, Serres' work tends to view the militaristic basis of 
scientific rationality as a transhistorical phenomenon, as a law 
that obtains "everywhere": 
The order of reasons is repetitive, and the train of thought 
that comes from it, infinitely iterative, is but a science 
of death. A science of dead things and a strategy of the 
kill. The order of reasons is martial. The world is in 
order, according to this mathematical physics in which the 
Stoics are met by Plato up the line and by Descartes further 
down, and where order reigns supreme over piles of cadavers. 
The laws are the same everywhere; they are thanatocratic. 
There is nothing to be learned, to be discovered, to be 
invented, in this repetitive world, which falls in the 
parallel lines of identity. 22 
Serres' argument, itself based on totalising words such as "is but" 
and "everywhere, " thus tends to essentialise scientific rationality 
as inevitably destructive, suggesting that the abusiveness of 
science runs deeper than its specific social and political 
organisation. 
Yet this dehistoricised position is merely one tendency in 
Serres' complex writing. Elsewhere, he investigates possible 
alternative strategies for scientific activity, to counter modern 
- 38 - 
science's militaristic basis in alienation from, and hatred of, the 
object. He suggests the need for a new "contract" with nature, that 
will give back to the object its autonomy from total control. This 
new science, avoiding the fraudulent projection of political schemas 
onto phenomena, will co-exist with an object "not bound by a 
commandment but self-directed. "23 
The problem hindering the emergence of this new science is that 
of "stemming a series of murders without another assassination. "24 
Serres contrasts the martial basis of Western science since 
Descartes with the idea of a contract with nature in the physics of 
Lucretius, whose De Rerun Natura he sees as a physics of Venus 
rather than of Mars, of peace and creativity rather than of guilt 
and dominance. Instead of certainty and law, there is recognition of 
stochastic elements and instability, and a breaking out of 
deterministic inevitabilities. 
The recent work in non-equilibrium thermodynamics by Ilya 
Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, described and extrapolated upon in 
Order out of Cbaos (1984), suggests that this new, non-militaristic 
paradigm for science is emerging. Prigogine's findings challenge 
deterministic theories of entropy, showing that, in "far-from- 
equilibrium" states, instability may lead to new behaviour 
unpredicted from initial conditions. His "dissipative structures" 
break with classical physics by allowing randomness and chance to 
play an organisational function in certain phenomena. 
In chemistry, appearances of dissipative structures are highly 
specific to the detailed chemical mechanisms involved. A sense of 
multiplicity and specificity therefore replaces any notion of a 
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general law applicable in all instances. As Prigogine and Stengers 
put it: 
In contrast with close-to-equilibrium situations, the 
behavior of a far-from-equilibrium system becomes highly 
specific. There is no longer any universally valid law from 
which the overall behavior of the system can be deduced. 
Each system is a separate case; each set of chemical 
reactions must be investigated and may wall produce a 
qualitatively different behavior. 26 
Moreover, in this new science, randomness becomes an inherent part 
of order, as the presence of random fluctuations in a system may 
produce a new, unpredictable type of behaviour for that system. In 
this way, both determinism and randomness may characterise the 
history of a system: 
Both the deterministic character of the kinetic equations 
whereby the set of possible states and their respective 
stability can be calculated, and the random fluctuations 
"choosing" between or among the states around bifurcation 
points are inextricably connected. This mixture of necessity 
and chance constitutes the history of the system. 26 
Ron-equilibrium science is thereby open to unexpected novelty and 
diversity, which can no longer be subsumed under a notion of 
mechanistic predictability: 
Both at the macroscopic and microscopic levels, the natural 
sciences have thus rid themselves of a conception of 
objective reality that implied that novelty and diversity 
had to be denied in the name of immutable universal laws. 
They have rid themselves of a fascination with a rationality 
taken as closed and a knowledge seen as nearly achieved. 
They are now open to the unexpected, which they no longer 
define as the result of imperfect knowledge or insufficient 
control. 27 
As a result, Prigogine and Stengers claim that their new "science of 
complexity" is "now capable of respecting the nature it 
investigates. "20 
This recent work in chemistry and statistical mechanics may be 
proposed as an example of Serres' non-militaristic science. In this 
- 40 - 
way, it may also be seen as an example of what Deleuze and Guattari 
call "nomad" science, in which difference and heterogeneity replace 
the deterministic uniformity, equilibrium and stasis preferred by 
what they call "royal" science. In such an analysis, the work of 
Nietzsche is clearly an important resource, as it is for the 
emphasis on heterogeneity, difference and free play In most of the 
French writers discussed in this chapter. In this respect, Deleuze's 
Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962) locates modern French thought within 
its historical context as a continuation of Nietzsche's attack on 
French rationalism and German dialectics. 
Deleuze quotes Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil (1886): "The 
pleasure of knowing oneself different": 
the enjoyment of difference... this is the new, aggressive 
and elevated conceptual element that empiricism substitutes 
for the heavy notions of the dialectic and above all, as the 
dialectician puts it, for the labour of the negative. It is 
sufficient to say that dialectic is a labour and empiricism 
is an enjoyment. 29 
The notion of "louissance" in many of the writers discussed in this 
chapter thus suggests possibilities for revolutionary disruptions of 
order, liberating pleasure and Joy, rather than sacrifice and 
militaristic dominance, in science, technology and society. 
Following Rietzsche, therefore, these writers do not simply 
perpetuate a Romantic, anti-scientific espousal of'the qualitative 
rather than the quantitative. As Deleuze puts the issue: 
gietzsche, as critic of science, never invokes the rights of 
quality against quantity; he invokes the rights of 
difference in quantity against equality, of inequality 
against equalisation of quantities... What he attacks in 
science is precisely the scientific mania for seeking 
balances, the utilltariauism and egalitarianism proper to 
science. This is why his whole critique operates on three 
levels; against logical identity, against mathematical 
equality and against physical equilibrium. 30 
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The "nomad" science described in Nomadology (1986) is thus a 
subversion of the practices of a state science which aims to found 
stable territories based on equilibrium and static order. 
In JKolecular Revolution (1984), Felix Guattari further explores 
the possibility of a liberation of desire in scientific and 
technological designs, while revealing the political workings of 
state, technocratic science. Like Foucault, he shows that the claims 
of state science to truth, representation and signification are 
alibis of domination and control for the bourgeois ruling class. As 
state science fixes a gaze of power in the guise of representation, 
Guattari explores a counter-politics to "enable all the intensive 
multiplicities to escape from the tyranny of the signifying over- 
encoding. 031 
Denotation, representation and signification are the main 
territorializing actions by which power systems seek to dominate 
other forms of knowledge: 
Referential thought, understanding, interpretation, the 
transcendentalizing of distinct, concrete objects, and 
dogmatism all proceed from the same method of subjecting 
people to the dominant statements and significations. Every 
statement has to be understood within the pre-established 
area of exclusive bi-polar values, and every semiotic 
sequence has to leave the realm of its original machinic 
formation to enter the systems of official expression of 
signification and representation. 32 
Guattari's critique of power-based linguistic systems thus draws on 
findings made in the 1920s by Korzybski and Wharf on the social and 
linguistic bases of perception. 
For Guattari, a liberation of de-territorialized jouissance 
breaks up these referential closures, so that "the fixed, 
syntactized, semanticized and rhetoricized stratification of 
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messages gives way to a collective engagement of utterance with 
unnumbered dimensions. "33 Guattari argues that this play of desire 
should be more generally acknowledged and encouraged in terms of 
scientific and technological creativity. By inventing "a-signifying 
particle-signs, " modern physicists pioneer a replacement of power- 
based referential systems by a liberatory ethic of imagination and 
deterritorialisation. Accordingly, desire, 
once freed from the control of authority, can be seen as 
more real and more realistic, a better organizer and more 
skilful engineer, than the raving rationalism of the 
planners and administrators of the present system. Science, 
innovation, creation - these things proliferate from desire, 
not from the pseudo-rationalism of the technocrats. 5' 
Kalecular Revolution thus investigates polyvocal and anti- 
hierarchical systems of n articulations, in which various non- 
signifying semiotics "combine their efforts without any one of them 
over-encoding the others. 035 Scientific activity is thereby freed 
from utilitarianism, for Jouissance. It is "man's specific capacity 
for de-territorialisation that enables him to produce signs for no 
purpose: not negative signs, not nothing signs, but signs to play 
about with for fun, for art. u3G 
Deleuze and Guattari's rejection of Romantic panics about 
science and technology thus opensthe way for challenges to the 
utilitarian, productivist regime in which science and technology 
operate in modern technocratic society. As such, their work, with 
the other writers examined in chapters 1 and 2, provides a 
vocabulary field within which the rest of this thesis will discuss 
science and technology in American culture. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
This chapter will explore some of the writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, Elihu Palmer, and Charles Brockden Brown in terms of 
issues of natural law, empirical certainty and utilitarian control. 
Rewtonian science is shown as an American inheritance from Europe, 
extending in the new Republic as a project of national security and 
growth. 
American leaders in the colonial and early Republican era tended 
to deploy commonplace word-ideas such as "science, " "law" and 
"nature, " familiar concepts in Newtonian physics, as guarantees for 
the right of technical elites to control society. According to these 
assumptions, human social behaviour was controlled by generalised, 
mechanical laws as "natural" as the fall of physical objects under 
gravity, so that a deterministic science of human morality and 
social behaviour could be discovered. In this way, societal law was 
assumed to be natural, and therefore inevitable, rather than 
socially constructed and changeable. The desire to extend Newton's 
formulations beyond physics into the workings of human society was a 
crucial American inheritance from eighteenth century Europe. 
After the Revolutionary War, Thomas Jefferson ensured that the 
liberal, individualist principles of property rights, unregulated 
markets and representative government, inherited from the political 
theories of John Locke, were built into the American Declaration of 
Independence (1776). The opening sentence of the Declaration evokes 
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the ultimate authority of the "laws of nature and nature's God" to 
justify the new nation's programme of separate and equal development 
from Britain. The law-bound, regular order by which the physical 
universe was interpreted was thereby taken as an adequate model for 
the government of human society, giving permission for power elites 
in America to carry out their programmes of social development. ' 
Elihu Palmer's Principles of Nature; or a Developement of the 
moral causes of happiness and misery (1819) is a strong statement of 
belief in the power of Newtonian determinism as a model for society. 
The word-idea "nature, " as the title suggests, is used throughout as 
a guarantor of the unquestionable truth and efficacy of Palmer's 
arguments. The preface states his intention to "settle moral 
arguments not from religious authority but from evidence. " Such 
empirical knowledge of "nature, " it is claimed, will provide a firm 
basis for deciding all moral issues in human society. The 
universalist tendencies of Newtonian thought thus suggest infinite 
prospects for knowledge and progress. 2 
Palmer employs key nineteenth century word-ideas, such as 
"energy, " "organic, " and "progress, " as mystificatory tokens, to win 
permission for-power and political control. He links Enlightenment 
science with desires for security and consolation: 
The sources of hope and consolation to the human race are to 
be sought for in the energy of the intellectual powers. To 
these, every specific amelioration must bear a constant and 
invariable reference; and whatever opposes the progress of 
such a power, is unquestionably in most pointed opposition 
to the best and most important of interests of our species. 
The organic construction of man induces a strong conclusion 
that no limits can possibly be assigned to his moral and 
scientific improvements. 
The strength of the human understanding is incalculable, 
its keenness of discernment would ultimately penetrate into 
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every part of nature, were it permitted to operate with 
uncontrolled and unqualified freedom. 3 
Palmer claims unlimited permission to extend control as a totalising 
and penetrative drive throughout the universe. However, his emphasis 
on the "intellectual powers" also suggests a repression of the body, 
perpetuating the radical separation of "head" from "heart" that is 
viewed by many nineteenth century writers as having destructive 
consequences for human beings in society. The work of Poe, Hawthorne 
and Melville, in this connection, will be discussed in the next 
three chapters. 
Palmer carefully fixes the "intellectual powers" of human beings 
within a utilitarian context: 
It is not sufficient that man acknowledges the possession of 
his intellectual powers, it is also necessary that these 
powers should be developed, and their force directed to the 
discovery of correct principle, and the useful application 
of it to social life... ' 
Daniel S. Greenberg's study of The Scientific Community (1969) shows 
that scientific activity in the early Republic was largely placed 
within this utilitarian context of applied knowledge. This emphasis 
in American scientific practice was evident from its early stages, 
with the founding of the "American Philosophical Society" in 1743, 
and its subsequent amalgamation in 1766 with the "American Society 
for Promoting and Propagating Useful Knowledge. " As Greenberg 
records, the American government esteemed, and was prepared to give 
financial support to, the "tinkerer, the gadgeteer, the Yankee 
engineer" who could translate knowledge into utility. It thereby 
promoted science and technology in terms of public programmes, in 
areas such as surveying, navigation, the standardisation of weights 
and measures, and public health. 
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Accordingly, attitudes to basic scientific research were less 
permissive. In the first half of the nineteenth century, American 
science was badly funded, in comparison with science in Europe, 
which was flourishing with the works of major figures such as 
Dalton, Faraday and Helmholtz. Although in both America and Europe, 
science was still largely a profession of wealthy gentlemen, basic 
science in Europe was also able to draw upon the resources of 
princely and commerical patronage, and of government-supported 
universities and research institutes. In America, on the other hand, 
"there were no princes, industry was yet to recognize the 
profitability of science, and government was concerned with utility, 
not fundamental knowledge. " Accordingly, in the 1840s, Congress took 
nearly a decade to accept the bequest of the British chemist James 
Smithson, for the establishment of an institution for "the increase 
and diffusion of knowledge among men, " a project that finally became 
the Smithsonian Institution in Vashington. 6 
The hegemony of utilitarian values was based on Newtonian 
assumptions of scientific empiricism and representation. Elihu 
Palmer's Principles of Bature follows orthodox Newtonian myths of 
induction and empiricism by appealing to an independent world of 
facts accessible to neutral, value-free scientific observation. 
According to such Newtonian methodology, the universe was simple and 
uniform, a deterministic machine, whose workings were transparent to 
correct empirical procedures. Palmer shows typical faith in the 
certainty of these methods: 
Man will never cease to be erroneous in his reasonings, 
while he departs from the simple and uniform ground of 
nature - the only solid basis of all conclusive 
argumentation - the only true source of all important 
science. It is in the physical constitution of existence, in 
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its real relations, in its energies, in its effects, that he 
must seek for the principles by which to construct an useful 
and well-cemented fabric - by which to arrange and methodize 
thought, and apply it to the diversified purposes of human 
life. The imperfection of his faculties does not enable him 
to seize upon all these objects in such a manner as to 
preclude the possibility, even probability, of many errors; 
but these errors are to be destroyed only by a constant 
recurrence to the fundamental data, from which correct 
conclusion must ever be deduced. 6 
Palmer's desire to "methodize thought, " and then to apply such fixed 
procedures to the "diversified purposes of human life, " relies for 
its assertion of truth-value on a vocabulary of origin, 
representation and epistemological certainty - "conclusion, " 
"ground, " "solid basis, " "true source, " "correct. " 
However, the corollary of empirical science's claim to universal 
truth is its suppression of the imaginative faculties of human 
beings as ineffectual in the search for a correct representation of 
truth. Accordingly, Palmer outlaws certain human activities: 
)an has lost himself in the wanderings of a fantastic 
imagination, in the fleeting dreams of fanaticism, and the 
malignant fury of a blind superstition; he has sought for 
truth where it is not to be found: his mind has diverged 
from the line of reality, and he has become the victim of 
innumerable prejudices. 
... The simplicity, the uniformity, the grandeur of the 
physical universe, have been abandoned, while the fictions 
and non-entities of delirious mortals have been substituted 
as the ground of evidence, and the principle of correct 
conclusion. ' 
Palmer has faith in the basis of Enlightenment liberalism in notions 
of rationality and objective truth. The totalitarianism of such a 
position, which excludes any "wanderings" of the imagination away 
from the singular, rationalist "line of reality, " is resisted 
elsewhere in early nineteenth century industrial culture. In 
Hawthorne and Melville, drifters beyond enclosures are celebrated, 
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if somewhat ambivalently, and boundary-crossing movements are vital 
for health. ' 
Elihu Palmer promises utopia as the final destination of a 
linear, Faustian history, and thereby provides an alibi for a 
continuation of the status quo: 
The period is at hand, in which kings and thrones, and 
priests and hierarchies, and the long catalogue of mischiefs 
which they have produced, shall be swept away from the face 
of the earth, and buried in the grave of everlasting 
destruction. Than will arrive the era of human felicity, in 
which the heart of unfortunate man shall be consoled; then 
will appear the movement of national consolation, and 
universal freedom; then the empire of reason, of science, 
and of virtue, will extend over the whole earth, and man, 
emancipated from the barbarous despotism of antiquity, will 
assume to himself his true predicament in nature, and become 
a standing evidence of the divinity of thought and the 
unlimited power of human reason. " 
This bourgeois desire for "national consolation" is also evident in 
the writings of Thomas Jefferson. In a letter to William Ludlow, 
written in 1824, Jefferson wrote of the evidence of progress he 
observed in a journey across the United States, which took him from 
"the savages of the Rocky Xountains" to the "as yet, most improved 
state" of human development "in our seaport towns. " "Barbarism, " for 
Jefferson, has "been receding before the steady step of 
amelioration; and will in time, I trust, disappear from the earth. " 
As in the last quotation from Elihu Palmer, the counter-term 
"barbarism" is used to guarantee the universal values of bourgeois 
"civilization, " as the inevitable end of nationalist material 
progress. 10 
As in Elihu Palmer, Jefferson deploys mechanistic and 
utilitarian assumptions in the service of a repressive, totalitarian 
system of reductive materialism. In a letter to John Adams, written 
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on August 15,1820, Jefferson makes a sweeping rejection of all 
ideas that contradict his own rigidly materialist orthodoxy. Doubts 
must not be entertained: 
To talk of im=terial existences, is to talk of nothings... 
Rejecting all organs of information, therefore, but my 
senses, I rid myself of the pyrrhonisms with which an 
indulgence in speculations hyperphysical and antiphysical, 
so uselessly occupy and disquiet the mind. A single sense 
may indeed be sometimes deceived, but rarely; and never all 
our senses together, with their faculty of reasoning. They 
evidence realities, and there are enough of these for all 
the purposes of life, without plunging into the fathomless 
abyss of dreams and phantasms. I am satisfied, and 
sufficiently occupied with the things which are, without 
tormenting or troubling myself about those which may indeed 
be, but of which I have no evidence. " 
Jefferson's aggressive materialism shows the totalitarian drive 
within state science to dominate, exploit, and finally to eradicate 
those human beings, and their forms of knowledge, in opposition to 
its basic assumptions. Newtonian faith in the solidity and 
exteriority of matter provides security against a "fathomless abyss" 
of subjectivity. However, this officially sanguine, deterministic 
version of history, in Elihu Palmer and Thomas Jefferson, has been 
subjected to sceptical examination throughout American history. Many 
writers have become suspicious of the rise of technical experts with 
power to control other human beings, possibly against their will or 
better interests. The desire for "consolation" in the apparent 
certainties of materialism is questioned, and the work of 
technicians and scientists is shown to be not neutral, and not 
necessarily explicable according to Enlightenment myths of progress, 
emancipation and objective truth. 
In Charles Brockden Brown's Vieland; or the Transformation 
(1798), key words - "certainty, " "plausibility, " "evidence, " 
V j 
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"testimony, " "belief, " "doubts" - recur throughout the novel to 
question conmonplace notions of empirical certainty and the simple 
verifiability of facts. Moreover, Brown relates such epistemological 
issues to an investigation of science, knowledge and power in the 
early Republic. 
Carwin's ventriloquist acts are presented as a question of how 
certain an observer can be of sensory data, as Brown's fiction 
introduces scepticism and doubt into the smug certainties of 
empiricist and rationalist methodologies. Deceived into thinking he 
has heard Catherine's voice on the hill outside the house, Pleyel is 
confused, because he is certain that she has been sitting in the 
house all the time: "Certain it is, if our eyes can give us 
certainty... 012 Later, Clara is forced by Pleyel to justify her 
innocence, against the testimony of the latter's senses, "witnesses 
the most explicit and unerring, of those which support the fabric of 
human knowledge. "13 In Vieland, unquestioning trust in sensory 
evidence opens the way for manipulation by power interests. Only 
constant vigilance may protect human beings from the dangers of 
external control. 
Brown presents Pleyel's erroneous deductions about Clara's 
behaviour as a misinterpretation of signs. Given that Pleyel had 
heard Clara's footsteps as she returned to her room at night, "In 
what other way was it possible for him to construe these signals? M14 
Interpretation is thus already a dangerous activity in American 
literature, as Carwin's manipulations transform the Wieland 
household into a scene of "blasted hopes and changeable fortune, 018 
markedly different from the utopian projections of Palmer and 
- 51 - 
Jefferson. Brown's fiction exposes those mechanisms of power under 
whose influences America itself falls from an Eden of new 
possibilities to an irreversibly damaged, exploitative society. 
Accordingly, Wieland-explores fears that technical expertise can be 
used by powerful figures to manipulate human beings against their 
will, and investigates the susceptibility of human beings to control 
by others. Carwin's "dangerous experiments"16 cause ruin, as he 
becomes an early instance in American fiction of the evil, or at 
least morally duplicitous, technical expert. 
Carwin's power over others is based partly on his flexibility 
and cunning, as he plays a role similar to that of Hermes in Greek 
mythology. A "murderer and thief, "" he invades the Wieland 
household like a parasite, an "imp of mischief" who causes 
disaster. 18 He is able to change his identity to suit his purposes, 
so that, having previously transformed himself into a Spanish 
Catholic to survive and prosper in Spain, Carwin enters the American 
community in the "garb of a rustic. "'9 Such duplicity is dangerous, 
making correct interpretation of motive and action difficult. 
Accordingly, Clara comes into contact with the "impenetrable veil of 
his duplicity, "20 so that she "could not calculate the motives and 
regulate the footsteps of this person. "21 
In Vieland, therefore, Carwin's actions are presented as morally 
ambiguous, rather than as unequivocally evil. He confesses to have 
"handled a tool of wonderful efficacy without malignant intentions, 
but without caution... "22 He has "rashly set in motion a machine, 
over whose progress I had no controul, and which experience had 
shown me was infinite in power... "23 Complacent assumptions of 
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mechanistic control and of progress thus become dangerously 
problematic, given the exercise of irresponsible power in society. 
In Brown's unfinished "Memoirs of Carwin, The Biloquist, " Carwin 
and Ludloe take pleasure in their sense of superiority and 
domination over others; 
I was actuated by ambition. I was delighted to possess 
superior power; I was prone to manifest that superiority, 
and was satisfied if this were done, without much solicitude 
concerning consequences. 24 
Like Dr. Benwaq, Villiam Burroughs' late twentieth century 
scientist, Brown's Carwin takes pleasure in his performance, without 
thought to the consequences his actions might have on the well-being 
of others. 
Brown's fiction is thus already concerned with the dangers of 
abuse of those "intellectual powers" complacently trusted by Elihu 
Palmer. In Vieland, Ludloe describes Carwin as "engaged in schemes, ' 
reasonably suspected to be, in the highest degree, criminal, but 
such as no human intelligence is able to unravel. "2& As an 
exceptional figure, Carwin's power might be deemed a threat to 
bourgeois notions of egalitarianism. At first, his high degree of 
education, and his powers as a communicator, are viewed as a 
positive attribute. For Clara, "To man possessed a larger store of 
knowledge, or a greater degree of skill in the communication of it 
to others; hence he was regarded as an inestimable addition to our 
society. 426 However, Carwin then proceeds to use his skills and 
intelligence to manipulate others, so that exceptional powers are 
viewed as a threat. His voice is such that, as Clara says, an heart 
of stone could not fail being moved by it. It imparted to me an 
emotion altogether involuntary and incontroulable. N27 This ability 
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to incite automatic behavioural responses through the exercise of 
invisible powers is one of the main sources of Carwin's control. 
Carwin succeeds in eliciting automatic responses from others 
because he understands their desires and needs, having "constructed 
his plot in a manner suited to the characters of those whom he had 
selected for his victims. 02e In particular, he exploits Wieland's 
susceptibility to total religious interpretations of reality. 
Wieland's religious training has fixed him in dogmatic 
necessities, so that, as Clara puts it, ")! oral necessity, and 
calvinistic inspiration, were the props on which my brother thought 
proper to repose. "29 Vieland attempts to fit all the evidence of his 
senses into a single, deterministic system, the prop of necessity on 
which he seeks "repose" and security. However, this need for 
totalisation is the basis of his downfall. 
Early in the novel, Clara is afraid that her brother's religious 
beliefs will lead him to make false and dangerous conclusions from 
empirical evidence: 
The will is the tool of the understanding, which must 
fashion its conclusions on the notices of sense. If the 
senses be depraved it is impossible to calculate the evils 
that may flow from the consequent deductions of the 
understanding. 3° 
In the rest of the novel, Vieland's senses are indeed shown to be 
depraved, as he fails to ascertain the objective truth of external 
facts, in accordance with the consoling securities of Enlightenment 
reason. This failure of empirical interpretation, which ultimately 
ends in Vieland sacrificing his family, is founded in his fixity of 
mind, his compulsion to interpret signs according to mental habits: 
Those ideas which, in others, are casual or obscure, which 
are entertained in moments of abstraction and solitude, and 
easily escape when the scene is changed, have obtained an 
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immoveable hold upon his mind. The conclusions which long 
habit has rendered familiar, and, in some sort, palpable to 
his intellect, are drawn from the deepest sources. All his 
actions and practical sentiments are linked with long and 
abtruse deductions from the system of divine government and 
the laws of our intellectual constitution. " 
Wieland evaluates sensory experience according to a single system of 
belief, interpreted in terms of law and habit. This dogmatic 
insistence on law, for security and consolation, is thus shown to be 
potentially damaging. 
In "Memoirs of Carwin, the Biloquist, " Ludloe suggests to Carwin 
that some people's desire to believe in the existence of invisible, 
supernatural beings is a point of weakness and gullibility that may 
be exploited. His language draws on images of mechanistic 
determinism and predictability: 
Ro more powerful engine, he said, could be conceived, by 
which the ignorant and credulous might be moulded to our 
purposes; managed by a man of ordinary talents, it would 
open for him the straightest and surest avenues to wealth 
and power. 32 
The figure of Ludloe in this work thus further articulates problems 
of power and responsibility. As an early example of the technocratic 
utopian planner, Ludloe promises a return to paradise, and the 
possibilLy of a new start, as a glamo rous alibi for the 
exploitation of others. Founding a secret organization dedicated to 
the establishment of a utopian community, his programme is itself 
shown to be based on sacrifice, exploitation and domination. 
To establish his utopian community will require, in Ludloe's 
view, some extraordinary method. 033 This is his justification for 
putting Carwin through a series of rigorous tests, sacrifices 
asserted as a necessary trial of his strength and dedication. As 
Carwin himself explains, "the station, my attainment of which 
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depended wholly on myself, was high above vulgar heads, and was to 
be gained by years of solicitude and labour. "34 In this sentence, 
Ludloe's own part as controller of this process has magically 
disappeared, as Carwin believes that his actions depend "wholly on 
myself. " 
Yet the actual basis of Ludloe's authoritarian control over 
Carwin is the threat of death, if the latter should betray the 
secrecy of the organization. Under the alibi of benevolent myths of 
social progress, Brown thus suggests forms of dominance and 
submission, violence and sacrifice. Ludloe is "only one among many, 
engaged in a great and arduous design, " a single, ruling idea which 
demands competition, sacrifice-and Oedipal perpetuatlons of power: 
As each of us, continued he, is mortal, each of us must, in 
time yield his post to another. - Each of us is ambitious to 
provide himself a successor, to have his place filled by one 
selected and instructed by himself. All our personal 
feelings and affections are by no means intended to be 
swallowed up by a passion for the general interest; when 
they can be kept alive and be brought into play, in 
subordination and subservience to the great end, they are 
cherished as useful, and revered as laudable... 1$ 
Wiihthe bland, complacent, and duplicitous tone of the later 
technocrats of science fiction, Ludloe insists that personal 
feelings and affections will not be sacrificed to a higher 
collective ideal. Yet in the second half of the same sentence, he 
admits the necessity of subservience to the "great end. " Nearly a 
century before the utopian fictions of Edward Bellamy and his 
followers, discussed in chapter 11, Brockden Brown investigates 
beneficent-sounding myths of progress, natural law, mechanistic 
inevitability and scientific empiricism in terms of totalitarianism 
and sacrificial power. 
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The issues of power, progress and the manipulations of Bewtonian 
science, discussed by the writers approached in this chapter, were 
part of a fundamental struggle in the early years of the American 
Republic between mercantile-industrial and agrarian interests. The 
development of science and technology at this time was thus enacted 
within a debate as to whether the new nation should remain a 
fundamentally agricultural society, or whether it should be 
developed for widespread manufacturing, on the pattern of England. 
These conflicts have been mapped in detail by Henry lash Smith, in 
Virgin Land (1950). 36 
In both the colonial period and the early years of the Republic, 
the utilitarian application of science, discussed in this chapter in 
terms of Palmer and Jefferson, was mostly concentrated in the area 
of agricultural production, with research carried out especially on 
projects for the improvement of crop yields, crop rotation, 
fertilizers, and harvesting methods, and for the control of disease 
and pests. Jefferson and Vashington, amongst others, had encouraged 
the formation of agricultural societies, including the "Philadelphia 
Society for Promoting Agriculture, " founded in 1785. Americans 
learned from Europe, in the words of Russel Blain lye, that farming 
was to be considered "not as an art or as a vocation, but as a 
science, amenable to an experimental approach and related to the 
materials and methods of other sciences, particularly to botany, 
zoology, and chemistry. "37 
At first, therefore, Jefferson refused to support moves for the 
development of industrial manufacturing in America. Instead, he 
preferred to promote the expeditions of fur traders and explorers 
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beyond the Mississippi, such as Meriwether Lewis and William Clark's 
expedition of 1804, in which they travelled up the Missouri, over 
the Rocky Mountains, to the mouth of the Columbia river, The 
geographical knowledge gained by such expeditions was of utilitarian 
interest, as a preliminary to economic and political exploitation 
within an agricultural context. As such, it was encouraged by the 
federal government as part of its programme of land settlement. As 
well as Lewis and Clarke's expedition, Sibley's to the Red River 
(1803), and Pike's and Long's to the Rockies (1805,1819,1823) 
contributed useful information in botany, zoology, meteorology, 
ethnology, and agriculture. 38 
After the War of Independence, the refusal of industrial 
manufacturing by agrarian interests, such as those of Jefferson, 
continued, as a new sense of nationalistic destiny was seen in terms 
of the expansion of agriculture into the empty, fertile lands beyond 
the Vestward-moving frontier. However, manufacturing interests, 
represented by such figures as Alexander Hamilton, began to prevail. 
The blockades of the Revolutionary Var had shown the dangers of 
America's dependence on foreign manufacturing industries. 
Accordingly, Jefferson changed his mind. In 1805, contemplating a 
new edition of his 1785 totes on Virginia, he planned to qualify 
chapter 19, in which he had previously rejected the idea of 
manufacturing in America. In a letter to )(r. Lithson, written on 
January 4th 1805, Jefferson claimed that the existence of free land 
in the Vest would act as a "safety-valve, " preventing the poverty 
and depravity that had followed industrial growth in European 
cities: 
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As yet our manufacturers are as much at their ease, as 
independent and moral as our agricultural inhabitants, and 
they will continue so as long as there are vacant lands for 
them to resort to; because whenever it shall be attempted by 
the other classes to reduce them to the minimum of 
subsistence, they will quit their trades and go to laboring 
the earth. 3' 
Jefferson's belated response to manufacturing interests came at time 
when the rise of the merchant class was firmly established, as can 
be seen in the work of Tenche Coxe and Alexander Hamilton. 
Coxe, a Philadelphia merchant, and assistant to Hamilton at the 
Treasury, spoke for his rising class, in his promotion of industrial 
manufacture and the "useful arts' in the agrarian economy of the 
United States, in the early years of the Republic. Coxe gives the 
importation of industrial technology from Europe a metaphysical 
sanction, removing the curse of Blake's "dark, Satanic mills, " by 
naturalising technology to the American landscape. He announced 
that, "unless business of this kind is carried on, certain great 
natural powers of the country will remain inactive and useless. Our 
numerous mill seats... would be given by Providence in vain. "40 The 
beneficence of manufacturing industry is thus given a divine 
guarantee, and located as part of God's plan for American utility 
and success. 
Alexander Hamilton's "Report on Manufactures", delivered before 
Congress on December 5,1791, presented the case for the development 
of manufacturing industry in the United States, as a means of 
guaranteeing its independence from other nations. Hamilton 
emphasised the desirability of maximum productivity, so that the 
operations of the "Cotton Mill" might "continue with convenience, 
during the night, as well as through the day. " As a result of 
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mechanization, America would be transformed into an industrial 
society that valued maximum utility and labour productivity. One of 
the benefits that Hamilton saw in manufacturing industry was 
therefore: 
the employment of persons who would otherwise be idle (and 
in many cases a burthen on the community), either from the 
byass of temper, habit, infirmity of body, or some other 
cause, indisposing, or disqualifying them for the toils of 
the Country. It is worthy of particular remark, that, in 
general, women and Children are rendered more useful and the 
latter more early useful by manufacturing establishments, 
than they would otherwise be. 41 
Children will be socialised early into the regime of industrial 
production, their lives considered not in a context of pleasure and 
imagination, but of utility. The quality of the lives of those human 
beings whose labour would be made increasingly routine and 
repetitive, and who would be treated as objects of utilitarian 
manipulation, is a question evaded by Hamilton's optimistic belief 
in both the promise and the inevitability of industrial technology. 
Vith the hegemony of Hamilton and Cose's industrial, merchant 
classes, scientific activity in America thus came to be concerned 
with a continuation of European methods involving the mechanistic 
control of human energies. The following chapters, 4-7, will examine 
various responses to such developments in nineteenth century 
American fiction. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
As a Southerner, Poe criticised Yankee complacencies as to the 
utilitarian benefits of technological and democratic progress. His 
work speculates on abuses of power and control in an era of 
industrialisation. Technology tends to appear in his fiction as a 
mystical, demonic force in hubristic challenge to the Christian 
order of a basically agrarian conception of "nature. " However, the 
duplicity of Poe's writing belies a simple ideological formulation 
or point-of-view towards science and technology. 
The Inquisition in "The Pit and the Pendulum" (1843-5) is a 
totalitarian power which has developed a highly sophisticated 
network of technologies of torture and invisible surveillance: 
I had scarcely stepped from my wooden bed of horror upon the 
stone floor of the prison, when the motion of the hellish 
machine ceased and I beheld it drawn up, by some invisible 
force, through the ceiling. This was a lesson which I took 
desperately to heart. My every motion was undoubtedly 
watched. ' 
The narrator, a prisoner of the Inquisition, is the victim of a 
machine that is both flexible and adaptable, so that enclosure no 
longer implies rigidity or fixity. After he escapes from the 
pendulum, the walls of his cell begin to move, forcing him towards 
the central pit: "There had been a second change in the cell - and 
now the change was obviously in the form. "2 This capability of power 
to take on multiple transformations makes resistance difficult: "I 
shrank back - but the closing walls pressed me resistlessly 
onward. 03 In the end, the prisoner escapes not through his own 
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efforts, but by the intervention of a deus ex r, acbina, as General 
Lasalle's French army enter Toledo. 
Poe's story investigates the psychology of obedience. As the 
pendulum descends, the prisoner admits to feeling the "peculiar 
thrilling sensation which the friction of cloth produces on the 
nerves, " and he takes a "frenzied pleasure in contrasting its 
downward with its lateral velocity. ", * The possibility of finding 
bodily pleasure and benefit in one's submission to technique is also 
suggested by the narrator of "Mellonta Tauta" (1849): 
here I am, cooped up in a dirty balloon, with some one or 
two hundred of the canaille, all bound on a pleasure 
excursion, (what a funny idea some people have of pleasure! ) 
and I have no prospect of touching terra firms for a month 
at least. " 
The "funny idea some people have of pleasure" is a source of 
fascination for Poe's investigations of body-mind interactions, 
which move far beyond the Enlightenment simplifications of Elihu 
Palmer's "intellectual powers. " 
In Poe's fiction, contemporary technology is often associated 
with demonic agents of destruction, a form of black magic 
transgressing Christian taboos on knowledge. For example, "The 
Thousand-and-Second Tale of Scheherazade" (1845) presents nineteenth 
century America as a scene of magic and supernatural miracle. The 
story anthropomorphises many instances of contemporary technology, 
including I4aelzel's chess-playing automaton, Babbage's Analytical 
Engine, the printing-press, dauguerrotypes, and the telegraph. The 
steam ship, which moves "altogether by necromancy, " is described by 
the porter as "a cruel demon, with bowels of sulphur and blood of 
fire, created by evil genii as the means of inflicting misery upon 
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mankind. " It contains not human beings but "mea-vermin, " or the 
"man-animal. " The railroad train is similarly "a huge horse whose 
bones were iron and whose blood was boiling water. "' 
This association of technology with black magic, as a 
blasphemous assault on the virtues of Christian humility, is also 
evident in The Man That Vas Used Up" (1839). The Brigadier General 
is a spokesman of nineteenth century American nationalist, 
industrialist orthodoxy: 
'There is nothing at all like It, ' he would say; 'we are a 
wonderful people, and live in a wonderful age! Parachutes 
and rail-roads - man-traps and spring-guns! Our steam-boats 
are upon every sea, and the Nassau balloon packet is about 
to run regular trips (fare either way only twenty pounds 
sterling) between London and Timbuctoo. And who shall 
calculate the immense influence upon social life - upon arts 
- upon commerce - upon literature - which will be the 
immediate result of the great principles of electro- 
magnetics! Nor is this all, let me assure you! There is 
really no end to the march of invention. The most wonderful 
- the most ingenious - and let no add, I say, the most 
useful - the most truly useful mechanical contrivances, are 
daily springing up like mushrooms, if I may so express 
myself, or, more figuratively, like - ah - grasshoppers - 
like grasshoppers, X- Thompson - about us and ah, - ah - ah - 
around us! '° 
Yet such manic enthusiasm is unfounded, for the champion of 
progress, mechanisation and utility has himself been turned into an 
automaton. The real effects of technological transformations are 
therefore the "rectangular precision" that attends every movement 
of the automaton General. 
Moreover, the General's technological prostheses may be an 
hubristic challenge to religious strictures. There is a sense here 
of a Christian limitation on the extent of human aspiration, as the 
"very capital discourse" of the Reverend Doctor Drummummupp quotes 
biblical authority: "'man that is born of woman kath but a short 
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time to live; he cometh up and is cut down like a flower! '010 
However, the ludicrous name given by Poe to the preacher suggests 
the presence of an irony and playfuless that belies singular point- 
of-view. 
The criticism of industrial hubris, suggested by this story, is 
evident elsewhere in Poe's fiction. Moreover, the arrogance of the 
General's assumptions as to the superiority of contemporary American 
technology may be placed with Poe's awareness of the relativity of 
cultural achievement, shown in Some Words With A Mummy" (1845). The 
mummy revived by galvanism belies the myth of technological progress 
assumed by his nineteenth century American interrogators, as Yankee 
notions of cultural and technological superiority are questioned. 
In this story, Mr. Silk Buckingham readily assumes the "marked 
inferiority of the old Egyptians in all particulars of science, when 
compared with the moderns, and more especially with the 
Yankees... "" In reply, the mummy points out the technological 
achievements of ancient Egypt as superior to those of contemporary 
America. Accordingly, he sees America's rail-roads as "rather 
slight, rather ill-conceived, and clumsily put together" in 
comparison with the "vast, direct, iron-grooved causeways, upon 
which the Egyptians conveyed entire temples and solid obelisks of a 
hundred and fifty feet in altitude. "12 Similarly, Anglo-American 
claims to have developed the steam engine are countered by an 
alternative history from "Hero, through Solomon de Caus. " The mummy 
finally admits that the ancient Egyptians were unable to match the 
invention of Ponnonner's lozenges, and Brandeth's pills. '3 
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In Poe's writing, then, parody and irony are important 
strategies to subvert orthodox points-of-view. The hoax was another 
important strategy for Poe's trickster disruptions of Yankee 
utilitarian certainties, as he satirised the gullibility of 
Americans for control, in a society increasingly dominated by the 
rapid, destabilising information provided by the new mass 
technologies of newspaper and telegraph. "Von Kempelen and His 
Discovery" (1849) thus ridiculed the California gold-rush, by 
claiming that a scientist had succeeded in transforming base metal 
into gold. As a result of Van Kempelen's experiments, "gold now is, 
or at least soon will be (for it cannot be supposed that Von 
Kempelen can long retain his secret) of no greater value than lead, 
and of far inferior value to silver. M14 Poe uses the plausible tone 
of his mock scientific report to question assumptions as to what 
might constitute real "value" in mid-century America. Some of Poe's 
texts, such as "Eureka" (1848) and "The Colloquy of Konos and Una" 
(1841), suggest, if duplicitously, that such value may be found in 
spiritual immutabilities, rather than in the rapid destabilisation 
of American industrial development. 
Technological transformation may therefore be seen as a symptom 
of cultural and spiritual disease in Poe. In this respect, "Mellonta 
Tauta" (1849) investigates Yankee myths of progress as a function of 
the speed of technological and cultural change. Acceleration breeds 
only dissatisfactions, and the subsequent need for endless growth 
and novelty: 
Heigho! when will any Invention visit the human pericranium? 
Are we forever to be doomed to the thousand inconveniences 
of the balloon? Vill nobody contrive a more expeditious mode 
of progress? This jog-trot movement, to my thinking, is 
little less than positive torture. Upon my word we have not 
- 65 - 
made more than a hundred miles the hour since leaving 
homeI I" 
Technological inventions are becoming rapidly obsolescent, and 
merely produce "ennui. ""' For Pundita, "Accustomed as I am to this 
mode of traveling, " "a hundred or even two hundred miles an hour is 
slow traveling, after all. " 17 In Poe's fiction, the human body 
adapts to the perceptual destabilisations of technological change, 
while demanding endless growth and Faustian progress. 
In "XS Found in a Bottle" (1833), the strange crew of seamen 
similarly preside over an obsolescent science and technology: the 
"cabin floor was thickly strewn with strange, iron-clasped folios, 
and moldering instruments of science, and obsolete long-forgotten 
charts. "1e In this story, speed destabilises the familar, habitual 
methods of thought exteriorized in technological instrumentation. 
The complacencies of Jeffersonian rationalism are thereby disrupted. 
The narrator begins the tale by explaining his "habits of rigid 
thought. " He is a dedicated rationalist: 
I have often been reproached with the aridity of my genius; 
a deficiency of imagination has been imputed to me as a 
crime; and the Pyrrhonism of my opinions has at all times 
rendered me notorious. Indeed, a strong relish for physical 
philosophy has, I fear, tinctured my mind with a very common 
error of this age -I mean the habit of referring 
occurrences, even the least susceptible of such reference, 
to the principles of that science. Upon the whole, no person 
could be less liable than myself to be led away from the 
severe precincts of truth by the ignes fatui of 
superstition. 19 
But the narrator enters a world where the securities and 
consolations of his scientific rationalism break down. 
The tale emphasises speed as a function of disruption and dis- 
ease. The accelerating rate of sensory data cannot be comprehended 
by quantitative measurement: "We scudded with frightful velocity 
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before the sea..., " "the hulk flew at a rate defying computation, " 
"Ye had no means of calculating time... "20 
The sailors on the strange ship similarly defy rational 
explanation and categorisation: "I was unwilling to trust myself 
with a race of people who had offered, to the cursory glance I had 
taken, so many points of vague novelty, doubt, and apprehension. "21 
Poe's fiction thus enters areas of unfamiliarity and doubt, in a 
movement contrary to that of many twentieth century science fiction 
narratives, which tend to move from an initial situation of 
defamiliarisation towards the consolations of explanation and the 
familiar. 
Nevertheless, in Poe's fiction, novelty and doubt tend to be 
perceived in a context of threat. In "MS Found in a Bottle, " the 
layout of the text itself begins to fragment, as the totalising 
securities of overall form have to be abandoned: 
A feeling, for which I have no name, has taken possession of 
my soul -a sensation which will admit of no analysis, to 
which the lessons of by-gone times are inadequate, and for 
which I fear futurity itself will offer me no key. To a mind 
constituted like my ova, the latter consideration is an 
evil. I shall never -I know that I shall never - be 
satisfied with regard to the nature of my conceptions. Yet 
it is not wonderful that these conceptions are indefinite, 
since they have their origin in sources so utterly novel. A 
new sense -a new entity is added to my sou1.22 
The new sensory data are overwhelming. and cannot be fitted into an 
a priori system. Yet the need for a key, for analysis and 
definition, outlives the possibility of their practical attainment. 
Even as he faces imminent death, the narrator is still fascinated by 
the possibility of finding secret knowledge and truth. Indeed, such 
rationalist obsessions are presented in terms of physical excitement 
and erotic penetration: 
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To conceive the horror of my sensations is, I presume, 
utterly impossible; yet a curiosity to penetrate the 
mysteries of these awful regions, predominates even over my 
despair, and will reconcile me to the most hideous aspects 
of death. It is evident that we are hurrying onwards to some 
exciting knowledge - some never-to-be-imparted secret, whose 
attainment is destruction. 23 
This fascination and terror with forbidden knowledge underlies Poe's 
notion of technology as a transgression of religious taboo. 
Another crucial exploration of these ideas is "The Colloquy of 
Xonos and Una" (1841), in which technological control of the 
environment is considered as a Fall from an original state of 
innocence. 
From a speculative future, Xonos recalls those non-conformists 
who had dared to question nineteenth century assumptions of 
"improvement" and "progress": 
You will remember that one or two of the wise among our 
forefathers - wise in fact, although not in the world's 
esteem - had ventured to doubt the propriety of the term 
'improvement', as applied to the progress of our 
civilization. There were periods in each of the five or six 
centuries immediately preceding our dissolution, when arose 
some vigorous intellect, boldly contending for those 
principles whose truth appears now, to our disenfranchised 
reason, so utterly obvious - principles which should have 
taught our race to submit to the guidance of the natural 
laws, rather than attempt their control. At long intervals 
some master-minds appeared, looking upon each advance in 
practical science as a retro-gradation in the true 
utility. 24 
In this passage, Poe shifts the meaning of the commonplace term 
"utility" away from material transformations through technology, 
towards a contemplative ideal of spiritual acquiescence, and a 
supposed rejection of human action and control. Writing in the 
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slavery-based economy of the South, Poe challenges Northern 
reliances on the mechanisation of labour as an hubristic challenge 
to Christian humility and to the necessity of submission to the will 
of God. The "poetic intellect" discovers "in the mystic parable that 
tells of the tree of knowledge, and of its forbidden fruit, death- 
producing, a distinct intimation that knowledge was not meet for man 
in the infant condition of his soul, "26 
Poe equates the rise of bourgeois industrial democracy with that 
of scientific rationalism as disruptions of "natural" Christian 
hierarchies. Rationalist desires for "system, ' *generality, " and 
"abstraction" produce "disease": 
Man, because he could not but acknowledge the majesty of 
Nature, fell into childish exultation at his acquired and 
still-increasing domination over her elements. Even while he 
stalked a God in his own fancy, an infantine imbecility came 
over him. As might be supposed from the origin of his 
disorder, he grew infected with system, and with 
abstraction. He enwrapped himself in generalities. Among 
other odd ideas, that of universal equality gained ground; 
and in the face of analogy and of God - in despite of the 
loud warning voice of the laws of gradation so visibly 
pervading all things in Earth amd Heaven - wild attempts at 
an omni-prevalent Democracy were made. Yet this evil sprang 
necessarily from the leading evil, Knowledge. Man could not 
both know and succumb. Meantime huge smoking cities arose, 
innumerable. Green leaves shrank before the hot breath of 
furnaces. The fair face of Nature was deformed as with the 
ravages of some loathsome disease. 26 
Here Poe is antagonistic to technology as a generalised evil, and 
nostalgic for a contemplative spirituality in opposition to the 
"harsh mathematical reason of the schools. 027 In "The Colloquy of 
Monos and Una, " Christian eschatologies are still available for the 
writer as a source of renewal: 
low it was that, in twilight, we discoursed of the days to 
come, when the Art-scarred surface of the Earth, having 
undergone that purification which alone could efface its 
rectangular obscenities, should clothe itself anew in the 
verdure and the mountain-slopes and the smiling waters of 
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Paradise, and be rendered at length a fit dwelling-place for 
man: - for man the Death-purged - for man to whose now 
exalted intellect there should be poison in knowledge no 
more - for the redeemed, regenerated, blissful, and now 
immortal, but still for the material, man. 2° 
This myth of a redeemed universe, beyond technological "Art, " forms 
one of the bases of "Eureka, " and also recurs in Poe's fascination 
with mesmerism. In the mesmerist stories, however, the desire for 
spiritual deliverance is played off against an investigation of 
power, consent and control. In this way, positive and negative 
evaluations of mesmerism interact in a state of ambiguity, as Poe's 
duplicitous fictional techniques disrupt the certainties of singular 
point-of-view. His work thus cannot be reduced to a simple theory or 
attitude towards science and technology. 
Ok Tale of the Ragged Mountains" (1845) suggests the 
authoritarian relationship by which the mesmerist-scientist 
dominates his victim-patient. In Saratoga, Bedloe receives mesmerist 
therapy from Doctor Templeton, "from whose attention, while there, 
he either received, or fancied that he received, great benefit. 030 
The ambiguity of the latter remark, suggesting a possible gdp 
between fancy and actuality, implies that the subject's own 
perception of his interests may not necessarily correspond to his 
real interests. For human beings involved in power relationships, 
decisions as to when to obey authority, and when to rebel, are thus 
shown to be problematic. 
Doctor Templeton uses mesmerist techniques to alleviate Bedloe's 
pain. This success "had very naturally inspired the latter with a 
certain degree of confidence in the opinions from which the remedies 
had been educed. "30 Here Bedloe generalises from an initial, local 
- 70 - 
benefit (the alleviation of his pain) to give his consent to the 
intellectual system within which the doctor places his actions. As a 
result, Templeton is able to "induce the sufferer to submit to 
numerous experiments. " As in Brockden Brown, the experimentalist in 
Poe is viewed suspiciously, as a potentially destructive manipulator 
of other human beings. 
Having provided the initial benefits of physical well-being, the 
doctor is then able to gain total control over Bedloe. He 
establishes a mesmeric rapport with him, after which the will of 
the patient succumbed rapidly to that of the physician, so that, 
when I first became acquainted with the two, sleep was brought about 
almost instantaneously, by the mere volition of the operator, even 
when the invalid was unaware of his presence. "3' Such control 
techniques, invisible, and acting at a distance, are not easily 
resisted. 
Yet Poe's story is duplicitous, disallowing a single evaluative 
point-of-view. The narrator presents his facts without an absolute 
explanatory system, so that Bedloe's vision of the Indian city is 
given more than one possible cause. For example, it may be a 
dysfunction of his own mental health, a self-induced hallucination, 
as it were, in that his temperament is described as "sensitive, 
excitable, enthusiastic, " and his imagination "singularly vigorous 
and creative, " deriving "additional force" from his morphine 
habit. 32 
Another possibility is that Bedloe has been manipulated by 
Templeton's hypnotic power, through mesmerism or telepathy. 
Templeton's anticipation of Bedloe's narrative at certain points 
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suggests the validity of this particular explanation. A third 
possiblity is the doctor's own explanation, that a mystical 
phenomenon related to the reincarnation of souls has taken place. 
By retaining this ambiguity, Poe's narrative presents the 
doctor's actions as neither beneficent nor malign. The writing thus 
presents no single, authorial point-of-view, "for" or "against" 
mesmerism. By means of this duplicitous, playful approach that 
refuses simplistic moral judgements, Poe extends his interest in 
mesmeric control beyond criticism of its authoritarian power bases, 
to an investigation of its potentialities as a source of 
metaphysical revelation about life and death. While describing 
mesmerism negatively in "Eureka, " as one of the "very uncertain 
isze33 that fail to account for cosmological developments, Poe 
elsewhere refuses to condemn mesmerism unequivocally as merely 
authoritarian manipulation. 
"Xesmeric Revelation" (1844) presents a definition of mesmerism 
that further suggests this ambiguous, speculative approach: 
that man, by mere exercise of will, can so impress his 
fellow, as to cast him into an abnormal condition, of which 
the phenomena resemble very closely those of death, or at 
least resemble them more than they do the phenomena of any 
other normal condition within our cognizance; that, while in 
this state, the person so impressed employs only with 
effort, and then feebly, the external organs of sense, yet 
perceives, with keenly refined perception, and through 
channels supposed unknown, matters beyond the scope of the 
physical organs; that, moreover, his intellectual faculties 
are wonderfully exalted and invigorated; that his sympathies 
with the person so impressing him are profound; and, 
finally, that his susceptibility to the impression increases 
with its frequency, while, in the same proportion, the 
peculiar phenomena elicited are more extended and more 
pronounced. 34 
Poe's story speculates on this religious dream of communion and 
immortality that lies at the centre of mesmerist and spiritualist 
_? 2_ 
practices. Mesmerism, as a control without technology, is thus not 
evaluated in the same context of demonic transgression that Foe 
brings to contemporary technological artifacts in the stories 
considered earlier in this chapter. 
The mesmerist-narrator of "Mesmeric Revelation" claim to 
"detail without commeatM38 the substance of the colloquy between the 
"sleep-walker" Kr. Vankirk, and himself. Yankirk willingly gives his 
consent to control. Indeed, he invites the mesmerist to hypnotise 
him, when he is on the verge of death, wishing thereby to be 
"intellectually convinced of his own immortality. "36 The possibility 
that mesmerism may enhance security by providing proof of spiritual 
realities, is therefore the motive for Vankirk's submission to 
mesmeric control. Accordingly, the mesmeric state is described as 
direct vision, beyond linguistic or sensory mediation: 
When I say that it resembles death, I mean that it resembles 
the ultimate life; for when I an entranced the senses of my 
rudimental life are in abeyance, and I perceive external 
things directly, without organs, through a medium which I 
shall employ in the ultimate, unorganized life-" 
However, Vankirk's apotheosis, "with a bright smile irradiating his 
features", 3e contrasts sharply with the painful, desperate death of 
the mesmerised subject in "The Facts in the Case of 
M. Valdemar" (1845). His life is suspended on the point of death by 
the action of a mesmerist, to whom the terminally-ill patient has 
again consented. The mesmerist-narrator reports that M. Valdemar 
seemed "vividly excited" by the opportunity to take part in his 
experiments, and that, when he is dying, he replies, "feebly, but 
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quite audibly, 'Yes, I wish to be mesmerized'... "*" Yet the horror 
of the story's ending, with its "nearly liquid mass of loathsome - 
of detestable putridity, *40 serves as a warning against the 
optimistic, joyful implications of the ending of ")esmaric 
Revelation. " 
Poe's "Eureka" further explores this dream of unmediated 
totality. A late attempt at building a total Tewtonian system, this 
"Essay on the Material and Spiritual universe" posits a system of 
full Laplacian determinism. "Accident" has no place in such a 
scheme, being a term "properly applied only to the result of 
indistinguishable or not immediately traceable 1a w "4' The universe 
is thus a totally determined system, based on a single, generalised 
Law: 
He who, divesting himself of prejudice, shall have the rare 
courage to think absolutely for himself, cannot fail to 
arrive, in the end, at the condensation of laws into Law - 
cannot fail of reaching the conclusion that each law of 
Nature is dependent at all points upon all other laws, and 
that all are but consequences of one primary exercise of the 
Divine Volition. 42 
Any contingency is "a result and a manifestation of his laws. " 
This Laplacian cosmology, resembling that of "Mesmeric 
Revelation, " posits an original unity to which the universe is 
returning, in a movement of teleological inevitability, from a state 
of multiplicity deemed abnormal. The Universe is constituted by 
"forcing the originally and therefore normally One into the abnormal 
condition of Xany. "43 
Poe's fascination with reversibility, unity, origin and ending 
is part of a total system based on electricity as a mystical power. 
The key force is Newtonian gravity, given a capital letter and 
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translated into electrical terms as "Attraction" and "Repulsion" in 
a "spiritual Ether. "44 Poe eroticises this electrical energy as a 
system of accelerating. mutual attraction in a reassuringly hopeful 
universe: 
While undergoing consolidation, the clusters themselves, 
with a speed prodigiously accumulative, have been rushing 
towards their own general centre - and now, with a million- 
fold electric velocity, commensurate only with their 
material grandeur and with their spiritual passion for 
oneness, the majestic remnants of the tribe of Stars flash, 
at length, into a common embrace. The inevitable catastrophe 
is at hand... Guiding our imaginations by that omniprevalent 
law of laws, the law of periodicity, are we not, indeed, 
more than justified in entertaining a belief - let us say, 
rather, indulging a hope - that the processes we have here 
ventured to contemplate will be renewed forever, and 
forever, and forever; a novel Universe swelling into 
existence, and then subsiding into nothingness, at every 
throb of the Heart Divine? 46 
The "source" of each atom "lies in the principle, Unity, " which is 
its "lost parent. "4111 
Poe's "Eureka" is thus a total mystical order, based on unity, 
completeness and law. However, the work remains duplicitously 
outside the orthodoxies of contemporary Newtonian-Laplacian science, 
in that elsewhere in the essay Poe satirises and exposes the 
mythical bases of scientific procedures based on induction and 
deduction, while claiming for his own cosmological work the status 
of "A Prose Poem, " its truth based on intuition rather than on 
science. Xyths of Newtonian scientific methodology, bases of the 
Enlightenment status quo, are in this way criticised and replaced by 
imagination and poesis as sources of truth. 
"Eureka" questions commonplace assumptions that scientific 
activities can be accounted for by a unitary scientific method, by 
criticising the assertion, prevalent in official versions of 
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science, that there exist "but two practicable roads to Trutb, " 
namely, the deductive mode of investigation, satirised as the line 
from "Aries Tattle" to Euclid to Kant, and the Inductive, "Hoggish" 
road of Francis Bacon. 4" 
Over a century before the revolutionary work of Kuhn and 
Feyerabend, Poe observes that practising scientists themselves 
necessarily ignore such rules. Kepler, for example, in formulating 
his three laws of planetary motion, "guessed - that is to say, he 
imagined them. "49 Alibis of logic and rationality in orthodox 
scientific accounts are therefore countered by an acknowledgement of 
the vital roles played in scientific discovery by imagination and 
intuition, the latter considered as "the conviction arising from 
those inductions or deductions of wbicb the processes are so shadowy 
as to escape our consciousness, elude our reason, or defy our 
capacity of expression. MB° 
Poe's criticism of scientific methodology attacks both induction 
and deduction. Deductive, axiomatic truth is made historically 
relative: 
Sow, it is clear, not only that what is obvious to one mind 
may not be obvious to another, but that what is obvious to 
one mind at one epoch, may be anything but obvious, at 
another epoch, to the same mind. It is clear, moreover, that 
what, today, is obvious even to the majority of mankind, or 
to the majority of the best intellects of mankind, may 
tomorrow be, to either majority, more or less obvious, or in 
no respect obvious at all. It is seen, then, that the 
axiomatic principle itself is susceptible of variation, and 
of course that axioms are susceptible of similar change. 
Being mutable, the 'truths' which grow out of them are 
necessarily mutable too; or, in other words, are never to be 
positively depended on as truths at all - since Truth and 
Immutability are ones' 
Put briefly: "as for 'self-evidence', there is no such thing. *62 
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Induction is also criticised for providing discrete facts 
without a larger explanatory system: 
The vital taint, however, in Baconianism - its most 
lamentable fount of error - lay in its tendency to throw 
power and consideration into the hands of merely perceptive 
men - of those inter-Tritonic minnows, the microscopical 
savans - the diggers and pedlers of minute facts, for the 
most part in physical science - facts all of which they 
retailed at the same price on the highway; their value 
depending, it was supposed, simply upon the fact of their 
fact, without reference to their applicability or 
inapplicability in the development of those ultimate and 
only legitimate facts, called Law. " 
Poe's questioning of scientific methodologies is thus part of his 
desire for an absolute, immutable system of universal truth, of a 
higher value than that asserted by orthodox science. Accordingly, 
"Eureka" begins with an affirmation of the need for a single, 
totalising, inclusive perspective, that will subsume empirical fact 
into a fixed, centralised point-of-view: 
Ve need so rapid a revolution of all things about the 
central point of sight that, while the minutiae vanish 
altogether, even the more conspicuous objects become blended 
into one. Among the vanishing minutiae, in a survey of this 
kind, would be all exclusively terrestrial matters. The 
Earth would be considered in its planetary relations alone. 
A man, in this view, becomes Mankind; Xankind a member of 
the cosmical family of Intelligences. s4 
Poe shows both science and art to be aspects of poesis by 
ambiguously locating his -holistic cosmology as both a poetic system 
whose beauty is its own guarantee, and as a logical system that 
requires a guarantee for its truth from scientific procedures. 
Poe therefore takes steps to defend his theory against 
scientific attack. Answering an objection to his cosmology from 
Newtonian dynamics - in which a second force is required to arrest 
uniform motion in a straight line - Poe insists that such principles 
cannot be assured "at an epoch when no 'principles', in anything, 
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exist. "6' However, Poe's own principles are apparently exempt from 
such assumptions, as he asserts the truth of his system in an 
authoritarian manner, using key absolutist phrases, such as "only, " 
"logical, " "the slightest, " "necessities, " "train" and 
"indisputability": 
I maintain, first, that only in the mode described is it 
conceivable that ? {atter could have been diffused so as to 
fulfil at once the conditions of radiation and of generally 
equable distribution. I maintain, secondly, that these 
conditions themselves have been imposed upon me, as 
necessities, in a train of ratiocination as rigorously 
logical as that which establishes any demonstration in 
Euclid; and I maintain, thirdly, that even if the charge of 
'hypothesis' were as fully sustained as it is, in fact, 
unsustained and untenable, still the validity and 
indisputability of my result would not, even in the 
slightest particular, be disturbed. 66 
Poe's remark that his system is as "rigorpusly logical" as an axiom 
in Euclid is duplicitous, since he has earlier suggested the 
historical relativity and uncertainty of all suchassertions of 
axiomatic truth. Poe's placing of "Eureka" within scientific 
procedures is therefore ambiguous, and edges into irony. 
IQoreover, in the Preface, Poe places "Eureka" beyond scientific 
truth-value and intellection: 
To the few who love me and whom I love - to those who feel 
rather than to those who think - to the dreamers and those 
who put faith in dreams as in the only realities -I offer 
this Book of Truths, not in its character of Truth-Teller, 
but for the Beauty that abounds in its Truth; constituting 
it true. To these I present the composition as an Art- 
Product alone: - let us say as a Romance or, if I be not 
urging too lofty a claim, as a Poem. 
In this way, Poe challenges rationalist versions of truth that 
suppress the vital role played in science by faculties such as 
intuition, imagination, dream, and an appreciation of beauty. As 
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such, his Romantic criticism of science and technology is a complex 
and ambiguous one. 
Poe's examination of science and technology may be compared with 
the work of Hawthorne and Melville, which continues to explore 





Hawthorne's fiction respects complexity and ambiguity in its 
handling, of issues concerning the exceptional figure in a 
utilitarian, democratic culture. In contrast to Poe, however, 
Hawthorne does not play with the possibilities of mesmerism as a 
means of religious salvation or of beneficent control. Instead, he 
unequivocally condemns such practice=: as an evil instance of power 
and manipulation. 
Westervelt, the mesmerist in The Blithedale Romance (1852), has 
Priscilla under hypnotic control, forcing her to perform as the 
mysterious "Veiled Lady. " He is also a spokesman for the mesmerist- 
spiritualist dream of spiritual communion and revelation, identical 
to that speculated on in a duplicitous manner by Poe: 
He spoke of a. now era that was dawning upon the world; an 
era that would link soul to soul, and the present life to 
what we call futurity, with a closeness that should finally 
convert both worlds into one great, mutually conscious 
brotherhood. ' 
Yet Hawthorne makes clear the totalitarian aspect: of such dreams of 
power, as Coverdale learns about mesmerism in terms of "the 
miraculous power of one human being over the will and passions of 
another. " For the hypnotist, "human character was but soft wax in 
his hands; and guilt, or virtue, only the forte into which he should 
see fit to mould it. " Coverdale registers horror and disgust that, 
if the stories of mesmeric power were true, the 
individual soul was virtually annihilated, and all that is 
sweet and pure, in our present life, debased, and that the 
idea of man': _ eternal responsibility was made ridiculous, 
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and Immortal ity rendered, at once, impossible, and not worth 
acceptance. But I would have perished on the spot, sooner 
than believe it. 
Coverdale thus reasserts the need for individual responsibility 
against forces of evil manipulation. Spiritualism in Hawthorne is 
therefore not a new hope for the salvation of humankind, but an 
unambiguous symptom of the latter's degeneracy: 
If these phenomena have not humbug at the bottom, so much 
the worse for us. What can they indicate, in a spiritual 
way, except that the soul of man is descending to a lower 
point than it has ever before reached, while incarnate? We 
are pursuing a downward course, in the eternal march, and 
thus bring ourselves into the same range with beings whom 
death, in requital of their gross and evil lives, has 
degraded below humanity. To hold intercourse with spirits of 
this order, we must stoop, and grovel in some element more 
vile than earthly dust. ` 
Westervelt's mesmeric manipulation 
investigation of power and control 
such, his ability to use technical 
their will is complemented by the 
Hollingsworth, which are presented 
seductive. 
Hawthorne's novel explores the 
of Priscilla is part of a wider 
in The Bli thedale Romance. As 
skill to control others against 
; ociai reform projects of 
as equally pseudo-scientific and 
damage that an inflexible, single 
system of belief can inflict on the lives of its unwitting victims, 
in a way similar to Brockden Brown in Wieland. Though he claims to 
act beneficently, in the interests of social reform, Hollingsworth 
is shown instead to be an egotistical manipulator, enclosed within a 
dogmatic, totalitarian system. Like Mary Shelley's Dr. Frankenstein, 
Hollingsworth has invented a monster, and becomes a monster h1IIsel f: 
His one true friend was the cold, spectral monster which he 
had himself conjured up, and on which he was wasting all the 
warmth of his heart, and of which, at last - as these men of 
a mighty purpose so invariably do - he had grown to be the 
bond-slave. It was his philanthropic theory! ' 
- Si - 
An over-in: --. -ten e or 
the power of the "head, " the "intellectual 
yýow re" eulo: ji ed by Elihu Palmer, leads to a repression of tactile, 
bodily experience, associated with the warmth and sympathy of the 
"heart. " Whatever benevolent intentions Hollingsworth may have had, 
they have been stifle by his doxological insistence on the 
exclusive truth of his system, which takes on an eroticised power 
over him: 
He had taught his benevolence to pour its warm tide 
exclusively through one channel; so that there was nothing 
to spare for other great manifestations of love to man, nor 
scarcely for the nutriment of individual attachments, unless 
they could minister, in some way, to the terrible egotism 
which he mistook for an angel of God. Had Hollingsworth's 
education been more enlarged, he might not so inevitably 
have stumbled into this pit-fall. But this identical pursuit 
had educated him. He knew absolutely nothing, except in a 
single direction, where he had thought so energetically, and 
felt to such a depth, that, no doubt, the entire reason and 
justice of the universe appeared to be concentrated 
thit herward. '`' 
A narrow, specialist education has produced a perverted, neurotic 
and authoritarian tyrant, who endangers the lives of others. The 
I ': or an cni7 tiuii beyond the na. -row _ iSTiS of neeld i 'rged ef. a üCt'a, moving yond gý. 
t 
disciplinary specialisation, thus figures in Hawthorne decades 
before the explorations of cultural studies initiativer by Lewis 
Mumford, Buckminster Fuller, and the other American writers 
discussed in chapter 1. 
Like Melville's Ahab, Hallingsworth's actions are described 
unequivocally as symptoms of madness. "It was my private opinion, 
says Ccverdale, "that, at this period of his life, Hollingsworth was 
fast going mad. . °" An American leader is here shown to be an 
3 C.. insane manipulator, underneath his rhetoric of democratic freedom 
and progress. 
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As a so cial s ientis s Hollingsworth channels all his desire 
into an "imaginary edifice, " a prison for the "reform" of criminals. 
Coverdale notices Hollingsworth making a sketch of his planned 
building, "as lovingly as another man might plan those of the 
projected home, where he meant to be happy with his wife and 
children, " as Hawthorne returns desire and erotic intensities to the 
neutral facade of the scientist-technocrat. The idea is literally 
Hollingsworth's brain-child, his unhealthy substitute for the 
mutuality of social relations. He is therefore described as "not 
altogether human": 
This is always true of those men who have surrendered 
themselves to an over-ruling purpose. It does not so much 
impel them from without, nor even operate as a motive power 
within, but grows incorporate with all they think and feel, 
and finally converts them into little else save that one 
principle. When such begins to be the predicament, it is not 
cowardice, but wisdom, to avoid these victims. They have no 
heart, no sympathy, no reason, no conscience. ' 
Hollingsworth': totalitarian system is self-perpetuating, in 
that an answer can be found for any question within the terms. of his 
coyistem: 
So plausible looked his theory, and, more than that, co 
practical; such an air of reasonableness had he, by patient 
thought, thrown over it; each segment of it was contrived to 
dove-tail into all the rest, with such a complicated 
applicability; and so ready was he with a response for every 
objection - that, really, so far as logic and argument went, 
he had the matter all his own way. ' 
The =seductiveness of such total security systems is a major issue in 
Hawthorne's fiction. Coverdale "detested this kind of man, and all 
the more, because a part of my own nature showed itself responsive 
to him. " 
Nevertheless, Coverdale is aale to resist Hollingsworth's 
assumptions of technocratic power: 
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"Mankind, in Hollingsworth's opinion, " thought I, "is but 
another yoke of oxen, as -stubborn, stupid, and sluggish, as 
our old Brown and Bright... But, are we his oxen? And what 
right has he to be the driver? "1O 
Hollingsworth confronts Coverdale with a reductive, Christian-- 
manichean choice - "Be with me... or be against me! There is no 
third choice for you... " However, unlike Poe's mesmerist patients, 
Coverdale answers - "No! " - to this invitation to submission. " 
Coverdale tries to disaffiliate himself from the desire for a 
singular "purpose" that motivates Hollingsworth's destructive 
actions towards others. 
In thus rejecting Hollingsworth's simplistic, binary division of 
the world, Coverdale become., a Hawthornian nay-ssayer. In a letter to 
Hawthorne, on 16? April? 1851, Melville referred to this quality of 
dissent in Hawthorne: 
He e. ayc NO! in thunder; but the Devil himself cannot make 
him ay yes. For all men who say yes, lie; and men who say 
no - why, they are in the happy condition of judicious, 
unincumbered travellers in Europe; they cross the frontiers 
into Eternity with nothing but a carpet bag, - that is to 
: say, the Ego. Whereas those yes-gentry, they travel with 
heaps of baggage, and, damn them' they will never get 
through the Custom House... ' 
The awareness of Melville and Hawthorne of the necessity of 
boundary-crossing, of moving out of singular fixities, opens up 
vital challenges to the inheritance by American power interests of 
totalitarian, deterministic systems from Europe. Flexibility and 
openness to a multiplicity of ideas are seen as necessary means of 
resistance to monomaniac obsessions with finding a singular truth. 
Accordingly, Coverdale realises the need to leave Blithedale and 
return temporarily to urban society, for, "No sagacious man will 
long retain his sagacity, if he live exclusively among reformers and 
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progressive people, without periodically returning into the settled 
system of things, to correct himself by a new observation from that 
old stand-; point. hI _' 
Hawthorne exposes Haliingsworth's obsession with singular truth 
as a restriction on human imagination and freedom. As Coverdale 
tells Hollingsworth: "I wish you would see fit to comprehend... that 
the profoundest wisdom must be mingled with nine-tenths of nonsense; 
else it is not worth the breath that utters it. 9114 This easing of 
Puritan insistence-, on truth adds liberal-Christian values 
associated with the "heart, " such as generosity, feeling and 
tolerance, to the hard intellection of Newtonian rationalism and 
science. 
Coverdale is a Romantic drifter-figure, resisting 
Hollingsworth's control through flexibility and lack of commitment 
to a singular. However, as a nay-sayer who refuses to participate as 
a joiner of social movements, his actions are nevertheless 
a Up 14 ' ,+ "ý as u 
'2 shows ý both positive dissent, and a denial of u 
responsibility. While Coverdale's lack of "purpose" guards him from 
the anti-social damage inflicted by a Hollingsworth, it is also a 
source of emptiness for him: 
As Hollingsworth once told me, I lack a purpose. How 
strange! He was ruined, morally, by an overplus of the very 
same ingredient, the want of which, I occasionally suspect, 
has rendered my own life all an emptiness. I by no means 
wish to die. Yet, were there any cause, in this whole chaos 
of human struggle, worth a sane man's dying for, and which 
my death would benefit, then - provided, however, the effort 
did not involve an unreasonable amount of trouble - methinks 
I might be bold to offer up my life. If Kossuth, for 
example, would pitch the battle-field of Hungarian rights 
within an easy ride of my abode, and choose a mild, sunny 
morning, after breakfast, for the conflict, Niles Coverdale 
would gladly be his man, for one brave rush upon the 
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levelled bayonets. Farther than that, i : should be loth to 
pledge myself. "- 
Like Melville's Bartieby, Coverdale risks stasis in his decision to 
"prefer not to" get involved in activity destructive of human 
potentiality. "'' But whether Coverdale': s refusal is a positive act, a 
nineteenth century anticipation of what Kenneth Rexroth, in 
connection with the Beat writers of the 11950s, calls 
"disaffiliation, " 17 or whether it is merely the complacency of a 
materially satisfied bourgeois, i:, an ambiguity which Hawthorne 
places before his reader. In admitting that "life has come to rather 
an idle pass with resistance and nay-saying are shown to have 
their negative side, as a morally lazy denial of responsibility. 
At one point in the novel, Coverdale observes the actions of the 
other protagonists at Blithedale from the top of a "white-pine 
tree, " thereby both avoiding the struggles enacted below him, and 
claiming exemption from responsibility. "' But although he see: _ 
himself as a "calm observer, "°'O Coverdale's assumption of neutrality 
is questionable. For his silence as he watches Priscilla being 
manipulated by Westervelt and Hollingsworth amounts to complicity 
and a refusal of responsibility, especially as he reveals on the 
final page of the novel that he was in love with Priscilla 
throughout his stay at Blithedale. Coverdale allows her exploitation 
to continue even after he fully comprehends the damage being done to 
her by Hollingsworth and Westervelt. In this way, any possibility of 
resistance through nay-saying IS itself scrutinised within the 
complex play of Hawthorne's fiction. The novel is not a didactic 
transmitter of ideas, but a field in which the reader evaluates 
ambiguities. 
_ RF - L+ v 
Hawthorne'. fictional investigations of science and power 
involve issues of sexual difference, as he explores several 
instances of women as victims of male power. In his work, the 
behavioural expectations for women in nineteenth century America 
leave them particularly vulnerable to exploitation by powerful men. 
In The Blithedale Romance, Hollingsworth takes advantage of 
Priscilla's passivity to totally impose his will on her. Priscilla 
succumbs to "that kind of personal worship which her sex is 
generally prone to lavish upon saints and heroes. " -1 The other 
occupants of Blithedale notice a "pleasant weakness in the girl, " in 
that she was "not quite able to look after her own interests, or 
fight her battle with the world. "Z'' Priscilla's lack of autonomy 
makes her Hollingsworth's ideal woman, "the gentle parasite, the 
soft reflection of a more powerful existence. " '' It is not 
surprising, given these specific cultural circumstances, that 
Hollingsworth, "like many other illustrious prophets, reformers, and 
,i 'Likely , casi, , pýý,. ant %ropzsivs : ý, was lt ý. ý make at ý i+, two proselytes, tý3o, 
among 
the women, to one among the men. "ý Passivity, especially in women, 
is fatally attractive to manipulation by powerful men. 
Moreover, Priscilla's tendency to drift makes her especially 
susceptible to control. She i:; "only a leaf, floating on the dark 
current of events, without influencing them by her own choice or 
plan... " "I am blown about like a leaf... I never have any free- 
Will, " she says. Lacking seIf-d. etermination, she easily becomes 
the "pale victim. " ' 
PrIscilia's inability to resist control is seen as a fatal 
consequence of the division of society into separate codes of 
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behaviour for men and women. Hawthorne exposes the Romantic duality 
of "head" and "heart, " and its attendant myth: of masculine- and 
feminine behavioural habits, as a damaging and unhealthy restriction 
of human potential. Hollingsworth's power depends on this divide- 
and-rule policy, as he tells Zenobia that she has "a woman's view... 
whose whole sphere of action is in the heart, and who can conceive 
of no higher nor wider one! "= 
Zenobia's training as a woman in this particular society has led 
her to channel all her energies into the perceived necessity of 
marriage, valued as the single centre of her experience. When she is 
disappointed in love, she commits suicide. The woman who takes on 
male society, and attempts to "transcends its rules, " " thus comes 
to a bad end. Hawthorne's novel may perhaps be seen as repeating 
sadistic treatments of the dissenting woman in male-dominated 
fiction, while at the same time opening up criticisms of the unequal 
treatment of women in a society dominated by powerful men. After 
'tdI bitt tY th d di t' ieni+. iica. s death, 'Co`v'erd e er'' criticise: =-, e: - the ea y imposition 
of singular models of behaviour onto women: 
It is nonsense, and a miserable wrong - the result, like so 
many others, of masculine egotism - that the success or 
failure of woman's existence should be made to depend wholly 
on the affections, and on one species of affection; while 
man has such a multitude of other chances, that this seems 
but an incident. -'- 
The need for multiplicity, rather than this reductiveness and 
simplification of human experience to singularities or nanichean 
dualities, is thus a central preoccupation in Hawthorne, and recurs 
in his fictional probes into the damage caused by scientific 
rationalism and empiricism in mid-nineteenth century America, 
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"nappaccini's Daughter" (1844) also explores the work of a lone 
scientist and his female victim. A doctor who cultivates a garden. of 
medicinal plants, Rappaccini's interests in. science move beyond the 
merely utilitarian, involving him in power and the manipulation of 
others. Like Hollingsworth, he is an example of an unhealthy 
separation of intellect and emotion, his face "singularly marked 
with intellect and cultivation, but which could never, even in his 
more youthful days, have expressed much warmth of heart. " 
Criticism of Rappaccini's actions and motives is explicitly 
voiced in the story by Baglioni. As a professor of medicine, he is 
distrustful of Rappaccinni's "professional character": 
he cares infinitely more for science than for mankind. His 
patients are interesting to him only as subjects for some 
new experiment. He would sacrifice human life, his own among 
the rest, or whatever else was dearest to him, for the sake 
of adding so much as a grain of mustard seed to the great 
heap of his accumulated knowledge. `-; --: 
Rapp; accini is "as true a man of science as ever distilled his heart 
in an alembic, " in that "with what he calls the interests of science 
before his eyes, (he) will hesitate at nothing. ""- Baglioni warns 
Giovanni that "you are the subject of one of Rappaccini's 
experiments. " :" 
However, Hawthorne's story places this criticism of the abuse of 
science in the context of a character who is given his own vested 
interests in seeing Rappaccini fail. It is suggested that Bagiioni' s 
judgement, however apparently reasonable, may be motivated by 
professional rivalry. Accordingly, Hawthorne adds that Giovanni 
"might have taken Baglioni's opinions with many grains of allowance 
had he known that there was a professional warfare of long 
continuance between him and Dr. Rappaccini in which the latter was 
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generally thought to have gained the advantage. ": Baglioni's 
motives mix admiration, hatred and pia_asure in his plan to free 
Rappaccini's daughter from her father's influence: 
"We will thwart Rappaccini yet, " thought he, chuckling to 
himself, as he descended the stairs; "but, let us confess 
the truth of him, he is a wonderful man -a wonderful man 
indeed; a vile empiric, however, in his practice, and 
therefore not to be tolerated by those who respect the good 
old rules of the medical profession. 
Baglioni is a conservative, defending scholastic methods against the 
new empiricism of Rappaccinni. 
In this way, professional rivalries are shown to lie at the 
centre of the production of scientific findings. )[oreover, by 
placing criticism of the doctor within a situation of professional 
rivalry, Hawthorne makes the truths of his fiction provisional. As 
in Brockden Brown, perceptions are relativised, and opened to doubt. 
Thus, by showing truth and actuality to be complex and uncertain, 
human susceptibilities to control and manipulation are made more 
understandable. The prospect of judging situations clearly, and of 
avoiding the deceptiveness of power, is difficult in a world of 
shifting and uncertain appearances. 
Looking down on the garden in the light of morning, Giovanni 
reassesses Rappaccini and his daughter, whom he had previously seen 
in the fading and deceptive light of sunset. He is no longer certain 
of the truth of his previous perceptions, as he "could not determine 
how much of the singularity which he attributed to both was due to 
their own qualities and how much to his wonder-working fancy; but he 
was inclined to take a most rational view of the whole matter. "' As 
in Brown's Wieland, the problem of what constitutes rationality, and 
whether truth is determinate and determinable, is not mere 
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epistemology and philosophy, but is a matter of life or death, in a 
society based on manipulative power. 
The relativisation of truth in Hawthorne's story is further 
suggested by the possibility that Giovanni was drunk when he first 
sees, or thinks he sees, the strange activities in the garden. He 
had returned to his lodgings after drinking wine, "which caused his 
brain to swim with strange fantasies in reference to Dr. Rappaccini 
and the beautiful Beatrice. "" The "singular incident" of the lizard 
being killed by a drop of moisture from one of the flowers is made 
uncertain by Hawthorne's qualifications: "unless Giovanni's draughts 
of wine had bewildered his senses, " "but, at the distance from which 
he gazed, he could scarcely have seen any thing, so minute. .. 
However, by the end of the story, the truth of the situation is 
revealed. In his uncertainty over Beatrice's motives and actions, 
Giovanni comes to believe that she has "instilled a fierce and 
subtle poison into his system, "'1 feeling that he has put himself 
it with 1t rflueiý of an 
unintelligible power" by co'mmunicatinp w1411111 411e 1_L ill+ýý 
with her. However, the end of the story makes clear that the real 
source of evil influence is the invisible father, who has infected 
both children with his poison. Rappaccini, as his "bent form grew 
erect with conscious power, ""-' finally exults in the ability that 
his power gives for the manipulation of others. His power will 
provide Beatrice with the opportunity to be strong, and to avoid 
victimisation: 
Does thou deem it misery to be endowed with marvellous gifts 
against which no power nor strength could avail an enemy - 
misery, to be able to quell the mightiest with a breath 
misery to be as terrible as thou art beautiful? Wouldst 
thou, then, have preferred the condition of a weak woman, 
exposed to all evil and capable of none ? 4: D 
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Rappaccini thus uses his scientific power as a form of competitive 
strength, confirming him as the perverted Adam who preside- over a 
fallen Eden: 
Was this garden, then, the Eden of the present world'? And 
this man, with such a perception of harm in what his own 
hands caused to grow, - was he the Adam? 44 
As in Poe's "The Colloquy of Mona; and Una, " the abuses of 
scientific and technological skill are thereby associated with a 
perversion of innocence, and with a violation of Christian taboos on 
knowledge. Accordingly, the flowers tended by Rappaccini are 
described as "unnatural": 
Several also would have shocked a delicate instinct by an 
appearance of artificialness indicating that there had been 
such commixture, and, as it were, adultery of various 
vegetable species, that the production was no longer of 
God's making, but the monstrous offspring of man's depraved 
fancy, glowing with only an evil mockery of beauty. They 
were probably the result of experiment, which in one or two 
cases had succeeded in mingling plants individually lovely 
into a compound possessing the questionable and ominous 
character that distinguished the whole growth of the 
garden. <I' 
Human powers of experimentation and design are considered to be 
hubristic assumptions of the divine prerogative on creativity, and 
the sciences of botany and plant breeding as Faustian tamperings 
with a fixed, preordained "nature. " The results of such human pride 
in Hawthorne's story are death and sacrifice, as Beatrice dies, "the 
poor victim of man's ingenuity and of thwarted nature, and of the 
fatality that attends all such efforts of perverted wisdom. 
F i- t hma. ". r 1ä" .i 4_ '1: also invezE+iga+es l -. - rn+e, -} ýi El 8'=acrifl , - c= in a context 
of liberal Christian anxieties. In his quest for a transcendental 
idea;. of perfection and beauty, Aylmer transgresses-: Christian limits 
in an hubristic challenge to the powers of God the Creator. The 
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stor; r is set at the end of the eighteenth century, at the height of 
the ambitions of Newtonian science, when the "higher intellect, the 
imagination, the spirit, and even the heart might all find their 
congenial aliment in pursuits which, as some of their ardent 
votaries believed, would ascend from one step of powerful 
intelligence to another, until the philosopher should lay his hand 
on the secret of creative force and perhaps make new worlds for 
himself. "4" : Again, the heart is involved in scientific pursuit, as 
the story suggests the erotic:, of medical science. 
Aylmer bases his power and reputation as a scientist on his 
confidence in the efficacy and rightness of science. He feels 
"confident in his science, and felt that he could draw a magic 
circle round her within which no evil might intrude. "'"' He shows his 
wife a poison he has developed, so that, as he tells her, "No king 
on his guarded throne could keep his life if 1, in my private 
station, should deem that the welfare of millions justified me in 
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dear ý-v ing 
him of i t. a 
"terrific drug, " he replies, 
"Do not mistrust me, dearest, " said her husband, smiling; 
"its virtuous potency is yet greater than its harmful one. ' 
The bland assurance that Aylmer shows in the moral virtues of his 
science is fatal, as his faith in scientific progress encourages him 
to press beyond the limits of his capability, with deadly 
consequences for Georgiana. 
The basis of Aylmer's confidence is a mistaken belief that 
elevations in human capability through science will be attended by a 
similar elevation in humanity's awareness of its moral 
responsibilities. Believing that the "universal solvent" sought by 
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the alchemists may be found "by the plainest : scientific logic, " he 
adds that "a phlii3: =: i1}iher who should wo deep enough to acquire týl= 
power would attain too lofty a wisdom to stoop to the exercise of 
it. "1' Aylmer thus dangerously confounds knowledge and wisdom, and 
wrongly assumes the identity of scientific and of moral progress. 
Indeed, the gap between these two types of progress forms the basis 
of Hawthorne's criticism of contemporary social developments, as it 
s for Emerson's essay "Works and Days" (1870), which will be doe 
discussed in chapter 7. 
Aylmer is shown, despite his accumulated knowledge, to lack a 
higher wisdom that would reach beyond the restrictive duality of 
matter and spirit: 
Yet, had Aylmer reached a profounder wisdom, he need not 
thus have flung away the happiness which would have woven 
his mortal life of the self:; ame texture with the celestial. 
The momentary circumstance was too strong for him; he failed 
to look beyond the shadowy scope of time, and, living once 
for all in eternity, to find the perfect future in the 
present. ,, _ 
A wit h Hollingsworth in The sii hedaie Romance, Aylmer's 
pursuit of science demonstrates the "tyrannizing influence acquired 
by one idea over his mind. °`, -' Accordingly, his monomania becomes 
anti-_ocial, displacing even his love for his wife: 
He had devoted himself, however, too unreservedly to 
scientific studier ever to be weaned from them by any second 
passion. His love for his young wife might prove the 
stronger of the two; but it could only be by intertwining 
itself with his love of science and uniting the strength of 
the latter to his own, `'13 
Thus Aylmer gets caught in an insane, quasi-religious quest for 
static, Platonist perfection. His wife's birthmark comes to 
represent for him "the visible mark of earthly imperfection. " its 
"crimson hand" expressing 
- 94 - 
the ineludible gripe in which mortality clutches the highest 
and purest earthly mould, degrading them into kindred with 
the lowest, and even with the very brutes, like whom their 
visible frames return to dust. In this mannner, selecting it 
as the symbol of his wife', liability to sin, sorrow, decay, 
and death. 
So Aylmer dedicates himself to using his scientific powers in a 
spiritual quest beyond mortal imperfection. Disgust and shame at the 
animality of the human body, in a Christian context of sin and 
bodily repression, leads Aylmer inadvertently to sacrifice his wife, 
in an insane attempt to perfect the imperfectible. Aylmer fails to 
recognize "the truth" he had discovered earlier in his scientific 
career, 
that our great creative Mother, while she amuses us with 
apparently working in the broadest . sunshine, is yet severely 
careful to keep her own secrets, and, in spite of her 
pretended openness, shows us nothing but results. She 
permits us, indeed, to mar, but seldom to mend, and, like a 
jealous patentee, on no account to make. "' 
Christian limits are thus seen to censor human creativity and 
poesis, correcting the boundary-breaking drives of Faustian science 
towards the infinite. 
The victim of Aylmer's transgression of Christian natural law is 
again a woman, who consents to the operation, as she says, "at 
whatever risk. '"1,7 The story suggests that her consent is grounded 
both in her need to be accepted by her husband, and in the faith she 
places in his scientific ability, on the basis of previous 
demonstrations of its efficacy. Having lived with Aylmer's horror at 
her birthmark, she "soon learned to shudder at his gaze, ""-` and 
thereby comes to accept her husband's perception of her, and the 
power and authority of his gaze, so that, before the operation, "Not 
even Aylmer now hated it so much as she. "'' 
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Reading her husband's scientific notebooks, G_orgiana admires 
the way he "handled physical details as if there were nothing beyond 
them; yet spiritualized them all and redeemed himself from 
materialism by his strong and eager aspiration towards the 
infinite. " After reading of his heroic failures, she tells him, "It 
has made me worship you more than ever... Accordingly, she 
offers herself as a sacrificial victim to a male god, convinced of 
her own worthlessness and sin. 
Consent is thus given through passivity and lack of self-will. 
Georaiana even takes her husband's dedication to an ideal of beauty 
as flattering, as an extraordinary display of "honorable love, " "so 
pure and lofty that it would accept nothing less than perfection nor 
miserably make itself contented with an earthier nature than he had 
dreamed of": 
She felt how much more precious was such a sentiment than 
that meaner kind which would have been guilty of treason to 
holy love by degrading its perfect idea to the level of the 
actual; and with her whole spirit she prayed that, for a 
single moment, she might satisfy his highest and deepest 
conception. Longer than one moment she well knew it could 
not be; for his spirit was ever on the march, ever 
ascending, and each instant required something that was 
beyond the scope of the instant before. '--1 
As in Poe, the desire for unlimited growth of scientific and 
technological procedures brings about dis-ease, and destroys beauty. 
Yet even when she is dying, killed by Aylmer's bungled operation, 
Georgiana's attitude remains one of respect for his power, and for 
the rightness of his actions: "you have aimed loftily; you have done 
nobly. Do not repent that, with so high and pure a feeling, you have 




In this way, Aylmer becomes an ambivalent figure of heroic 
failure, as the comments on hin journal suggest: 
It was the sad confession and continual exemplification of 
the shortcomings of the composite man, the spirit burdened 
with clay and working in matter, and of the despair that 
assails the higher nature at finding itself so miserably 
thwarted by the earthly part. Perhaps every man of genius, 
in whatever sphere, might recognize the image of his own 
experience in Aylmer's journal. 
"The Birthmark" is thus ambivalent in its handling of the 
aspirations of an exceptional figure for an ideal, Spiritual 
perfection. Such ambivalence is also evident in "The Artist of the 
Beautiful" (1844). Owen Warland's "irregular genius""I is an object 
of suspicion for his acquaintances. Peter Hovenden sums up a 
prevalent attitude to the exceptional figure since the nineteenth 
century: "What can Owen Warland be about? "`-'" 
Warland does not conform to the utilitarian orthodoxies of 
nineteenth century industrialism, exemplified in the work of the 
blacksmith Robert Danforth, The latter's hard, manual labour is 
clued by the community, who consider him a man who, as Peter 
Hovenden puts it, "spends his labor upon a reality. "`'Warland, in 
contrast, works "always for the purposes of grace, and never with 
any mockery of the useful, " his work "refined from all utilitarian 
coarseness. " As a result, he looks "with singular distaste at the 
stiff and regular processes of ordinary machinery. " The steam engine 
appears as "something monstrous and unnatural to him. ""'' 
Warland's squeamish rejection of contemporary industrial 
technology provokes his quasi-aristocratic removal from the rest of 
scoiety. He comes to live the anti-social life that Hawthorne sees 
as a constant danger for the creative non-conformist: 
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To persons whose pursuits are insulated from the common 
business of life - who are either in advance of mankind or 
apart from it - there often comes a sensation of moral cold 
that makes the spirit shiver as if it had reached the frozen 
solitudes around the pole. What the prophet, the poet, the 
reformer, the criminal, or any other man with human 
yearnings, but separated from the multitude by a peculiar 
lot, might feel, poor Owen Warland felt. '="` 
He become:; absorbed in a "secret occupation, "'" the "one idea to 
which all his intellectual activity referred itself. "7' In this 
story, Hawthorne's monomaniac pursues an ideal comparable to 
Aylmer's in "The Birthmark, " namely, that of the "spiritualization 
of matter. "" 
The insanity of such an impossible quest is, however, treated 
ambiguously. Hawthorne's writing refuses either to condemn him 
unequivocally, or to confirm his madness, as the shifting, 
indecisive argument in the following quotation makes evident: 
The townspeople had one comprehensive explanation of all 
these singularities. Owen Warland had gone mad! How 
universally efficacious - how satisfactory, too, and 
soothing to the injured sensibility of narrowness and 
dulness - is this easy method. of accounting for whatever 
lies beyond 'S most ordinary 1 From t. Paul's lbeyond tisie Würl ld. i `ý' oS^ý^pe v 
days down to our poor little Artist of the Beautiful, the 
: same talisman had been applied to the elucidation of all 
mysteries in the words or deeds of men who spoke or acted 
too wisely or too well. In Owen Warland's case the judgement 
of his townspeople may have been correct. Perhaps he was 
mad. The lack of sympathy - that contrast between himself 
and his neighbors which took away the restraint of example - 
was enough to male him so. Or possibly he had caught just so 
much of ethereal radiance as served to bewilder him, in an 
earthly sense, by its intermixture with the common 
daylight.: ': 
Warland is made an ambivalent figure by the refusal of a singular 
authorial point-of-view: view: "It was his fortune, good or ill, to 
achieve the purpose of his life. "'' 
Like Aylmer in I' the Birthmark, " Wariand seeks to improve on 
"Nature, " in response to a Platonic ideal mimesis: 
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Nature's ideal butterfly was here realized in all its 
perfection, not in the pattern of such faded insects as flit 
among earthly flowers, but of those which hover across the 
meads of paradise for child-angels and the spirits of 
departed infants to disport themselves with. '' 
Crucially, this desire to transcend actuality carries over 
damagingly into Warland's relationships with other human beings in 
society, especially in his reluctance or inability to pursue his 
love for Annie. Her subsequent marriage to the blacksmith produces a 
child., "a little personage who had come mysteriously out of the 
infinite, but with something so sturdy and real, in his composition 
that he seemed moulded out of the densest substance which earth 
could supply. "''`' Unlike Warland's automaton butterfly, the child is 
not a mere simulacrum of life, SO that Annie admires "her own 
infant, and with good reason, far more than the artistic 
butterfly. ", `- Here, Hawthorne's duplicitious handling is temporarily 
abandoned, and Warland is explicitly and unequivocally condemned for 
pursuing an impassible ideal. Actuality is reasserted over Platonist 
lýngrng. 
Annie's "good reason" for preferring actuality to Platonic ideal 
is reinforced by Danforth, who inadvertently reduces Warland's 
life's work to an absurdity. At first, Danforth is convinced that 
the automaton is a real butterfly. However, he dismisses this, notion 
as improbable, assuming that any attempt to imitate a real butterfly 
would be futile: 
Do you suppose any mortal has skill enough to make a 
butterfly, or would put himself to the trouble of making, 
one, when any child may catch a score of them in a summer's 
afternoon? ' 
Danforth's demolition of Warland'&ý attempts at mimesis moves beyond 
mere utilitarian, common sen:; i, cal ignorance, towards a criticism of 
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himself puts Warland's obsession with his single idea. As Warland 
it, his butterfly "may well be said to posse-ýi;: 1 life, for it has 
absorbed my own being into itself. °It has "imbibed a spiritual 
essence - call it magnetism, or what you will. "'- The artist has 
wasted his creative energies on a trivial technological artifact 
which, rather than being under his control, has total control over 
him. So the child, "with his grandsire's sharp and shrewd expression 
in his face, " crushes the automaton butterfly with his "plump 
an 
14 l a:: 
Nevertheless, Hawthorne's story remains ambivalent, in that 
Warland's quest for perfection is given the final word, in terms of 
nobility and of heroic failure. The ruin of Warland's life's work 
was "yet no ruin": 
He had caught a far other butterfly than this. When the 
artist rose high enough to achieve the beautiful, the symbol 
by which he made it perceptible to mortal senses became of 
little value in his eyes while his spirit possessed itself 
in the enjoyment of the reality.: " 
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individual genius, noticeable in both "The Artist of the Beautiful" 
and "Rappaccini's Daughter, " i5 markedly absent from 
"Ethan Brand" (1851), which, with The B1ithedale Rnxance, is an 
unequivocal condemnation of monomanic obsession. 
Ethan Brand's search for the "Unpardonable Sin" is an insane 
dedication to a single ruling idea, the "one though', that took 
po5: -: e, e: _ion of his life. " "1His quest is as futile as the dog chasing 
its own tail: "Never was seen such headlong eagerness in pursuit of 
an object that could not possibly be attained. `-- 
-- 10 () - 
Like Owen Warland, Brand rejects the utilitarian values 
predominant in his society, represented in this story by the man who 
was "of a different order, and troubled himself with no thoughts 
save the very few that were requisite to his business»'4 More so 
than in "The Artist of the Beautiful, " however, the utilitarian and 
commonplace in "Ethan Brand" suggest= a sense of that human 
communality and warmth rejected by Brand's egotistic withdrawl. 
Brand's intentions began beneficently, inspired by liberal 
Christian values of humanistic mutuality: 
He remembered with what tenderness, with what love and 
sympathy for mankind, and what pity for human guilt and woe, 
he had first begun to contemplate those ideas which 
afterwards became the inspiration of his life; with what 
reverence he had then looked into the heart of man, viewing 
it as a temple originally divine, and, however desecrated, 
still to be held sacred by a brother; with what awful fear 
he had deprecated the success of his pursuit, and prayed 
that the Unpardonable Sin might never be revealed to him. 
However, Brand commits the fatal error in Hawthorne, of separating 
intellect from emotion, head from heart. Enclosed in hubristic 
egotism, he is static and fixed, "standing erect with a pride that 
distinguishes all enthusiasts of his stamp. " Like a brand or a 
stamp, his ego lacks flexibility, and asserts itself repeatedly in 
its singular quest, without consideration for others. Brand admits 
to having committed the "sin of an intellect that triumphed over the 
sense of brotherhood with man and reverence for God, and sacrificed 
everything to its own mighty claims: "7, 
S'uch male control is main exerted over female vulnerability, as 
the story mentions Esther, "the very girl whom, with such cold and 
remorseless purpose, Ethan Brand had made the subject of a 
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psychological experiment, and wasted, absorbed, and perhaps 
annihilated her soul, in the process. "- 
Brand's Faustian rise and fall is summarised as follows: 
Then ensued that vast intellectual development, which, in 
its progress, disturbed the counterpoise between his mind 
and heart. The Idea that possessed his life had operated as 
a means of education; it had gone on cultivating his powers 
to the highest point of which they were : susceptible; it had 
raised him from the level of an unlettered laborer to stand 
on a star-lit eminence whither the philosophers of the earth, 
laden with the lore of universities, might vainly strive to 
clamber after him. So much for the intellect! But where was 
the heart'? That, indeed, had withered, - had contracted, - 
had hardened, - had perished! It had ceased to partake of 
the universal throb. He had lost his hold of the magnetic 
chain of humanity. He was no longer a brother-man, opening 
the chambers or the dungeons of our common nature by the key 
of holy sympathy, which gave him a right to share in all its 
secrets; he was now a cold observer, looking, on mankind as 
the subject of his experiment, and, at length, converting 
man and woman to be his puppets, and pulling the wires that 
moved them to such degres:: -ý; of crime as were demanded for his 
study. 
Thus Ethan Brand became a fiend. He began to be so from 
the moment that his moral nature had ceased to keep the pace 
of improvement with his intellect.;: 
Hawthorne thus criticr. _: e, the apparent detachment of the 
1111t-elle- .. 
+uÄ'1l manipulator, tuý, c ý. ý LL 
"coed " .i +äc ý1 ýi observer 
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of others, G' .. ý , "1ý4vu 
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who errs by neglecting to acknowledge the sense of mutual 
involvement and participation on which a democratic society depends. 
"Ethan Brand, " and the other stories discussed in this chapter, 
may in this way be considered an attack on the claims to 
objectivity, moral detachment and progress of the Newtonian 
experimental scientist. The scientist is considered as a solitary, 
exceptional figure, who endangers society by his dedication to a 
single, fixed purpose, abstracted from healthy centres of mutuality, 
emotion and sociability. 
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Hawthorne's perception of the widening gap between intellectual 
and moral progress in the middle of the nineteenth century is taken 
up again by Melville and Emerson, whose work will be discussed in 
the next two chapters. 
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CHAPTER C. 
He aan 1'LF' ji i, 
1 ft. ' 
The engineer-scientist iIi the fiction of Herman Melville, as in 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, is a single individual, not yet part of a 
collective organisation. In "The Bell-Tower" (1855), Melville 
ores the anti-: oc_ial tendencies of the lone Faustian inventor. 
An "unble: t foundling, " Bannadonna's separateness from the rest of 
orthodox Christoman society Ien`s his work, "that sort, of mystery 
pertaining to the forbidden. The narrative provides coljectu 
rather than certain interpretations, of the secret motivation:; of 
hin work. 
The relationship between Bannadonna and his State oatrons 
suggests issues concerning the political control of science and 
technology. Because of his exceptional reputation, Bannadonna is 
ai t_iState- "the noblest F-e 1i-Tower emplo e-d v the t0 t1 build e nü<e'1t in It31y, 
paid for by the wealth created by foreign trade with the Levant. The 
inventor' personal ambition is thus exploited by the State for its 
own purposes. The casting of the giant bell, an unprecedented feat 
of advanced engineering, is a triumph for the individual caster "in 
which the state might not scorn to share. ""- 
The: 
-7. e political interests are protected by both the legal system 
and the Church. When Bannadonna commits a "homicide, " kiiiina one o* 
h= wor_ men with a ladle after he has shown fear during the meta 
smelting process, his "feIony" in remitted by the judge, and he i: F, 
given absolution by the priest. Moreover, 
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Y ti-= ha ýt a bls that `ü_ 4} wa but imputed to sudden 1 
transports o esthetic passion, not to any iagit iou 
quality. A kick from an Arabian charger; not Sign of vice, 
but blood. " 
Melville's prose thus presents ambivalences and tentative, 
Provisional evaluations of the artist-engineer, whose power edges 
into criminality. 
The ambivalent relationship between the engineer and political 
leadership is also shown in the attribution to Bannadonna of 
mysterious powers, which give an esoteric and awesome appearance to 
his scient1fic and technical knowledge. When he refer= to his 
machine as a living person - "he" rather than "it" - the politicians 
hide their unease, remaining silent, "unwilling, perhaps, to let the 
foundling see how easily it lay within his plebeian art to stir the 
placid dignity of the nobles. '" Standing at the top of his faell- 
tower, Bannadonna's unique power is again evident. From his elevated 
pos tion, achieved through hie own technological expertise, e. he is 
able to survey "sigh. ts invisible from the plain, " and can gaze at 
the people below without being seen: "Invisible, too, from thence 
was that eye he turned below... "' This dream of invisible, 
unassai able )aiio ptiC control through technology will return in the 
practices of "scientific management" of Frederick Taylor and Henry 
Ford, discussed in chapter 12, as te_chniQue: ý; of power are further 
developed in the twentieth century. 
Ban-nadonna's fixed, obsessional project has apparently 
utility Ian bases: to invent a machine that rII automate tle ob of 
bell ringirr His criteria for success therefore include efficiency 
and mechanically accurate time-kee_'iiing: "to de'v'ise some metallic 
0F -- 
ag nt Which should strike te hour with its mechanic hand , with 
f `v° is greater precision than the vital one. 
However, Melville places these dreams of total automation within 
a Christian context of fears about the human creation of simulacra. 
in this way, Bannadonna's search for a perfect substitute for human 
toil move,; beyond utilitarian, industrialist values, as he seeks to 
supply "nothing le: _:. than a supplement to the Six Day's Work; 
stocking the earth with a new serf. "'" His actions would thereby be 
considered blasphemous within a. context of Christian anxieties 
concerning the Fall, which sake:; physical labour a deserved 
ansequenc of rebellion. The engineer, from this Christian point- 
of-view, commits the sin of pride in seeking to improve on God's 
creation: "all excellencies of all God-made creatures, which served 
man, were here to receive advancement, and then to be combined in 
one ,u 
rr 
"The Bell-Tower" places these rellvt2ious anxiet- with t Le, myth 
rf . rometheu 1, a central myth of nineteenth century technolo: aical 
expansion. As such, the story may be compared to Mary Shel ley' . =: 
Frrankenstei n; or, the Nodern Prometheus ; lS l8) .'' 
Like Bannadanna, Dr. Frankenstein is a contemporary scientist 
who draws on modern : _: cientific technique-. Rather than relying on 
the old alchemical methods of Paracelsus and Albertu: NLagnus to 
create his monster, he undertakes physiological research into human 
anatomy, using corpse:; stolen from the local graveyard. The use of 
1e tricitV in the attempt to resuscitate corpses is S17elley'ö 
extrapolation from contemporary cieni e, such a: tee work of Luigi. 
GalJani and his nephew Giovanni Aldini, who in 1802 experimented on 
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a recently hanged criminal as part of iii ; research into a dream of 
reviving corpses through electrical treatment. 
r in Meiville's story, Eannadonna similarly reject'- the alchemical 
mysteries of "Albert Magus" and Agrippa, but goes even further than 
Dr. Frankenstein, by showing a lack of interest in modern research 
into natural philosophy. He does not hope "bT physiological and 
chemical induction;,, to arrive at a knowledge of the source of life, 
and so qualify... to manufacture and improve upon it'll- - the 
technique of Dr. Frankenstein - but rather approaches the problem of 
simulating life processes pragmatically, with a minimum of theory. 
He has tie "utilitarian ambition" of Jeffersonian science and 
engineering: 
a practical materialist, what Bannadonna had aimed at was to 
have been reached, not by logic, not by crucible, not by 
altars; but by plain vice-benc1i and hammer. In short, to 
solve nature, to steal into her, to intrigue beyond her, to 
procure some one else to bind her to his hand; - these, one 
and all, had not been his objects; but, asking no favors 
from any element or any being, of himself, to rival her, 
outstrip her, and rule her. He stooped to conquer. With him, 
common sense was thr_'urgy; machinery, miracle; Prometheus, 
the heroic name of rachinist; Elan, the true God. 1-4 
Eaninaäonna. `s desire to rule a natural world depicted as essentially 
femiial follows in the damagin histor Cal tradition of Science from 
Francis Bacon's identification of Feature as feminine and passive, 
and therefore exploitable. Melville shows scientific control to be 
not magical, but a product of technological design and pragmatic 
engineering. However, the suggestion of mystery and of Promethean 
struggle between divine force; -, remains in the ambiguous pairing:; of 
the last sentence quoted above. 
Th e=, ce i: = ;e of religious iýr ead is also evident in "the ia2 taros 
of Maids" (1855', in which Melville shi emphasis from "the Cy is 
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solitaire", " of "The Bell-Tower" to the new collective factory 
organisations of mid-century America. The "whitewashed"', paper mill 
becomes a sepulchre in which young girls are subjected to the 
repetitive tasks of an assembly-line. As a result, their bodily 
actions become as repetitive and mechanical as the machines they are 
operating: 
At rows of blank-looking counter: -. sat rows of blank-looking 
girls, wit: blank, white folder: in Their blank hand-., all 
blankly folding blank paper. '" 
The girls are thus transformed into the. product they make: "handling 
such white bits of sheet all he time makes them so sheet "I; -. 
Melville'; story charts a dual. movement beyond utilitarian and 
rationalist commonplace-G. As the girls are de-humanised through 
mechanisation, so the central machine appears to take on independent 
life, ruling in silent, animal power: 
Not a syllable was breathed. Nothing was heard but the low, 
steady overruling hum of the iron animals. The human voice 
was banished from the spot. Machinery - that vaunted stave 
of humanity - here stood menially served by human beings, 
who served mutely and cr inginwly as the slave serves the 
Sultan. The girls did not so much seem accessory wheels to 
the general machinery as mere cogs to the wheels. " 
Human beings have besame slaves to a new god, whose power i. 
associated with its gigantic size and its rigid determinism. The 
Kadin co1O: zý; sal water wheel" move:; "with its one immutable 
It " 
The perfect determinism of the Newtonian Watch-maker God can be 
feit in the machine's rigid execution of its tasks: 
For a moment a curious emotion filled me, not wholly unlike 
that which one might experience at the fulfillment of some 
mysterious prophecy. But how absurd, thought I again; the 
thing is a mere machine, the essence of which is unvarying 
p unctua1ity and precision. ''' 
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The la our- rotes exactly timed to take nine minutes, as the 
1'ýem line, invented at the erid of the eighteenth century by 
Oiiver Evans, imposes speed, repetition and passivity on its workers 
decades before Frederick Taylor's introduction of "time and motion" 
work disciplines at t ie end of the_' ninetet nth. 'entury.... '.. 
Ir. Melvilie's story, such mechanical perfection is identified 
with divine intelligence: 
Something of awe now stole over me, as I gazed upon this 
inflexible iron animal, Always, more or less, machinery of 
this ponderous, elaborate sort strikes, in some moods, 
strange dread into the human heart, as some living, panting 
Behemoth might. But what made the thing I saw so specially 
terrible to me was the metallic necessity, the unbudging 
fatality which governed it. Though, here and there, I could 
not follow the thin, gauzy veil of pulp in the course of its 
more mysterious or entirely invisible advance, yet it was 
indubitable that, at those points where it eluded me, it 
still marched on in unvarying docility to the autocratic 
cunning of the machine. A fascination fastened on me. I 
stood spell-bound and wandering in my soul. `z` 
This identification of technology with divine power places 
technology within a context of inevitability and of "metallic 
necessity, " thereby shifting emphasis away from the specific 
historical power relations that pertain in industrial society. The 
machine in Melville's story is mystified as a "miracle of 
inscrutable intricacy. "`"' This Christian attribution of divine power 
to technological extensions of the humnan body can thus ne seen as a 
potential otlscuration of power relations. Such evasive strategies 
will be seen again in Henry Adams' vision of the dynamos in Paris, 
as. well as in the science fiction examined in chapter 11. 
This anthropomorphic mystification of technology makes the 
invention Of possible resistances difficult. in "The Tartarus of 
Maids, " the "passive-looking show no capacity for 
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disobedience or revolt. Instead, they are "Their own executioners; 
themselves whetting the very _words that -lay them, meditated n..; r:. 
The pallid faces that the narrator sees in the pulp move "Slowly, 
mournfully, beseechingly, yet unresistingly.. "'' At the end of the 
story, the girls remain "maid: -, " cut off from vitalising, erotic 
areas of bodily pleasure and fulfillment. 
In Noby-Dick (1851), authoritarian power is again considered as 
silent and deterministic, as Ahab'- mania for progress and 
determinism calls for sacrificial dedication: 
Captain Ahab stood erect, looking straight out beyond the 
ship's ever-pitching prow. There was an infinity of firmest 
fortitude, a determinate, unsurrenderable wilfulne. s, in the 
fixed and fearless, forward dedication of that glance, Not a 
word he spoke; nor did his officers say aught to him: though 
by all their minutest gestures and expressions=:, they plainly 
showed the uneasy, if not , painful consciousnes: _., of being 
under a troubled master-eye. And not only that, but moody 
stricken Ahab stood before them a crucifixion in his face; 
in all the nameless regal overbearing dignity of some mighty 
woe, '' 
The gaze of power is here considered as fixity and repetition within 
an uncertain, "ever-pitching" space. Yet Aha 's suffering and 'elf- 
sacrifice is also dignified, as he is attributed the status of 
tragic hero. 
Ahab is finally dragged under the sea by the White Whale itself, 
for the tragic, hubristic limitations on human endeavour in Xoby- 
Dick are elemental. In Chapter 58, "Brit, " Ishmael warns of natural 
resist to science and technology, which thwart human ambitions 
to dominate nature. The universe is greater than human abilities to 
master and subdue it: 
however baby man may brag of his science and Skill, and 
however much, in a flattering future, that science and skill 
may augment; yet for ever and ever, to the crack of doom, 
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the sea will insult and murder him, and pulveri_e the 
stateliest, stiffest frigate he can make... -' 
Melville's awareness of the refractory powers of the non-human 
distinguishes his writing from those myths of scientific and 
technological omniscience that have tended to underpin much American 
science fiction writing since his time. Ishmael is willing to 
respect the "inscrutable tides of God, ""' and to preserve their 
inscrutability. Ahab, on the other hand, insists on a singular 
interpretation of natural phenomena, leading to his mad desire to 
kill the White Whale, which, in its inscrutability and otherness, 
appears as a threat to his desire for total control. As in 
Hawthorne's fiction, therefore, commitment to singularity and 
deterministic fixity is in Melville a prime source of danger for 
human society. 
Ahab suffers because of his compulsive need to pierce the 
phenomenal world of events, in order to reveal a static, absolute 
reality beneath: 
Al l visible objects, man, are but Paste board Jas-ks. But in 
each event - in the living act, the undoubted deed - there, 
some unknown but still reasoning thing puts forth the 
mouldings of i Its features from behind the unreasoning mask. 
If a man will strike, strike through the mask' How can the 
prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall? 
To me the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me, 
Sometimes I think there's naught beyond. But 'tie enough. he 
tasks me; he heaps me; I : gee in him outrageous strength, 
with an inscrutable malice sinewing in it. That inscrutable 
thing is chiefly what I hate; and be the white whale agent, 
or be the white whale principal, I will wreak that hate upon 
mim. 
Ahab's paranoiac quest for the singular is thus part of Mohr-Dick's 
examination of the damage of totalising ans totalitarian impulses. 
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In Israel Potter (1855), Benjamin Franklin is similarly 
satirised as a manically totalitarian rationalist, As Melville 
summarises Franklin's American technologist's know-how: 
Having carefully weighed the world, Franklin could act any 
part in it... jack of all trades, master of each and 
mastered by none - the type and genius of his land. Franklin 
was everything but a poet. 
Franklin seeks to impose a total grid of continuous, connected space 
onto the world. This programme, as in the other stories explored in 
this chapter, is given suggestions of black magic and mystique. The 
walls of the American hero's : study thus have a "necromantic look, " 
and contain 
wide maps of far countries in the New World, containing vast 
empty spaces in the middle, with the word DESERT 
diffusely printed there, so as to span five-and-twenty 
degrees of longitude with only two syllables, - which 
printed word however bore a vigorous pen-mark, in the 
Doctor's hand, drawn straight through it as if in summary 
repeal of it... 
Israel Potter himself counters such rationalist, mercantile 
enclosures with an adventurous drifting across boundaries, 
Nevertheless. Israel's act of rebellion against his tyrannical 
father is treated ambivalently by Melville, with a sense of loss and 
of nostalgia. Having "emancipated himself from his sire, " Israel's 
adventures are part of his "fifty years of exile, " in which "poor 
Potter wandered' in the Wild wilderness of the World''=. extremist 
h"-., a. ard, shi ps and il. L'.. " 
In X L)v i'' k. 's_hlame" ]s another ' rI i ter, his nu e mot: Ef 
ein 
provisional and unfixed: "Cal me ? shmael. " _ Hi_ boundary-eronnin; 
and drifting beyond atati city is less nostalgic than L that of Israel 
V lL 
Potter. Explaining his decision to go to sea as an escape from 
despair, an alternative to suicide or murder, Ishmael finds only 
-'1121 - 




}'tied to counters, nailed to benches, Clinched to 
le_k ." The sea, in contrast, initiate:; a line of flight; it is, 
in Ishmael's description, "the image of the ungraspable phantom of 
life. This acknowledgement of the sea as beyond fixity and 
comprehension informs Moby-Dick's criticism of totalising fantasies. 
The "Cetology" chapter extends this satire on de-sires for a secure 
totality in terms of encyclopaedic clla. s. sif', 4. atory and explanatory 
Structures. 
L hmael bases his c toio ical . stem on the categoric:; of print 
technology - folio, octavo, quarto, etc - perhaps suggesting (a: ý a 
sort of proto-Mchuhan) a relationship between the need for 
hierarchical classificatory systems and the obse:, ion:; of a print- 
base 3 society with visual neatness and order. 
Ishmael states his ambition as the "classification of the 
_o i: ýtitt ent: E of a chao , nothing 
is her P_ c: ý; =;: a'yed. However 
trio I-est of the chapter su- ge`1t;; that chaos is an irreducible fac. tor 
in any y; t, em, and that the phenomenological complexity of 
experience cannot be contained by static abstractions. Of the 
failure; of previous systematisers of whales, "only those following 
Dwrn ever saw living wha1e: =;, and but one of the wa a Ted 
professional har, pooneer and whalemani. " :: The actual detail; of 
whales, any they exist in an unfixed, proceaoal envircarrent, thu:; 
belie the attempts of stienti: t: and philosophers to place them 
within Static a priori systems. In this way, Melville reverses the 
relegation of empirical particulars in Poe''_ "Eureka, " and in the 
work of Emerson, discussed in the next chapter. 
1 LI 
Ishmael understands the necessity of giving up such ambitions 
fo r totality and complete ness, for having the la ,t word: "I promise 
nothing complete; because any human thing supposed to be complete, 
must fr that very reason infallibly be faulty. " So his system 
becomes a meta-system, aware of its own fictiveness. The Structure 
of cla: s: sification sy, _tems, as Felix Guattari puts it in Kolecular 
Revolution, "exist not within things, but alongside them. "' 
At the end of the "Cetology" chapter, anomalies remain that 
aasnot be fitted into the system: the "rabble of uncertain, 
fugitive, half-fabulous whales, which, as an American whalernan, 1 
know by reputation, bt not per soIial ly. "a Ishmael must necessarily 
leave his classificatory system unfinished. But this failure is 
characterised by a tone of humour, rather than of melancholy and 
regret, as Melville explodes nostalgic needs for certainty, static 
order and singular truth: 
But now I leave my cetological System standing thus 
unfinished, even as the great Cathedral of Cologne was left, 
with the crane still standing upon the top of the 
uncompleted tower. For small erections may be finished by 
their first architects; grand ones, true ones, ever leave 
the copestone to posterity. God keep me from ever completing 
anything. This whole book is but a draught - nay, but the 
draught of a draught. Oh, Time, Strength, Cash, and 
Patience! 
Melville is thus an early critic of deterministic, total i. ning 
ambitions, who tends to view quests for singularity, including those 
of science and technology, as a transgression of moral taboos, and 
consequently as a source of both : anxiety and fascination. 
-ii 4t - 
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FM; chapter will be mainly concerned with the relationship 
between change and systematisation in. the work of Emerson. His 
strivings for unitary truth and system provide their own critique, 
as an awareness of change and variety in the universe giver his 
writings a complexity beyond the simplifications of a static 
cosmology. 
in the essay "Nature" (1; ß, 3r), Emerson gave his criterion for the 
truth of a theory in terms of itS a priarl power of totalisation: 
Vhenever a true theory appears, it will be its own evidence. 
It test is, that it will explain all phenomena. 
The essay deploys the word "nature" as a magical guarantor of 
spiritual renewal through unmediated acces: _, to a universal Iota] ity. 
The whole is healing: 
In the woods, we return to reason and faith. There L feel 
that nothing; can befall me in life, - no disgrace, no 
calamity , leaving me my eyes), whirl nature can of repair. 
Standing on the bare ground, - my head bathed by the blithe 
air and uplifted into infinite space, - all mean egotism 
vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I 
see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate 
through me; i am part and parcel of God. 
As a "transparent eyeball, " Emerson maintains the Romantic urge to 
span the gap between self and other, by receiving meaning beyond 
mediation. Thus despite the disclaimer, Emerson's visionary is a 
supreme egotist: "In proportion to the energy of his thought and 
will, he takes up the world into himself. " 
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a view of 7an'd`uaue ao corre: ýDon ingg' mimetic: ly to natural ob, jects, 
and revealing thereby a divinely-ordained spiritual meaning. Emerson 
puts this schematically: 
1. Words are signs of natural facts. 
2. Particular natural facts are symbol. -: of particular 
Uriritual facts, 
3, Nature is the symbol of spirit. 4 
10 this way, Emerson places "facts" within a total signifying 
system, as signs of an overall, immutable system of moral and 
spiritual law. Diverse evidences of change, complexity and 
transformation in the universe are thereby incuded in a projected 
unity. However, the complexity and paradoxical strategies of 
Emerson's prose works against the singular, overall unity that he 
seeks. 
In the 1836 "Nature, " Emerson describes the laws of nature a 
source, of moral slaw in human society, as "axioms of physics 
translate the law of ethics, `:, in this way, the transcendentalist 
Emerson meets the materialist Elihu Palmer, in their use of "nature" 
and the "organic" as a prescriptive, justificatory argument for 
human behaviour and politics. Emerson's system seeks to subsume 
diversity and. "boundless" change within a higher moral order, static 
and unified: 
All things are moral; and in their boundless changes have an 
unceasing reference to spiritual nature, Therefore is nature 
glorious with form, color, and notion; that every globe in 
the remotest heaven, every chemical change from the rudest 
crystal up to the laws of life, every change of vegetation 
from the first principle of growth in the eye of a leaf, to 
the tropical forest and antediluvian coal-mine, every animal 
function from the sponge up to Hercules, shall hint or 
thunder to man the laws of right and wrong, and echo the Ten 
Commandment:. Therefore is Nature ever the ally of Pýeligion: 
lends all her pomp and riches to the religious sentiment. " 
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This need to subsume empirical facts within. a total system is the 
u,: i'öi; _ O 
Emer: ýOP, ämI'iýlä 11 eng attitude towards pinysical For 
Emerson, physical scientists must gain access to Platonic ideal- 
forms beyond empirical sense data. Challenging the certainties of 
Newtonian materialism as merely "solid seemini, " he places such a 
critique of material-i! =-m within a total a priori system of spiritual 
transcendence: 
a spiritual life has been imparted to nature; that the solid 
seeming block of matter has been pervaded and dissolved by a 
thought; that this feeble human being has penetrated the 
vast masses of nature with an informing soul, and recognized 
itself in their harmony, that is, seized their law. in 
physics, when this is attained, the memory disburthens 
itself of its cumbrous catalogues of particulars, and 
carries centuries of observation in a single formula. 
Thus even in physics, the material is degraded before 
the spiritual, The astronomer, the geometer, rely on their 
irrefragable analysis, and disdain the results of 
observation. The sublime remark of Euler on his law of 
arches, "This will be found contrary to all experience, yet 
is true; " had already transferredi nature into the mind, and 
left matter like an outcast corpse. ' 
Yet Emerson's cosmology may be s en to anticipate modern physics, in 
its reiusa3 . 
to accept the existence of objective matter independent 
of the active human mind. The Emer: sonian "Over-Soul, " as an 
integration of modern . science and transcendentalist religion, may 
thus be seen in Fr it 1 Cf C aT_rd' recent at tempt to unify Buddhism and 
modern physics.:. 
Emerson's cosmology subsumes the particular and multiple into 
the : singular and unified. He therefore finds empirical scientific 
activity, based on data collection, inadequate. As in Poe's 
"Eureka, " the spiritual nature of truth is revealed to a poetic, 
holistic or synthesising imagination, and not to rationality. 
analysis and quantification: 
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Empirical science is apt to cloud the sight, and by the very 
knowledge of functions and processes to bereave the student 
of the manly contemplation of the whole. The savant becomes 
unpoetic. But the best read naturalist who lends an entire 
and devout attention to the truth, will see that there 
remains much to learn of his relation to the world, and that 
it is not to be learned by any addition or subtraction or 
other comparison of known quantities, but is arrived at by 
untaught sallies of the spirit, by a continual self- 
recovery, and by entire humility. He will perceive that 
there are far more excellent qualities in the student than 
nrecis_: eness and indisputable affirmation, and that a dream 
may let us deeper into the secret of nature than a hundred 
concerted experiments. =' 
Again as in Poe, unconscious and imaginative processes, such as 
dreaming, are celebrated as giving access to truth, In this way, the 
Cartesian separation of human beings into inner-outer dichotomies, 
presided over by religion and science as separate compartments of 
thought, is challenged. 
In Emerson's later essay "Nature" (1844), the tendency towards 
staticitV of the earlier essay gives way to a universe in which 
natural variety and change are included as part of a more uncertain 
system that evades totalisation. 
there is throughout nature something mocking, something that 
leads us on and on, but arrives nowhere; keeps no faith with 
us. All promise outruns the performance. We live in a system 
of approximations. Every end is prospective of some other 
end, which is also temporary; a round and final success 
nowhere. ' <' 
As in the earlier essay "Nature, " the gap between self and other is 
intolerable for Emerson, and must be crossed. However, in the 1844 
essay, he recognises the impossibility of doing so, as a regretful 
fai; u. re; "always a referred existence, an absence, never a presence 
and satisfaction.! However, in a complex and fluctuating text, 
natures absence in relation to the observer be-come: - a 
promise 
- 1i8- 
To the intelligent, nature converts itself' into a vast 
Jr omise, and will not be ra: nsly explained. Her secret is 
untold... 
The divine circulations never rest or linger. Nature is 
the incarnation of a thought, and turns to a thought again, 
as ice becomes water and gas. The world is mind 
precipitated, and the volatile e: _.: lence is forever escaping 
again into the state of free thought. '-°" 
The tension in Emerson's thought between a statici ing and 
totalising order, and an awareness of proce: s; ual change and 
fluctuation, is summarised by Lewis Mumford as his "system- 
shattering openness" : 
His mission was to examine crumbling foundations, to condemn 
unsound structures, to clear the site of lumber, to quarry 
new materials - not to instruct the would-be builders, nor 
design a new structure. What he retained', tbrru. -'h i iss 
constitutional ineptitude, was a readiness to examine and 
even anticipate incredible new discoveries that sy: ýtems- 
mongers could not open the door to without acknowledging the 
insufficiency of their systems. ' 
Emerson's openess to the breakdown of totalising systems in the face 
of accelerating complexity and change clearly provides a resource 
for Numford's own work in these areas, as discussed in chapter 1 of z 
this thesis. 
Technology, as part of the desire for empirical control, is an 
ambivalent force in Emerson. In "Works and Days" (1870), he 
evaluates techne oical developments in terms of great cultural 
promise in danger of not being fulfilled. 
The beginning of the essay celebrates technology as an extension 
of human v-neory control over the environment. Technological "arts, " 
such as steam power, galvanism, the telegraph and the photograph, 
"open the great gates of a future, promising to make the world 
plastic and to lift human life out of its beggary to a god-like ease 
and power. "'4 Emerson gives to the infinite re-creation of the world 
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through technology the sanction of divine authority, as an instance 
of the inevitabilities of Hegelian Spirit: 
There does not seem any limit to these new informations of 
the same Spirit that made the elements at first, and now, 
through man, works them. Art and power will go on as they 
have done, - will make day out of night, time out of space, 
and space out of time. "--` 
However, the latter part of "Works and Days" is more cautious, as 
Emerson qualifies orthodox ideas of progress. In an argument similar 
to that suggested in Hawthorne's short story "The Birthmark, " 
Emerson fears that "with the material power the moral progress has 
not kept pace. "1 Believing that "we must look deeper for our 
salvation than to steam, photographs, balloons or astronomy, " he 
opens up a discussion of the social and psychic effects of 
technology beyond dominant utilitarian assumptions. 
Mechanisation is now seen as a potential threat, altering human 
behaviour, and turning the human user of technology into a machine: 
These tools have some Questionable properties. They are 
reagents. Machinery is aggressive. The weaver becomes a web, 
the machinist a machine. If you so not use the tools, they 
use you. All tools are in one sense edge-tools, and 
dangerous. ' 
Critical of the implications that industrialisation has for the 
quality of American life, Emerson calls for re-evaluation away from 
linear mechanical principles. The "measure of time, " and the real 
measure of human "progress" and "economy, " should be "spiritual, not 
mechanical, """ involving delight and wisdom as qualities vital for a 
healthy society: 
And this is the progress of every earnest mind; from the 
works of man and the activity of the hands to a delight in 
the faculties which rule them; from a respect to the works 
to a wise wonder at this mystic element of time in which he 
is conditioned; from local skills and the economy which 
reckons the amount of production per hour to the firer 
economy which respects the quality of what is done, and the 
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right we have to the work, or the fidelity with which it 
flows from ourselve: ; then to the depth of thought it 
betrays, looking to its universality, or that its roots are 
in eternity, not in time. Then it flows from character, that 
sublime health which values one moment as another, and makes 
us great in all conditions, as the only definition we have 
of freedom and power. '-': -' 
Technological power in Emerson thus doe:; not necessarily have the 
negative associations of hubris prevalent in Hawthorne and Melville. 
Emerson's concern over the destructive effects of imposed 
utilitarian necessities may be briefly compared with similar areas 
in Thoreau. The !! Economy!! chapter of Walden (1854) indict- the 
factory-system of clothing manufacture as ; ein" based on the 
"principal object!! not "that mankind may be well and honestly clad, 
but, unquestionably, that the corporations may be enriched. `- 
Walden thus redefines the notion of "cost" away from monetary Value 
towards oualitative exchange: "th e co t of a thin i; 7 ti. amount o 
what 1 will call. lif e- which 1:; re i rn to be claanged fot, 
ý... _ecü... 3:. ý. - iii 2'Jr:. n. _. 
___r', 1 i;.. _ uti It. ' üre.,; , ý. :: with na marKet 
acr, on _en a; a ri tiori _iusan potertiai. Liberation Iron 
- ý.. --, -f!! ,+": 
_;, ach ; io _. _ r_I , ýesaý, =y gor , rar th 
Actually, the iabcr ing man has not lei surfe for a true 
integrity day by day; he cannot afford to sustain the 
a m nlie: ± relations to men; his labor would be depreciated in 
the market. He has no time to he anything but a machine. How 
can he remember weil his ignorance - which growth requires - 
who has so often to use his knowledge? We show feed and 
clothe him gratuitously sometimes, and recruit him with our 
Cordials, before we judge him. The finest qualities of our 
nature, like the bloom on fruits, can be preserved only by 
the most delicate handling. Yet we do not treat ourselves 
nor one another thus tenderly. 
Thoreau questions the relegation of life to mere survival, to those 
lives of "quiet desperation" led by the "mass of men" in urban 
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society. His movement out of this. society to Walden Pond is 
the refüre an escape from slavery, which he as a moral condition 
not restricted to the South. In competitive society, "you are the 
slave-driver of yourself. " As a form of resistance, Thoreau opens up 
po: sibilrties for freedom by allowing the imagination, repressed by 
utilitarian constraints, to play: 
Self-emancipation even in the West Indian provinces of the 
fancy and imagination, - what Wilberforce is there to bring 
that about? '-' 
=ý"e; ä i: _, IG. 'i;. ý: f Ci'. ipi,. ýi n 'iýi l: =: i and return 
to the "gross necessaries of life. "' This movement involves a 
minimum of technology, as he discovers that "a few implements, a 
knife, an axe, a spade, a wheelbarrow, etc., and for the studious, 
lamplight, stationery, and access to a few books, rank next to 
: necessaries, and can all be obtained at a trifling cost. " Thus 
Walden does not reform technological development, but reverses it, 
bac, to the apparent simplicities of pioneer life. 
The politics of Thoreau's anarchist withdrawl from competitive 
capitalist America are echoed in Emerson': _: respect for a Romantic 
ideal of individual freedom and wisdom in his essaf, "Politic:: " 
(l 4) Emerson calls f0: minimal government, and an end to 
"governments founded on force" :` `- 
The antidote to this abuse of formal government is the 
influence of private character, the growth of the 
Individual; the appearance of the principal to supersede the 
proxy; the appearance of the wise man; of whom the existing 
government is, it must be owned, but a shabby imitation, 
To educate the wise man the State exists, and with the 
appearance of the wise man the State expires. The appearance 
of character makes the State unnece: s: _; ary. -' 
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:, on' individualism 
become: =-; a fascination for authoritarian leadership. Even after the 
Civil War, he could characterise Napoleon as "The Nan of the World": 
He was the agitator, the destroyer of prescription, the 
internal improver, the liberal, the radical, the inventor of 
means, the opener of door; and markets, the e"ubverter of 
monopoly and abuse. -: ' 
The charismatic leader is celebrated as a proponent of merchant 
capitalism, his movement across, boundaries and borders given as 
natural and inevitable: "men give way before such a man, as before 
natural events. " , 
This authoritarian side of Emerson is another element in his 
paradoxical explorations of reality as a complexity that cannot be 
fitted into a singular system. 
Issues of cience, technology, value 
and power are discussed in shifting, open texts that refuse total 
systematisation, while also showing nostalgia for the Security such 
lixity might afford. The following chapter will explore similar 
transcendentalist issues of totality and change in the work of 
Emerson's contemporary, the botanist Louis Agassiz 
- LG. j 
CHAPTER 8. 
is Agasaiz and the breakdown of total system. a. 
Ru. osel Blaine Nye summarises the programmatic:, of Newtonian 
science at the beginning of the nineteenth century in America in 
terms of four central principles 
ä. belief in the inductive method as opposed to simple 
authority; a belief in the Newtonian doctrine of a 
mechanistic universe governed by immutable, discoverable 
laws; a belief (tempered, but neverthele: _;: _: pervasive) in the 
efficacy of scientific method as applied to the study of 
human relations and human problem:; and a belief in the 
unity of science, implying a mechanistic relationship among 
all branches of knowledge. ' 
As the discussion of Elihu Palmer and Jeffers=. on in chapter 3' has 
shown, these belief systems implied power relations, as scientific 
rationalists employed mythical discourses in an attempt to guarantee 
the truth and efficacy of their practice-.. 
However, the Newtonian ideal of : science as a static, mechanistic 
and closed system of knowledge was under constant and increasing 
pressure from factor=, that suggested the existence of irreversible 
change and diversity in the universe. In the nineteenth century, 
then, the Newtonian desire for a general theory unifying all 
phenomena broke down into a new multiplicity of specialised, 
fragmented area: of scientific knowledge. in particular, the 
developing biological science indicated complexity, rather than 
mechanical simplicity, as the basis of reality, As Nye puts it: 
The world was a surprisingly complex place, it seemed, not 
to be reduced to an easily ordered, unified pattern of 
mechanistic relationships among things. Scientific discovery 
and speculation produced conflicts, paradoxes, and 
unresolved questions, while rationalization of them all 
became more and more difficult. If one assumed with the 
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Enlightenment that the universe was inflexibly and 
absolutely rational, the frantic attempt of scientists to 
make everything fit into the universal pattern became in 
itself a kind of irrationality. 
In The Order of Things (1966), Michel Foucault also describes 
important changes in systems-building in the nineteenth century, 
when "a profound historicity penetrates into the heart of things, 
isolates and defines them in their own coherence, imposes upon them 
the forms of order implied by the continuity of time. "` This chapter 
will examine the classical taxonomy of the botanist Louis Agassiz, 
which came under increasing pressure from the accelerated speed of 
scientific discovery in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
A Swiss emigre, arriving in the United States in 1846, Agassiz 
inherited the totalising ordering principles of classical European 
science. Taking up Cuvier's project of an encyclopaedic 
classification of nature based on direct observation of the 
comparative anatomy of fossils, he planned thereby to compile a 
series of volumes which would include the entire field of American 
natural history. The epic desire for deterministic completion in 
such work would be criticised later in the nineteenth century by 
ph ilo: -. ophers such as Chauncey Wright and Ag. assiz' pupil, Charle: ý 
Pelt-e, whose attack on total systems will be discussed in the next 
two chapters. 
Agasriz' totalioirig impulse attempted to fit all the precise 
empirical data he could collect inside a ringle, a priori system, 
based on transcendentalist assumptions of divine order. As with Foe 
and Emerson, then, particulars were to be subsumed in an overall 
-singular. In 1862 Agassiz summarised this project as follows: 
the facts must e collected, but their mere accumulation 




comparison of facts and their transformation into idea: that 
lead into a deeper insight into the significance of 
Nature... Facts are the works of God, and we may heap them 
together endlessly, but they will teach us little or nothing 
till we place them in their true relations, and recognize 
the thought that binds them together as a consistent whole. " 
Agassiz' system was underpinned by a myth of origin that considered 
the various species of animal and plant 'life as existing in eternal, 
static ideal-types, whose unchanging order was ordained by God at 
Creation. Aga .. iz thus took for granted the ultimate existence of 
coherence, divine intelligence and planning in the universe. As in 
Poe's "Eureka" and Emerson's 1836 "Nature, " immutability is a key 
area of security that holds off the disruptive possibilities of 
irreversible change. 
Ac: cordinyly, the Essay on Classification (1857), challenges 
Newtonian materialist determinism by asserting in its place a static 
system. of spiritual determinism: 
the character of the connections between organized beings 
and the physical conditions under which they live is such as 
to display thought; these connections are therefore to be 
considered as established, determined, and regulated by a 
thinking being. They must have been fixed for each species 
at its beginning, while the fact of their permanency through 
successive generations is further evidence that with their 
natural relations to the surrounding world were also 
determined the relations of individuals to one another; 
their generic as well as their family relations, and every 
higher grade of affinity; showing, therefore, not only 
thought, in reference to the physical conditions of 
existence, but such comprehensive thoughts as would embrace 
simultaneously every characteristic of each species. ' 
Agassiz restates the eternal permanence of Cuvier'n four great 
divisions of the animal world - vertebrates, articulates, mol us:; k: a, 
any radiates - as categories inherent in nature itse: t. As in 
Emerson, a mmetic; correspondence between language and reality is 
claimed to guarantee unmediated access to eternal truth: 
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To me it appears indisputable that this order and 1 
arrangement of our studies are based upon the natural, 
primitive relations of animal life - those systems to which 
we have given the names of the great leaders of our science 
who first proposed them being in truth but translations into 
human language of the thoughts of the Creator. And if this 
is indeed so, do we not find in this adaptability of the 
human intellect to the facts of creation, by which we become 
instinctively, and, as have said, unconsciously, the 
translators of the thoughts of God, the most conclusive 
proof of our affinity with the Divine Mind? 
As in Poe and Emerson, Agassiz acknowledges the role of instinctual 
and unconscious processes in scientific thought. Nevertheless, while 
constituting an important criticism of the dogmas of Enlightenment 
rationalism, such a belief also tends to protect Agassiz' system 
from empirical scrutiny. The Essay in Classi ication was published 
only two years before the publication in England of Darwin's 
The Origin of Specie in 1859. However, as Agassiz' explanatory 
system came under pressure from such evidence of change and 
development within species, he merely tended to fall back on 
dogmatic affirmations of his first principles, and on the authority 
of his professional reputation. His generalizations became, in his 
biographer Edward Lurie': words, "sweeping and dogmatic affirmations 
that seemed to shut off further inquiry rather than to inspire 
fundamental questioning. " As a result, Agassiz became "more and more 
isolated from any understanding of contemporary interpretations of 
nature grounded on suppositions other than his own. "' 
Agassiz' system-building must therefore be placed within its 
social contest, as a discourse produced within specific 
institutional and cultural practices. In this way, Agassiz' social 
reputation as an authority can be seen to shield his ideas from 
criticism. Lurie records an occasion when "the weight of his 
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reputation was : ýo rýcwerful as to impel editor Horace Greeley to 
refuse to publish an attack on him by an amateur naturalist and to 
warn the man that it would be futile to pursue a quarrel against 
such a Personage. " Moreover, because of the time he spent organising 
hie museum collection at Harvard, begun in the late 1840s, Agassiz 
was unable to carry out the research necessary to keep up with the 
accelerating theoretical developments in mid-nineteenth century 
biology. The career of Agassiz may therefore confirm the theses of 
Thoma. Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend concerning the professional 
retrenchment of old authorities during times of paradigm-shift. As 
new ideas become more widely accepted by younger scientists, so old 
positions are merely reasserted through dogmatic argument and 
censorship. 
The breakdown of deterministic ideas in mid-century America - 
whether those of transcendentalist. like Agassiz, or 2: ewtonians like 
E ihu Palmer - may be related to institutional changes in the 
American university system, in relation to state, business and 
religious rotere tom, Ag assiz' '; Christian view of botany as a complete 
reading of the Book of Creation was an advocation of a speculative, 
non-utilitarian science. In a rapidly industrialising America, such 
values came under increasing pressure from the utilitarianism of the 
hegemonic 'Northern merchant-industrial classes around the time of 
the Civil War. 
Nevertheless, Agassiz was himself an important instigator of 
inks between university science and state funding, in a move to 
both augment and to replace private patronage. Though his own 
scientific work relied on the private patronage of Francis Calley 
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dir a}ý, a wealthy iron manufacturer , 
Agassiz perceived a nerd for 
ionT-range financial support for science from the state. In this 
connection, he advocated scientific research free from utilitarian 
demands for immmediate, practical results, and subject to the full 
and unconditional control of the professional scientists 
themselves. " 
Accordingly, in 1853 Agassiz established the Florentine Academy 
at Cambridge, Massachusetts, as an informal organization designed to 
promote the ideas of leading American scientist:. The Academy called 
for institutional support from both federal government and private 
bodies to subsidize graduate instruct1on and . scientific research. 
The "Lazzaroni" were ambitious to create an American counterpart 
to the Royal Society or the French Academy of Sciences, that is, a 
centralised, national scientific institution. Support for such a 
move came especially from Alexander Bache, superintendent of the 
United States Coast Survey, and rear admiral Charles Henry Davis of 
the United States Navv. Military-capitalist demands for the control 
and development of geographical space were therefore prime motives 
for the creation of formal links between state and scientists in the 
United States. 
The Civil War was a vital catalyst in these developments. In 
February 1H2, Congress established a Permanent 
with reporting to the US Navy on scientific res 
useful for the war effort. Projects such as the 
torpedoes and under-water guns depended on such 
Armytage records that by 21 September 1S65,257 
made to the government. 
Commis ion charged 
parch that might be 
development of 
expert advice. W. H. 
reports had been 
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The first state-supported national body, the National Academy of 
Sciences, was founded with a bill passed in Congress in March 1863. 
Its committees examined technological isses such as the metric 
system, anti-rusting techniques for ships, hydrometers and naval 
charts. The NAS still holds a congressional charter designating it 
as scientific adviser to the federal government. However, Daniel 
Greenberg points out its lack of power, in that its brief is to 
offer advice to government only when that advice is sought. As a 
result of rarely being consulted, the academy played little part in 
governmental affairs until the Second World War. Nevertheless, the 
founding of the NAS demonstrates a new trend of government 
sponsorship of basic scientific activity in America in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. 
Such governmental action, as has already been stated, was 
largely dominated by the utilitarian interests of the h egemo ni c 
d imnartart in, fit tionai Northern industrial claooen. The t --r 
DROVSCý ton o . oo vi. viý w"ar, ripe ir:. orri AC. 5 of iOO. ana -oi: 'u, 
by ti" net in u 'r ial =. allocated th', u 
a le It blic : -anfor voc, 
tional rainir tour. e. concentrating 
c l: y 0. subjects-.. Federal action of this kind was 
conplemented by private endowments from i dustr ialist themselves, 
as private millionaires, such as Rockerfeller and Carnegie, began to 
subsidize scientific and technological research. Armytage shows 
; hat, up to 1850, most engineer= were educated at West Point or 
Rensselaer Polytechnic in New York (established. in 1824'. However, 
t ie ä"rear demand for engineers to 
develop the railway system, aril to 
expand the cli and Steel Industrie_ after the Clvii Va r led to a 
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sharp rise in trained engineers, educated at the land-grant 
colleges, in 1840, there were only two engineering schools in 
America; by 1870, there were seventy. 
The subservience of this expanding scientific and technical 
education to the practical, utilitarian requirement:, of the 
expanding capitalist economy may be seen in the first department of 
entomology, which was founded in 1881 for research into insect 
pests, and in the geology departments founded. in the 1860s to survey 
Western mineral re: sour ces. By the end of the sin eenth century, man, 
major companies, led by General Electric and American Telephone and 
Telegraph, had introduced research and development departments, 
employing res earchers relatively free of pressures to turn a rapid 
ý. ofit, ý, 
Changes in the American university system around the time of the 
Civil dar al o lei tentatively towards the encoura: ement of 
scientific reýsCarch, within ütl_itdrian ötriCtüre: =;, Christian 
religious controls on education were contested at Harvard, and 
finally removed with the Presidency of Charle_: William Eliot in 
1569, a move significantly opposed by Louis Aaassiz. 
In The Academic System in American Society (1974), Alaine 
louraine summarises the modernisation of 
the universities as a 
01llue le of two main ideologies, Darwinism and progres: =: ivism: 
it involves, much more than simply allowing the students to 
freely choose the components of their edu anon. lt is a 
rejection of the of dogma of education as a net of moral 
values and as a conception of man and his virtues. The key 
word is utility: service not to the community but to 
society, to what is being created, not to what is being 
transmitted. Classical studies were supplemented by 
commercial and industrial ones without the former being 




University reform wras thus part of the growing integration of the 
new industrialist and business ruling class. 
As a new university, Johns Hopkins founded in Baltimore in 
1876, avoided the intellectual struggles with older forms of 
religious authority that were being fought at Harvard and Yale at 
that time. Professor. were young, courses were presented with no 
fixed theological commitment, and students wer=: not compelled to 
attend chapel. Significantly, the keynote address on the opening of 
the university was by the leading atheist, Darwinist and economic 
liberal, Thomas Henry Huxley. 
Johns Hopkins was the first American university to be wholly 
dedicated to original graduate research. The word "re:: ea h" itself. 
, as the university's first president Daniel Coit Gilman pointed out, 
was newly coined in 1875. Research findings were disseminated by the 
first university printing press-, in the country. , "-. 
hes changes in the American university system enable new 
ideas, such as 
those of Darwin and Comte, to be openly is U :: wed in 
American academic circles. Ia 1869-70, Eliot invited John Ficke to 
lecture on "The Positive Philosophy, " even though Fiske had been 
expellled from Harvard nine years earlier for his positivist 
sympathies. Eliot also gave permission for Chauncey Wright to 
lecture in psychology in 1870 as part of the new postgraduate 
cour_; es. 
In this way, the older, transcendentalist order of Agassiz' 
Harvard came under pressure. from positivist and empiricist 
methodologies, and a new self-reflexive interest in the processes of 
scientific investigation itself. The new group of scientific 
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intellectuals included a relatively large proportion of Unitarians, 
who criticised Puritan notion, of inherited guilt and asceticism, 
encouraging instead liberal ideas of individual freedom, and the 
necessity of freeing, scientific investigation from precedents of 
scriptural authority, '' 
There changes in American philosophy and science centred on 
various figures associated with the "Ketaphysical Club, " the name 
which Charles Peirce gave to a group of scientists, writers, poets, 
and lawyers which met in Cambridge, Massachusetts in the early 
18`10: x. It was from among, this group that many of the new, empiricist 
challenges to mechanical determinism and totality were produced. 
The "Metaphysical Club" discussed the writings of Darwin, Comte 
and Mill, and developed pragmatic testability as the central 
criterion of scientific truth, As a result, both idealist and 
materialist dogmas were challenged, and the totalizing systems of 
earlier science were criticised in the name of a liberal, 
utilitarian ethic. Moreover, change, chance, uncertainty and 
probability came to he considered as vital elements in intellectual 
order. These developments will be discus: ed in the next two 
chapters, in the work of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Chauncey Wright, 
Charles Peirce and Henry Adams. 
CHAPTER 9. 
ienge"= to deter-mini m in Oliver Wendell Holme: and Chauncey 
In his essay, "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy" (1909), 
John Dewey described how Darwinism broke with earlier a priori 
be ief-sy=stems. After Darwin, the phenomenon of change in living 
beings was no longer assumed to be an Aristotelian progression 
towards a "completed, perfected end. "' The imputation of a 
pro; ggress_: ive realization of purpose" to fixed, eternal specie; was 
shaft red, Darwinism "forswear, inquiry after absolute origins and 
absolute finalities in order to explore specific values- and the 
specific conditions that generate them. ": 
Dewey's essay on Darwinism records a decisive shift towards a 
provisional, pragmatic approach to : scientific truth denying the 
security of absolute, transcendental guarantees. The'_ý_ are dismissed 
as evasive, justificatory alibis: 
The habit of derogating from present meanings and 
prevents our looking the facts of experience in the face; it 
prevents serious acknowledgement of the evils they present 
and serious concerns with the goods they promise but do not 
as yet fulfill. It turns thought to the business of finding 
a wholesale transcendent remedy for the one and guarantee 
for the other. 
Dewey thus considers his pragmatist rejection of metaphysical 
absolutes as introducing a series of responsibility into 
intellectual lit;. 
To idealize and rationalize the universe at large is after 
all a confe: _. sion of inability to master the courses of 
things that specifically concern us. As long as mankind 
suffered from this impotency, it naturally shifted a burden 
of responsibility that it could not carry over to the more 
competent shoulders of the transcendent cause. But if 
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insight irito specific conditions of val I_ and into pecific 
consequences of idea:; is possible, philosophy must in time 
become a method of locating and interpreting the more 
serious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a method of 
projecting ways for dealing with them: a method of moral and 
political diagnosis and prognosis-. 'Testability 
in terms of utility and manipulative power thus becomes 
a central criterion of scientific value. Dewey attributes to 
Darwinism the break in totalising generalisations necessary to 
produce a more provisional and empirical science. The contributions 
made by Oliver Wendell Holmes and Chauncey Wright to this rupture in 
scientific and philosophical discourse, in the latter decades of the 
nineteenth century, will be discussed in this chapter. 
As a medical doctor, Profess: or of Anatomy at Harvard, essayist, 
poet, novelist and lyceum lecturer, Oliver Wendell Holmes embodied a 
multiple, flexible approach to knowledge. Besides his contributions 
to medical research, which included his first coining of the term 
"anaesthetics, " first used in October 1846, Holmes also took an 
early role, as an in the questioning of Newtonian 
determinism in America, His writings investigated problems of 
inheritance and mechanistic determinism within a Christian context 
of guilt and sin, promoting a liberalisation of both science and 
religion. 
In "Me _chanism in Thought and Morals, " an address delivered at 
Harvard in June 1870, Newtonian-Cartesian mechanistic model:. of 
human behaviour are opened to doubt, as Holmes recognizes 
unconscious and unknowable areas of experience beyond the reductive 
explanation; of materialist pnilos-: ophies. What he calls the "mystery 
of unconscious ienitai action" includes areas of intuitive, automatic 
and involuntary action, inaccessible to simple causal analysis: 
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The more we examine the mechanism of thought, the more we 
shall see that the automatic, unconscious action of the mind 
enters largely into all its processes. Our definite ideas 
are stepping-stones; how we get from one to the other, we do 
not know: something carries us; we do not take the step, 
Scientific knowledge is no longer the firm ground sought by 
Descartes, but has become a more uncertain and perilous set of 
"stepping-stones. " Holmes acknowledges the role of intuition in 
science, which is moreover considered as a product of human 
creativity. In this way, the unhealthy separation of reason and 
imagination, and the relegation of the latter qual1 ty, evident in 
doctrinaire rationa fiats such as Jefferson and Elihu Palmer, is 
demolished: 
What happens when one idea brings up another? Some internal 
movement, of which we are wholly unconscious, and which we 
only know by its effect. What is this action, which in Dame 
Quickly agglutinates contiguous circumstances by their 
surfaces; in men of wit and fancy, connects remote ideas by 
partial resemblances; in men of imagination, by the vital 
identity which underlies the phenomenal diversity; in the 
man of science, groups the objects of thought in sequences 
of maximum resemblance? Not one of them can answer. There is 
a Delphi and a Pythoness in every human breast. " 
Because imagination and intellect are not analysable according to 
mechanical principles, on the lines of a system in physics, 
arguments from physics to human society are inadmissible: 
the intellectual product does not belong to the category of 
force at all, as defined by physicists. It does not answer 
their definition as "that which is expended in producing or 
resisting motion. " It is not reconvertible into other forms 
of force. One cannot lift a weight with, a logical 
demonstration, or make a tea-kettle boil by writing an ode 
to it. ' 
Such challenges to mechanistic doterminism have important social and 
moral consequences. As a Unitarian, Holmes rejected the Puritan 
doctrine of original sin, by which guilt is inherited from 
generation to generation. Rejecting "the mechanical doctrine which 
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make; ? me a slave of outside influences, " Holmes sought "to eliminate 
all mechanical idea: which have crowded into the sphere of 
intelligent choice between right and wrong. "ý 
A mechanistic view of moral life in terms of "transmissible 
responsibility" is thus criticised ed as the basis of doctrines of 
inherited guilt. As Holmes puts it: 
To treat a mal-volition, which is inseparably involved with 
an internal condition, as capable of external transfer from 
one person to another, is simply to materialize it. When we 
can take the dimensions of virtue by triangulation; when we 
can literally weigh Justice in her own scales; when we can 
speak of the specific gravity of truth, or the square root 
of honesty; when we can send a statesman his integrity in a 
package to Washington, if he happen to have left it behind, 
- then we may begin to speak of the moral character of 
inherited tendencies, which belong to the machinery for 
which the Sovereign Power alone is responsible, "' 
Holmes thus restricts the field of applicability for mechanistic 
models, in a move counter to those tendencies in figures such as 
Jefferson and Elihu Palmer discussed in chapter 3. Mechanism is 
thereby reformed, rather than rejected completely. For Holmes, where 
the mechanical phenomenon of "inherited tendencies" exists as an 
inevitability, the individual human being cannot be held morally 
responsible. Accordingly, he promotes a liberal tolerance in the 
face of severe Puritan attributions of individual moral 
reoponnibilty: "The misfortune of perverse instincts, which adhere 
to us as congenital inheritances, should go to our side of the 
account, if the books of heaven are kept, as the great Church of 
Christendom maintains they are, by double entry. " " 
Holmes' novel Elsie Venner (1861) further explore,; this 
relationship between structures of inheritance and determinism, and 
moral culpability. As the subtitle, "A Romance of Destiny, " 
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suggests, the novel posits a deterministic situation against which 
the victim has no volition or choice. In the Second Preface to the 
18B3 edition, he summarises his concerns as follows: 
Was Elsie Venner, poisoned by the venom of a crotalus before 
she was born, morally responsible for the "volitional" 
aberrations, which translated into acts become what is known 
as sin, and, it may be, what is punished as crime? '' 
In the novel, the "wandering habits"'ý of the snake-like Elsie 
Venner are taken by the rest of society as a sign of her 
transgressive nature: 
The more common version of the trouble at the mansion-house 
was this: Elsie was not exactly in her right mind. Her 
temper was singular, her tastes were anomalous, her habits 
were lawless, her antipathies were many and intense, and she 
was liable to explosions of ungovernable anger. `- 
However, by the end of the novel, Elsie is temporarily "restored to 
that truer self which lay beneath her false and adventitious 
heingr. " "' Yet the cost of this return to health is her death, as the 
novel thereby makes its anomalous, lawless element safe. With the 
marriage of Dudley Veneer and Helen Barley, and Langdon's 
engagement, the novel ends with a further restoration of social and 
moral order. 
Elsie Venner may therefore be seen as a liberal reform of issues 
of criminality, law, deterministic "destiny" and religion. 
Crucially, Elsie's "aberrations" from the norm are not seen as a 
moral insufficiency of which she is responsible. Accordingly, the 
Professor prefers arguments from physiology and even phrenology to 
religious evaluations of Elsie's mental and physical state: 
The limitations of human responsibility have never been 
properly studied, unless it be by the phrenologists. You 
know from my lectures that I consider phrenology, as taught, 
a pseudo-science, and not a branch of positive knowledge; 
but, for all that, we owe it an immense debt... It has 
brought out that great doctrine of moral insanity, which has 
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done more to make men charitable and soften legal and 
theological barbarism than any one doctrine that I can think 
of since the message of peace and good-will to men. ' 
In removing religion from evaluations of bodily and mental health 
and of secular law, Holmes reveals the basis of his explorations in 
a reformed scientific rationalism. Thus, in criticising the 
inappropriate extension of mechanistic models into human affairs, 
Holmes did not reject or deprecate scientific practices themselves, 
but rather insisted on a more complex understanding of the processes 
of such work, 
Indeed, "Mechanism in Thought and Morals" renews Enlightenment 
hopes for social Progress through an advancement of science. In 
Holmes' words, science substitutes the "Rise of man" for the 11 Fa 
of man, " thereby bringing about "the utter ; is'. I the 
ritL3i pesa7 l]: =mýs whicli have bn like a SH" IIt in th hear an'- a 
cramp iii tll-ie ý'iitr3i_2; 
t LS man for c, c many centur iec " Knf: )wleage, 
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to : soul 
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--t h, 23n of science who accepts with manly reverence 
the facts of Nature, in the face of all his venerated 
traditions, offer a more acceptable service than he who 
repeats the formulae, and copies the gesture; =;, derived from 
the language and custom; of despots and their subjects? The 
attitude of modern Science is erect, her aspect serene, her 
determination inexorable, her onward movement unflinching; 
because she believe,; herself, in the order of Providence, 
the true succe'ssor of the men of old who brought down the 
light of heaven to men. 
The creative act of liberation for Holmes is therefore the killing 
of the father, tie archetypical act of American rebellion from the 
Old World of inherited authority. As he puts it, 
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Each generation strangle', a-rid devour s its predecessor. The 
young Feejeean carries a cord in his girdle for his father's 
neck; the young American, a string of propositions or 
vlloaisns in his brain to finish the same relative. 
Past forms; do not have to be inherited. Instead, ideas are testable 
according to empirical and rationalist criteria: 
Our dwellings are built on shell-heaps, the kitchen-midden 
of the age of stone. Inherited beliefs=-., as obscure in their 
origin as the parentage of the cave-dwellers, are stronger 
with many minds than the evidence of the senses: and the 
simplest deductions of the intelligence. 
Holmes' faith in a unitary scientific method is itself inherited 
from Enlightenment science, such as that promoted by Jefferson and 
Elihu Palmer. However, for his attack on deterministic 
inevitabilities, Holmes can be seen as making a vital break with the 
totalitarian ambitions of earlier Newtonian-Cartesian dogmatists. 
This attack was also taken up by Chauncey Wright, a senior 
member of Boston's Metaphysical Club. In "The Philosophy of Herbert 
__ e" ýTiýer . iU0,5.5), Wright challenges t nP_ aö: =: Umitlon of totality In 
Science, criticising Spencer's desire to extend scientific 
investigations to "universal human intere_-t:;. " Wright's essay 
reveals the faulty and misleading nature of Spencer's methods, in 
which, "History, society, laws, and morality, - all are claimed as 
topics with which scientific methods are competent to deal. " '' 
Wright thus introduced a positivist distrust of generalisation 
into Spencor's assumptions of total knowledge. Spencer, he . paid 
"applies a method for the ascertainment of ultimate truths, which a 
positivist would regard as correct only on the supposition that the 
materials of truth have all been collected', and that the research of 
science is no longer for the enlargement of our experience or for 
the i forming of the mind. '" '" 
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and forcing them into 
Spencer's inheritance 
Laplace is misplaced. 
evolution" is typical DI such "Premature and 
or extensions of descriptions to what is 
pan" :,: 'In positing descriptions as universal, 
areas to which they may be inapplicable, 
of the universalising programmes of Newton and 
Wright summarises Spencer as: 
a writer whose pretensions aim at a system of truth which 
shall formulate all legitimate human knowledge, but whose 
performance of the part he has undertaken gives little hope 
of success in what yet remains to do.., the number in regard 
to which we have been compelled to deny his conclusions 
illustrates his incompetency for the further development of 
his encyclopedic abstractions, 
The failure of encyclopaedic ambitions suggested by hfob -Dick's 
"Cetology" chapter thus reaches American philosophy in Chauncey 
Wright. 
Although Wright's philosophy undoubtedly draws on positivism, he 
does not refer to himself as a "positivist. " Accordingly, he does 
not allow the new ideas to become a fixed dogma or "ism. " Instead, 
, Wright explores new strategies That are lieft tentative and 
uncertain, thereby resisting the blind, incompetent, totalising 
simplifications of a Herbert Spencer. 
"The Philosopy of Herbert Spencer" challenges not only the 
tataiitarian ambition; of mechanistic science, but also the a priori 
assumption of immutability, law and origin which underlie systems 
such as those of Emerson, Poe and Agassi;. For Chauncey Wright, 
lange is a fundamental reality that denies fixed 'yst ms: 
Nothing_ chowc a trace _ 
of an original, immutable nature, 
except the unchangeable laws of change. These point to no 
beginning and to no end in time, nor to any bounds in space. 
Al'', indications to the contrary in the results of physical 
re: -earch are clearly traceable to imperfection in our 
present knowledge of all the laws of change, and to that 
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dispo`-ttlon to co'sICloio': icai speculations which otiii 
prevails even in science. 
However, Wright still assumes that change is a surface, under 
which are discoverable permanent, deterministic structures, The role 
of the scientist is thus to move between permanence and change, to 
seek "not the immutable natures which Plato sought for above a world 
of confusion and unreality, in the world of his own intelligence, 
but the immutable elements in the orders of all changes, the 
permanent relations of co-existences and sequences, which are hidden 
in the confusions of complex phenomena. " In this way, Wright's 
philosophy moves beyond transcendentalist prejudgements, while 
preserving faith in the ultimate reality of determinism and 
universal law. 
The a priori fixities which generated the work of earlier 
scientists, ; uch as Louis Ag. as, siz, are corrected by an appeal to 
empirical evidence. Wright cites pü: litiv T1 a favouring "legitimate 
par ti u ar inferences from Qb: =er 1 tion. r" roste d of as; 'Irvin a 
universal "law of causation": 
It does not suppose that there are throughout nature 
unbroken series in causation, forming in their entirety 
intelligible wholes, determinable in their beginnings, their 
progressions, and their ends, with a birth, a growth, a 
maturation, and a decay. It only presumes that the perhaps 
intelligible wholes, both in the sequences and the co- 
existences of natural phenomena, are composed of 
intelligible elements; that chaos does not subsist at the 
heart of things; that the order in nature which is 
discernible vaguely even to the unobservant implies at least 
a precise elementary order, or fixed relations of 
antecedents and consequent= in its ultimate parts and 
constituents; that the apparently irregular heterogeneous 
masses, the concrete eerie:; of events, are crystalline in 
their substance. 
Fixity, regularity and stasis are thus reasserted within change and 
fluctuation. However, Wright insists that this deduction of 
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general iced order must be related to observed facts, rather than 
merely asserted a priori, so that "to explain any such order by 
simply defining it externally in vague, abstract terms, and to 
postulate such orders as the components of nature and parts of one 
complete and intelligible order, is to take a step in advance of 
legitimate speculation, and a step backward in scientific method, 
is to commit the mistake of the ancient philosophers of nature. "-"I - 
In this way, Wright distanced himself from previous dogmatic 
systems, both idealist amd materialist. The new "legi+. mate" method 
of scientific truth was to be based on utility: 
Nothing justifies: the development of abstract principles in 
science but their utility in enlarging our concrete 
knowledge of nature. The ideas on which mathematical 
Mechanic: - and the Calculus are founded, the morphological 
ideas of Natural History, and the theories of Chemistry are 
such working ideas, - finders, not merely summaries of 
truth. - 
The exclusivity of Wright's language - "nothing... but" - already 
suggests the dogma into which positivist and pragmatist ideas later 
fell, as they solidified into what, in chapter 14, will be called, 
after H. T. Wilson, "The American ideology. " P: everthele: a: _: Wright's 
assertion of scientific activity, not as a total description of 
reality, but as an on-going and necessarily incomplete process of 
investigation, opens up possibilities for science as an explorative, 
non--dogmatic enterprise. 
With such utilitarian criteria for science, rigid distinctions 
between 'science and technology, or pure and applied science, could 
no longer be upheld: 
modern science finds in the requirements of the material 
arts the safest guide to exact knowledge. A theory which is 
utilized receives the highest possible certificate of truth. 
Navigation by the aid of astronomical tables, the magnetic 
telegraph, the innumerable utilities of mechanical and 
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chemical science, are constant and perfect tests of 
scientific theories, and afford the standard of certitude, 
which science has been able to apply so extensively in its 
interpretations of natural phenomena. " 
Hypotheses will be "validated" according to their predictive 
usefulness in controlling the environment. 
This empirical basis for science depends on a positivist myth of 
a domain of facts external to the observer. Empirical knowledge of 
these supposedly independent fact= is held to be more efficacious in 
guaranteeing truth-value than more speculative methods based on 
deductive rationality. Like Oliver Wendell Holmes, Wright therefore 
trusts the possibility of neutral sense data as a means of 
scientific verification: 
The positivists` principle of verification comes, then, only 
to this, - that, inasmuch as mankind are nearly unanimous 
about the testimony and trustworthiness of their senses, but 
are divided about the validity of all other kinds of 
authority, which they in a word call the reason, or internal 
sense, therefore verification by the senses produces 
absolute conviction, while verification by the reason 
settles nothing, but is liable to the same uncertainty which 
attends the primary appeals to this authority for the data 
of speculative knowledge. °'-, 
Despite the empiricist myth of representation at the centre of 
Wright's philosophy of science, his work avoids some of the 
seductiveness of later scientific methodologist.. He thus places his 
desire for "verification" within an acknowledgement of the 
possibilities of doubt and uncertainty, admitting that there is 
"etill room for debate as to what constitute!; verification in the 
various departments of philosophical inquiry. " 
Furthermore, Wright was still willing to accept the value of 
more speculative forms of knowledge, These he identifies as the 
domain of philosophy, which explores "another curiosity purified by 
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its association with the nobler sentiments, - with wonder, 
admiration, veneration, - and with the interests of our moral and 
aesthetical natures. " In this way, Wright's assertion of pragmatic 
criteria is qualified, and not allowed to rigidify into a doxa: 
However meanly the conclusions of theological and 
metaphysical speculations may appear, when tried by the 
objective standard of science, they too have their 
superioritie: by the test of which science becomes in turn 
insignificant. Unverified conclusions, vague ideas, crude 
fancies, they may be, but they certainly are the products of 
activities which constitute more of human happiness and 
human worth than the narrow material standards of science 
have been able to measure. ' 
Wri -ht's openness to forms of knowledge other than those of 
empirical science separates him from the reductiveness of 
Jefferscnian materialism, and from later developments in pragmatism 
in the twentieth century, whereby the reduction of knowledge within 
state institutions to the narrow requirements of the techno- 
bureaucratic state has produced languages of power and operativity, 
in which speculative or dissident form= of knowledge tend to be 
either banned or appropriated. 
As John Dewey observed in the essay quoted at the start of this 
chapter, the introduction of Darwinian ideas into American 
philosophy was a vital element in the revision of previous 
authorities. Chauncey Wright took the crucial step of attacking 
Herbert Spencer's generalisation of Darwinism to human society, 
while defending Darwin's theory of natural selection in its 
introduction of notions of irregularity, accident and 
unpredictaeility into scientific theories, 'Wright introduced a 
greater ='omplexit_} into received nation, _ of order and causality, 
though remaining fundamentally a determinist, asserting the real 
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existence of causality and determinism beneath the complexity of 
causal connections. in "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, " Wright 
anticipates the objections made by Einstein and others to the 
implications of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, by claiming that 
irregularity "indicates not an abridgement of causality but only an 
abridgement of our knowledge of it. "` Irregularity in nature is 
finally an illusion due to a lack of information, rather than a 
phenomenon inherent in physical processes themselves. 
Similarly, "accidents, " that is, occurences which cannot be 
predicted or derived from previous knowledge due to the complexity 
of the given situation, do not imply the presence of uncaused 
phenomena. In "The Genesis of Specie: =: " 1,1871), Wright clarifies this 
aspect of Darwin's thought: 
in referring any effect to "accident", he only means that 
its causer are like particular phases of the weather, or 
like innumerable phenomena in the concrete course of nature 
generally, which are quite beyond the power of finite minds 
to anticipate or account for in detail, though none the less 
really determinate or due to regular causes. --` 
Accident is thus seen as a hacter'ist:.. =. not of events but o the 
observer's imperfect knowledge of them. It is not that events are 
uncaused, but that the investigator does not know the causes of 
them. 
Wright's theory of innovation, of the new, also remains partly 
deterministic, in that every novel event is assumed to have an 
antecedent, to prevent an abridgement in causality. In his essay 
"Evolution of -elf-consciousness" (1873), the emergence of novelty 
in the evolution of : species is seen as a discontinuous leap, which 
is nevertheless ultimately related to universal, deterministic laws: 
new uses of old powers arise discontinuously both in the 
bodily and mental nature: -, of the animal, and in its 
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individual developments, as well as in the development of 
its race, although, at their rise, these uses are small and 
of the smallest importance to life... The new uses are 
related to older powers only as accidents, so far as the 
special services of the older powers are concerned, 
although, from the more general point of view of natural 
law, their relations to older uses have not the character of 
accidents, since these relations are, for the most part, 
determined by universal properties and laws, which are not 
specially related to the needs and conditions of living 
beings. 
Wright's challenge to determinism is therefore significant, if 
partial. A more profound challenge may be seen in the work of 
Charles Peirce, who proposes chance as a fundamental reality, in 
interaction with law and order. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, Henrv Adams was exploring the possibilities of chaos and 
anarchy in science, as Newtonian determinism had broken down 
radically into a new era of multiplicity and drift. These 
developments will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER, 10. 
Chance and law in Charles Peirce and Henry Adam= 
Charles Peirce offered a more radical challenge to determinism 
than Chauncey Wright. In his work, the operations of chance are 
considered as fundamental, and increases in novelty, variety and 
complexity in the universe are all seen to depend on chance action. 
Interactions of chance and law thus constitute a universe free of 
rigid deterministic necessities, so that the doctrine that 
"everything to come is already built in from the beginning" is 
broken. 
Peirce explored the possibility that change, Irrego arit'y and 
indeterminacy may be factor:; it erert r= nature, arid not m, -, rely 
v iu'pto_: ý ol 'ark obse r rk of 4r1ý4vlt_'ý, iii "iii- Doc, trine of 
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ver k' e ell Hol me: _: Pei e rejected he assumption that 
mechanical principles can explain all areas of reality. Moreover, he 
questioned the faith in empirical observation and ultimate law 
reviou: ly e r_ in Chauncey Wright: 
Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the 
more precise your observations, the more certain they will 
be to show irregular departures from the law. We are 
accustomed to ascribe these, and i do not say wrongly, to 
errors of observation; yet we cannot usually account for 
such errors in any antecedently probable way. Trace their 
causes ca, ---k far enough, and you will be forted to admit they 
are always- due to arbitrary determination, or chance. 
I'eirceps challenge to mechanistic determinism thereby opens up 
science to new areas of diversity, change and complexity. 
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A vital feature of this new science is a recognition of time as 
an irreversibility, a factor which : eirce': = Leacher Louis Agassiz 
had been unwilling to include in his system. Peirce note:, an 
increase in diversification in crucial areas of she univer=se, 
including "the life of an individual animal or plant, or of a 
mined... the history of states, of institution:, of language, of 
ideas. " As with Oliver Wendell Holmes, therefore, Peirce'; science 
provides optimistic challengge: = to Newtonian inevitabilities and 
repetitions: "Everywhere the main fact is growth and increasing 
oiaple it V. Deaf i and orruption are mere accidents or secondary 
phenomena. 
Mechanical law is shown to be inadequate in accounting for these 
increases in variety and complexity. Novelty emerges, beyond 
mechanistic explanation, as a spontaneous rupture of law: 
By thus admitting pure spontaneity or life as a character of 
the universe, acting always and everywhere though restrained 
within narrow bounds by law, producing infinitesimal 
de arture, _: from law continually, and great ones with 
infinite infrequency, 1 account for all the variety and 
diversity of the universe, in the only sense in which the 
really sui go . ergs and new can be said to be accounted for. ' 
Spontaneity and transgression of law are thus recognized as 
essential aspects of novelty and of life pr oce: =; ses in general. 
the relationship between law and spontaneity is further examined 
in. "Man's Glassy Essence" (18'92). In this essay, Peirce may be seen 
to anticipate the sort of structures that Ilya Prigogine 
inne tl 3t ß as 11di'="öi; Dative structures, " discussed in chapter 
wh re j lric 3sln ! omplexitT in a cyst m 11a`d lead to instability, 
Peirce : lote:; that, "Ail very complicated substances are 
unstable... "` Mechanical explanation, are inadequate to account for 
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such phenomena, which, significantly, include living protoplasm. 
Peirce's challenge to mechanistic determinism recalls James Clerk J 
Maxwells contemporaneous discovery of "singular points": 
If, then, we suppose that matter never does obey its ideal 
laws with absolute precision, but that there are almost 
insensible fortuitous departures: from regularity, these will 
produce, in general, equally minute effects. But protoplasm 
is in an excessively unstable condition; and it is the 
characteristic of unstable equilibrium, that near that point 
excessively minute causes may produce startingly large 
effects. Here, then, the usual departures from regularity 
will be followed by others that are very great; and the 
large fortuitous departures from law so produced, will tend 
still further to break up the laws, supposing that these are 
of the nature of habits. ' 
he concept of "law" thus no longer provides those assumptions of 
fixity and inevitability on which totalising and totalitarian. 
sc entific discourses, and their social and political 
extrapolations, a-. @ based. Instead, Peirce '. s science maps the 
formation and breaking of regularities as interactions between 
chance and habit. As he summarises these inter-relationships: 
diversification is the vestige of chance-Spontaneity; and 
wherever diversity is increasing, there chance must be 
operative. On the other hand, wherever uniformity is 
increasing, habit must be operative. ' 
The role of science for Peirce is to discover these regularities of 
habit and law within complex phenomena: 
nothing but a principle of habit, itself due to the growth 
by habit of an infinitesimal chance tendency toward habit- 
making, is the only bridge that can span the chasm between 
the chance-medley of chaos and the cosmos of order and law. 
Everyday :; cientifi. _ practice is involved in the search ±or habit in 
nature, so that, through the development and refinement of 
scientific met lodoiogies, as much certa. nty as possible may be 
disco: 'ered. F e 1rCe's fence thus a complex interaction between 
oder and chaos, chance and regularity, randomness and habit. As a 
-1. o- 
pi obabiil sti i Y, it at reim to find an much certainty a 
po s7 ü1r in a universe that includes chap e deviations . I'OTIl law, 
Ir the es: =, ay, "The Order of Nature" (1878), science is 
considered to explore degrees of causal orderliness in the universe, 
as mechanistic notions of deterministic certainty are replaced by a 
probability theory: 
That we ever do discover the precise causes of things, that 
any induction whatever is, absolutely without exception, is 
what we have no right to assume. On the contrary, it is an 
easy corollary, from the theorem just referred to, that 
every empirical rule has an exception. But there are certain 
of our inductions which present an approach to universality 
so extraordinary that, even if we are to : upppo: se that they 
are not strictly universal truths, we cannot possibly think 
t hat they have been reached merely by accident. '`-, 
Emphasising the nece, r ty of provi sionality and doubt in scientific 
thought, Peirce never theIe;; _; consider it the tasK of indu ll 
science to approach as lose to certainty as posy ble. 
1 ne of the untenable assumptions of Newtonian dreams of total 
pr edicta: ili t yr and certainty was that certain 
determined. through observation without error. 
practical impossibility of such a notion, ign, 
process, of technological mediation in hach 
are produced: 
quantities could be 
Peirce reveals the 
Dring as it doe=: the 
scientific discourses 
To one who is behind the scenes, and who knows that the most 
refined comparisons of masses, lengths, and. angles, far 
surpassing in precision all other measurements, yet fall 
behind the accuracy of bank-accounts, and that the ordinary 
determinations of physical constants, such as appear from 
month to month in the journals, are about on a par with an 
upholsterer's measurements of carpets and curtains, the idea 
of mathematical exactitude being demonstrated in the 
laboratory will appear simply ridiculous. 
gor Pe1rcc i. concerned With estimating magni tu; r': ý of error, 
under circumstances in which information is not always availa le. 
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die concIU'sions of fence _zerefore "make no pretence to being, more 
than probable, and niidsrin that a probable inference cn at most 
only suppose something to be most frequently, or otherwise 
approximately, true, but never that anything is precisely true 
without exception throughout the universe... "' No scientist "can 
maintain that the precise and universal conformity of facto to law 
clearly proved, or even rendered particularly probable, by any 
observations hitherto made. 
It war the task of science for Peirce to move towarfi: _: as much 
certainty as possible. Like Chauncey Wright, he thereby arrived at a 
pragmatic, utilitarian criterion for truth. The essay "How to Make 
Our Ideas iearl' (18'7d) i nk, s srient; r c truth value with claritv of 
apprehension Of those facts -discovered by practical experiment: 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have 
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception 
to have. Then, our Conception of these effects is the whole 
of our conception of the object. "I 
The totallsing aspect of 
; Gn iderations pragmatic 
shows again the dogmatic 
pragmatist approaches to 
Peirce' s advocaC. t) 
this statement, its assertion that 
are the "whole conception of the object, 
possibilities in early statements of 
science. 
;f the need for statistical approaches to 
certainty was an attempt to preserve a secure area for science in a 
universe of increasingly discovered complexity. For Henry Adams, on 
the other hand, even the securities of statistic-, were illusory. Tlhe 
chaos and anarchy that Adams perceived in all areas of knowledge at 
the end of the nineteenth century could not be contained by a single 
lent. if 1C me_t od or simple notion of . 
lari ty and truth. Newtoniian 
attempts to order and predict phenomena had failed, and stattSti -al, 
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: ýroba _1 E. tic method_ ugge`sted_ for Adams., not consolation, but a :J :J 
*ua ion of near-desperate ignorance amid _: nao; _. 
In The Education of Henry Adams (1'91S), the possibility of 
"faith" comes under pressure from the accelerating speed of 
discovery of unsystematised facts: 
At the Statistical Bureau, Worthington Ford supplied any 
material that curiosity could imagine for filling the vast 
gaps of ignorance, and method: for applying the plasters of 
fact. One seemed for a while to be winning ground, and one's 
averages projected themselves as laws into the future. 
Perhaps the most y:, erplexing part of the study layy in the 
attitude of the statisticians, who showed no enthusiastic 
confidence in their own figures. They should have reached 
certainty, but they talked like other men who knew less. The 
method did not result in faith. Indeed, every increase of 
mass - of volume and velocity - seemed to bring in new 
elements, and, at last, a scholar, fresh in arithmetic and 
ignorant of algebra, fell into a superstitious terror of 
complexity as the sink of facts. Nothing came out as it 
Should. I '`- 
The appeal to "facts" thus no longer provides for Adams a final 
guarantee of confidence and security, as it did for Holmes and 
Wright. 
Furthermore, Adams saw limitations and possible evasions in 
utilitarian approaches to truth. By concentrating on the use-value 
of new technological and scientific invention: -, pragmatic criteria 
neglected those social effects which moved into irrational, psychic 
areas of experience. In contrast, Adams' writing attributes a sense 
of mystery and unconscious power to technology, beyond the 
securities of simple utility and conceptual clarity. He cites the 
comnpass, the pulp, the supply-pipe, the sieve, and the reservoir for 
collecting electricity, as uses to which human beings had put 
magentism, "still without knowing how it worked or what it was. " 
The magnet "in its new relation staggered his education by its 
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evidence of growing complexity, and multiplicity, and even 
contradiction, in life. " In the same way, the dynamo revealed to him 
a "condition of human ignorance and helplessness before the 
commonest forces, such as his mind refused to credit. " For Henry 
Adams, science and technology thus bring an increasingly mysterious 
world, rather than Enlightenment clarities under utilitarian 
control .1 , - 
Adams' work explored the new universe revealed by European 
phývsicisto at the end of the nineteenth century, in which the very 
notion of materiality central to the Newtonian cosmology was 
rendered uncertain and conditional. For example, the discovery of 
radium by the Curies in 18'93 suggested an irruption of new, 
anarchical forces, which ruptured previous certainties, and drove 
"the scientific lawgivers of Unity into the open. "'' Consequently, 
Adams began to question science's appeal to an ultimate unity and 
consistency in the universe. 
For the physicist Samuel Langley, the new rays are "little short 
of parricidal in their wicked -spirit towards science. " Radium 
"denied its God - or, what was to Langley the same thing, denied the 
truths of his Science. The force was wholly new. "' Not only 
received notions of law and order, but the very structures of time 
and space were called into question. The new "economies of force" 
could not be fitted into the Newtonian scheme of mechanically-acting 
material forces. Instead, they appeared as "absolute, super-sensual, 
occult; incapable of expression in horse-power": 
fie had entered a supersensual world, in which he could 
measure nothing except by chance collisions of movement! 
imperceptible to his senses, perhaps even imperceptible to 
his instruments, but perceptible to each other, and so to 
some known ray at the end of the scale. Langley seemed 
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prepared for anything, even for an indeterminable number of 
universes interfused - physics stark mad in metaphysics. 
The desire of Chauncey Wright and Peirce, in the early years of 
pragmatist philosophy, to limit the field of science to the non- 
metaphysical, is therefore brought into question by Adam . 'writing. 
By 1900, Adams had "entered a far vaster universe, where all the 
old roads ran about in every direction, overrunning, dividing, 
subdividing, stopping abruptly, vanishing slowly, with side-paths 
that led nowhere, and sequences that could not be proved. " Within 
this complexity, new modes of navigation had to be invented, and 
old, archaic methods discarded. In particular, the search for unity 
and full determinism, as a means of controlling the new 
multiplicity, was considered as a habit belonging to systems of 
thought that had irreversibly broken down. 
Adams thus made an early challenge to dialectical systems, as a 
nostalgic appeal to an overall, unified security which was no longer 
tenable. Contradictions could no longer be merged into a larger 
synthesis, to satisfy the dof Hegelian dialectics. Such dogmas - 
appeals to a higher unity were desperate, quasi-religious attempts 
to resuscitate deterministic securities: 
Evolution was becoming change of form broken by freaks of 
force, and warped at times by attractions affecting 
intelligence, twisted and tortured at other times by sheer 
violence, cosmic, chemical, solar, supersensual, 
electrolytic - who knew what? - defying science, if not 
denying known law; and the wisest of men could but imitate 
the Church, and invoke a "larger synthesis" to unify the 
anarchy again. -: ' 
Adams made the crucial observation that, "For human purposes a point 
must always be soon reached where larger synthesis is suicide. " ' 
Instead, paradox and contradiction are seen as irreducible and vital 
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elements in the processes of intellectual order. As the "navigator 
of ignorance, "'` Adams showed his willingness to accept that "order 
and anarchy were one, but that the unity was chaos. "; '4 
Systems-building is thus shown to be based on exclusion and 
coercion, rather than on inclusion and accomodation. Moreover, the 
new uncertainty and complexity affected not only the systems of the 
scientist, but also the historian's interest in linear seauence. The 
historian, "assuming in silence a relation of mause and effect, " 
must also come to terms with the weight of exogenous facts. Adams 
realised that history is "in essence incoherent and immoral, " and 
has to be taught as such, "or falsified. `:: `, Unlike Peirce and 
Wright, therefore, he saw no possibility of a single, pure 
methodology able to cope with accelerating complexity and 
contradiction. He cites the recent discovery of the Pteraspis, an 
apparent anomaly in the theory of Darwinian linear evolutionary 
development, as an example of the inadmissibility of absolute, 
overall explanations of history: 
Nothing is easier than to teach historical method, but, when 
learned, it has little use. History is a tangled skein that 
one may take up at any point, and break when one has 
unravelled enough; but complexity precedes evolution. The 
Fteraspis grins horribly from the closed entrance. One may 
riot begin at the beginning, and one has but the loosest 
relative truths to follow up. Adams found himself obliged to 
force his material into some shape to which a seth; od Cour d 
)e apjýiied.:: _. 7. 
Adams` work ýih b-1 ts an a. i;; v, lei.., ar-a 4- n hých a n+2= ý; 
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lathe.. and nature a mother, and all was for the best in a scientific 
universe. '"-However, 
in the modern era, "all forms" are "shifting phases of 
motion": 
Granting this ocean of colliding atoms the last hope of 
humanity, what happened i one dropped the sounder into the 
abyss - let it go - frankly gave up Unity altogether? What 
was Unity? Why was one to be forced to affirm it?: '`: 
Adam. was therefore prepared to accept an insecure, uncertain 
science, "adrift on a sensual raft in the midst of a supersensual 
chaos. " - In this way, he pioneered a new form of education, later 
taken up by Buckminster Fuller, and others, as discussed in 
chapter 1, that involves a grasp of multiplicity, in response to 
modern physics, vital to train human beings for the twentieth 
century: 
The child born in 11.900 would, then, be born into a new world 
which would not be a unity but a multiple. Adams tried to 
imagine it, and an education that would fit it. He found 
himself in a land where no one had ever penetrated before; 
where order was an accidental relation obnoxious to nature; 
artificial compulsion imposed on motion; against which every 
Free energy of the universe revolted; and which, being 
merely occasional, resolved itself back into anarchy at 
last. - 
While these challenges were being formulated in America, the 
militaristic industrial state was continuing its obsessions with 
determinism a: a form of security and control. This neurotic 
traini gor ear an industrial labour drew on the utilitarian, 
pragmatic elements of late nineteenth century science. The 
rovi Tonal xplor at on: = of Chauricey Wright and Charles Peirce 
became the "ism" of "pragmatism, " as technocratic power interests 
formulated utilitarian. deterministic orthodoxies With Which' to 
restrict and control divergent, oppositional dis courses. Since the 
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foundin,, - of monopoly capitalist society in the late nineteenth 
century, state power has tended to rely on such determini=stic 
orthodoxies as Social Darwinism, Taylorist "scientific management" 
and behaviourism, in its quest for mechanistic predictability and 
authoritarian control. The following chapters will explore the rise 
of technocratic power at the end of the nineteenth century, and 
discuss the continuing challenges to deterministic order in the 
United States, area: " opened up by the work of Holmes, Wright, Peirce 
and Adams. 
_. i5lý - 
CHAPTEE 11. 
I °i se Qr monopoly eanitaIism, at then, of the nineteenth 
century. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the ownership of wealth in 
America was becoming increasingly centralised and monopolistic. The 
stabilization of capitalism at this time depended, at least in part, 
on the adoption by the American government of the gold standard, 
which, as Henry Adams observed, was a decisive moment in American 
history: 
For a hundred years, between 179: 3 and 1893, the American 
people had hesitated, vacillated, swayed forward and back, 
between two forces, one simply industrial, the other 
capitalistic, centralizing, and mechanical. In 1893, the 
iss up- came on the single gold standard, and the majority at 
last declared itself, once for all, in favor of the 
capitalistic system with all its necessary machinery. 
Henry's brof er, Brooks Adams, analysed the financial situation in 
greater detail in The Law or Civilization and Decay &l8126), in terms 
of the rise of banking interests over those of industrialists and 
merchants. 
Brooks Adams considers the economic centralization of industrial 
society as a by-product of speed: 
Probably the velocity of the social movement of any 
community is proportionate to its energy and mass, and its 
centralization is proportionate to its velocity; therefore, 
as human movement is accelerated, societies centralize. - 
He di -de-s the concert of wealth, as a form of stored surplus 
energy, into two aspects: capital, whic stores ener y in f lied 
iannels, and money. which i5 a mare fie xi bi s our e ; 7f enemy that 
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enable, -, actual transformations to take place. Money "alone in 
capable of being tranomuted immediately into any form of activity. " 
Adams records how the early hi torical stages of capital 
accumulation worked in favour of the new industrialists and 
merchants, and their need for flexible money to be invested in 
production. These are the interest of Alexander Hamilton and Tenche s 
Core in tine early American republic, as discussed in chapter 3. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, however, the banking Class, whose 
interests were not in the production of goods, but in the 
accumulation of fixed capital for usurious -profit, won hegemony over 
the interests of the industrial, merchant classes. 
The establishment of the first stage of this process - the 
dominance of the industrial producers in Britain, which Adams dates 
from 1u'38 to 1815 - was accelerated by the British victory at 
P1assey in 1757. The seizure and importation of vast quantities of 
Indian treasure a: war booty provide the influx of capital 
ecee:: ar y to Iran siorm Britain into an Inaustriai society. The 
expansion of credit based on Indian gold financed investment in the 
new centralised factory-system of industrial manufacture, led by the 
new dass of industrial producers. Financiers therefore played a 
Vital role in enabling the development of the new industria. 
technologiies. AS Brooks Adams put it, in themselves "inventions are 
passive, many of the most important having lain dormant for 
centuries, waiting for a sufficient store of force to have 
accumulated to =et them working. That store must aiways take the 
shape of money, and money not hoarded, but in motion, " 
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to industrial and merchant classes required that money be 
plentiful and cheap, aria therefore easily available for adventurous 
investment. Accordingly, it was in their interest to maintain the 
value of their merchandise relative to coin, for they lost when 
selling on a falling market. By the end of the eighteenth century, 
however, the very success of the merchants, in accumulating wealth 
"until it prevailed over all other forms of force, " had raised to 
power the modern banking class, whore interests differe from those 
of the industrial producers and merchants. '. 
The rise to power of the new banking class can best be seen in 
the strategies of control followed by the Rothschild family, heirs 
to the massive wealth of their father, Mayer Amschel, "Court Jew" to 
the Landgrave of liesse, Brooks Adams records that, on the death of 
Mayer Amschel in 1812, one of his five sons stayed in Frankfurt, 
while the other four migrated to different European capitals - 
Naples, Vienna, Paris, and Lon on, In this way, "acting continually 
in consort, they succeeded in obtaining' a Control over the money 
market of Europe, as unprecedented as it was lucrative to 
themselves;. "'- 
'ihe power of banking interests such as the Rothschilds', by the 
end of the nineteenth century, was instrumental in forcing 
government- to adopt the gold standard, against the interests of the 
industrial producers and merchants. For the bankers benefitted not 
from an expanding economy, like the industrialists, but from its 
ontra- cL ion: 
Sell-interest had from the outset taught the producer that, 
to prosper, he should deal in wares which tended rather to 
rise than fall in value, relatively to coin. The opposite 
instinct possesed the usurer; he found that he grew rich 
when money appreciated, or when the borrower had to part 
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with more property to pay his debt when it fell due, than 
the case lent him would have bought the day the obligation 
was contracted. ' 
Given their need for abundant currency, merchants relied on the 
cheapening of the currency when prices fell. They sought 
arrangements with the directors of the Bank of England, who would, 
on their part, relieve money shortages with paper money. This system 
of discounting bills favoured the merchants, to the detriment of 
bankers, who wished the value of money to rise: 
for as long as the Bank continued discounting bills, and 
thus emitting an unlimited quantity of notes whenever the 
rate of interest rose, debtors not only might always be able 
to face their obligations, but the worth of money could not 
be materially enhanced.., with such a system the currency 
tended to fall rather than to rise in value, in comparison 
with commodities, and for this reason the owners of the 
great hoards were at a disadvantage. What powerful usurers, 
like Rothschild, wanted, was a legal tender fixed in 
quantity, which, being unable to expand to meet an increased 
demand, would rise in price. Moreover, they needed a 
circulating medium sufficiently compact to be controlled by 
a comparatively small number of capitalists, who would thus, 
under favourable conditions, hold the whole debtor community 
at their mercy. 
ie adoption off a fixed weight of gold as the Lin ie standard of 
currency heavily favoured the lender over the borrower, as the 
measure of value was no longer the commodity itself, but coin. The 
bankers could increase the value of money through the clever 
manipulation of scarcity, Like any other article limited il 
, quantity 
Brooke Adams summarises the strategies by which the banker 
amuel Loyd manipulated business cycle: -: for the profit of the money- 
lending class, analysing thereby monetarist methods that continue to 
underpin modern global capitalism: 
he reasoned that under pressure price:, must fall to a point 
lower than in other nations, that then money would flow from 
abroad, and relief would ultimately be given, even if the 
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government did not interfere; that this influx of gold would. 
increase the quantity of money, by so doing, would again 
raise prices, and that, when prices rose, pledges forfeited 
in the panic might be resold at an advance. '' 
Resistance by the producers of goods to these financial changes is 
made difficult by the sheer extent of monetarist control. In such 
circumstances, liberal electoral democracy becomes a powerless sham. 
So the modern financial system analysed by Brooks Adams already 
appears as a monolithic, absolutist oligarchy: 
Although the conventions of popular government are still 
preserved, capital is at 'east as absolute as under the 
Caesars, and, among capitalists, the money-lenders form an 
aristocracy. Debtors are in reality powerless, because of 
the extension of that very system of credit which they 
invented to satisfy their needs. Although the volume of 
credit is gigantic, the basis on which it rests is so narrow 
that it may be manipulated by a handful of men. That basis 
is gold; in gold debts must be paid; therefore, when gold is 
withdrawn, the debtor is helpless and become:, the servant of 
the master. The elasticity of the age of expansion is 
gone. "> 
Brook, Adams was aware of the increasingly central role played by a 
profe_ssionalise_d police-force in controlling potential rebellion 
against these ruling class interests: 
The aristocracy which wields this autocratic power is beyond 
attack, for it is defended by a wage-earning police, by the 
side of which the legions were a toy; a police so formidable 
that, for the first time in history, revolt is hopeless and 
is not attempted. The only question which preoccupies the 
ruling class is whether it is cheaper to coerce or to 
. r ibe 
The coercive measures described by Brooks Adams were used to 
suppress the labour unrest that accompanied the concentration and 
consolidation of power into monopoly capitalism at the end of the 
nineteenth century, so that the hereditary wealth and wider cultural 
hegemony of the ruling elites in Goth Britain and the United States 
could be maintained. 
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The labour disputes which proliferated at this time led many 
middle class reformers to fear proletarian revolt. Such disputes, 
which had earlier in American history been small and localised, were 
now given nationwide exposure by newspaper and telegraph, so that 
when workers on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad struck in Pittsburgh 
in 1877, to protest against wage reductions, there were sympathetic 
riots across the country. However, workers' resistances to the 
impoverishing effects of monopolisation were brutally suppressed by 
business interests. For example, on May Day 1886, police and 
Pinkertons fired on a peaceful crowd of workers in Chicago, who were 
demonstrating against the empýoyment by the McCormick Harvester 
Company of three hundred gunmen to terrorize workers into accepting 
starvation wages, following a lockout. In 1804, the Western 
Federation of Mineworkers led a massive strike in Cripple Greek, 
Colorado, which was broken up by the National Guard. 
üt to ä< id industrial interests thll=, concerned themselves with 
the violent suppression of socialists, and of socialism. They were 
aided in such activity by the absence of solidarity amongst the 
American working-class, as the rapidly institutionalised trade 
unions defended the crafts of established workers from the new 
generation of unskilled immigrant labourers from Europe. As another 
reason for the lack of effective socialist ideas in America, Edward 
Ryas points to the 
by anarchist terror 
Italian immigrant, 
police and gangster 
protest:, 
negative light into which such 
i: nt action: , perpetrated mainly 
and largely provoked by tre vii 
hired by employers to control 
ideas were placed 
by German and 
Dlence of the 
their workers' 
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Yerüaps more significantly, Hyams shows the damage to sociaýist 
ideas that stemmed from an over-emphasis on the necessity of 
monopolistic state control in left-wing revolutionary strategies. In 
this respect, the popularity of such totalitarian ideas amongst 
utopians and reformers at the end of the nineteenth century must be 
sires e3. At this time, opposition to monopoly capitalism was mostly 
seen in terms of the promise of a bureaucratic, statist form of 
single government emerging from the capitalist process of 
monopolisation itself. 
This faith in single government is a solutionary action in 
Ignatius Donnelly's novel Caesar's Column: A Story of the Twentieth 
Century where it merges with nostalgia for a semi-agrarian 
society. Written out of the author's commitment to the Midwestern 
agararian movement, Caesar's Column finds ultimate consolation in an 
agrarian utopia in Uganda, far removed from the threat of 
proletarian revolution that is the novel's major source of anxiety. 
Donnelly speculates on a near future when the monopolisation of 
resources by a central oligarchy leads to the collapse of 
"civilization. " New York has been transformed into a modern electric 
city, with elevated and subway trains, street lighting, 
intercontinental airlines and a push-button technology. However, 
such technological innovations have led to a degeneration of human 
beings. Women, for example, have been reduced to the sarge "soulless 
likeness, " as Donnelly submits to Romantic anxieties about the loss 
of humanist values in a technologically complex society based on 
mass production. '`' 1 
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The material sophistication of Donnelly's future society is 
based on usury, "-' and on the exploitation of manual labourers, who 
inhabit the "Under-World" as a vi cious criminalised class, 
identified, amid racist anxieties, in terms of an "invasion of the 
Mongolian hordes": 
these vast, streaming, endless swarms were the condemned, 
marching noiselessly as shades to unavoidable and 
everlasting misery. They seemed to me merely automata, in 
the hands of some ruthless and unrelenting destiny. 
However, in this society, everyone is considered as a victim of an 
impersonal system: 
brutality above had produced brutality below; cunning there 
was answered by cunning here; cruelty in the aristocrat was 
mirrored by cruelty in the workman. High and low were alike 
victims - unconscious victim. - of .=y: _ =: z. 
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by the international Brotherhood of Destruction, is 
signified in the novel by images that imply natural inevitability; 
And if the molten mass of horror should break its 
ii; ritation: and overflow the earth! Already it seemed to me 
the planet trembled; I could hear the volcanic explosions; 1 
could see the Sordid flood of wrath and hunger pouring. 
through those halls; cataracts of IäiserTY bursting, through 
every door and window, and sweeping away all this. splendor 
into negier ending blackness=. and ruin, 
Donnelly'; fear is therefore, as Eric Nottram puts i t} 
ch racterist. icaiiv AIle ican: "the mutated workers, the poor and t<he 
criminals as the source of uncontrollable energy. " ' The 
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ine_vi abiIitie; =; in Caesar's Column are Darwinian competitive 
ctru '; ý; which DoFine lV compares to Waves in the sea c imbing over 
each other, suggesting "the endless compeUdons of men in the arena 
D Life. 
w, 
TQ ata irorhe of proletarian rebellion will Hill off three-- 
quarters of the world's population, and the remainder, 
"constituting, by the law of the survival of the fittest, the most 
powerful and brutal, " will form gangs: "the great fighter in each of 
these will become chief, as among all savages. " The disastrous 
history of the world will then be repeated.: `' 
Donnelly':; redemptive schema draws on apocalyptic 
Justifications, as the destruction of society may be "Godý, =. Way of 
wiping off the blackboard. ° The novel is thus ultimately concerned 
With religious, utopian consolation. As Gabriel put; it, "I must 
save the world from such a calamity. ": ° The utopia in Africa is a 
"return homer " to a semi-pastoral society, in which the problem of 
industrial technology is resolved by a vague compromise: "We do not 
give any encouragement to labor-saving inventions, although we do 
not discard them. °: 
Donne. ly's novel views state intervention as the solution for an 
economy that can no longer be connidered as a self-regulating 
machine. Centralised, state control is claimed as an organised, 
ben( volent system let ;? y a government based on the ýt lon ighted 
thoughts of philanthropy, of states- lansIhip and statecraft" of "a few 
superior intellect.. "- The agrarian utopia thus betrays an 
authoritarian programme of social engineering, For the ingenuity of 
man, 
has conquered the forces of steam and electricity, but it 
has neglected the great adjustments of society, on which the 
happiness of millions depends. If the same intelligence 
which has been bestowed on perfecting the steam-engine had 
been directed to a consideration of the correlations of mar, 
to man, and pursuit to pursuit, supply and demand would have 
precisely matched each other, and there need have been no 
pauperism in the world - save that of the sick and 
imbecile. 
The dangers of authoritarian control in Donnelly's speculations are 
also clear in Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward: 2000-1887 (1588). 
Bellamy's utopian novel sold i-ýD, OOO copies in its first two 
years of publication. The popularity of the book, with its 
prescription of bureaucratic statist forms of socialism, played an 
important part in the subsequent neglect of more libertarian 
counter-trends in American socialist thought. The widespread 
identification of Bellamy's Look-lag Backward with socialism was 
therefore a serious obstacle to the advancement and discussion of 
revolutionary ideas in America since its publication in 1885. 
The promotion of a single, central bureaucratic government of 
aocIety i: given a spurious guarantee in Looking Backward by tie 
word 1°cc fence " which becc0mes an alibi for the apparent neutrality 
of the power interest: who superintend the supposedly "rationale 
planning of society. 
Lewis Mumford, writing midway through a twentieth century 
characterised by a global politics of mass murder and repression in 
the name of the centralised, monopolistic state, analyse:; Bellamy's 
utopia as hart of a line that moves from Plato's R'eti' 11: 1 J c, in 
nupoort of an absolutist state: 
it was an attempt to impose upon a whole community a common 
mill tar y discipline - to drive out the Dionysian love for 
food and drink and sexual delight, to banish the poet and 
artist, and to reserve only for the guardian:; of the state 
the full exercise of thought. Every form of privacy is 
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either diminished or denied under this system; every form of 
tender feeling is repressed. The end product is a community 
unified, centrally directed, uniformly responsive to 
command: freed from anxiety, insecurity, mischance or error; 
and by that fact equally freed from the possibility of 
growth and improvement, "''I' 
Such utopian replace Dionysian joy with an homogenous contentment, 
static, bland, passive, and untroubling to the militaristic status 
quo. 
Looking; Backward is based mainly on extrapolations from 
contemporary political and economic developments, against which 
technological innovations are secondary. Capital has followed its 
"logical evolut on` into a centralised state monopoly, as the 
nationalisation of industry and cco. erce is, viewed as the single, 
inevitable solution to the labour unrest of late nineteenth century 
America. 
Bellamy locates the reason for such unrest in widespread fears 
that the great corporation: were preparing for the working class te 
"yoke of a baser servitude than had ever been imposed on tee race, 
servitude not to men but to soulle.: =: machines incapable of any 
motive but insatiable greed. ""' However, Bellamy's own solutionary 
programme to alleviate these fears relies itself an mechanical 
principles of organisation and servitude, and. derives it. s model of 
militaristic and machine-like efficiency from the great capitalist 
corporations themselves. 
For it is the very effectiveness of the monopolistic 
corporations in, producing, material wealth that enables the 
transition to state capitalism to be peaceful, and in accordance 
with tae demands of "public opinion. " For the American People 
had seen for many year-; syndicates handling revenues greater 
t an those of states, and directing the Tabor:. of hundred: 
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of thousands of men with an efficiency and economy 
unattainable in smaller operations. It had come to be 
recogniz ed as an axiom that the larger the business the 
simpler the principle:, that can be applied to that, as a 
machine is truer than the hand, so the system, which in a 
great concern does the work of the master's eye in a small 
business, turns out more accurate 
As in Ignatius Donnelly, the word "system" here suggests impersonal, 
mechanical control, conveniently eliding issues of personal and 
organisational responsibility and power. This model of the state as 
a mechanistic "system, " run on apparently simple, bureaucratic lines 
according to pseudo-scientific axioms, recurs in the assumptions of 
Frederick Taylor, and in the theorists of " mana: erial society, " 
discussed in chapters 12 and 13. 
in Looking Backward, the workforce is organised on militaristic 
lines, as an "army of industry. " :' Dreaming that he has returned to 
nineteenth century Boston, Jul an vest deplores the chaos of urban 
life, until he sees a passing military regiment: "there at last were 
order and reason, an exhibition of what intelligent cooperation can 
at_i; Týlüi2 £iHe Eubsequerti, y compares °t tý7_ Si.: lciiZii iýý manner 
which the nation wen It to war With the uIl --4. rntiiic manner in weich 
i1 Went to work, " '1b cl erice11 is thus used as an alibi for ttle_ total 
re ; uTation o the JE: -=; of the human beirr ;S that make up the 
industrial workforce, ' cience i:; here synonymous with determinism 
and prell ctaniiity, while implying that such strategic: are 
inevitable and incontrove_rtitible. 
The work of Herbert Marcuse anal' ses the failure-; of monopol y 
state capitalism in the twentieth century, as well as its continued 
ability to win the consent and submission of the workforce, In 
. 
4n Essay on Liberation (I96ý)), Marcuse examines the boil 
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incorporation of repress-ion as a "second nature, " whereby even those 
areas of behaviour in which the individual might designate his or 
her actions as voluntary and free are subject to imposed capitalist 
control: 
Once a specific morality is firmly established as a norm of 
social behaviour, it is not only introjected - it also 
operates as a norm of 'organic' behaviour: the organism 
receives and reacts to certain stimuli and 'ignores' and 
repels others in accord with the introjected morality, which 
is thus promoting or impeding the function of the organism 
as a living cell in the respective society. in this way, a 
society constantly re-creates, this side of consciousness 
and ideology, patterns of behaviour and aspiration as part 
of the 'nature' of its people ... "-I 
In Looking Backwrard, total control is instigated under the rubric of 
"public opinion, " as the "principle of universal military service 
applied to the labor question" 'become; '"a matter of course, rather 
than compulsion... regarded as so absolutely natural and reasonable 
that the idea of its being compulsory has ceased to be thought 
of. ": '' This naturalisation of power in utopian fictions is a central 
technique of their persuasiveness. 
Indeed, Julian West's unquestioning submission to the authority 
of his doctors provides a model for obedience in Bellamy's novel, 
Undergoing mesmerism from a Professor of Animal Magnetism in order 
to cure his insomnia, West is accidentally put to sleep for one 
hundred and thirteen years. Waking in the year 2000 in the house of 
Dr. Leete, he nevertheless still trusts the authority of the new 
; ioctor. Dr. Leete "Save me a wine glas-, of something or other which 
sent me to sleet. as soon a, my head touched the pillow. " -- 
Submission to control is deemed casual and unproblematic in Looking 
Backward. 
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Bellamy's utopia proposed a magical solutionary programme to 
allay the insomnias of liberal reformers, such as his own Julian 
West. it consequently inspired the formation of hundreds of clubs, 
and a "Nationalist Party, " devoted to implementing Bellamy's 
political system. H. Bruce Franklin mentions the June 1890 issue of 
the Overland PforztJ1y, which was completely devoted to Bellamy's 
ideas. Amon the majority of works extending and supporting 
Bellamy's programme was H. Elton Smith's "The Last Sinner, " an early 
anti-utopian protest in favour of individualist non-conformity. 
Another utopian novel of this period, Chauncey Thomas' 
. 
The Crystal Button {1891) emphasises social change through moral 
reform, while speculating on technological changes in greater detail 
than L coking Backward. 
Subtitled "The Adventures of Paul Prognosis in the 49th 
Century, " The crystal Button was published four years after 
Looking Backward, although the author claims in the preface, in 
response to the popularity of that novel, that it was written as 
early as 1878, in the preface, Thomas, a Boston coach-builder, 
describes the imaginative possibilities of a fiction that speculates 
about science! 
Here was a field of inquiry limitless, and with scarcely a 
footprint. Here the inventor could experiment on the largest 
scale, with no expense for models or patent-rights. ` 
Tie. Crystal Button thus stands at the head of the glut of such work 
in the twentieth century, as science fiction has become one of the 
most prolific and lucrative areas of the American entertainment 
industries. 
he novel, is a successful Paul Prognosis, the hero of 
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eiectrica engineer, experimenting at the vanguard of late 
nineteenth century technology. He dreams of a future city, called 
Tone, in which the natural world is under the total control of 
science and technology, administered by a centralised, monopolistic 
state. Electric power, generated from the sun, wind and waves, is 
used to create a clean and healthy environment. However, as in 
Looking Backward, the new society is static and uniform, presided 
over by the appropriately-named "Government of Settled Forms. " 
The novel predicts several future technological innovations, 
such as airships and urban subway systems, but goes further to 
postulate a situation of absolute control over the environment 
through scientific knowledge. All animals considered harmful to 
human beings have been eradicated - lion, tiger, hippopotamus, 
rhinoceros, crocodile - as nature is completely and brutally 
subjugated to the requirements of human society, as defined by the 
Government: Such extinction of great classes of animal life has 
been mainly accomplished by direct and systematic warfare in the 
interests of humanity. °': ' 
The philosophical alibi for such destructiveness is the assumed 
inevitability of Darwinian-Spencer ian evolutionary processes, The 
"survival of the fittest, " a phrase which, Paul is told, "was a new 
by-word in your day. .. 
iss now a gospel. """ By accepting Spencerian 
inevitabilities as a scriptural orthodoxy, permission is assumed by 
the government for control not only of animal life, but also of 
human beings themselves. In its most extreme case, people are 
subjected to compulsory sterilisation if their physical or moral 
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u li's bilitiec" are likely to be transmitted to the next generation, 
"for it is contrary to every rule of justice that physical and moral 
disease afflicting the present generation should be allowed to cast 
its curse upon a helpless and innocent generation yet unborn. "4' 
This is the force that organises the society at its most overt; 
elsewhere, stability is maintained through an engineering of consent 
similar to that found in Looking Backward. 
The Government of Settled Forms is a single world government, 
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Melville of the totalitarian danwero of those who seek the stability 
of a "single idea" are ignored. Statist totalltarianlsuin become 
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Although both novels claim apparently limitless possibilities for 
human uro ress_;, the management of their societies-; on mechanical 
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principles of efficiency, predicated upon total knowledge of a 
single "Truth" available to science, suggests a rigidly enforced 
totalitarian regime. Theo political realities: are smuggled into 
such utopias beneath alibis of beneficent rule and of scientific 
progress. Describing the seductiveness of such total solutions, 
Lewis Mumford observes that, , in Looking Backward, "the proposed 
equalization of income, duties, sacrifices, opportunities, seems so 
palapably just and 'democratic', so unmenacing, so beneficial, that 
the one element missing in this hem- escapes us - because we scheme eý ýa are. - 
already so close to having lost it: namely, there are no 
alternatives to the system itself. "'' 
The key to the utopia of The Crystal Button is the technocratic 
use of knowledge to redesign the environment. Consequently, the 
guide that the author chooses to explain his future society is a 
Professor, a yellow of the Academy of Sciences. He explains that 
nineteenth century experimental science has finally succeeded in its 
project for the total explanation of nature: 
the youthful period of experimenting and scheming is past, 
and we now understand the force= and materials that are at 
our disposal, and can thus work toward any given end with 
reasonable assurance of success... Science, which merely 
means knowing, has now taken the place of experimenting, 
which means trying to knows, and consequently implies 
ignorance. " 
At a time when Charles Peirce and Chauncey Wright were exploring a 
provisional, ant i-teleolosgical science, Chauncey Thomas re-assert,,, -=. 
tie archaic Newtonian-. ap acial'i project of omrletenr: =: s and 
.. L=ý.. ality. : iV 
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Teri again in the work of Isaac Asinov and Arthur C. Clarke, in be 
chapter 1}. 
In The Crystal Button, the application of this newly completed 
totality of scientific knowledge as instrumental technique acting 
upon nature produces a society of unprecedented material affluence, 
which is distributed in an egalitarian manner by the central 
bureaucracy. Happiness is thereby administered ýýcientifically, In an 
anticipation of the automated paradise-: of twentieth century utopian 
fiction, such as Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (l 32), In the city 
of Tone, the "Palace of the Sun" provides "a world in itself, -a 
tropical world, where summer always reign- and where nothing is 
ever ailowe: i to enter that no no- brie bi. ossoms, or perfume, or 
music, or smiles, or h ppiness in some form; nothing, I should say, 
other than humanity. °' The novel thus raises vital questions of 
what may constitute a liberatory technology, as centrally defined 
leisure activitie are permitted for its off-duty worker army. The 
complex issue:; of pleasure, technology and power will he raised 
again in connection with Henry Ford, and his decisive innovations in 
twentieth century history, in the next chapter. 
The brutality underlying the totalitarian utopias explored by 
Donnelly, Bellamy, and Thomas was made visible at the time by Mark 
Twain's A Connecticut Yankee in king Arthur's Court (1889). 
Contemporary industrialisation and plutocracy are satirised in the 
i' lure of hank Morgan a worker at Colt's gun factory in Hartford, 
who finds himself in sixth century England. Using his nineteenth 
century Yankee "hard unsentimental common-sense and reason, ""' he 
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natives. 
Morgan realizes that human beings are products of environmental 
training, and makes this an alibi for his power: 
Training - training is everything; training is all there is 
to a person. We speak of nature; it is folly; there is no 
such thing as nature; what we call by that misleading name 
is merely heredity and training. We have no thoughts of our 
own. they are transmitted to us, trained into us. " 
, wain's novel is ambiguous as to whether the retraining that Morgan 
give. s to the inhabitants of medieval England is to their benefit, as 
a means of breaking the old system of slavery and tyranny, or 
whether Morgan imposes his will on others merely for the sake of 
Dower and domination, 
Like Brockden Brown's Ludloe or Donnelly's Brotherhood of 
Destruction, : wain' s Hank Mom gan founds a secret colon,,, where he 
met usa patent office, a school, a newspaper, a military academy 
and other 21ementa neues a2y ±or a capltaiiet i-adustria1 society 
in various quiet nooks and corners i had the beginnings of 
all sorts of industries under way nuclei of future vast 
factories, the iron and steel missionaries of my future 
civilization. In these were gathered together the brightest 
young minds I could find, and I kept agents out raking the 
country for more, all the time. I was training, a crowd of 
ignorant folk into experts - experts in every sort of 
handiwork and scientific calling. These nurseries of mine 
went smoothly and privately along undisturbed in their 
obscure country retreats, for nobody was allowed to come 
into their precincts without a special permit - for I was 
afraid of the Church. '"' 
A simple evaluation 
final clause, which 
t=rice of Morgan' s pri 
apiarent promise of 
through t :e country 
of the secret elite as evil is mitigated by the 
suas, ests the revolutionary, 
a. iect. This ambiguity is also present in the 
the network of "confidential agents tricKiin_g 
some time, whose office was to undermine 
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t, -1 ya +i. i l-. - 1"" - Ti ý' T .l, l at r: ii iiýi'iGG+i ý? iiurirý =rp .. uic d 
ea, a. Li 0 ý'11aW a iiitie 3' 
and t_iai and t ie Other superstition, and so prepare the way 
gradually for a better order of things. "'" Moreover, Morgan 
evaluates England convincingly in terms of master-slave 
relationships, and questions of obedience to tyrannical authority, 
He attempts to bring to feudal society bourgeois "freedunder 
which "a man will be his own property, not the property of 
magistrate and master. "';: 
Never t. _ieles; s, Morgan' _- attack on tyrannical pow r, base d on 
those values of liberal egalitarianism on which America was founde, i, 
involves a desire to impose a tyrannical system of his own, by force 
and persuasion, using his own mechanical automata for that purpose: 
There was hardly a knight in all the land who wasn't in some 
useful employment. They were going from end to end of the 
country in all manner of useful missionary capacities; their 
penchant for wandering, and their experience in it, made 
them altogether the most effective spreaders of civilization 
we had. They went clothed in steel and equipped with sword 
and lance and battle axe, and if they couldn't persuade a 
person to try a sewing machine on the instalment plan, or a 
melodeon, or a barbed wire fence, or a prohibition Journal, 
or any of the other thousand and one things they canvassed 
for, they removed him and passed on. ' " 
The word "removed" , demonstrate= iwain's early grasp of the 
euphemistic language of authoritarian control. 
Morgan' =. secret agent" subvert feudal society by creating 
consumer needs to be met by the new industrial capitalism. For 
example, Morgan chooses a man to work on developing a stove-polish: 
(here were no stoves yet, and so there could be nothing 
serious about stove-polish. All that the agent needed to do 
wa. to deftl4 and by de, rees re; car e the public for the 
great change, and have them established in 
toward neatness against the time when the stove should 
appear upon the stage. -4 
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The consumer is already being sold to the product to perpetuate the 
capitalist status quo. Morgan imposes his cwsumerist, industrial 
technocracy as a form of American imperialism, imparting what he 
calls the "civilization" of the nineteenth century to medieval 
England. Describing his "colony" as "a Factory where i' m going to 
turn groping and grubbing automata into ien, "'-, " , in fact, he does the 
opposite. The "serene volcano, standing innocent with its smokeless 
summit in the blue sky" gives "no sign of the rising hell in its 
bowels. "`; ` 
So Morgan's plans to lead a peaceful bourgeois revolution, 
introducing universal suffrage and freedom of religious worship, end 
in failure. His attempts at mass education cannot cope with what is 
seen as human beings habitually fixed in servility: "Did you think 
you had educated the superstition out of those people? "``' The 
revolutionary moment is lost, and habitual obedience and self- 
sacrifice take over again: 
the Church, the nobles, and the `entry then turned one 
grand, all-disapproving frown upon them and shriveled them 
into sheep! From that moment the sheep had begun to gather 
to the fold - that is to say, the camps - and offer their 
valueless: lives and their valuable wool to the "righteous 
cause", and glorifying it, praying for it, sentimentally 
slabbering over it, just like all the other commoners. 
Imagine such human muck as this; conceive of this folly! '.. 
Thus despite images throughout the novel of contemporary technology 
ua form of magic to rival that of Merlin, the novel ends with a 
clear ex, osur e_ of the mower relations within which modern 
technology 
was being introdu es. Morgan' s "deadly scientific war. -material" 
consists of an electrified fence connected to "twelve immenslJ 
strong wires - naked, not insulated -- from a big dynamo in the cave 
- dynamo with no brushes except a positive and a negative one. . 
"'' 
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iwatn''. +'mp" asi; on modern teoR-110 Lam' F': =: of mass destruction, and 
hi attack on myths oZ progress and t ie power bares of plutocratic 
control, thus contrasts sharply with the vogue for utopian dreams in 
America, prompted by the monopolisation of capitalism at the end of 
the nineteenth century. His satire provides ambivalent complexities, 
in vital resistance to the singularisation of discourse prevalent in 
utopian works such as Looking Backward and The Crystal Button. 
The following chapter will pursue the utopian, militaristic 
bases evident in Bellamy and Thomas into the twentieth century work 
of Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford 
CHAPTER 1?. 
Ere er i- . or and Henry Ford. 
This chapter will examine the theory of "scientific management" 
developed by Frederick Taylor and. Henry Ford as a central tool of 
modern capitalist domination in twentieth century Americas and 
beyond, 
Frederick Taylor formulated his ideas when working as a foreman 
for ? idvale Steel Company in the 1880s. His system applies simple 
mechanistic principles to all work processes. The Frinciple of 
Scientific Management (1913), as the title suggests, asserts the 
possibility of controlling the behaviour of a workforce through what 
are asserted to be "scientific. " that is, deterministic, methods. 
Taylor's desire was to eliminate "wastes of human effort" from 
ai i industrial WGrK proCr; Accordingly, there would be no room 
b or indiv ouai initiative, n teaii, aim acciGne Wer_ to De governea 
by a fixed set of rules and standards, established by the managers. 
As Taylor pu 7t, "iin the pasi the man has been first, in the future 
the : 3yS tem must be first, " G that the remedy for inefficiency lips 
in systematic management, rather than in searching for some unusual 
or extraordinary man. ". 
Already, the word "scientific" is placed with the word "system, " 
as a bureaucratic structure too large for individual control, Power 
relations are thus obscured under a rhetoric of supposedly value- 
free, empirically-valid behavioural rules and procedures. In this 
way, Taylorism perpetuates bourgeois capitalist travesties of 
-1°"1 - 
: emocracy, as a quantitative levelling down, suspicious of the 
exceptional or non--conformist, of the "unusual or extraordinary 
man. " Instead, the ", system" demands loyalty, obedience and 
sacrif ice. 
Taylor's methods are totalitarian in their generalised 
applicability, as he extends "scientific management" to include "ail 
social activities": 
to the management of our homes; the management of our farms; 
the management of the business of our tradesmen, large and 
small; of our churches, our philanthropic institutions, our 
universities, and our government departments. 
All areas of human life are seen as potentially reducible to simple, 
deterministic scientific rules. 
Efficiency, as defined by the managers, becomes the fundamental 
norm against which these areas of human endeavour will be measured. 
Taylor's principle of efficiency was based on "time and motion" 
studies, which determined which actions could be judged Guperfluous 
to the specific physical task being studied. Speed was therefore the 
main test of efficiency. The desired end of "maximum productivity" 
would be achieved when "each man and each machine are turning out 
the largest possible output. "A in this way, what was wasteful, 
according to a criterion of optimum performance, could be 
eradicated, so that, as Siegfried Gliedion puts it, "The human body 
is studied to discover how far it can be transformed into a 
aecha . iom. "'° Similar principles of performativity have formed the 
basis of management strategies throughout the twentieth century. 
The mechanistic foundations of Taylor's theory are disguised 
under a rhetoric of beneficent reformism, The avowed object of 
"scie_ntif is management" is to move "toward promoting prosper it yý 
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toward the diminution of poverty, and the alleviation of 
ýu fe ing, a thereby promoting "increased opportunities for 
education, culture, and recreation, "` Taylor claimed that his system 
of getting workers to produce more for the same pay would benefit 
the "third great party, the whole people, - the consumers... ": At 
the start of the twentieth century, then, Taylor brings together 
many of the central alibis by which modern industrial society 
perpetuates the status Quo. Key words - "output. " "s-, ystem, rr 
"consumer, " "efficiency, " "science, " "research" - are already in 
rhetorical play, 
The Enlightenment myth of a liberatory technology to which 
Taylor appeals is used in this way as a strategy to consolidate the 
capitalist class system. The alibi of beneficence disgui ses a 
strengthening of existing social hierarchies. This is clear in 
Taylor's assertion that "one type of mar, is needed to plan ahead and 
an entirely different type to execute the work. " Indeed, Taylor's 
attitude to the wo`i Ker under ientifis management" is notorious. 
Handling pig-iron is described as a task "so crude and elementary in 
its nature that tihe writer -firmly believes that it would be possible 
to train an intelligent gorilla so as to become a more efficient 
pig-iron handler than any man can be. " The main requirement of a 
pig-iron handler is that "he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic 
that he more nearly resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any 
other type. " A man who is "mentally alert and intelligent" would be 
unsuited to the task. ''' 
Managers were instructed to choose as models for time and motion 




workman Chosen was therefore a "first-class man, " like Schmidt, whom 





_. h"r r. describes as 
The standard to which all workers were forced to conform '. tea 























E. ýsu_c and c. _i _., .. 
at, Jry waste, 
beVcnd utilitarianism - "I lean 501 . oafs at my ease observing a 
ý... 
_ :a 
of _ umtue or a s.. 
' was no 
_: 
nsei to be tolerated. ' 
c: `. ` 0i 1' . 1r r' :1 
to reduc o the la OUr pi ones to what iaylo saw 
as he `one best me` hod. iIii. : hunt Zor the , =, iný`,., 'ular entailed 
the 
observation of "traditional knowledge" and rule-of-thumb methods, 
which would t Ten, in Taylor's words, bG "codified" and 
"- s ematically analyze(!, ud The manager: _, ' tank would be in 
ca sify'ing', tabulating, and reducing this knowledge to rules, 
law, -, and formulae which are immensQ. helpful to tie workmen in 
doing their daily work. "", These apparently impersonal. and abstract 
rules we re to "replace the judgement of the individual workman. " 
The continuing obsession of Power interests With codification will 
he discussed ir.,. chapter 14. 
Lay o is_ management is a synthesis Of ultiple form=a of 
technological control, in which the manager oversees his workers' 
behaviour by methods of panoptic urveillance. From a specially 
built office, "every laborer's work was planned out well in advance, 
ans the workmen were all moved from Diace to place by the clerks 
with elaborate diagrams or maps of the yard before them, very much 
as chessmen are moved on a chess-board, a telephone and messenger 
system having been installed for this purpo: e. "' 
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Tay for oweriy admitted his role as an experimenter on human 
beings. Each workman is "studied, taught, and trained, and one may 
say ?< perimente, s With, instead of allowing the workmen to select 
themselves and t e_velop in a. haphazard Way. "'- In Taylorism, human 
behaviour is assumed to be law-bound and determined, so that 
scientific research by an elite of experts can be extended to the 
"accurate study of the motives which influence men": 
At first it may appear that this is a matter for individual 
observation and judo, meat, and is not a proper subject for 
exact scientific experiments. It is true that the laws which 
result from experiments of this class, owing to the fact 
that the very complex organism - the human being - is being 
experimented with, are subject to a larger number os 
exceptions than is the case with laws relating to material 
things. And yet laws of this kind, which apply to a large 
majority of men, unquestionably exist, and when clearly 
defined are of great value as a guide in dealing with men. 
in developing these laws, accurate, carefully planned and 
executed experiments, extending, through a term of years, 
have been male..., 
For Taylor's contemporary, Henry Adam, the proliferation of 
exceptions destroyed faith in such totalising theories. Taylorism, 
on the other hand, sought to extend Newtonian conceptions of 
mechanistic determinism, predictability and law to the study and 
governance of human beings in 
industrial society. 
One of the far-reaching implications of iay ori: m is its attempt 
to replace political struggle:; and debate with "science. '' 
Deterministic science is thus hell up as the perfect arbiter of 
human life, as a means of ending conflict by eliminating disputes 
between worker and management. in the future, "What constitutes a 
fair day's work will be a que:; tiOn for scientific investigation, 
instead of a ; subject to be bargained and haggled over. This 




ui? üo efliy "neutral" technocratic mediation, administered by a 
manageria elite, is repeated in the managerial theories of Tames 
Burnham, as well as in Isaac Asimov's science fiction stories, based 
on the desirability of global cybernetic control; subjects disco=; ed 
in chapters 13 and 15 respectively. 
The power of such technocratic theories depend- on the 
eradication of chance and unpredictable elements, Sudhir Kakar cite:, 
Comte's "savoir pour prdvoir, privoir pour prdvenir" as a basis for 
Taylor's system: "Henceforth, it was to be a self-evident 
proposition that all the problems that might hinder the precise and 
effective functioning of a factory organization were not to be left 
to the chance ingenuity or momentary inspiration of the worker but 
were to be confronted and resolved in advance, to be forestalled on 
the basis of knowledge already available. ";, 
Iuevertheles Kakar's study traces the difficulties that 
Taylor's system ran into from its earliest days, as it aroused 
opposition from both workers, fellow engineers, and management. in 
1911, Samuel Gamp'ero, leader of the American Federation o Labour, 
urged workers to resist the Taylorist peed up, speaking in terms of 
its intolerable imposition of mechanical slavery onto the American 
worker: 
Ho, there you are, wage-workers in general, mere machines - 
considered industrially, of course. Hence, why should you 
not be standardized and your motion-power brought up to the 
highest possible perfection in all respei ts, includin 
speeNor only your ien th, Greases, and thickness as a 
machine, but your grade of hardness, malleability, 
tractability, and general serviceability, can be 
ascertained, registered, and then employed as desirable. 
Science would thus get the most out of you before you are 
cent to the junkpile. 
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Oapo ýt on to Taylor ism ai. 60 came prom financiers, confirming Brooks 
Adams' thesis in their reluctance to invest in the ion, g-term 
reconstruction of workplaces with no guarantee of short-term profit. 
'However, despite these renistan es, Taylor's ystem was adopted 
in factories as an ideal model of control, and as a supposedly 
"scientific" theory beyond political ideology. Thus in Pravda, on 28 
April 1918, Lenin argued for the adoption of Taylorism as a solution 
to 'The Urgent Problems of Soviet Rule": "We should try out every 
scientific: and progressive suggestion of the Taylor system... we 
must introduce in Russia the study and teaching of the new Taylor 
o its + and " t,, the a ýV: tý-M and i ._ ýJ i? ýat l, t-ial ant adapt on. W2 Qu the ado tiß l 
of Taylorist organisation by Soviet industry, the development of a 
genuinely participatory socialism in the country was severely 
hi rider eci. 
T In the United States, a filar ie was used as a basis for the 
ia-Lor'y'--, yswem developed by Henry Ford. with the basic cost of 
producing the modes of prodUCtton rising at the end of the 
nineteenth century. and with wage utting an impractical means of 
lowering, production costs, industrial interests looked to Taylor's 
speed-up as an effective means of increasing productivity. 
Accordingly, Ford introduced Taylorist organisational methods into 
his factories, using the material rewards of technological 
development as a bribe to buy the consent of the workforce for these 
banges 
in _1913, Ford introduced high-speed electrified as. seýibly-line 
production at his Highland Park . slant near 
Detroit, thereby reducing 
the time taken to as embie a car one third. As a result, Fie was by 
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able both to raise the wages paid to his workers, and to lower the 
price of his goods on the mrket thereby encouraging consumer 
spending. Low Wages, as Ford said in his autobiography, ultimately 
work against big business interests, in that they mean "the cutting 
of buying power and the Curtailment of the home market. " 
Ford's semi-automation of industrial production was a drive, as 
Lewis Mustard arg ues, to "invade distant markets, standardize tastes 
and buying habits, destroy alternative choices, (and) wipe out 
in this way, it renewed capitalism, and 
Gi f _e-t the threat of irr aletar ian revolt, the cause of so much 
anxiety for bourgeois reformers such as Ignatius Donnelly and Edward 
Bellamy, at the end of the nineteenth century. In this context, Paul 
Virilio, in Speed and Politics (1977), places Ford at the centre of 
the American state's ability to survive economic crisis in the early 
decades of the twentieth century: 
The stroke of genius will, consist in doing away with the 
direct repression of riots, and the political discourse 
itse f, ', y unvei iil the essence of this discourse. the 
trans tortation capacity created by the mass production of 
automobiles (since 1914 with Ford) can become a social 
assault, a revolution sufficient and able to modify the 
citizen's way of life by transforming all. the consumer's 
need:,, by totally remodeling a territory that . need we be 
reminded of it'? ) at the beginning had no more than 400 
kilometers of road., 
in his e_; ay "Americanism and Fordlls-`. (c, 1926), Antonio Gramsci 
examined these new technique= of capitalist invasion, by emphasising, 
the erotic bases of consumer ist control! 
-. 
He describes Ford's methods 
;x "a s'ki_IuI _ombination of Ior cr' (1 : =; trll tion of worklng-cIa. ' s 
trade unionism on a territorial basi_) ann persuasion (high wages, 
various social benefits, ertrememi-, r subtle ideological and political 
i-: ropaganda) ," 
Ford Succeeded in "making the whole 11±0_ of ttihe nation 
- 1UV 
r evoi Jo around jDroduction 
requirao for its exorcise 
political and ideological 
capitalism, the political 
network that includes com 
authoritarian control. 
Ford gave the careful 
Hegemony here is born in the factorv and 
only a minute quantity of professional 
intermediaries. ",::, Under modern 
class rules indirectly, through a cultural 
modity consumption as a vital area of 
regulation of human energies to the 
requirements of industrial production an alibi of capitalist 
democracy, in his celebration of the Mode's. T as the world's first 
mass produced luxury item. But as in the famous joke - that the 
purchaser of a Ford Model T could have any colour, as long as it ., as 
black - the democratic potential of the motor car was rigidly 
cirJ'umscribed. Tt IS said that the bench seat in the Model T was 
only 37" wide in a deliberate attempt by Ford to discourage couples 
rom having sexual intercourse in one of his cars, Certainly, Ford's 
management was notorious in its attempted surveillance of the 
private lives of the companjl's employees, as what, Gramsci calls the 
'psycho-phy. si cal adaptation": ' of the worker to the demands of 
production was extended to the sexual enemies of the workforce, As 
Gramsci put it, "the new type of man demanded by the rationalisation 
of production and work, cannot be developed until the sexual instinct 
has been suitably regulated and until lt too has been 
rationalise. "' ' Industrialism thus becomes another instance of 
"subjugating natural (i. e. animal and primitive) instincts to new, 
more complex and rigid norms and habits of order, exactitude and 
precision which can make possible the increasingly complex forms of 
collective life which are the necessary consequence of industrial 
_ i0(ß - 
is lei i Iit. "i lt asur? lo both sanctioned and controlled by the 
recu1r e entt Hfl' oinino i tjr production, as teile worker 1. S encouraged by 
capitalist interests to consume in order to "maintain and restore 
the strength that has been worn down by the new form of toil. "'" 
Ford's role in the formation of modern consumer capitalism has 
been discussed by Edward Hyams, in The Millenium Postponed (11974), a 
book written in a context of the failures of socialist ideas to make 
a widespread impact, after the travesty of the Soviet Revolution 
and decades of social democracy in Western industrial nations. Hyams 
points to the strengthening of capitalist interests in severa 
crucial areas in the twentieth century, so that Marxist dreams of a 
dialectic of history, in which the capitalist state will inevitably 
wither away, must be relinquished as simplistic consolations. 
Orthodox Marxists did not fernes several vital changes, which Hyams 
summarises as Follows: 
(1) The mass-production techniques invented by the 
greatest industrial genius of the century, Henry Ford, and 
the amount of surplus value which technologically 
sophisticated industry can produce, with the consequent need 
for capitalists to pay higher and higher wages in order to 
create a market for their product, in other words, they did 
not and could not foresee that scientific progress plus the 
steady pressure of his own economic thinking on both 
worker's organizations and capitalism, would ensure that 
after a certain trough in the curve of decline workers' 
wages would begin to rise. 
(ii) The fiexibility and enormous growth following on 
the above, of the ancient device of usury, in the expansion 
of credit commerce to enable the workers to become the 
largest consumers of durable consumer goods - owners of 
house, car, etc., on credit, a credit which furthermore had 
the advantage for the capitalists of keeping the worker 
bound by legal obligations to the capitalist system, He no 
longer had nothing to lose but his chains, 
(iii) The advent, in John Maynard Keynes, of a genius 
capable of adapting socialist economists' ideas for 
controlling the economy and its growth, to capitalist ends. 
After Keynes it was no longer necessary for capitalism to be 
governed simply by uncontrollable market fluctuations; it 
- DO? - 
could be controlled and steered, though within certain 
limits. 
(iv) The growth of very large industrial and commercial 
corporations to the point at which they could be managed, 
like the State, only by a bureaucracy; and the scale of 
State interference in capitalist business, together 
resulting, under trade-union pressure, in partial adoption 
into capitalist enterprise of socialist planning and a 
measure of socialist welfare. 
(v) The extent and pace of the expansion of world trade. 
(vi) Finally, the threat of exhaustion of certain 
natural resources. A socialist, like an expanding 
capitalist, assumption was that these would be virtually 
inexhaustible. As a result of the deliberate fostering, of 
demand for consumer goods by capitalism and, of course, of 
excessive population growth, supplying demand on a fair- 
share basis must result in exhaustive consumption of natural 
resources on such a scale that certain commodities essential 
for the continuance of a high-consumption economy will soon 
become scarce, _ 
Hyman rare-: vital issues which will recur in tue re: =: t of this 
thesis. The following chanters will discuss the development of state 
bureaucracy in the twentieth Century, as iiordis - 1aylori St 
strategies of capitalist management form the basis of technocratic 
power in modern America society. 
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CHAý'TER 131. 
Lm-erfe at , tnac_xtic sv; n toe twent iet 11 ce atury. 
W. H. Armytage analyses American industrial hegemony in the early 
twentieth century in terms an inter-relationship between the four 
basic technologies which America contributed to Europe - the motor 
car, petroleum, electric power and production engineering. 
War, again, was an important catalyst for technological 
development. The United States emerged from the First World War in 
the lQ20s an, the world's most powerful country, and its creditor for 
global expansion on American capitalist lines, Moreover, during the 
war, federal funding of scientific research became more effectively 
organised. For example, the National Research Council, formed on a 
permanent basis in May 1918, was established to promote and apply 
scientific knowledge on behalf of the President of the United 
States 
America's inadequacy in aviation research and production during 
World War One - it possessed only 23 aircraft, whereas France owned 
, 400 and Germany 1000 - led to the establishment of the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Nevertheless, such moves were 
tentative. Daniel Greenberg quotes James B. Conant of the American 
Chemical Society, who recalled that when the Society offered its 
service: - to the Secretary of War, the latter replied "that it was 
unnecessary as he had looked into the matter and found that the War 
Department already had a chemist. "' 
-12- 
But the integration of science and technology with the demands 
of : state and business Power was strengthening. The First World War 
demonstrated for Randolph Bourne the integration of the young 
intelligentsia of America into the instrumental requirement-- of the 
state. In his essay "Twilight of Idols" , '1917, -, he de-: c i: ,_ýhe: 
workers in American society at ollo s: 
`' Tý_. Ti La e -J liC t0l ý' AT Aa Ld, 
34 
äýýi .a 4'Y 
.... _ýLN 
J1 , ý. a 
_l1 
0 27 C 'I 
ti- ti' fl 
tl : «_n Iha. er za: yeti i. i : ai studies to one that 
uoCha_ i: 
_i 'olitica 
and et onoTl values. cacti a c ý. i y all t'` 
element, one would say, is lined up in service of the 
war technique... What i .- significant is that it is the 
technical side of the war that appeals to them, not the 
interpretative or political side. The formulation of values 
and ideals, the production of articulate and suggestive 
thinking, had not, in their education, kept ,, ace, to any 
extent whatever, with their technical aptitude. 
T hhe word "technocracy, " defined by the O. i,. D as "the control of 
society or industry by technical expert'= a ruling body of such 
experts, " was first coined at this time, . he tirst, reference to the 
Word in the O!. E. L'. is from W. H, Smythe, who Wrote in Irrdustria.! 
ffana3eme, nt for March LQI'D that, "For this unique experiment in 
rationalized Industrial Democracy I have coined the term 
'technocracy' " 
One of the early American theorists of modern society as a 
com^le. ti mechanical system, ruled by a technical and managerial 
elite, was Thorstein Veblen. In The En ineer: _ and the Price 5v: stem 
; ll2l Vebleri rut forward the idea that industrial managers, those 
concerned with the techni. a means of production, were gaining 
decisive? control of industrial . ocl 
Ies ,, i rougnout the worid, 
because he increasing diver ity, specialisation and complexity of 
- 1c3 - 
their work was making them indispensable to the maintenance a 1C1 
ex) ans''an of those societies, Like Frederick Taylor, Veblen claimed 
that modern m nagers had ccess to ce tic rules and axioms, 
which could be applied to industry to expand the productive capacity 
of the nation. The supposed ' scientif nature of these principle, , 
it was asserted, would guarantee their neutrality. As a value-free 
methodology, not subject to vested political interests, scientific 
prificiple::; would replace the arbitrary exercise of power by the 
ownership class. 
Vebien recalls Brooks; Adams iii criticising the corporate 
financiers and "captains of industry" who hinder the emergent 
managerial class by seeking to maintain prices and profits, rather 
than to increase productivity and growth. Financial interests thus 
place restrictive controls on the ability of the technical managers 
to increase material output. 
in The Engineers and the Price System, Veblen sought a 
mcc a- is sjs em that wou ;i apparently remove politics Zrom 
industrial production. As he out it, "Politics and investment are 
s i, II all iowed to ecide matters of In! ustria. Foiicy which should 
plainly be left to the discretion of the general staff of production 
engineers driven by no commercial bias. " He gives permission for 
technical managers to be "arbiters of the community's welfare, " 
through the assumed scientific objectivity : "osse: ý: ýed by the 
technical managerial class., 
e Men's model of society is therefore that at of a "ys Lem" 
warping impersonally. deterministically and analysable 
Ieriti2l äi 'J. As a result, he seems political value judgements 
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irrelevant, and puppre'=s=. _ problems of political power and 
e: ploltatio n: 
In more than one respect the industrial sy=stem of today is 
notably different from what has gone before. lt is eminently 
a system, : =. e? f-balanced and conprehensive; and it is a 
ve: tem of interlockin mechanical processes, rather than of 
skilful manipulation... It is of an impersonal nature, after 
the fa pion of the material science:, on which it constantly 
draws... This industrial system runs on as an inclusive 
organization of many and diverse interlocking mechanical 
processes, interdependent and balanced among themselves in 
such a way that the due working of any part of it is 
conditioned on the due working, of all the rest. '' 
Tnis mechanical mode;. of industrial society tends to make the 
governors of society invisible, hidden behind the impersonal and 
automatic workings of a machine. By obfuscating issues of power, 
domination, and political choice and struggle in this way, Veblen's 
model tends to perpetuate existing hieran chiral structures an, the 
dominant myths by which they are maintained. 
Similar technocratic ideas of society as a system o2 neutral, 
machine-like operat oIls, controlled by a seemingly apolitical 
bureaucratic elite, were developed by James Burnham during the 
Second World 'War. 
He announced in the title of his book a new revolution in 
America, Germany and the Soviet Union: namely, The Kanageri 1 
r: °ý 1üv on t srrlü -am,, 'st reiterate: Vecieni s , as he :g 
the de elope, nations of the world undergoing a transition from 
capitalism to an era in which a new class of manager-;, those in 
control the technical means of production - the organisation of -11 
mateia. ls, tools, machines, and labour - were gradual Ly assuming 
decisive Dower. 
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Ac the tasks o:. the management bureaucracy become more hignly 
epecia' iced, relying on expertise in the physical, psychological and 
social sciences, and as the capitalist class increasingly withdraws 
from the direct running of economic affairs, so Burnham claimed that 
the actual control of the property-owning class become: =-: "tenuous, 
indirect, intermittent. "` As with Veblen, therefore, the 
indispensability of the managers, in terms of their increasingly 
?t3 liz 's technical knowledge, is confused with their ac julý. ion 
of real political power. 
For Burnham, managerialism obviates the need for socialism, as 
tie ric of bureaucratic administration and planning; is a 
"revolution" in its'c f. Burnham thus calls for a "localization of 
gnty, whereby boards and bureau;; replace parliament as over P4 
lawmaking and judiciary bodies, As this centralisation of the 
economy deetroy--ý the independent economic bases necessary for 
p'e_nuine political oppo'sit on, Burnham üredicts the necessity of a 
system Oi one-party monopoly as Inc most probabiee Ior imi of fu t'Jr e 
government. The strong, monopolistic State, familiar in the Utopian 
fiction of Edward Bellamy, is again considered to be the most 
effective programme for modern industrial society. 
Burnham asserts that the "intent of this book is non 
journalistic but scientific, "-' and it is this claim to scientific 
objectivity that provides the author with an alibi for ignoring the 
uolitical implication's of his theory. Accordingly, Burnham 
approaches question: _ of power, only to dismiss them in the name of a 
supposedly value-free sociology. This sis especially strategy 
noticeable when he introduces the subject of "exploitation": 
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This word {"exploit") is often used in a moral or 
psychological rather than a more neutral historical and 
economic : sense. 
for example. a "bad" employer who pays his 
workers sweatshop wages is said to "exploit" his workers, 
whereas a "good" employer who pays union wages does not. As 
the word is used in this book, there is no moral or 
psychological reference of any kind. By an "exploiting" 
economy is meant simply an economy wherein one group 
receiver a relatively larger share of the products of the 
her. .. economy than anot independently of any moral judgement 
or of the psychological motives of the individuals 
concerned. `' 
So Burnham takes the curse off the term. "exploitation, " as elsewhere 
ideas of "fascism" and "communism" are analysed in ways that 
emphasise the apparently neutral role of the managerial elite, while 
suppressing complex discussion of those issues of morality, 
. ýychology, power and leader: =: hip implied by these system=, of 
political control. 
Burnham's managerial theory was attacked at the time by 
C. Wright Millis, in his essay "A Marx for the Managers" (l 42), 
Mills shows how Burnham confuses the indispensability of the 
_ the ýianai er :.. + 
"give advice, but they receive orders''- In Nazi Germany, one of 
Burnham's examples of the rising managerial class, real power 
remains with the ownership class; 
The question is. Where i _, the power , And the answer is it 
is the structure of domination, which is the state with its 
monopoly of physical force, and fused within it the 
industrialists and their agrarian colleagues, 
Itiiis Doints out how Burnham neglects the capacity of bourgeois 
owe_r interests to consolidate iE1emselves hrou; gh the disposition of 
property to the next generation: "It is pertinent that the ': sons of 
the managers do not inherit the managed property but rather the 
r etati`e's of the absentee owners, "-: The relative insecurity of 
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t-,:! rrüre for technical e: 7nertc cannot match this e; =, ta lishe power. 
Moreover, most members of the technical bureaucracy accept the 
dominance of the onwership class, and show 'loyalty to the status 
quo. 
At one point in The Managerial Revolution, Burnham admits to a 
complexity beyond his analysis. 
The rules of managerial society do not really proceed 
scientifically any more than has any other ruling group. 
Their social aspirations are hidden by ideologies, not 
clarified by a genuine social science. The ideologies mask 
what is happening, not only from men generally, but from the 
rulers: themselves. When a process is not subjected to 
scientific; control, there is no systematic means for the 
elimination of errors, no rational device for the resolution 
of conflicts: errors may accumulate into disasters; 
conflicts tend toward catastrophes. 
urnbam dreams of a genuinely rational social science that will 
provide programmes for social engineering, to eliminate errors, 
catas4r"ophe:; and , onfli t: = in society, providing thereby the 
cu ity of an homogeneous space of control. 
His work therefore turns the state into te ultimate guarantee 
of order, the absolute authority to which. sacrifice must be ma e. 
Bureaucracy becomes a god, and the managers a new priesthood, as 
Edward H_yamu c ggestc 
Vhereve. and whenever the State is regarded as being a 
transcendent entity, as being morally superior to the 
individual citizen just as God is regarded by the religious 
as being morally superior to man, the State becomes God, 
The bureaucrat who manages it is then automatically and 
inevitably invested with a power for the use of which he is 
not answerable to the people severally, but to the State 
whose will he, at the same time, interprets. `I 
iahe i ehaviour ism of I. F. Skinner pro 
based on a similar --all for 
individual sacrifice in the name of a statist, managerial society, 
In Beyond Freedom and Di nity (l971i, Darwinism is used as an alibi 
1jJ, - 
for the inevitability of authoritarian control: "Many social 
practices essential to the welfare of the species involve the 
control of one person by another, and no one can suppress them who 
has any concern for human achievements. "` 
Like Taylor and Burnham, Skinner asserts the scientific validity 
of his methods: "The technology of behaviour which emerges is 
ethically neutral, but when applied to the design of a culture, the 
survival of the culture functions as a value. "'" This survivalism of 
the collective depends for Skinner on the suppression of those 
liberal individual freedoms on which the American constitution was 
founded: 
Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are basic 
rights. But they are the rights of the individual and were 
listed +e_; as :ý such c.: h at a time when the literatures of freedom and 
dignity were concerned with the aggrandizement of the 
individual. They have only a minor bearing on the survival 
of a culture. 
However, beneath this rhetoric of radicalism, Skinner give: basic 
support to the status quo of elite rule, as collective survival is 
seen to depend on a rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian sy=stem of 
tat se c oIlÜý ol. In a "laT ef laid. population, " says Skinner, , 
"the 
control of the population as a whole must be delegated to 
specialists to poll e, priest: owner:, therapists, and so on, 
with their special zed reinforcers and their codified 
tont naencies. 
Skinner's utopian novel Vaiden Two 01948) also suggests the 
desirability of a bureaucratically planned society. The question 
raised by the novel is: "what are the techniques, the engineering 
practices, which will shape the behavior of the members of a group 
so that they will function smoothly for the benefit of all? "'" At 
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the Start of the novel, a flock of sheep provide: the model for the 
behaviour of human beings in society. The sheep are grazing in a 
field, and the electric fence which had previously enforced their 
enclosure has been replaced by string. The sheep have been 
successfully trained to obedience and passivity through positive 
reinforcement, a technique by which the reality of coercive power 
can therefore be rendered invisible. 
This invisibility is the ultimate aim of control for the 
technocrats of Walden Two: 
We can achieve a sort of control under which the controlled, 
though they are following a. code much more scrupulously than 
was ever the case under the old system, nevertheless feel 
free. They are doing what they want to do, not what they are 
forced to do. That's the source of the tremendous power of 
positive reinforcement - there's no restraint and no revolt. 
By a careful cultural design, we control not the final 
behavior, but the inclination to behave - the motives, the 
desire:;, the wishes.: 
she aim is to "exploit every alternative to forcible control. By 
skillful planning, by a wise choice of techniques we increase the 
feeling of freedom. ",: ' 
The methods used by this "we, " the technocratic elite of 
managers and planners, are assumed to be scientific. Frazier clam; 
"All we use is unbiased information. ++ " This supposedly impersonal 
"science" replacer the need for both the "head" and "heart" of the 
Promethean leader: 
The leader or hero . =supplement:; a fault-; science. 
That's his 
first function - to use his head and heart where science 
fails. We have no need for him here. Our Planner.: act 
perfectly well in practically complete anonymity. - 
he word-idea "science" is thus again given as an alibi for an 
evasion of Dersonal resDonsibiiity for power and control, and an 
elision of issues of selective leadership, Nevertheless, the 
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technocratic elitism of the state is clear, as specialm ation is 
used as an argument against democratic participation: 
when we've acquired a behavioral technology, we can't leave 
the control of behavior to the unskilled... The people are 
in no position to evaluate experts. ="' 
As in the nineteenth century utopias of Edward Bellamy and 
Chauncey Thomas, Walden Two gives magical guarantee. of the 
beneficence and efficacy of its system, misleading, ly playing down 
the role of the controllers by claiming that they are "more likely 
to be looked on as servants than masters, although we strive for a 
neutral attitude, ", ", The absolutist control -Promoted b Walden Two is 
thus given the guarantee of beneficence typical of the requirements 
of technocracy. Skinner also guarantees an end to the conformity and 
uniformity prevalent in American society since World War Two: 
We are utterly free of that institutional atmosphere which 
15 inevitable when everyone is doing the same thing at the 
same time. Our days have a roundness, a flexibility, a 
diversity, a flow. ? tos all quite pleasing and healthful. 
Yet this influx of change and diversity is merely a rhetorical 
attempt to succeed where the staticity of previous utopias failed, 
It is belied by the writing itself, the fixed propaganda of which 
does not allow opportunities for multiple or flexible 
interpretation. It is to this issue of : singular, authoritarian 
interpretation in the forms of utopian fiction that Samuel Delany 
addresses his reforms of science fiction, moves which will be 
discussed in chapters 16 and 17. 
The threat of change and diversity is mitigated by the careful 
socialisation of children in Walden Two, as Skinner seeks to offset 
c rtemporary fear= of disobedience and revolt. In this utopia, 
children are trained in the virtues of deferred gratification an, 
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ihis is not, however, an instance 
oý i' _ Oiit rci. "don't r' Iülsietlt the control always rests in the 
As a result of such control methot s, tie children of Walden Two 
are "we! i Cehavea. u '- Nore_over, when observed at play, "Sow kind of 
marching game was in progress. " Skinner is thus both reassuring 
and complacent as to the militaristic obedience of American youth, 
in a novel written during the first stirrings of the rebellions of 
the Beats. 
] de_. Two presents its arguments for a managerial technocracy 
in the familiar didactic manner of authoritarian utopias. However, 
the novel does provide its Own dissenting voice, in the figure of 
Castle, who criticises Frazier's control in terms of his "personal 
magnetism, " based on what he calls the "Fuhrer principle": "He's got 
these people hypnotized. " Deliberately breaking his washbowl, Castle 
defiantly asks: "what does the Code say " 
l oweVer, despiti, 2 these disruptions of order, the rhetorical 
direction of the novel is unequivocally in favour of the 
technocratic control methods of Frazier. Castle'` argument is merely 
a false dialectic that is designed to s'. ýor, uj.; 
he an argument. 
For at ? ii_ end of the novel, Castle's resistance to the idea of the 
Code in undercut by the narrative voice itself: 
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T erormi; r of ' ýztlv'. intell e. ct u al =ten! Could he really 
believe that he was free of code and psychological uas-ions? 
Could he look upon his l ze a" a . mau... ion of deliberate 
acts? Why, he parted his very hair by a code! 
she basic issues of ivafden Two are thus focussed in terms of 
determinism and free will. kinnorian control i; founded on 
assumptions of total deterministic predicta il ity as a basis of it.: 
claims to the status of value--free science. As Frazier put=: it: 
I deny that free. om exists at all. I must deny it - or my 
program would be absurd. You can't have a science about a 
subject matter which hops' capriciously about. 
=>kinnerian behaviourism, and the technocratic social theory in which 
it is placed, is thus an attempt to continue the mechanistic, 
deterministic science of the Newtonian paradigm. The anomalous 
discoveries of quantum mechanics, of Heisenberg's Uncertainty 
Principle, are thereby ignored, in a desperate quest for simplicity 
and security. 
When Castle picks up a box of matches, and asks Frazier whether 
he will hold them or drop them. Frazier replies, "[ne deterministic 
forces: zaJ be subtle but they are inexorable. " in this way, 
determinism becomes a justificatory god, a source of quasi-religious 
consolation, promising the security of total explanation that 
Laplace sought in his demon: 
All that happens is contained in an original plan, vet at 
every stage the individual seems to he making choices and 
determining, the outcome. 
Froýü ,he top of ti'tone Hill, on a led e called the "T- one, " Frazier 
survey:: ; Dairen Ewo with a telescope, imitating: the invisible gaze ct 
she Christian God, li F_ el Ji i le' Ba In ; 3dQTina: 'i look upon my work, 
and, A it it T: ooct' 
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in Older Two, than, Skinner -. clings i i ý, , 
to the theological authority 
31 mechanistic, deterministic sy"stem, , 
the failure Oi which was 
noted at the en; of the nineteenth century by Chauncey Wright, 
Charless Peirce and Henry Adams, and which continue to be questioned 
in the work toi contemporary scientists such as Ilya Frigogine. This 
breakdown of deterministic totalities, and the recognition of drift 
within systems, provides a vital basis for criticisms of the 
totalitarian ambitions of the technocratic apologists discussed in 
this chapter. The anomalies and problems suppressed by these 
technocratic theories of society are explores by several critical 
theorists writing since World War Two. This chapter will end by 
discussing some of the work of lour of them: Alvin (. icult ner, Lewis 
Murford, C. Wright Mills and Anthony Wiener. 
The technocratic mythologies of VGblen_, Burnham and Skinner rest 
on an a'=oumption t at the withdrawi from economic affair =, of the 
Capitalist cIac, _ effectively Strip; 1liem of power , 
Accordin; g to 
Surr. iam, "lo rule societv, let ]. t bp- remembered, is a full-time 
job, " However, this assumption ails to taxe into account the 
controlling influence of the mass media in modern societies, which 
enables the capitalist class To maintain its rule by indirect means. 
Alvin Goulrner's critical Marxist sociology addres__s some of 
jp ower , 
üviuinaticn and 4-ünvi =, y iii Lodern 
r: duotrial society elide :i by managerial the, For Gauiciner, 
following trdrisci, the con tant issue for t' e ruling diass is that 
of sustaining ITS hegemony over the State (the mill ary, Judiciary, 
se tors 01 oci2 'Y'" Gouldner observes that the rule of the economic 
-- 2 tiJ 4- 
within the complex, differentiated structures of capitallist 
loci ty is a 
-mediated 
Clio, as it creates alibis ©i "legitimation" 
fo its rule. In periods of economic growth, ° legitma ion" is 
sustained through controlled inflation and the wide availability of 
consumer gratlfi cations, backed u-p by ideologies that encourage 
loyalty to the "System" as a whole. As such, power stays decisively 
In tue hands of the ruling, economic class, and the managerial elite 
do not form a new class with significantly different interests from 
the economic class. Gouldner points out that: 
the administrative-political classes are not autonomous; 
they are in fact. in tacit alliance with the hegemonic 
class; are greatly subject to the la' ter 's influence through 
various pressures and temptations; have entered into a 
mutually gratifying system for the exchange of reciprocities 
with the hegemonic class; and that some have become members 
of the saw subcommuni. ty. 
The suppression of questions of power beneath the operation of 
supposedly depoliticised, impersonal rules and axiom, by a ruling; 
class whose domination is mediate and indirect, taus lies behind 
the theo --i e: _: o technocracy exami ied iti this chapter, idependenc 
the capitalist i's: _ on mediated rule has encouraged an 'rage 04: 
society as a mechanical . =. v--tem, to replace that of society as an 
hierarchy of power. What is now required is a "system loyalty, not 
merely a cla_:: loyalt; r; non2Lhele: -; s, this .sa loyalty to a social 
syste within ,: hach there _. a certain hiera. chy of institutions -a 
structure of dominance that systematically benefit: _: t le henemonic 
la: ýs and protects its vital inters: =; t ." Models of society as a 
machine regulated for optimum periormativitf therefore serve the 
interest:; of the hegemonic class: 
What the he_gemonlc class finally require=: of the others is 
neither right thinking nor even obedience but, rather, the 
effective and reliable performance of certain functions. 
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Sort, however 
, of 
the performance of tii_ se ons "by 
mach ne , an alternative never ignored, right 
behavior 
commonly turns on the prevalence of appropriate ideologies, 
as on the visibility and growth of the economy, and on the 
development of effective organizations. "' 
The social system what Lewis Mumford refers to, in 
The Transformations Of Nan, as "anonvmous people, without singular 
merit, who are in fact inter+_nanp; eaole and removable parts: 
technicians and bureaucrats, experts in their own narrow 
deoar ýment: ý, but incompetent muddlers iii the arts of life, which 
demand the very aptitudes they have skil fully suppressed. " 
However, Mumforä argues that technocratic control is not total, 
but drifts towards disorder, as a system undergoing the entropy of 
over-Organisation: "as each part of the process becomes more 
mechanised and rationalised, the whole tends to escape human 
control, so that even those who are supposedly in charge of the 
machine become its passive agents and finally its victims "' _ 
Mum ford's work tends to interpret breakdown and entropic decline as 
a loss of "human" values, Having "lost the secret of how to make 
himself human, " modern "man" faces a central paradox: 
not merely that the more automatic the means of living 
becames the lee=: life itself will be under human control, 
but the more rationalised become the pro; _=_: e: _. of 
produ tiara, the more irrational will finally become the end 
product, man himself. 
la short, Dower and order, pushed to their final limit, 
lead to t neir self destructive inversion: disorganisation, 
violence, mental aberration, subjective cinaoe. 
In The cciolo iCa1 imagination 019537, Wright ill", further 
descr iJ; _:; ii mi"ation , arromaiic'. -. acid 
dan. L; Crn With. ire o-c4aI st ate 
ideclogie: =; of rationality and determinism, In MiiIs ana: 7=ithe 
ratlonaiizatIon of nodal institutions has paradoxically produced a 
decrease in individual opportunities to reason. He cites h 
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development of large-scale bureaucracies, within highly specialized 
div 'niorin GI labour, as the major factor in the failure of 
industrial societies to achieve Enlightenment ideas of individual 
freedon and reason: 
Great and rational organizations - in brief bureaucracies - 
have indeed increased, but the substantive reason of the 
individual at large has not. Caught in the limited milieux 
of their everyday lives, ordinary men often cannot reason 
about the great structures - rational and irrational - of 
which their milieux are subordinate parts. Accordingly, they 
often carry out series of apparently rational actions 
without any ideas of t're ends they serve, and there is the 
increasing suspicion that those at the top as well - like 
Tolstoy` =, generals - only pretend they know. '"! 
For Mills, nineteenth Century' liberal and socialist ideologies of 
social proFress, based on rationality, education, science and 
freedom, have virtually collapsed under twentieth century 
experiences of totalitarianism, bureaucracy, and cold war, instead, 
human beings have cow to regulate their lives according to the 
reauirements of industrial and business organizations. 
To counter these tendencies, Kills called for the proper and 
full enactment of Enlightenment programmes, reasserting the 
continuing, necessity of rationality and social science as 
bases of 
genuine democratic control. Because the future is not a net of 
variables open to deterministic prediction, freedom is still 
possible: 
The interest of the social scientist in social structure is 
not due to any view that the future is structurally 
determined, We study the structural limits of human decision 
in an attempt to find ? Dints of effective intervention, in 
order to know what can and what must be structurally changed 
if the role of e plicit decision in history-making is to be 
enlarged, .. 
We study historical social structures, in brief, 
in order to find within them the ways in which they are and 
can be controlled. For only in this way can we come to know 
the limits and then meaning of human freedom. "' 
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Mills' faith is the efficacy of rational control is echoed in 
yr Wiener's "Faustian t'r0grE: ý: ý" CIP6J). he argues That Anthony ý 
the "geometric increase in the Complexity and organization of modern 
life will necessitate corresponding, even if not directly 
proportional, increases in the scope and complexity of human 
organizational controls. "`'- The ma, or concern of the social system 
thu becomes the problem of its own perpetuation, through the 
f i-. considers "deviance" "Ä" containment of 4Jhat i and y: ýZURCtIOn. 
Ac'rordin ; iy, in modern capitalist politics, pragmatic, short- 





As always, the central government would no likely be nwampea 
by the problem of keeping the system functioning properly 
that it would be concerned only with marginal and immediate 
problems rather than with long-run, basic issues... 
The object of pragmatic, empirical (sensate) knowledge 
is to control rather than to comprehend nature - to 
understand it instrumentally and manipulatively, rather than 
emphatically, normativelly, or mythically. ". ' 
A are that the naive optimism of the Enlightenment has been 
irreversibly damaged, Wiener calls for a moderation of Faustian 
urge: - to overcome the environment, urges that have produced the 
modern world of nuclear weapons, exploitation, surveillance, and 
pollution: 
What is nece'=: ýary is an unflagging respect for the world as 
we find it and gor dissent and diversity, even for OfT1ery 
individual stubbornness, in spite of the mounting 
impressiveness of the technical-rational structure that 
bourgeois, sensate society is u1laing. 
Wien=r' . : äi= u»ion of the narrowing of i er issib e äi course tea. 
modern societ; T, with its totalitarian supp, <-; o: ion of difference and 
multipl city, will be developed in the ne_et , ha ter, in terms of the 
tZ Ji ` :T2; ß and of mOii ag 'lei orüt'_, 
d by power i me ent , and of 
strategies of re=Jstanoe to such programmatic controls. 
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°ra4r;;. -tir= 1= and the "American ideology" since World War Two. 
This chapter will explore twentieth century technocratic Control 
as a linguistic structure, based an pragmatism and Codification. it 
Will also explore alternative str&tegie: _. de ised by writers a 
to 
, -U -I 
totalitarian damage. Fir ; tly the development olf 
contemporary state . =i nce 
in America siace World War two Will be T 
briefly e_-_ mined. 
Sc, onU Wir la War was the Aast u: itican ra: for in the 
acceleration in American governmental support for noientific 
ra; @artea. feIorF mils t1rne, america was =, t II iargeiy aepencent on 
basic research undertaken in Europe. The atom bomb, for example, 
developed a. the end of the Second World War at Los Alamos, was 
ifbafÄia 
1 se i u3: jed or. sUi3iELtal tr 
1R lP1 le- . 
discovered Almast excliu_, gel jr 
an Europe. and built mostly by scientist=. born or trained there. 
In P 4O . °e: i went . oos eßt established the National Defense 
Ccmini ttee, which later k: Ei-aMe Ihl'- Oii1Cc: Of Scientific 
Research and Development. Dominated by civilian scientists, the 03RD 
was, as described by Daniel Greenberg, a "civilian-controlled 
preserve, reporting Faire t'jr to the President, Working toward ý 
military objectives, in clo=ve liacon with the military, but 
irid end nt of military control. "-' Greenberg follows in detail the 
struggles of American scientists to enure the continuation of this 
balance betwocn governmental support for, but. not control of, 
_; ertiflý resear - h. 
-'10- 
_. cr_rit' is . ýi iili il. ii 
t'J n America thus emir Let from ý.:.. _ 
ivd. 
with a nein en se of ti: i. l lä1 oen: bfli. C6teve President 
Truman's decd -ion to drop the atomic bomb or, Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
in 1945 "instantly shattered the spirit of unity that ham generally 
prevailed in the = ientific community through the long war. " Within 
three months of the Japanese surrender, three thousand scientists, 
mainly from the Manhattan Project, fo. rmed the Federation of American 
CA- Ientist , 
to raise opposition to those phy'si. -i: ts, such as 
O penheimer arid Ferri, who had support_ the action of the Truman 
ddn, inistration. Subst. quil- nt campaign issues "came to be formul ate: in 
term=; of civilian Versus Military Control of 
the atom, 
it ter national i: ver, s u onopo y, freedom Versus secrecy. '' 
However, the riggt-wing: onsoiidate; i the close tree-, between 
ýcie-atist; and tl: e mill, itary. Edward Te-I ter, working at the Radiation 
ab'oratory at Berkeley, won permis: =: ßt2 from t he government for 
e: aoarch into the hydrogen bomb., c. part of an arms rac, e with the 
So, 
'71 Union, as scientitllc research became . --trmagiy connected witi1 
nationalist Secrecy and co ipetition during the cold war. 
?i cr contribution has remained into the : `. v°v, s with his 
leafing of re; arch into tho 11 Str, ate`, ic Defeo-. Ini tiati v e. " indeed, 
American fears of losing height advantage to an enemy, grounded in 
perennial fears of invasion, ha: --. fed t3 the technological control of 
cute spate, one of the major proJects around which scientifi_ 
cse: rch has been concentrated since World War Two, The oýiet 
crunch of Sputnik in October 19117 was a vital Cd t3 vS fo his 
wor £. L ? di' ng loss of li '_ i tary advantage in an era of nu lr_' ýr war , 
C: ong ec,; subsequuent1 y re verse; l previcu: s cuts in undiri wh; the 
-, ýý1- 
'w'hite louse anpointod a full -time ntifit_ adviser fo' üe fir- 
me. 
Scientific research has thus come firmly under governmental 
control. The old system, operating during the war, when "in 
practice, scientists=; wrote most of the rule:; for the use of federal 
research money; . scientist: staffed the agencies. that dispensed the 
money, and scientists from the university community advised these 
same . staff scienti=; t', on the distribution of money, " has been 





Congresses have attempted to supervise the way in whfch f decal 
money is . 
spent, as pool i tical administrations lia err mýi1 lsis :i 
utility an d Profi a:; he main -r items la for scientific rl ; l=arch and 
de`, ielos ment. This "diminution of the de facto sovereignty" oi 
scientists Ls taking the form of an a ýl? cation of Tavlori=: Y 
cr it' 1 of of . ncy ir3. tý operativi ty to scientific institutions. 
in The Feet-, fodern Condition : i«'L'a? Jeas-F'ranTois Lyotard 
ues=cribe:; tan formation of state ; cienc'@ ne a situation in which the 
game: of C1_"language" have become "the game=': of the ric' i, 
in which whoever is the ro 3i'.. hieet Ea: the best chance of beinw 
fight. An equation ý2±WP_en wealth, of icierncy, an truth is thug 
e: tabl iohed. " L; yotard describes the circular inter-relationship 
Ue t weei La itaiia tech : uiogy, a. zi . : ýcienýific research and 
development as foo : ý. 
A te, "Inical ajD iar atu.; requires an ii1Vr: _tüe-nt; but since it 
optimize=: the efficiency of the task to which it is applied? 
it also optimizes ' i, e surplu_-value derived from this 
improved performance. All that is needed is for the surplus- 
value to be realize; i, ýn other words, for the ; Droduct of the 
task performed to he sold. An; the system can be sealed in 
the following a portion of the sale is recycled into a 
rese-arch fund dedicated to further performance improvement. 
Lý1G 
Scientific knowledge "ne il -. 1 there' .7 according tt , ýý(. e 
1ý ý;. _DY 
judged to the ? aV`Ori; ýc. 
principle of "optimum performance, " as a ratio expressed in 
cybernetic term as a "maximum output of information" from a 
"minimum imput of energy. " Accordingly, for the contemporary 
financial backers of research, the "only credible goal is nower. 
Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased not to find 
truth, but to augment j? ower. " 
in Lyo+ard'. _ analy: _; 1=., 'here ore, sciontiiic diocour'se has 
V ome the object of de facto legitimation, in that the effective 
control of reality by technology " upplies procedur_c= that 
pragmatically Justify their continued use. V7. thia the myth of 
s 
_lety 
as a self-regulating system, the "transmission of knowledge 
is no longer designed to train an elite capable of' guiding the 
nation towarls its emancipation, but to supply the system with 
player! --. capable of acceptably fulfilling their role:, at the 
pragmatic posts quirea by its ýastitutions. '", 
to early developments of thec. _ Pragmatic criteria for 
scientific knowledge were disousnrd in chapters 9-10, in the 
f ; ýurcey ý explorations of Chauncey Wright t and Clures_, Peirce. Their approach, 
while promoting positivist myths of clarity and value-free 
objectivity, tended to reset the simplistic formation of a do a. On 
+h c the Se-co- l `Jar, ra ma ts Ih other hL anü i ri AmGri c ace tug -d ord sm 
r idifi l _r. to a tot aiisiTig network of resat ionszm, between 
I. rchnologyy, langvage, and state power. This regime of 
control has been a C(<y _, 
Wilson, the .. i, TM.. - <iGaP. la i. YOlOsy. " He 
sumnaý-: ses this riet of concept-, as to: lows: 
aT anti-re±lexive and anti-theoretical b_a, =. .. whit Jr 
more 
_ibyeral' 
times extended to virtually all intellectual 
activity , combined, parado_2i : ar +h- lly, wi _ 
2) a more recent 
- Gi"ý 
concern for accumulating ' know', edge' , under. 
tood as 
vpioltaile e rva lom:. (or 'observations in principle) 
havin`, immediate application and 'releevan_e' ; undergirded 
jointly by 3) a false commitment to objectivity in the 
absence of the object being aspired to, derived from 
scientific rationalism with its unreflexive notion of 
neutrality, scepticism, and freedom from values and 
interest: and by 4) a vision of social and political 
processes as the product of a' piecemeal' , trial and error 
approach concerned with procedural legitimacy for its own 
sake and prone to value a reformist posture towards social 
change understood as a set of activities played out within 
the rules of a game which sociological and political 
knowledge (and knowing) must emulate and thereby legitimize; 
5) a derived contemporary view of this 'open' society as 
eminently exportable, a negation of this very openness which 
justifies itself by invoking economics, sociology and 
politic-, as disciplines which demonstrate a coming 
convergence of world . Societies and c ltur and the 
supremacy and longevity (not to mention perLmanence) of t lie 
xnerican-type Western society. 
Modern American society thus maintains itself by attempting to set 
up prescribed limits on critical reflection, in that the principle 
of applied knowledge circumscribe= the possibilities of knowledge 
within a narrowly defined area of utilitarian. "validity, '' 
Karl Popper has Popp or a leading proponent of these liberal 
capitalist theories o science and technology. 
in He Poverty n 
Historiciern (1957), he advocates primacy for knowledge that is 
practical and technological, rather than speculative, in that 
besides helping us in the fundamental task o selecting 
problem, the technological approach imposes a discipline on 
our speculative inclinations (which, especially in the field 
of sociology proper, are liable to lead us into the region 
of metaphysics); for it forces us to submit our theories to 
definite standards, such as standards of clarity and 
practical testability. ' 
Popperý'ý disciplinarian approach ties down theorctfca, reflection in 
t Le service of the "--atus quo. 
A mythically unified ent 
method, " ba: ned on linear cause-and-effect hypothe e:;, produce;; 
knowledge a:; an in: tram it for fort Ler ob: erva l onom. The:; _ are 
14- 
directed toward: intervention, control and prediction of the 
c `ernal world, as processes shaped by the demands of capitalist 
society, and used as a means of securing is continuing dominance. 
As H. T, Wilson puts it, "only by conceiving of knowledge as property 
which can he accumulated and invested, and of interests in knowing 
as disciplines' having a territory to be acknowledged and 
protected, is it possible to make the role of reason in the human 
project comprehensible as an instrument for perfecting the social 
division of labour. " I '' 
This functional language of control posit=, an ideal 
completeness, according to which language has the power to 
completely appropriate its object. The object is deemed exterior to 
a neutral observation language, so that politics; and history are 
apparently removed from the actions of scientific discourse. By 
means of these strategies, modern science attempts to hide its 
location within a specifically bureaucratic-capitalist mode of 
production: 
`ihjectivity becomes: a mask which justifies preference and 
decisions aimed at realizing specific societal objectives by 
; 
_nvoking zmeritocratic values alleged 
to constitute 
'rationality' rather than a form of neo-capitalist rational 
domination. 
That rationality is itself culturally-specific has been pointed out 
by Marshall i cT uhan. who Connects it with mechanistic habits 
resulting from the social and psychic effects of print-based 
technologies: 
ýRat ional ý of curse, hams for the i4Tesi'. 1G '= mean , 
"uniform 
and continuous and scauential. " In other words, we have 
confused res___. with literacy, and rationalism with a Ingle 
technology. 
29 r-, - 
'3tionaiism i today confused with a number of technolo ; ies, 
crucially with the digital computer, the mythoiogie=; of which Will 
be approached in Chapter, 15. 
Inc over-valuing oI Ci: aritv and Consistency, whereby scientific 
rationality serves the operational dictates of the modern state, 
tends to suppress language as a free play of reflection. As Wilson 
put, it: 
Reducing speech to language to communication not only rakes 
things easier for the speaker but for the 'recipients'. The 
idea is to factor out of speech as much of that which is not 
immediately 'available' as fact or value as possible. 
Operational usage demands that the thing spoken be 
identified with its function in the observable world. A noun 
in social theory must be about something whose existence 
gives rise to and explains the speech which contains it if 
it is to be taken seriously. I 
McLuhan's "the medium is the message" destroys this myth of a 
distinct separation between form and content. There can be no 
"about, " no single message or key to interpretation. As Mc-uhan put, 
it in Understanding Hedia: "Specialized s gments of attention have 
shifted to total 1ield. " "`ý Form and content must be seen as an 
interactive field, and their nave separation as a function of 
power-based language controls. 
The reduction of speech to communicative competence, criticised 
by Wilson above, draws on the pr, a matic approaches of Wright, 
Peirce, and Dewey, and has hardened in the poet-Second World War 
fate into a belated attempt to . wave rationality and determinism for 
purposes of manipulative secur1 tja. Pragmatic "speech act theory n in 
Searle, Austin and Habermac, has been established as a narrow 
i. eology, which suppresses or effectively ignorer other linguistic 
strategies. 
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J. L. Austin's William James Lectures, delivered at Harvard in 
1'a5 restate a pragmatic theory of language. A: _- the title of the s 
subsequent hook, How to no Things Vi th Words (1962) suggests, Austin 
attempts to reduce speech to a set of rules and laws similar to 
those sought by "scientifl " linguistic; for language in general. In 
Saussurean terms, Austin seeks rules for parole, as well as for 
langue. In this way, he tends to restrict speech acts to the 
performance of an ideally competent communication. 
The fixation with law in such work is evident in the derivation 
of Austin's term, "performatives, " which he relates to the lawyer's 
term "operative, " as "referring to that part, i. e. those clauses, of 
an instrument which serves, to effect the transaction. .., which is 
its wain object... ", `. The search is therefore for le; gali: tic 
definitions and clarities, that will remove ambiguities, error and 
"noise" in order to control speech for the purposes of communicating 
information. Austin calls "the doctrine of the tbins-s that can be 
the occasion: of s tterariceý-, the doctrine of the and Wrün on uÜ'i uL 
Inýelicities. " " The eradication of such apparent anomalies will 
produce smooth operational speech 
Cri tic-ising such strategies from a desire for änietzsche: an 
"jouissance" in language, Roland Bartheu summarises the bases of 
such speech act theories as follows: the "spoken word is 'clear': 
the banishment of polysemy (such banishment being the definition of 
'clarity') -ervec the Law - all speech is on the side of the Law. "' 
The "Law" laid down by Austin's de ire for univoca14 ty is 
secured by a delimitation of his theory's applicability: 
a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar 
way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if 
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introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies 
in a similar manner to any and every utterance - 
a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such 
circumstances is in special ways - intelligibly - used not 
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use - ways 
which fall under the doctrine of the etiolatiorls of 
language. All this we are excluding from consideration. Our 
performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be 
understood as issued under ordinary circumstances. "I 
in this way, while not quite ignoring forme; of language such as 
poetry, Austin tends to relegate them to an inferior position in his 
hierarchy. 
Similarly, J it¬an Haberman bases his theory of "universal 
pr .. gmatics" on an 
"i. dealizei case of communicative action, Viz. 
'consensual interaction, ' in which participants share a tradition 
and their orientations are normatively integrated to such an extent 
that they start from the same definition of the -ituation and do not 
disagree about the claims to validity that they reciprocally 
raise. ", " He therefore chooses to "exclude those explicit speech 
actions in standard form that appear in contexts that produce shifts 
of meaning. 
This attempt to "identify and reconstruct universal conditions 
of possible understanding" 01 may thus be seen as a quest for 
deterministic security, eased on a nostalgic, Enlightenment desire 
for rational consensual order in society. In his essay 
"Legitimation Problem in the Modern State, " dahermaS provides the 
political context for his speech act work: "Only the rules and 
I ., 
i Oll; - t hat 
d '.. ci C I- C', C' ,-,, 
trr 
i. avC 
i .Ji: hr powe i. 
H1 git ma t2un WP_ 
3i_, 1 
from a cunt i Tlg nt or 
t c. -' 
have to, a:; 1e oystematica71y to 
01 
, valuate 1c itirna, y claim.: in a rational, internubjectivelp testable 
way. Can we do this? "2 This desire for a rational, consensual and 
"legitimized" basis for power places such speech act theories within 
the legalistic discourses of H. T. Wilson's "American ideology. 
In both Austin and Haberman, the assumption is that anomaiies_., 
"infelicities, " and "shifts of meaning" can be eradicated from 
communication. This narrowing of the potentialities of language to 
prescribed norm: is being challenged by several contemporary French 
writers some of whom were discussed in chapter 2 of this thesis, in 
terms of an introduction of Pýietz: _; che, n free-play into the 
singularities of codified' discourse. 
Jacques Derrida' s essay "Signature Event Context" (195 ) argues 
that language can never era. a. icete its paras-ites and anomalies, in 
the way dre amt of by theorists of pragmatic o Cn]cation. Derrida 
suggests the insufficiencies of such approaches to language, as a 
fallacy of a content that remains present and unchanged from 
transmitter to [ eceiver odei-n elects-onii=; c orFimu ri. i : rations rely on 
this myth of pr-l, =sen ce, according to which 
Meaning, the content of the semantic message, is thus 
transmitted, communicated, by different means, by 
technically more powerful mediations, over a much greater 
distance, but within a milieu that is fundamentally 
continuous and ecual to itself, within a homogenous element 
across which the unity and integrity of meaning is not 
eff, ectei 41 n an es se_ntial way. -'° 
Ir ; uch theories of ;: ommuoioatior, signs ? re assumed to directly 
represent ideas, so that information can be rendered instantaneously 
present. The Sig: is Seen as the representation of the idea, Which 
itsel Te. I'esen+ the perceived thing. Derrida trace=; : uCh 
assumptions back to the Ideologues of. Enlightenment France, a. 
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"concepts destined to ensure the authority and force of a certain 
historic discourse, " implying a magical overcoming of the "distance, 
division, delay, diff'ron1ce" between sender and addressee. 2" 
In his essay "Requiem for the : (edia" (1921), jean Baudrillard 
posits the necessity of "ambivalence" as a means of short-circuiting 
what he calls the "terrorism of the code": 
in the symbolic exchange relation, there is, a simultaneous 
response. There is no transmitter or receiver on both sides 
of a message: nor, for that matter, is there any longer any 
"message, " any corpus of information to decode univocally 
under the aegis of a co: _. The symbolic consists precisely 
in breaching the univocality of the "message, " in restoring 
the ambivalence of meaning and in demolishing in the same 
strike the agency of the cods, " 
.R 
land Bar then' exploration of 11dcr tore is a similar strategy of 
resistance through multiplicity and ambivalence: "the term 'writer' 
(a term which here always refers to a practice, not to a social 
value) may be applied to any sender whose 'message' (thereby 
immediately 
destroying its very nature as message) cannot be 
summarized, a condition the writer shares with the madman, the 
chatterbox and the mathematician but which precisely writing (namely 
a certain practice of the signifier) has as its task to specify ` 
. 
Julia : ýri: =. 
tcvý. similarly opens up possibilties ý_ subverting 
the 
E:: ail iment. discourse of pragmatic communicative competence. Tn 
: 
desire in LAY 'i. Iaee : PO , 
t_i `, 7'v'a P_F;. t an multi-deter mined' 
poetic word "adheres= to a 1caic exceeding that of codified discour-: e 
and fully Come.; into being OFi'_y iIl the_ margins of recognized 
culture" Extrapolating from Bakhtln' s iý1 a of the " at li`Jai2: ýý ue, ýt c 
Eri'steJa advocat ; the "poly phonic novel" as an attack an state 
authority and its legalistic di_scour: e: _;: 
Carnivaleslue discourse breaks through the laws of a 
language censored by gran ar and and, at the : --am. 
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ý. e, oc . ai arid political protest. There is no 
Iva, 'ril.: 
but rather, idea ii'r be 4, between ý ü. iI enging 
official linguistic cod__ and challeagin>; official law. 
in an exploration cio: e to the work of Benjamin TýThorf, iri t? va 
challenges rationalist scientific procedure:; as based on the 
structure of the Greek (Indo-European) sentence, which "begins as 
ý;: biz t preäicate and grows by identification, determination, and 
causality. " Ia this way, the psychic, and social 
"prohibition" in 1 : God, Law, Definition,,. "" 
FZ:;. 
itances 
to this totalitarian "ingula 1: =;: 3ä. i071 are dia overo'a. 
in what Kri:: otova refers 11 J as the- "douh1 u Of r1J t1C ßI1=Ud f? which 
haliei gen 
. 
CPC"uCtivene; ý; s to the "one or zero" favoured by bipolar 
Jodi -a'ion: 
the actions of definitions determination, the sign 
t'-" and 
the very concept of sign, which gr esup C= a vertical 
(hierarchical) divi_ion between signifier and sI. 1 ed, 
cannot be applied to poetic language by definition an 
infinity of pairings and combinatio 
The notion of sign (SF-Sd) is a product of scientific 
e . -e-cause-goal as structure of Id utiL `r ýýüü: ýtaP.. 
abstraction 
the indo-Europoan sentence), de: =; igniting a vertically and 
hierarchically linear 
;J 22.11iß tlüvi otl lJl LtUU111 1 C, 1. ilr 
result of th n . 
ing over poetic (not scientific) language, 
denote: -, "sp, a. ti; alization" and correlation of 
the literary 
i ingui. =tic) 
What K i; te! Ca, after EakhtaiIl, Cd21; -: the "double" 1=; therefore not a 
dialecctic, but is closer to Deleu'ze and Guattari' "rhizom0 " as a 
multiple, non-totalisable system with. n configuration;. "'' 
in Kri teva' analy i: } 
the "reaiiet nov 1" i.; a 




Realist description, definition of "personality, '' 
"character" Creation, and "subject" development - all are 
descriptive narrative elements belonging to the 0-1 interval 
and are thus =nciogica2. The only discourse integrally to 
achieve the 0-2 oeti laic is that of the carnival. 
By 
adopt:.: a dream iogic, it rubes of linguistic 
code and social morality a_ well. 
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the Amer join no veli.: ýi,: ý ýt:.: peers 'LO-20 of t-iis t' 
-Si 
transgress in various wavs the rules of oltrolal codifI cation. As 
prelude to ouch work, Norman Mailer's exploration of the radical 
potential of the writer in resisting power will be discussed in the 
rest Of this chapter, in terms of an analysis=. of A Fire On the Dion 
(1970). 
Nailer desc ri es the regime of corporate "teamwork, " that has 
becom the key concept in post-war American capitcslis , as a system 
that combines " fie methods of the ho; Eiltal mixed with the methods Of 
this, 
football team, He 
, _.. _, _s ih8 
Qrt_. ý1ä. 'ýIOn of Ciitr-ai"1CýlOii- 
in -I sch modern technocratic e0)ogy a d, ogre to . moothe_ out 
conflicts and urpr , ii, tabilitie; producing thereby a clean 
environment whose ideal image is that of the astronaut in outer 
-pace: 
Consider that sense of life rzýrogrammed and w sted, Of reason 
., O overa plieiä to wife that all ,.; ntradi 
bons having been 
killer, the 1 -ht of reason. had finally left the eye ... 
ihi o>erational, codified language of the Apollo astronauý. -s 
represses areas of imagination and dread, in order to gain a 
reassuring cerise of abstraction 
from expierieace: 
Even as the Nazis and the Communists had used to speak of 
mass-murder as liquidation, so the astronauts spoke of 
possible personal disasters as 'contingency'. The heart of 
astronaut talk, like the heart of all bureaucratic talk, was 
a jargon which could be easily converted to computer 
programming, a language like Fortran or Cobol or Algol. 
Anti-dread formulations were the center of it, as if words 
like pills were there to suppress emotional symptoms, 
Ma 'er f ., ý that at "real Au is ü: aiwa = ke in as a 
ii2,3: ':: _, of attaýiIý suc h -, =-I rlty. Ac; Cr117igiy phenomena ar_ "only 
of menace when they de not eccomraodate theTMs_lves to 
lün uage . _ýrtro =. 
Or, -better, to initýai-controls. " The acrcnvms 
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_-; f oporat ior. al speech are thug "chaoo-hold:,, those ledges, of 
meaning and mea äinle: r; words in infancy u_ aot of arbitrary 
stations of sound which were : somehow better and 1chaotic than no 
sound'... ""- Technical language i =: therefore viewed as a fixed, 
codified structure that holds experience at a safe distance. 
Mailer's account of the discourse of the astronauts, as they 
^escri :, the powdery surface particles of the moon, exposes a regime 
of fake rationality and totalitarian information-control, which 
predates Jean Baudrillard' =" concern that the reduction of language 
to code suggests an end "especially to unanswerable ; 7estion ": 
A question was at lea, _; t being answered, if the answer wa, -; 
ordinary, still there was one less question in the lonely 
space: _. of the hunar mind. Aquarius had an instant when he 
glim se; ý : space expanding like the widening pool of an 
unanswered que=stion. Was that the power behind the force 
which made technology triumphant in this century? - that 
technology was at least a force which attempted to bring 
back answers from questions which had been considered to be 
without answers, °` 
The provision of banal answers to SiiencG difficult questioning, and 
tc+. -1- t Y. 7'ý. +... .ýý 1-, mot 't v pi CL 2L 11C CL isturbanLCD of "DC<LtUI 
1 ;' DULtu qüe"si Arl Liýj CLi .. mil - i"_, 
symptomatic; of an attempt to suppress dissent under an ideology of 
speciously objective functionality. Today, alternative=: to the 
status quo tend to be hidden by alibis of the latter's perpetuation. 
At the start of the '19710s, Mailer's 4 Fire on the Moon fears that 
the " Sgiuai es" have won, and that the resistances of the existential 
Hip to, in "The White Negro" l JT i. u have become exhausted. In 
1the Squares have reached the moon, and won the Consent from a 
. a, iority of Americans for their power and domination. 
Yet Mailer seeks counter-: 7trategies to explore the possibilitiý; 
of breaking the simplifications of functional codification. The 
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D enin chaff t? i O Fire on L-a X con, entitled "A loss of Ego, " 
de ': rib the writer a "weary of his own voice, own facee, person, 
persona, will, ideas, speeches, and general sense of importance. " In 
an attempt to break out of the closuZ e: ý of this singular, static 
identity, he therefore assumes a new name, for the purposes of 
destabilised exploration. The writer therefore feels "detached this 
season from the imperial demands of his ego, " and decides to assume 
nth Aquarius, as a sign of heroic movement: ýiiý name of 
lt was t= perfect name for a man who would begin the study 
of rockets. The water-bearer traversed the earth and 
broatied tho air: three element.; wore his medium, solid, 
liquid, and gas. That was kin to the rocket. Apollo 11 would 
leave the earth, travel on the combustion of its liquids, 
and traverse a space. What indeed was space but the final 
d comprossion of a gas? On such unscientific though s did 
u 
Norman, sign of Aquarius, travel. " 
ACt_ort ng1ys Aquarius' journey move:, beyond the securities of 
tßta. itarian s mplliications, to re tore a new sense of heroic powe 
to human experience, in this way, he recallthe complacency and 
blandness of Jan Armstrong, to a ironaut wife, who had said, 
"What wo can L under-stand, we fear": 
His heart went dull at the thought of the total take-over 
implicit in the remark, no neat, so ambitious, so world- 
vaulting in its assumption that sooner or later everything 
would be understood - 'I paid a trip to death, and death is 
a pleasant place and ready for us to come in and renovate 
it. '... The real heroism, he thought, was to understand, and 
because one under: -. tood, be even more full of fear at the 
enormity of what one understood, yet at that moment continue 
to be ready for the feat one had decided it was essential 
to 
perform... But the astronauts, brave men, proceeded on the 
paradoxical principle that fear once deposed by knowledge 
would make bravery redundant. It was in the complacent 
assumption that the universse was no maie. ati mansion of 
architectonics out there between evil and nobility, or 
strife on a darkling plain, but rather an ultimately benign 
field of investigation which left Aquarius in the worst of 
temper, ` 
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One a1r the Conventions of twentieth ; e-atury science fictiar< as 
suggested by Tak in Samuel Delany's Dial, ren C1ý7r', is that ""the 
Universe is an essentially hospitable place, full of earth-type 
planets where you can crash-land your spaceship and survive long 
enough to have an adventure. "' The science fiction hero, and the 
impassive faces of movie actor:., from Cannery to Stallone and 
Schwarzennegger, thus advertise the complacent and deceptive nature 
of operativity, hiding murder and authoritarian control beneath 
masks of would-be neutrality. 
For Norman Mailer, the lack of flamboyance and of heroism 
amongst the astronauts is a sign of an America drugged by the 
"anodyne of technoi ogese, "", as the nation drift. _; towards total 
narcosis: "The American cool 'wTas becoming a narcotic. The horror of 
the Twentieth Century was the size of each new event, and the 
paucity of its reverberation. "°' The mysteries, dangers, and radica 
novelties of outer space are rendered lifeless and homogeneous by 
L .. discourse the mechanlý , un- mag a1- ve and unheroic üz LuC 
astronauts: 
What Joy muht be found in a world which would have no hope 
of a Hemingway? Or nearest matters first, of a Joe RIamath, 
or Cassius Clay, Jimmy Dean, Domin"uin? - it was as if the 
astronauts were there to demonstrate that heroism's previous 
relation to romance had been highly improper - it was 
technology and the absence of emotion which were the only 
fit mates for the brave. ''' 
In Nailer' s attack on this =ilplification and reduction of hum n 
Xrer en tG iunctiorialitV, the artist' task of exploring, 
renovating, and extending language in cru; lall. Indeed, the artiste, 
heCCme, n for Mailer the true adventurer, crossing heterogeneous 
zone.;, dispersing ego, and refusing strategies of reassuring 
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cio' u e. The Nriter comics to , ='plor'e 
tüf li krowr: through co etant 
U 
aiepiaoement. He rauet there ore not produce consoling fictions, but 
ehould instead follow the disturbing processes of radical 
investigation as far as possible: 
she dreamer was no longer consoling himself. Rather he was 
exploring the depths of his own ability to perceive crisis 
and react to it; he was exploring ultimate modes of 
existence in sex and in violence, in catastrophe and in 
death. So the real substance of a dream was a submersion 
into dread. One tested the ability of the psyche to bear 
anxiety as one submerged into deeper and deeper plumbings of 
the unknowable until one reached a point where the 
adventurer in oneself could descend no longer, panic was 
present - one was exploded out of the dream. But a dangerous 
shoal had at least been located. 
Mailer's adventurous journey is thus not an erasure of anomalie: and 
obstacles in the name of an homogenising Reason.. Instead, the writer 
insists on asking difficult and dangerous questions that cannot be 
contained in a preconceived point-of-view, or controlled by venial 
codes or formulae. Aquarius` madness is therefore, parado_; ically, a 
: 1ea. th y reiu ; ate of situp cities and securities: 
ýt was 
his profess-ion to live alone with thoughts at the 
very eiarge of his mental reach. 1Z brooding over unanswered 
questions was the root of th. mad, however, and sanity was 
the ssttling of dilemmas, then with how many questions cou< 
one live? He would answer that it was better to live with 
too many than too few. Rave on, he would. He would rave 
on. ,,.., 
The artist doe: not compromise his investigations by providing 
consoling solution= and instrumental codifications of meaning. 
Rather, Mailer's sense of ongoing displacement recalls Rimbaud's 
J. c+. of May 1-1, ' . =r 
May 1'., 18711: + "A FOe4 ý IIidie: =, it:. m; =; elf a visionary through a V 
on; g, boundless, and systematized disorG''anisation of all the 
sense. °,, 
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However, it should be said that the Romanticism in Nailer's 
artistic counter-strategies to rower tends to radically separate art 
from : science. The artist must oppose the manipulations of 
technology, which Mailer sees as essentially negative. Accordingly, 
in A Fire on the frToon there is little interest or belief in the 
Nasýibilitie: ý of more liberatory forms of technology. Instead, 
Starding in }he Vehicle A:: embly Euildin (the V E% in Fior.; a, 
Aquarius nostalgic for a my. tl4ca-y =; iri" uai era before 
the v äYýt=G`JQ Z of 'ý'r'lia+i, i1? _ y =^_, 
iliP WLl; ýt üi _, i. c?; 'X taiiü yy ý'ýL 1 =; 
the a; iye 
ý 'v_ 
of 
t. 7 _, ey I os 
-e .., a. - 
'an, -Ii aQ- at icu_+ in `h: _ ii+ cathedral of 
the age 
of to hz ,- 
logy, ari:: I, he might as weil re co, gnize that the wor ld 
would change, th3t +i. 
.e 
world had changed. The great 
hui' lies cri a religious age had names: the Alhambra, Santa 
Sofia, Mont Samt--Michel, Chartres, Westminster Abbey, Notre 
Dame. Now: VA-11, Nothing fit any longer. The art of 
communication had become the mechanical function, and the 
machine was the work of art. What a fall for the ego of the 
artist. What a climb to capture the language again! '` 
Rather than viewing both :ý ience and art as potential forms Of human 
creativity and de;. J n, i'Lail1-i lh-U-S maintains U. e- 111 ýýVr lVa1 split 
b -r. 1 and 
11 " 
ýweer. . ýcierý".. 
ce and art as separate 
+ 
ýe areas of 
"head" 
any hear+ . 
This position on technology and art may be compared to that of 
1ar1 s ii: ýOFi in is essay "Human 'Universe' (ý`a5 wb. ere Ile sense:; 
the neces t j' for ho h artist zP t? C not fist equally 
to invent new 
orrio That rr'; 1pect the : 0mp1e x it7 of the real world to which they 
are addressed: 
For the truth i- is, that the management of external nature so 
that none of its virtu 1: = 
lost, 
in vegetables '.. agriculture) 
or in art, is as much a delicate juggling at her content as 
is the same juggling by any one of us of our own. And when 
men are not such jugglers, are. not able to manage a mean:; of 
expression the equal of their own or -nature's intricac, ý, the 
i 
lesh doe; choke. .. _. 
The d_sir 
ý 
leads failure of complexity in - to acceptance of the 
homogenisation s of a passive consumerist society, in which 
"Fpectatorism crowds out participation as the conditions of 
culture. " The artist, scientist and technologist in Olson provide 
counter-strategies that heal the damage of a repressively 
technocratic society. 
For Marshall Mo: Luhan in The Mechanical Bride (19951), consumer 
capitalism provides commodities that simplify and contain 
multiplicity and complexity: "the character and function of the 
popular myths of technolo i di mart appear quite plainly as cluster 
images of many interest-: and anxieties=: that go into action to 
produce a comic catharsis or relieL ": 'i Re=>t chapt will -e er h 
LLi: ; us: =; some twentieth century science fiction in the light of these 
remarks. In the remaining chapters, the technocratic capitalist 
rci i IiE of Cär qty, ip l7lifäZiun, law and cod-e w:. il Ue seizm to be- 
challenged, in the Lame Cif iul iplicity Irk -` 
DiBy and üe` 
te_rriti: riali. sed ex_plorai, ion, in. the writings of four recent American 
nove'list' . 
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ý-HA TER i5. 
ticience f'xý+ core te: and el ctro--manic, 
The inne tion and development of the electronic computer during 
the Second World War has reinforced inc myth, examined in the last 
chapter, opt a manageriai bureaucracy running society according to 
rules and procedures claimed as scientific, and therefore as 
ab! solute and uncontetable. According to the myth, modern state- 
corporate society runs like an electronic machine, without either 
the need or the desirability of human intervention. As a result, 
electronic mysticism and mythopoeia prevail as means of eliding 
problems of hierarchy and power in modern post-industrial society. 
Electricity, and the scientists and technologists involved in 
its apt>lication, entered American mythology as a divine or demonic 
force, a silent, Inv,: 7iblc and potentially dangerous source of 
ener y. 31 estion s of 
human 
. 
re'-pOns-- lil- for technological and 
political affairs, and the workings of power relations, have tended 
to be ob: , ure; 3 by this mythology s ale ctronic technology as an 
natural and unconditional force. 
Henry 'Nash SadLh shows this attribution Of secretive= - mystical t 
nowero to the electrical inventor in the cartoon and article on 
Ihcýr3°- Edison, published in Harper' eeblti on 2nd August 18y The 
tone of suspiciousness within which the technological e_-pert is 
gnifie, recalls Meville and Hawthorne. Edison is de gibed a- il 
a midnight workman with supernal forces whose mysterious 
phenomena. have taunt men their largest idea of elemental 
power; a modern alc`1emist, who finds the philosopher's stone 
to be made of carbon, and with hie magnetic wand changes 
every-day knowledge into the pure gold of new applications 
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and o 'in nal us es. He is Thomas Alva T. dl or. at work in his ` 
labc. - at or , 
deep in his conjuring of Nature while the wort d 
For Henry Adams, contemplating the dynamos at the Great 
E posit4oni of iGV() in Paris, electricity also appears as a mystical 
source of energy a system of infinite, silent, and occult power, 
which summons him, not to suspicion, but to an uneasy worship. He is 
: seduced into worshipping the new invisible god of rapid electrical 
tram=formations: 
As he grew accustomed to the great gallery of machines, he 
began to feel the forty-foot dynamos as a moral force, much 
as the early Christian: felt the Crass. The planet itself 
s _aea impressive, in its old-fashioned, deliberate, 
annual or daily revolution, than this huge wheel, revolving 
within arm's len th at some vertiginous speed, and barely 
murmuring -- scarcely humming an audible warning to stand a 
Lair's-br+e, adth further for respect for power - while it 
would not wake the baby lying close against its frame. 
efore the end, one began to pray to it; inherited instinct 
taught the natural expression of man before silent and 
infinite force. Among the thousand symbols of ultimate 
energy, the dynamo was not so human as some, but it was the 
most expressive. 
Praying in subservience to the machine is given as a "natural 
expres ion" of "inh cited iristinct. " eilte Melville in "The Tartarus 
of -Maids, " Adams thus attribute's power not to the human inventors 
and owners of the machines, but to the machines themselves. Thou h 
he ar`a ues for the existence of a central of ig"archy of managers, who 
evade political control through their invisibility and silence, 
Adam ue that tL ^- - here managers 
are themselves ulti t ma. _ý1 
control led by apparently autonomous `forces and powers created by 
modern electronic technolc_; y; 
the wort, of domestic pro^re: ss is done by masses of a 
mechanical power steam, electric, furnace, or other 
which have to 
be control 1=: d by a score or --wo of individuals 
who have shown capacity to manage it, The work of internal 
government has become the task of controlling these men, who 
are socially as remote as heathen gods, alone worth knowing, 
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but never known, and who could tell nothing of political 
value ii one skinnned then a1 i ve. Most of them have nothing 
to tell, but are forces as dumb as their dynamos, absorbed 
in the development or economy of power. They are trustees 
for the public, and whenever so-. iety assumes the property, 
it must confer on them that title; but the power will remain 
as before, whoever manages it, and will then control society 
without appeal, as it controls its stokers and pit-men. 
Modern politics is, at bottom, a struggle not of men but of 
forces. The men become every year more and more creatures of 
force, massed about central power-houses., The conflict is no 
longer between the men, but between the motors that drive 
the men, and the men tend to succumb to their own motive 
forces. : 
Adam's here reduce:; politics to natural "forces, " so that human 
responsibility for, and control of, society becomes, 
. in 
ter ms of his 
analysis, problematic. Yet Adams shows early insights into the 
future course of twentieth century industrial society as a 
tot l1 var ial! elegy. trio spectacle. These developments were noticeable 
as early as 1904, at the St. Louis Exposition, with its 
"long lines 
of white palaces, exquisitely lighted by thousands on thousands of 
e ec; tric candles, soft, rich, shadowy, palpable in their sens uous 
; tepth: >. "'1 Norman iler's ing connection o NASA' buildings 
with Nazism. in AF re on the Noon, recalls Henry Adams' dread of 
the "vast, white monumental solitude" of modern American 
technological society, 
ratz Lany-'s f-? 4 ýr opo is D2 "1 0) 1t an early and influential 
example of noieni eii:: t' oral treatments of t ieoe. developments. The 
film recall! - Ignatius Donnelly'., Caesar's Column in its- presentation 
of a totalitarian spectacle dominating a meGmeris-, ed workforce, as 
Lan} attempts to chow, in his own words, "the desire to keep an 
individual an individual. "' An homogeneous mob of workers, exhausted 
by repetitive industrial tasks performe in subterranean darkness, 
are victims of giant maohinec likened to the god Moloch, an image of 
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the industrial war machine which will be deployed again in Alen 
Gi ns=berg' . _, poem "Howl" (1956) .' 
Metropolis' moralistic ending emphasi. ýec the necessity of 
mediation between labour and management. This liberal-corporatist 
solution, in which "the heart must mediate between the brain and the 
hands, " forestalls the threat of proletarian revolution. ': 
Ironically. Hitler was impressed by the spectacle of ketropoilS, 
and subsequently invited Lang to make Nazi propaganda films. Indeed, 
the monumentality of the city's architecture was taken over as neo- 
fascist celebration in later films, such as The Shape of Things to 
Comp (i936 and in the final scene of Star Vars : i9 77. What Henry 
Miller called the "Air-Conditioned Nightmare" of modern America in 
this way becomes a desirable model for certain science fiction 
writers and fi lm-makers. " 
The rest of this chapter will examine the role of the digital 
computer in giving new impetus to these dreams of electronic 
My st ici sm. 
The Second World War stimulated decisions to Cl Yli ute ize 
American society, moves undertaken firstly by the military and 
surveillance organizations, followed rapidly by banking and business 
interests. The p; rpetual, if fluctuating, state of what Paul Virilio 
calls "Pure 'iar" "' has continued to give impetus to new products and 
design innovations since the 1950s. 
The history of the computer, since the monolithic ENIAC, 
invented in 1946, has been one of a miniaturisation, condensation 
and multiplication of functions. The industry has drawn on 
innovations in several areas, being accelerated especially by the 
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invention of magnetic tape in the l)50s, and of the transistor in 
the 1ý330s. By the 1970: ß, computer manufacturers had introduced the 
microcomputer, under an advertising rhetoric promising such values 
as democracy, order, efficiency, clarity, rationality, silence, 
transcen ence and power. Brand names such as "Apple" imply a new 
chance of Edenic freshness and health. On the other hand, a 
Honeywell Bull advertisement, by the Brothers Qutw9, uses 
Metropolis style backdrops and Wagner to indicate a quasi-fascist 
dream of purity, transcendence and noise-free order. 
These current myths are alibis for the imposition by managements 
of a Taylorist reorganisation of office and intellectual work. The 
dream of computers as ai iberatory technology has thus tended to 
obscure their use in the consolidation of the status cuo. As Levidow 
and Solomonides' recent arxist study of the introduction of 
computers into office work suggests, the new technology "does, not 
releass time for respite; rather, it sometimes raises the standard 
or the complex ty of work or the output demanded by the executive, 
while at other t3 ?ý it generates more work With a less useful 
outcome, "' Neither has the promise of iecentralisation been 
fulfilled, in that the ": onvergence of technology means convergence 
of control centralization in the . guise of de-Volution, - for the 
networked outpost appears autonomous and yet in touch with all other 
iIDbs, but is of course primarily in touch with and under the 
patronage of the centre, " 
In On the Line Deleuze and Guattari similarly describe 
computers as hierarchical systems that "still retain the oldest 
ode1: i; of thought insofar as they confer power on a central organ or 
-- 
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memory. They quote Rosentiehl and Petitot on "arborescent command 
sy tem5" : 
In a hierarchical system, an individual accepts only a 
single active neighbour, his hierarchical superior... The 
channels of transmission are pre-established: the 
arborescent structure pre-exists the individual, who is 
integrated into a specific position within it. 
These studies: belie the optimism of earlier hopes for liberation 
through automation. Writing in the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan suggested 
that electronic technology promised freedom from the repetitiveness 
and centralisation of assembly-line mechanisation.: 
the_ social and educational patterns latent in automation are 
those of self-employment and artistic autonomy. Panic about 
automation as a threat of uniformity on a world scale is the 
projection into the future of mechanical standardization and 
specialism, which. are now past. I" 
However, McLuhan': probe into cultural possibilities states with 
provocative hyperbole a situation that has not yet been fulfilled. 
Computers have instead been forced by power interests to consolidate 
existing hierarc, ies, as an e:: ample of what IcLuhan calls "rear-view 
irror' t iri fingt whereby 'offi cial culture still strives to force 
the new media to do the work of the old media. " The 'liberatory 
potential of computerised automation is thus suppressed, and the new 
medium is used merely to perpetuate archaic systems of centralised 
power. 
These power bases, within which computerisation accelerates 
under capitalist dictates, tend t, c be obscured by the myths invented 
by capitalist interests to signify these developments, These 
mythologies deflect attention away from both personal and structural 
accounts of social and technological change. Indeed, this desire 
apparently to remove human agency and political factors from 
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technological mediation is a fundamental tenet of research into so- 
called "Ar"tificial intelligence. " a quest to develop a. compu4er 
technology "to supplement and ultimately to supplant human 
judgement. "'7 Prevailing myths of electronic power serve to 
perpetuate these new developments, which fundamentally consist in 
renewed drive for capitalist expa :: _; ion. As Solomonides observes in 
Lornnulsiv TechnoJo yi yýv J, "mystification is good for busines. ý:; 
and for entrepreneurial research in universities. " 
In The Transfo, -mat. ions of Man, Lewis Mumford exposes these myths 
of the computer as a new god, in whose certainty and infallibility 
technocratic interests place their faith: 
With the further development of , cybernetic controllers, to 
make decisions on matters beyond the range of human patience 
or conscious human calculation, because of their 
complication or the astronomical range of numbers involved, 
past-historic man is on the verge of displacing the only 
organ of the human anatomy he fully values: the frontal lobe 
of the brain. 
In creating the thinking machine, man has made the last 
step in. submission to mechanisation; and his final 
abdication before this product of his own ingenuity will 
give him a new object of worship: a cybernetic god. 
The new religion demands an act of faith "that this mechanical 
demiurge, whose calculations cannot be humanly checked, will give 
only the correct answers, " 
Much American science fiction grows out of this attribution to 
the computer of quasi-diviric' power, seriously elidiri` or distorting 
consideration of problems of human responsibility and control, and 
thereby Drovi in' mythical alibis for the perpetuation of the status 
quo. Stories by isaac Asimov and Arthur C. Clarke ignore the dangers 
of entropy through an over-organisation of energy, finding in the 
security of Newtonian reversibilities an alibi for mythic 
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celebrations of the power of a techno-bureaucrati. elite, who e rule 
reinforced by the electronic computer. 
. _. ý : v1_4 
has 
=spe_cial y argued for 
the dies)raUl 1y of 
computerised technocratic control. In this way, his fiction serves 
the wider interests of the techno-bureaucratic state, evading 
problems of power and exploitation by presenting a quasi-religious 
myth of electronic power at the service of a bureaucratic elite. His 
work therefore gives permission for the secretive rule of a cadre of 
scientific workers, who are guaranteed access to truth and 
elf cfency through the digital computer . 
in dedicating The Robots of 
Da' ;n (l984) to Joseph En; Relberger and Marvin Minsky, leaders in the 
fields of "robotics" (Asimov's own 'ward), and ü call ýýArtificai 
intelligence" respectively, A.: _imov reveals the politic a l 
program atlcS of his science fiction iIi the heil an w now, and 
demonstrates demonstrates his ýentra. lity to the ideological pur. pose.; of the Y 
techn crcat. i c _i 
to n mod 
_I , 
ne_ i an ociety 
.c 
we vcr, A:, im no v' s-LD,. __ _, 
u 11 t 41 ris eivtivallý.. ý. he 
.iýUý 
n c17 d, a he tü r . -m_S1 r; 
ham" 
c<. J-nrß .. 
hat ao1 _. nce 
. _.,. A ý. 
l 
.. 
1 T ß_1 J_ .: 
i aa whoic:, and 
'y`= the infallibility of computer technology, 
an, -inn , he technocrats who control and are controlled by it, In this 
context, Asimov's "Three Laws of Robotics, " a single mechanical 
algorithm controlling his fictional robots, magically removes the 
threat of technolonical damage from his stories. The Three Law- are 
e central device b-, wných Asimov is able to dis miss as irrational 
fears üi the ll17 Sll'ý2 Oi to nologTy, LIl hiS S+i oriec, as James Gunn 
points out-, "the emotional response - the rear or -the machine, the 
2 31 61 - 
Sear 
..... ý 
the creature turnirr on its creator - was ü4_: rided. in the 
robot stur such response:; are characteristic of foolish, 
unthinking people, religious fanatics, port-sighted labor unions, " 
What Asimov calls the "Frankenstein complex-" is "false to humanity's 
intellectual aspiration to be rational. and to build rationally. " ° 
This re ection of Romantic criticisms of technology, which have 
been examined in this thesis in the nineteenth century fears of 
Fromethear, hubris, becomes in As mov's work a totalitarian desire 
fcr static order and rationality, suppressing areas of emotion and 
sexuality, 
in the story "Evidence" (11)46), the appropriately-named 
Susan a Yin thus r;.; r_, iý_ the Three Laws of obotic sa an meal 
moral code for obedience in human beings: 
the three Rules of Robotics are the essential guiding 
principles of a good many of the world's ethical system. Of 
course, every human being is supposed to have the instinct 
of self-preservation. That's Rule Three to a robot. Also 
every "good" human being, with a social conscience and a 
sense of responsibility, is supposed to defer to proper 
authority; to list no his doctor, his boss, hiss 
CVt rnment, his psychiatrist, his fellow man; to follow 
rules. to conform TO custom - even when they interfere with 
his comfort or his safety. That's Rule Two to a robot. Also, 
every "good" human ein' i supposed to love others a s 
himself, protect his fellow Win, risk hi life to save 
another. hat's Rule One to a robot. To put it simply if 
Byerley follows all the Rules of Robotics, he may be a 
robot, and may simply be a very good man. .:: 
"1 
Asimcv s . dance fiction thus prcmote: = , hri: >tian-capitalist ' vague: 
of nacrizice and obedience to taw and authority. Accordingly, 
ac_: cident and unpredictability, rather than being creati ve re: ýoürce: ý, 
an they are, for example, in the fiction of Ronald Sukenick (See 
r_' r are or c üa A lIIlrr mereiV not c: 1 anw o r' üc CramCatei 
from an efficient system. This policy is evident in 11ihe Evitabie 
Cone I Ictn ýC1,55 
.). 
-ýý7- 
Ir thin =: torythe ýlüip ifiýýät-ion of soviet to a c: ri'ien of 
mec anic3 7 eau rati function has enabled ontro to Eiass from 
human beings to a centralised group of omput r called IITh ces 
Machines, " In his way, the logical implications of the theory of 
+l. he 11 mý. nagerial soviet yl' have been car r carried ou t. society is a machine 
run by machines, and the conflicts, errors and catastrophes that 
worried James 'Ourrham have been Eradicated. 
Problems of political power are thereby deemed irrelevant. The 
Machines are an omniscient Sod, like Laplace's demon, so that "in 
their own particular province of collecting and analyzing a nearly 
infinite number of 
data and relationships thereof, in nearly 
infinitesimal time, they have progressed beyond the possibility of 
detailed human control. ` Whereas in some science fictions, this 
suggestion - brings iiyL: tGplaTi fears, for Asimov, the relinquishing of 
human 
control 
in positively to be recommended as a social necessity. 
The story describes the defeat of a small group of dissidents, 
tie üocietý for Humanity, " who had infiltrated the perfect 
bureaucracy in order to sabotage it. The technocratic "Co--ordinator" 
Stephen Byerley reveals his priorities in summarising, what he se s 
as the reactionary nature of these humanist rebels: "To disobey the 
Machine's analjjse,;. is to follow a non-optimal , 'path. "': ' 
Most of A: ý_zimov's stories centre on a myth of simple, "logical" 
problem so1virig, deducing soIuticrio: "rationally" from the Three Laws: 
of Robotics. The problem pooch in "T eE . 
table Conflict" is to 
acco'u - for the cri: 
tabilitle: in the society, which ought not to 
exist ii the central computer system really wan acting in an V 
omninclent nI1a Genei icG t manner. !t1: coon Pointed out that the 
_üA V_ J 
social i, St a}biiit ies, such as economic crises of overproduction and 
u iý: MPioymont, are not errors or anomalie. that imply the failure or 
in` if ii ie t of the Maci ties bu are a de 1i ber ate policy designed 
by the Machines themselves. to root out the subversive humanists from 
the positions of power they are abusing. 
Dr. Susan Calvin is again the authoritarian, near-omniscient 
engineer who "solves" such yogi cal problems, reasserting thereby the 
i aternalisti c benevolence of techo cratic Co tro According to her 
apparently incontrovertible diagnoe; l_;, the Machines 
are quietly taking care of the only elements left that 
threaten them... the Machine is shaking the boat - very 
slightly - just enough to shake loose those few which clingy, 
to the 'de for Purposes the Na chines consider harmful to 
ihumoni ty. ý: ýtf. 
"The Evitable Conflict" advocates unaccountability an d secrecy as 
necessary for the state bureaucracy. For Dr. Calvin, tG Machine 
snow direct human society, "preferably without tell in us, since 
iii our pnorant pr(-ýJud ces we only know that what we are ucea to, is 
oo - 'ÄTia we wouici bier light. criarige '__. _" ini this way, ii: _. ir ov 
21 Il f Gr ces ýC policies of st r secrecy in the jicCartb43 a y, riG 
the s or y' s writing. 
Moreover, as Dr. Calvin point: outs, to oppose such extensions 
cf. technocratic control is to oppo: ce "change" as a whole. Asimov 
thus ar tempts to Claim for his own dicour. a monopoly on radical 
though tin Ed 
war 
1. 
liam; ý' `s 
i 
our. "1.; nE 
P, i;: kward, thereff ore ,t 
at-, 
.ý 
i Be st 
forms of cocia control . are 
given as the single. most rational 
dir Ilion of social change, to the exclusior, of alternative 
Strategies. Radical thought is itself moinopCiiSP_ . 
__ 
ü I) _. l 
Ii of , 




oIitivlbV tü8 Xat; hlne äY2 "hC: "Yi[71e, " DY. CaiV1Z1 rCp`is_, = 
with the bland assurance of the technocrat: 
Perhaps how wonderful! Think, that for all time, all- 
conflicts are finally evitable, Only the 1iaohines, from now 
on, are inevitable. 
In Asimov's technocratic utopia, as in Skinner's Walden Two, power 
is thus no longer given as a Darwinist struggle between rival 
intere_: is but can instead be "scientifically" administered, in the 
final sentence of the story, the fire in Byerley's fireplace, which 
the reader is told at the start of the story had "n. o functional 
aignificance, goes out, "and only a curl of smoke was left to 
indicate it. place. For Asimov, this extinction of the 
possibilities of transformation through Promethean conflict, and the 
eradication of any form of life beyond the merely functional, serves 
only to guarantee the power of the teoohno-bureaucratic elite. 
Asimov's i'ur; tanica repression of the non-tunctionai extend,; to 
, Li writing itse_li. There le no spark of human life or of -, ou ssancce 
in his writing, whose style may be summed up by borrowing Jean 
Baudrll? ard' o description of the order of industrial production, as 
"Bull, industrial, repetitive, echo', ss, operational and 
efficacious. "': The repressions of Asimov's writing further recall 
the statement by computerologist Marvin 1(iIlsky, that his researches 
"structures ai are Cont-ý? FZlýü with i. the TCiinC1 as and , ýü rOti ýiia*?. ý rather 
than with tiro "blcody mess of organic mattor. °< Yet Asimov's style 
is only an extreme version of the repressive lack of interest in 
human complexities, and in linguistic free-play, that reveals the 
authoritarian designs of much American science fiction. 
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In As -mov , 
"The Last Que=stion" 1G54: 
,a computer attain: 
y. to Lü 
intelligence and power, and becomes Goff. This story is a nostalgic 
desire for Newtonian certainty and totality, in which Maxwell's 
Demon is effectively re-created as computer technology, and 
universal entro, p. y is reversed. Beneat, hi the narrative, therefore, i:.. 
a quest for religious consolation, taking the form of a desire for 
deliverance from sexuality and the body. The fundamentally religious 
nature of such science fiction myths has serious political 
ramifications, as power interest s gseek , 
in the words of Solo onide: 
and Levidow, to reinforce "the directne: s. s of control under the guise 
of benevolent connectedne_s. "''' The workings of power are obscured 
behind alibis of corporatist conSensus and mutual involvement, and a 
myth of mystical unity and oneness through the expansion of computer 
technology. 
In Asimov's "The Last Question, " the human race is expanding 
tiirouehout the galaxy, so that the prospect of an entropic limit to 
such growth be-comes Into erabie, as one inhabitant says, 'i do not 
wish it to happen even after billions of year:. " The most 
important question for the super-computer to answer iss, therefor-, 
"How can the net amount of entropy of the universe be massively 
decr eased? " _ 
For centuries, the computer gives the same response: 
IN UFFICIEN. T DATA FOR MEANINGFUL ANSWER. " :i Meanwhile, human beings 
finally reach their apotheosis, achieving immortality, a 
transcendence of the physical body, and the subjection of the 
individual to the collectivity: 
Minds, not bodies! The immortal bodies remained back on the 
planets, in suspension over the eons. Sometimes they roused 
for material activity but that was growing rarer. Few new 
4 
individuals were coming into existence to join the 
incredibly mighty throng, saut what matter? There was little 
room in the Universe for new individuals. -" 
Asimov's utopia is a static unity of electronic connectednens, 
indifferent and death-like: 
Man considered with himself, for in a way, Ran, mentally, 
Wa:: -ý one. 
He consisted of a trillion, trillion, trillion 
ageless bodies, each in its place, each resting quiet and 
incorruptibly, each cared for by perfect automatons, equally 
incorruptible, while the minds of all the bodies freely 
melted one into the other, indistinguishable.:: -; - 
Universal AC, the final manifestation of the computer, is described 
as "aloof, " a "shining globe, two feel; across, difficult to See. " 
Asimov':; electronic mysticism thus celebrates 'light, whiteness, 
invisibility, singular it'y, Circularity, and communality, and reveals 
that hatred of the body, celebration of purity, and desire for 
subsumption in mass uniformity that Wilhelm Reich identifies as the 
sexual neuroses of fascism. 
The universal computer finally reaches: a finite point of total 
information: "All collected data had come to a final end. Nothing 
left to be collected, " Having successfully accumulated complete was 
knowledge, the computer restores the universe to order. "The Last 
Question" is thus a Laplacian myth of knowledge as accumulative and 
potentially complete, as Asimov's language becomes biblical: "And it 
came to pass that AC- learned how to reverse the direction of 
ontro, v. " So the dream of Newtonian reue ="ibility is fulfilled in a 
return to origin: 
Tý, e consc iou ne. s of A, -' encompassed all of what had once 
been a Universe and brooded over what was now Chao:,. Step by 
step, it might be done, 
And AC said, "LET THERE BE LIGHT! " 
And there was light - ; -4 
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Arthur C. Clarke's "The : tine Billion Names of God" (1053) 
similarly posits a myth of ideal co pletene: ss wit l. n rho 
Aristotelian securities of , rche and telos. 
Tibetan marks use a 
computer to compile a list "which shall contain all the possible 
names of God. """ By systematically rearranging different 
permutations of letters, the nine billion names of God will be 
successfully encoded. The Mark V computer, which was "utterly silent 
as it flashed through its thousands of calculations a second n1' f 
reiterates the mythical speed and invisible power of a god, where 
enchatology and mathematical science meet. 
The monks believe that when they have completed their list of 
names, 
God's purpose will be achieved. The human race will have 
finished what it was created to do, and there won't be any 
point in carrying on. Indeed, the very idea is something 
like blasphemy. "- 
When the list +e list is completed, they believe, God "steps in and simply 
winds things up. " Despite the scepticism of the American computer 
salesmen and experts, this is precisely what appears to happen at 
the end of the story, as, in the last sentence, "overhead, without 
any fuss, the stars were going out»' The world ends, not with a 
bang, but with the smooth, operational efficiency of a computer 
reaching its terminating condition. 
The celebration of electronic technology as magic in Asimov and 
Clarke is, of course, countered by many dystopian science fictional 
a_; trapolation5 of future cybernetic societies. However, one factor 
that such stories have in common with celebrations of technocratic 
power is the tendency to displace attention away from problem of 
human control. Rather than analysing the networks of human power 
L't J 
relations in which computers are attributed myths and meanings, 
these stories tend to posit a myth of an autonomous machine, in 
which computers escape the control of their human inventors. The 
fear is that, having reached a point in their development where they 
appear to have the potentiality to initiate programmes 'for 
themselves, ' computers will begin to achieve autonomy. This 
anthropomorphisation of the computer deflects attention from more 
important issues of the extent of human responsibility for technical 
developments and the degree of exploitation of the human workers 
living in techno-bureaucratic society. Moreover, these repetitions 
of the Frankenstein myth - Asimov's "Frankenstein complex" - are 
often contained by a reassuring ending that reasserts technocratic 
values of scientific rationality within existing power hierarchies. 
Jack Williamson's The Humanoids (1948-9) is one such science 
fiction novel. The technocratic leader Warren Mansfield has 
introduced total automation, the social effects of which, unlike in 
an ASimov's Stories, are seen negatively. otal a tomation, through 
the mass use of robots, has produced a society in which human beings 
are ignorant of technology, passive, and protected against 
aggression, and have therefore themselves degenerated to the 
robotic. In this society, the robot-slaves are controlled by a 
variation of Asimov's Three Laws, the Prime Directive, "To Serve and 
Obey, and Guard Men from Harm, " laws which, unlike in Asimov, have 
inadvertently Suppressed human development. "" 
Opposition to technocratic control in the novel takes the form 
of the individualist rebellions of Clay Forester and ? dark White. The 
244 -- 
latter is leader of a gang of freedom fighters, whose credo is 
summarised as follows: 
put my trust in men - in the native human powers I had 
begun to learn. If men were to save themselves, I saw they 
must discover and use their own inborn capacities, rusty as 
they are from long neglect. "1 
Wh to struggles for "the worth and dignity and the rights of every 
inividual. 
However, despite these liberal, individualist strategies, the 
solution to social crisis: proposed by the novel is found in a new, 
quasi-mystical source of energy. Forester, a pioneering scientist, 
undertakes a quest to find "just One equation, which would be the 
nasic statement of all reality, the final precise expression of the 
whole nature and relation of matter and energy, space and time, 
creation and decay. "47 His subsequent discovery of "psychophysical 
energy" or "rhodomagnetics" as a third sort of ener y, beyond the 
electromagnetic spectrum, is thus seen as a. fulfillment of "the 
oldest goal of alchemy and science": "The fabulous prima materia, 
when now at last he grasped it, proved to be a very simple equation, 
. so plainly obvious that he thought he should have found it long 
ago. " The three energies are "different aspects of the single basic 
unity science had ever : ought. " :: ' 
This mythical solution provided by The Humanoids is therefore a 
continuation of the nineteenth century dream of mesrnericm, explored 
ambivalently by Foe, and excoriated by Hawthorne. A spiritual or 
menta'! i. et monism guarantees total contrc:., and the gratification of 
Omnipotent desire. As ; any`, tide -WSVIchic chi d, explains: 
1 `--iIl you an han e any . ato: , 
to 
_et 
it go into 
. -r gy, and then nave the energy : iaht bac into . v° oti. er 
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`. of "he 
r ., 1a t__i____ h. _f"ou wanted l- to :? e. ly 
upli: =, t pathological dre=am of "matter moulded by sheer 
th ught! "'' displaces technology and politics into mysticism, as the 
new psychic powers give the bearer control over the environment 
without technology. The Humanoids thus presents a myth of 
singularity, unity and totalitarian power as salvationary 
metaphysics. The new force is guaranteed as beneficent, in that 
attempts to use it for murder fail, because the force can be used 
for "creative" purposes only. '- Such reassuring mythical guarantees 
obscure arguments concerning social change through pol ti cal and 
teohnologlcai actions, preferring instead a consolatory programme 
based on iliasi n, magi, and omnipotent desire. 
This evasive resolution defuses the rioveils earlier satirical 
'aisturý, ances, In a movement which is for Gary K. Wolfe typical of 
many works of science fiction, which offer programmes of religious 
consolation to human pro oleI7 : 
Like much science fiction, The Hw anoids introduces a 
problem that is highly visible in our own society, but 
proposes a solution that is achievable only with the aid of 
something akin to grace: if we passively allow technology to 
follow its course, things will be terrible for a while, but 
there aright be a way of transcending the problem through 
evolutionary change. -- 
ior_ov_r, in The Hu avoids exploitation of the new force of 
rhodomagnetics is u. tinately shown to be dependent on technocratic 
control, deemed a, ,. s necessary step in evolutionary processes. As 
Man: stield explains: 
Can't you see that any society must shape and train its 
members? And somehow discover and control and reclaim 
maladjusted individuals - before they destroy other-- or 
themse1ve, _? ' 
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So the individualist For^c: 
-te 
finally submits, somewhat reluctantly, 
to. the, "benef 1 nt" therapy of the hL manoi j5. He refuses the 
o opportunity of "esca e, and triumphant r_tal iation, " and surrenders 
in "a-thetic frustration, "" The novel ends with the one-time rebel ýa. 
about to join a programme of further colonial expansion, saying, to 
himself: 
For why shouldn't the wise benevolence of the Frime 
Directive be extended as far as men could go`? How could the 
colonists care for themselves, without me hanicals? ' 
rorester'Ü fate in The 4a=-, oids is a common trajectory in science 
fiction. whereby opposition and difference are considered as 
anomalies within a functional system, which are either 'destroyed or 
appropriated by the status quo for the Purposes of Its renewal 
Williamý-on's novel, Forester, the non-conf ormist, is finally 
reconciled with the off cial system of technocratic control. 
This treatment of political opposition and rebellion in 
The Humanoid-- is matched by its attitude to scientific anomaly. Like 
much science fictions the novel takes an interest in the radical 
possibilities provided by anomalies within scientific orthodoxies. 
Chara, teri;; tically, however, these anomalies tend to ne explored for 
the purpose: of reinvigorating a complacent scientific and 
technological bureaucracy. For exam-pie, -he pos 4 
power, relegates by te scie tifiC establishment to -parascientif-"C 
-, atus, becomes a means of renewal for the statu- ý quo, strengthening 
existing power 
interests. 
Accordingly, in The Humanoids, the teleportational powers of 
sane 'Carter ,t ie 
"grimy little waif, " disrupt Forester's complacent 
rationalist certainties: 
- ý4'f - 
Forester idoredi himself a man of reason. iechnologi : al 
va-iß no lo I: T_r as to d hi m, b ut he preferred to ignore is r 
any stray bits of experience which refused too stubbornly to 
fit the ordered pattern of physics, The plant-shattering 
missiles of the project no longer aroused any particular 
wonder in him, because they were part of the same pattern. 
But the urchin's visit wasn't. 
The grotesque impossibility of her coming and going left 
him shuddering;. ': `. 
However, in much science iiction, such disruptions by the grotesque, 
magi al or uncanny tend to be made sale, as the narrative moves from 
an initial unfamiliarity towards the security of total explanation 
and a renewed familiar. 
Moreo erg such anomalies tend to be placed within epic, 
totalitarian justificatory alibis. Thus the psychics in 
ne umanmos are outsiders, 1411ahin who renew the existing 
civilization from The "most talented } the margins. citizens of this 
planet, " they are gathered together by their leader Mark White from 
"the gutter, the jail, the madhouse. ""' In this respect, such 
science fiction may be seen to provide consolatory fantasies for 
those who fall snort of the competitive requirements of American 
society. In this way, the capitalist status quo can be reaffirmed. 
in The Huininoids, such desires for omnipotence and renewal are 
placed within ar penglerian history of cyclic repetition, thereby 
guaranteeing the apparent inevitability of perpetual colonial and 
technological expansion. These programmes are justified as an 
evolutionary inevitability, beyond the need, or possibility, of 
human, political intarvGntion' 
Moreover, as a consequence of science fictica's displacement of 
its narratives into the far future, potentially disturbing issue: 
tend to be deferred to a safe distance. Written in the immediate 
- . 48 - 
aftermath of the American government 9" atomic bombing of Hiroshima 
JV 
d. riii ivagasaki, The Humanoids is neverthele: ý: _; able to contain its 
political issues wthin an impersonal, apocalyptic schema: 
A hundred centuries had gone since the time of Einstein and 
Hiroshima, and the tamed atom had powered ships to scatter 
the seed of man across many thousand habitable planets 
within a hundred Light-years of Earth. Countless human 
cultures, isolated from one another by the long life-times 
and generations required by the best atomic ships to cross 
from star to star, had grown and killed themselves and 
sprung hardly up to invite new destruction... the old 
historical cycle of rise and ruin was preparing to repeat 
itself again. - and again with variations. Threatened with 
the inevitable fruit of its own exported know-how, the 
democratic republic was already sacrificing democracy as it 
armed desperately to face a hostile new alliance of the 
totalitarian Triplanet Powers. '"_' 
The Hurerio2ds may stand for many science fiction texts in which 
sacrifice and war are given as "inevitable. " desistance to 
technocratic control in such works takes the form of an 
ndi dualist rebellion against bureaucratic Conformity. The single 
man i:; an anomaly, a drift w thin the system, who is re-appropriates 
and ma is same at rue end of she story. A similar appropriation QI 
potential di rent may be see n in two recent American science fiction 
films, Vargame" 1: 11383) and Trog 
John. Badham's film Vargrames (screenplay and novel adapted by 
David Bischoff) adopts a liberal reformist position towards 
questions of authority and power, as the solitary non onforüi t is 
again co-opted into the technocratic orthodoxy. The teenage rebel 
hero of the film, David Lightman, finally learns a new respect for 
authoritty, as the 
Ee i-mang the 
iroollc t to hi 
cl, large, in po: liti 
urge GI rebellion is raise,, and then removed. 
story with an "attitude problem" at school, David 
o teacher, believing that "most of the people in 
ons of authority, were such complete turkeys. "', ° 
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Considering his parents as looked in static, oppressive roles, David 
thereby continues the Hollywood movie tradition of misunderstood 
middle-class youth: 
Nobody really cared... They were too busy, too wrapped up in 
their own frozen attitudes, their own games that just kept 
looping like a faulty program. " .> 
This casual use of terms from computerology to describe human beings 
occurs throughout Wargames. As David's disobedience edges into 
criminality, when he "hacks" into the school computer to improve his 
Biology grade, he describes his friend Jennifer's attitude in terms 
of cybernetics: 
She was too locked into social programming that said the 
authorities made the rules and you can't fool around with 
them, even if you're cleverer than the numbskulls who told 
you how you were supposed to be. -' 
For David, social rules are as flexible and temporary as a computer 
programme. Life is a game, and to bend the rules is a new form of 
pleasur able survival. 
in this way, David Lightman may be considered a fictional 
example of what J. D. Bolter calls "Turing's Dian, " human beings whose 
sense-ratios, in McLuhan's phrasing, are adapting to the digital 
computer a an extension of the human brain. Bolter argues that, 
because computer programmes suggest an impermanent state in which 
every solution is "temporary, makeshift, obsolescent, " a culture in 
which computer-use is widespread will lose its sense of ultimate 
failure. Instead, there will be merely temporary setbacks in an on- 
going Fare, a "spinning out of solutions to well-defined problems 
according; to strict ruie'ý. " Faustian obsessions with remote and 
- uit goals will Iiceretore decline in importance, to be replaced 
by a sort of I2Ji--trau, -nian "bricolage": 
-- 25C- 
it is not a search for something remote, hidden, deep. A 
game is Played with materials ready at hand; it may indeed 
be tricky or taxing but always within a familiar field of 
play... Turing's man lacks the emotional intensity of his 
predecessor. He invests less of himself in his games 
precisely because the games he plays are not irrevocable. 
They are meant to be played to a conclusion and then reset 
and played again. The programmer indeed cares about the 
game's outcome, but he is saved from ultimate failure by its 
impermanence. A computer program that fails can usually be 
corrected and rerun. `.: 
The danger in this vocabulary of "game-playing" iý3 that real people 
may be sacrifice beyond the fascinating and addictive microcosm of 
the electronic screen. However, Bolter suggests that a computerised 
society, having ? ost its Faustian urges, is less . likely to produce a 
totalitarian leader. Hitler would, in McLuhan's phrase, be too "hot" 
for the modern era of "cool" game-playing: 
Computers make hierarchical communication and control far 
easier, but they also work against the fundamental sense of 
purpose, the absolute dedication to the party line, which is 
the core of the autocratic state. The computer programmer is 
always aware of other options. If anything, the great 
pol ical danger o the comp ter age 7.. 5 a new definition of 
anarchy. 
ü. '. e oo terns thesis may i tSe' f be too optimistic and 
superficial in these respects, in that Faustian totalitarianism, 
rather than disappearing, has been modified into the post-Second 
World War militaristic state, which, as Mailer observes in A Fire on 
the Noon, has translated Nazi obsessions with whiteness and order 
into a new glamo roux technocracy. The computer gives this 
totalitarian control an alibi of technological efficiency and 
cleanliness, thereby reinforcing rather than preventing its future 
consolidation. 
ä-vert ieles: the anarchic tendencies that Bolter identifies in 
he neY+ di re sipct + y3t tt T ll riü1v" sh o Gti: ý f _. 
f or per mane rý It a ll t Ih or ity ýý Nan 
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arise as problem:; to which Var ames provides a reassuring and 
magical solution. The solitary technical expert, who has been 
perceived as disrupting order in American society since at least 
Brockden Brown's Carwin the Biloquist, now takes the form of the 
computer "hacker, " whose technical skill is ultimately appropriated ý 
and controlled by the corporate capitalist status quo, and made to 
function inside existing structures of law and organisational 
hierarchy. 
David is told by Dr. Falken that the computer "was not built as 
the result of an urgent desire of mankind to see a little yellow 
ball gobbling up dote in a maze. i le computer i in a very real 
seise, the child of wir 
"1-1 Yet IITa1h3ms fails to specula-te on 
connections between the militaristic games in video arcades and the 
training of youth far consent to the global military strategies of 
the American armed forces. Instead, the film merely reasserts a 
liberal posit_on, according to whi c'h children should show respect 
for, and not tamper with, adult authority. The film thus becomes a 
cautionary tale for the young computer hacker. - of America, 
reaffirming the necessity of law, order and conformity within a 
liberal, reformed image of authority. It ends with a Cal' for a 
renewed sense of responsibility among workers for the technocracy: 
"" The whole world may become dependent on computers... but it will 
certainly therefore become dependent on the people who know 
computers. °r: " 
So the curse i=. taken off David Lightman, as he learns the 
virtue_s of social responsibility, which in this film mean iearni ng 
to participate in an admittedly lunatic : Struggle: 
'ýG, 'i 
- GL ýý u 
Ilp till now, David Lig t an had onsidered himself a 
mistake, an outcast, an outsider, dani ing on the perimeter 
Of things, making faces at the funny goings-on inside the 
loony bin. But now he realized that he was one of the 
inmate; 
- had always been one of the inmates - and the 
struggle going on was his struggle as well, '-° 
This new sense of corporate responsibility is seen as a Safe context 
for David's individualistic skill at computers. Accordingly, he wins 
a summer soh at NORAD, and shows his headmaster the "new smile of 
respect he had for authority now. "`"' The asocial, potentially 
ona criminal hacker thus becomes a functional member of American 
consumer s-ociety. Instead of following the Golitary pursuit ol- video 
game: -; David chose: instead to so to aerobi , -_s classes with 
his, new 
girlfriend, whistling Olivia Newton-John's "Let', Get Physical. " 
Social issues are trivialised, and given a magical solution in the 
sentimental, gluey connectedness of an electronic corporate society, 
Trcn, Brian Daley's novel, based on Steven Lisberger's 
screenplay for the Walt Disney Productions film, places this liberal 
containment of dissent with a justificatory myth of electromagic 
reminiscent of Acimov and Arthur C. Clarke. Loyalty to the "system'' 
in non is, seduction by the magical, glamourous mystique of 
totalitarian spectacle: 
The Electronic, World wensshes the Earth, and reaches 
beyond it. Information is moved through the computer system:; 
and processed by the artificial intelligences, The programs 
compute and search, retrieve and collate; they are already 
indispensable to science, industry, education, and 
government - to society in its present form. 
The program; challenge and entertain in videogame= with 
no risk of harm to their human Users; t. ey teach in the 
carrels and test in the classrooms. They evaluate and 
mediate; thsir word often final, Their World i=. vast; 
their Users know less of it that the Users suppose. 
The programs are only algorithms as human beings are 
only collections of chenicalo. ', 
- ýý3 -- 
Tr3l: 'her'e_f oro takes a leap of al hrýý o nor hisa ian, and gives 
autonomous life to computer programs, As computers are humanised in 
this way, so, more importantly, are human beings roboti ed. 
The action of the film is an extension of the gaming arcade, 
where, on the video screens, "computer-modeled figures warred, 
throwing disks of devasting power at each other.... " The narrative 
is therefore a commonplace manichean struggle between the virtuous 
Blues and the evil Reds, fighting within a liberal rhetoric of "free 
world" versus "totalitarianism. " This fight between electronic 
automata is depicted as a medieval combat, in which the soldiers' 
Jodies, armoured in "pauldron: E That cupped their shoulders and 
vambraces that encased their forearms, " are "patterned with radiant 
lines suggesting vestigial circuitry. "' As in the Superman myth, 
this medieval costume may be a transhistorical alibi, signifying the 
apparent ti ele: ý: _: ness of war, power and sa. cr ifice, while 
. 
oven entli z -wading polt :ý iss e il: to ca tl ýT o t.. ýr ýr rý Y 
by presenting an unfamilar social system before such issues were in 
historical existence. 
Tror1 celebrates a supposedly value-free liberalism, in 
o_vpo;:. tion to the total itar'J. an power of the Raster Control Program, 
The warrior iron is therefore a "hundred-percent independent!... MCA' 
cool n' tel , "i what 
to tt7i: +} 
n ... " Having "defied ail the M'CP'". 
efforts to enslave or convert him, " Tron fight- against the Reds, 
who have reduced human beings to a mesmerised worktorce of "labor 
automatons" familiar to science fiction since Caesar's Column and 
fietrepolis. In the Factory Complex, Yori replies to Tron "as if ia n 
25 4- 
: ron is resolved ", -o set t ings light an i:. r-store orde_ 
and purpose and safety to the System. "; 
The narrative of 'r on is basically aarciaic, being J,. west for a 
7}P_;, iai disk, which h is "the key to a new order": "x the iioppy-di ski 
as a mystical sour Je Of enemy and power. However, like üargames, 
the f ilin sakes: some attempt at criticising irresponsible power from 
a liberal re_formiJ 
that 1a'v'lo it efficient y is shown 
to he inadequate wi vhout a cushion of vaguely 
humanistic values. The 
Master Control rogras te11: 3 -1l ger, 
head of the multi-national 
IAllü? 
iý corporation, that it can run , 
h' ngs "900 to 11200 tines: better 
than any human" 
For 'better' read 'more efficiently, Dillinger told 
hi?; _: elf. Ar. d that would mean no patience with human foibles 
or shortcomings. Dillinger had always advocated maximum 
efficiency, but knew that his own program far outdid his at 
that. 
These human foible: -; and shortcomings mainly take the form of the 
nca 'd7 dua » . Wiente 
As in Va ^7c r-Eas, the potentially disruptive 
and anarchic` factor is, a computer hacker, Flynn, whose outlaw 
credentials are clear: he Call: himself "The kid, " and i. e played by 
Jeff Bridge's. "" 
-Flynn 
is viewed by illinw r as a hreat to the latter'.; 
i tJ 
security and power; 
{. ' c3 11 i, '-ü, T. pi: v- i cz e ., 
i rIf lUc_ e' t ý_ _____; }.. 
_Y , and t is ýTic c i; ipa,;.: lie ý_.. r 
accorded all i; activities and secrets by the MCP: these 
things protected him. Still, with a reckle: =: s, unpredictable 
maverick like Flynn, one could never be completely certain 
of one's safety. Dammit, the man wa: o unorthodo. s. 
Similes lV, the MCP cannot quite analyze the "random factors, 
unpred ctabie impulses, and sudden whim; of the organic compute': 
14 that was Flynn's l. }rain " it is evident from this- quo . ation 
that, 
., ar: _ J 
in Iron. Flynn's i ua1 ities of unpredi ct ab ? lity unorthodoxy, and 
spontaneity are not allowed to radically disrupt the functionality 
of the system. Instead, cybernetic orthodoxies, which casually view 
the human brain, as above, as an "organic computer, " ultimately hold 
Flynn's disruptive behaviour in check, as the unpredictable, 
solitary technical expert Is successfully appropriated by the 
status quo, to what the first page of the novel called "society in 
its Present form. 14 
Indeed, unorthodoxy becomes a positive source of renewal for the 
establishment, as Flynn' "irreverence, humor" and "nimble turn of 
mind" are channeled into enterprises considered socially useful. 
Despite the "awl -too-fre`lent occasions when Flynn's brash nature 
brought him into contact with higher authorities, " the potential 
anarchy of the technical expert is tamed. ' ii So the former hacker 
ends the story as : `senior Oneratin; Officer at ENCOM, riding in the 
company helicopter. He _. r: r ari--g "a natty iý^ u ý, Ct^_;: quit 
had Chasei! to wear his running A limited form of 
unorthodoxy is to elated, and , =.. 
ld back to the citizen as Consumer 
fashion and stye. 
in fact, Flynn's qualitie as a ha li I are not dissimilar. from 
those required by the official techno-bureaucracy. Flynn survive: 
hiss test" in the Grid, where his ", strong competitive nature had 
bel ebt his most, mDartant as. -. _; e r 
The ....... y h. - Grid, gi 1_, Grid, wliere p:. secan; a 
ns and constant attention were recurred to keep from 
Olliding wi, h so me thing" `is good training for the accelerating 
speed of corporatist capitalism. Flynn'ö "anaving whims, " which 
>znar_kie, _ of .L on groped for the word autcrorut" can therefore 
Ii% iak= ý-' U I. 
tc'. d tai t vC 
ica týýä: V 
r at C: i 1 1, 
:. VY+ 'v 
'- - C': r 
bimse if 
woi thy to join. 
In effect, the "simu acrum'"'of Flynn ire th_ Grid is his real 
form, his better half. When he is "digitalized, " Flynn is 
transformed into a "being of Iight. " He is both angel and robot: 
"incandescent lines, resembling circuitry, ran over his tor=so and 
limb=... ", Flynn later recalls when he had "stolen the aura of the 
downed Red. `::: In Tron, therefore, as elsewhere in modern culture, 
the authoritarian aura ha: not been destroyed le by e -; tron-* c ma: _- 
production, as Walter Benjamin naivery thought.: '; ' Rather, a new 
religion of electronic technology is in power, the central values of 
which are robotic obedience and angelic; purity. Iron thus Celebrates 
American totalitarianism as a spectacle of electr'o-magic and neo- 
Nazi as with whiteness, bloridenes=. ý and cleanlin_s=, -. Like 
Flynn, Yoram is also transfigured into a pure, electronic angel: 
An aurora appeared around her gentle and tr. rt : ant. To i 
transformed, brightened, as if shedding camouflage. Her 
h"f lmuet-_. ap was gone; her golden hair swirled and floated 
behind her, Tron watched, erii han d. Sie sent gýadl'y of rh 
Dower he'd given her, The worker's ; aspect fell away as 1'oi`i 
stood clothed in a cloud of splendor. 
Sexuality and erotic passion are thus: anaesthetised, and transformed 
into mesmeric acts performed by electromagnetic auomata, in a : ath 
of Disney sentimentality: 
They extended their hands until they nearly touched, pa re to 
upriser- palm. A blissful ray sprang between them, widening 
to envelop them, until they were like bright filameritý_ 
ele: etials, they Shared energy, were one. They sank down 
among the reclining-contours; the room shone with glory. 
Aa film deemed suitable for ch_ldr'en, Fron thus socializes its 
young viewers into 7fi1 tarastiC hr stian-capitaiist values, while 
t --aping the po: ýýsi iitie-- of dissent and, - =b____=a: 
J -- 
hE st or ies -: n tiered so mar 
in this chaps' 
VarTaiss and Tron -- all reassert the desirability of 
+t+ t" l- through y+ ctali azlan, ýechnccraýlc ru ý, a control ei appropria in 
of dissent. Opposition i: Considered as individualistic, rather than 
as , potentially' collective. 
In ome science fiction, however, dissent 
remain., uncollected by the system at the end of tI t; .. 
the narrative. 
Nevertheless_, such opposition again tends to take a liberal 
individualist fcr'm, as a solitary individual manages to avoid 
integration with the bureaucratic state. Such work may retain a 
critical edge, while entering areas of survivalism as a response to 
a supposedly unchangeable totalitarian system. 
In contrast to the works explored so far in this chapter, 
Michael Crichton' n he Terriial An (1972) refuses to compromise its 
criticis : of the control of human behaviour through electronic 
technology. The novel is a well-researched extrapolation from the 
history of medical Science, that criticises abuses of power by 
professional surgeons and lawyers, without succumbing to evasive 
alibis of electronic mysticism. 
Authoritarian control is effected in the novel through the 
ip antation in the rain of electrodes inked, to a compll per. After 
a car accident, Harold Benson a computer ex-er' suffers blackouts 
andi violent aggre_: _: iCIlsimi ar to those experienced by a "tempor'al- 
o' ee inept c. After drug treatment has fai el, he is forced 
Wil e under olive Url: 3; a tio1 tC undergo ail ojýeraition Cri his 
brain. The ambitious Dr. Whose utilitarian attitude is summed 
up by his motto, "We can fix you ups". ' . is Seen by Janet o. - toe 
psychiatrist, to be "terr ibl; y eager to pert, orm the new C er ý. t:. OIl. " ' 
'iF4 
C. ' .J LLt 
Even befc. e his accident, Benson na beer suffering from. paranoid 
delusions that "machine:; were competing with human beings, and that 
ultimately machines would take over the world'. "" I 
she implantation of electrode in Benson"ý brain el Ns to 
control his epileptic seizures, through feedback with a central 
computer. However, his paranoid delusions remain, and become 
aggravated to the point of psychotic violence. So the novel is 
another re-telling of the myth of Frankenstein':::, monster, or of the 
Jewish Golem. Benson takes his murderous revenge on any human being 
associated with machines, and is finally shot dead in =elf-defence 
by Dr. Ross after he has tried to demolish the hospital ; -computer 
that is controlling him, 
The Terminal Nan adds an important complication to its analysis 
of the permission assumed by scientists and technologists for their 
work, in its reference to the neurological research of James Old in 
the [)itd: =, identified what he called "river=: of reward" Jr, th! e 
brain, the electrical stimulation of which produce= feelings of 
intense leasure 
an i an electrode was ü1c: e'4 in such an area, a rat would 
press a sel-; timulari :; n leve to re el de a shock as often 
as five thousand times per hour. In its quest for pleasure, 
it would ignore food and water. It would slap pressing the 
lever only when it was prostrate with exhaustion. ''"'' 
This phenomenon leads Crichton to the notion of the "electrical 
addict" or "elad, " as "the man who needed pleasureable shocks. " At 
the hospital, Dr. Morris interview:; Craig Eeckerman, the first 
person to actually volunteer for the electrode-implantation 
operation underdone by Benson. He has read in a magazine article 
that "one 
, 
jolt of electricity was like a dozen orgasm.. " When asked 
J fý __ 
by 
, 
mrr is why he wants the oDoratlori, he 
is yiri 
Seim; "Are you 
kidding., '? WoG.. i;. Zl L everybody wane li. Pleasure like tilat 
Meanwhile, Benson himself begins to initiate Seizures voluntarily In 
order to experience pleasureable ! -. hock. 
In this way, Crichton's story explores possible reasons why 
consent to control may be given, thereby refusing a simplistic 
notion of human beings as merely passive victims of an imposed power 
relation. Control, in Eartha: _' phrase, is seen to be both imposed 
and demanded. 
Crichton' use of science fiction as a criticism of power 
relations separates The Terminal Man from the mythical alibis taken 
up by many writers towards modern electronic society. Another 
response found in science fiction is a cool survivalism, drifting 
beyond simple moral polarities. Such an approach characterises 
William Gibson' s Count Zero (1986). in this novel, the "elads" which 
provoke concern in The Terminal an are treated with a more 
libertarian sense of permission, as a possible strategy of 
pleasureable survival. Electronic mysticism, familiar in Asimov, 
Arthur C. Clarke and Tron, here returns as a variation on the 
"expanded consciousness" of counter-cultural de-territorialisation:. 
Gibson invents the concept of "cyberspace, " as a global 
electronic system connected to the nervous systems of computer- 
users, constituting a new sensory environment. Computer-users 
experience thrills of control and danger by plugging into cyberspace 
decks, which are described as 
toys that shuttled you through the infinite reaches of that 
space that wasn't space, mankind's unthinkably complez: 
consensual hallucination, the matrix cyberspace, where the 




dense you suffered sensory ' oyorload if you tried to 
apprehend more than the merest outline. ' 
In Gibson's work, the experience of computers as a sort of 
pleasureable hallucinogen becomes the source of a new religion, in 
Count Zero, some computer operators have begun to invent miyths of 
origin to account for their intuition of new forces present in the 
electronic matrix: 
1Throne= and dominion ,' 
the Finn said, obscurely. 'Yeah, 
there's things out there. Ghosts, vo1Ce'S. Why not? Oceans 
had mermaids, all that shit, and we had a sea of silicon, 
see? Sure, it's just a tailored hallucination we all agreed 
to have, cyberspace, but anybody who jacks in knows, fucking 
knows' it's a whole universe. And every year it gets a little 
more crowded... ' 
The arch technological visionary of this new religious society 
is Wigan Ludgate, "The Wig" has "become convinced that God lived in 
cyberspace, or perhaps that cyberspace ms God, or some new 
manifestation of same. " The Wig thus embark. s on an "epic if somewhat 
random voyage of cybernetic discovery, " using a "technique of 
exploration" la 'v 
that t ": ivý v. ^ýU 
mystical 
iv%. =, 
projecting his consciousness into blank, unstructured 
sectors of the matrix and waiting. To the man's credit, the 
Finn said, he never actually claimed to have met God, 
although he did maintain that he had on several occasions 
sensed His presence moving upon the face of the grid. ', 
The Wig moves into outer space to find God: "I gotta get up the 
gravity well, God's up there, 1 mean, he says, He's everywhere but 
there's too much static down here, it obscures His face. " 1` 
eauvoir, the computer pirate: also speculates on the notion of 
i 
electronic divinity. For him, the gods that inhabit cyberspace are 
Vodoc forces of practical magic. The new religion is therefore a 
pragmatic, operational bri olage: 
It isn't concerned with notions of salvation and 
transcendence. What it's about is getting things done, You 
_ýr:, l_ 
follow me? in our system, there are zany gods, spirits. Part 
of one big family, with all the virtues, all the vices. 
There's a ritual tradition of communal manifestation, 
understand? '`" 
The science fictional basis for this speculation is provided by 
Angie Mitchell, who appears to receive visitations from the gods of 
the electronic matrix. Her vision of a new creation myth suggests 
that the ghosts in the matrix may be the result of complex 
computers, based on Hbiochips, " that have gained both sentience and 
the ability to self-replicate: 
Once, there was nothing there, nothing moving on its awn, 
just data and people shuffling it around. Then something, 
happened, and it ... it knew i tse .f. 
The myth of "Artificial intelligence, " promoted by technologists 
such as Marvin Minsky at M. I. T'., thus provides the basis for 
Gibson' s speculations into a new form of electro-magic. 
Nevertheless, Count Zero also explores computer technology in 
terms of competitive power struggles between corporate business 
interests, in legal and illegal markets. The basi_. narratives are 
v 
repetitions of Western myths, with cyberspace as the new frontier. 
As Beauvoir puts it., "Bad dudes, big money, that's all you need to 
knows : However, in contrast to Tran, for example, Gibson 
introduce: a hipster scepticism into science fiction. Count Zero is 
therefore agnostic and ironic about its own technological mysticism. 
Jammer claim; that the matrix gods are a hoax perpetuated by rival 
business interests, while Marty senses the "almost palpable 
craziness that radiated from Wigan Ludgate. " ", `1 
This ambivalent approach adds an element of complexity and of 
moral relativism to the novel. Yet in Gibson's future society, old 
myths seemingly cannot be avoided. As a result, the novel concerns 
- 2h-2 - 
it 11, Ul t iLat_1y w±tb . purvivalism, 
is which th? pleasures of 
"Jacking into cyb rnpacio" are of, by the rec3: ýS1' y of avoiding 
ýolence and surveillance. 
Count Zero ultimately provides the consoling fantasy that 
personal heroism is possible in a complex, monolithic system. Though 
Jackie is killed by the force of cyberspace, Bobby heroically rides 
the danger: 
He felt it, rode out to the edge and almost knew it far what 
it was. He was screaming, spinning, sucked up through the 
glacial white funnel that had been waiting for them. 
he scale of the thing was impossible, toa vast, as 
though the kind of cybernetic me astruoture that represented 
the whole of a multinational had brought its entire weight 
to bear on Bobby Newmark and a dancer called Jackie, 
1mpa : _ible... 
On the way back, he'd seen the big thing, the 
thing that had sucked them up, start to alter and Shift, 
gargantuan black-, of it rotating, merging, taking on new 
alignments, the entire outline changing. '' 
The parasiti a vampiric relationship, of being ":; licked up" by a 
Force greater than one-. Gll f, is e pe_rienc d as pleasureable thrill 
T 
i-. - 
the othe in -= chanter, w it the 
-r 
exception of The TarEi al Han, Gibson'a Count Zero thus succumbs to 
a consolatory fantasy typical of modern industrial society. The m' th 
of iectro-maggic" common to these popular fictions suggests 
-Y, cLuh R'ß examination of the "craving for a power thrill that comes 
from identity with a huge, anonymous crowd, " as the "Craving for 
. Iii, =-Ilse individuality and attention m? ges with the opposite extreme 
of security through uniformity. " submergence in the crowd signifi e : =, 
i0: C;,.. üB. aa, "rem lea e Iron personal responsi bl it y. It I- le-. 
With its omnipotent fantasies of ; lower and control, Count Zero 
in thus ultimately as reassuring as Disney's Tron. Bobby grids the 
1ßV? twit la amourous = -p cGa trey chile ar Y oiss of modern 
26 3- 
Y' ii'i' ar shown do he e; ui glob Ily' . _lii 
io 
Ill i1eW 'eiivironmGo' 
1, t 
to make 
the ca ', ileac= t!. -iarv, 
" "'but t Wä: ß ri n 
Yr orthwhil4e, n <...: 
Samu: _i D la--V tale:; up Lc=_'c 1 ; u25 Gi nur 
iva1is in a highly 
tech iclo, ýi; ;l society as an examination of which myths remain as 
valuable, and which may be rejected as anachronistic in a given 
culture. Delany sees his -science fiction as moving beyond the 
bipolar morality of utopia and dystcpia. Whereas most o the works 
explored in this hui to present heir e ?; tunic t: chnocraci a: 
ei her morally ,: esir able 
(Asimov, iron, Wargames, or as morally 
"Crichton), elany's fiction, Jke that of William Gibson, explore 
unstable regions beyond the y G: =1Iti ilij of ýýCJ =in ular moral 
evai cation; Ioweve also as in : bson, thi morn rel tint m and. 
libertarian coolness tend. = : if to become a form of urvivalisin. 
;s revision of c_ enC fiction, away from the singular vi-sic-n-, 
plored er e, 'N'i le di: 1'cussed .in 
he next : rio hapter s. 
1 
, HASP CEP ifs. 
Sanue1 Delany: +r°nazre-=ion and Trift. 
In an ýn rcie: Y with Charl _ _, 
patt, sarmuel speaks- of 
need to Subject GI myth. to critical scrut ny, rather than 
to 
merely repeat. them out of habit; 
ii you :lý: ve. a gut response i, o a story you iii Z 11U 
'i esponding" to something new, you can your 
botto 2 dollar 
that what you are really responding to is a story you were 
to: where you were six or seven, which has been so overlaid, 
{ou don't recognize what it real f is. But your -L conscious 
recognises it, If you're , airy to work with those old 
: eng i think you do better to work with 
them with a sense 
of lroi1y. to know that you're 
toiling feie old story and 
indeed keep you tongue somewhat ir your cheek as you toll 
lt. You also have to know what those old storie's are and 
what they mean is order to actually say öometning- new. 
because, i'. you don't, what you will 
do is end up saying t he 
old thing- without knowing it. 
he1ar. v' Te Einstein Intersection 1119b l) also e<am <e: e function 
le 
has taken over the td? 
, i7i 
the Iioe'y i iP r ý. a CülLUýre T 
Earth, which humari beings have Left to co onise_ Ober planet 
leaving behind a radiation-coritaminated planet. 
in order to cope 
with the ho: ý rile environment, the non-humans seek to 
become human 
through genetic mutation, and by imitating 
tine cultural pattern- of. 
Li. ei P- ede es o on the 
Earth 
. 




which uytüý; are J, ällidL,: ý. Le, and which can 
be 
.. i SCdreüý 
iR a given Societ'y'. These explorati e processes concentrate on 
the 
main n s: Orpheus, Billy the 
Kid, arid t äe Bret i Xan or Christ 
myi; h. 
DeI Delany thus approa ches science fiction critically in 
,lis nov 
refusing to merely repeat aInd inner it its mithic and narr ative 
-265- 
st r of +' -i'-- ,.. - .y-. ý., +' str ý. 
tur e. as in n1G'. 1t Ol eC iý.., u. -, i: i"tliý'öc:.. 
in han.. er G. 
'riting in 11970, Delany places his open, explorative fiction Within 
wider cultural movements in America since the 1960s: 
our culture's scientific context, which has given us the 
plow, the tape-recorder, insecticides, the butter-r_hurn, and 
the bomb, is currently under an internal and informed 
onslaught as radical as our social context is suffering 
before the evidence of Women's Liberation, Gay Activism, 
Radical Psychiatry, or Black Power, 
Much science fiction inadvertently reflects the 
context's failure. 
The best science fiction explores the attack. 
In The Einstein Intersection, Delany quotes from a conversation with 
Michael M: cGure. This connection with the Beat writers is an 
important context for the fictional de-territorJ, alisations of 
Delany's work, tiacCiure's play The Beard (13F5) also examines Billy 
the Kid as a mythical figure, in a context of breaking closures of 
habit and identity. 
Finding themselves in Heli together, Jean Harlow and the Kid 
taunt each other: 
Before you can Dry any secrets from me. you must first find 
the real me! Which one will you pursue, ' 
Mzs<iure's play thus posits the self as multiple and complex. This 
acknowledgement of plural centres that disperse personal identity is 
a liberation from inherited restrictions: "We can do anything we 
want to here... WE'RE ABSOLUTELY FREE! "" 
The Beard is therefore a Dionysian challenge to limits, 
exploring the possibilities of choosing behaviour according to 
desire, beyond precedent and law. As the Kid says, "i can be crazy 
and divine, or silly and divine - or violent and divine! "" This 
liberation of desire is duplicitous and paradoxical, both 
potentially creative and destructive: 
- 266 - 
Harlow: What'll we do? 
Kid: WHAT I WANT! 
Harlow: WHAT ABOUT ME? 
Kid: Whatever you want! `°- 
This duplicity carries over into Delany's examination of the 
breakdown of habitual mythic actions in The Einstein Intersection. 
The sense of potentiality and libertarian freedom in this novel 
is based on speculations on the epistemological implications of Kurt 
Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, as a means of moving from a universe 
considered as a closed, finite system, towards an open, 
indeterminate universe in which innovation is possible. This 
potentiality is seen to include the possibilities of psychic power, 
as phenomena opened to serious consideration by the fracturing of 
the old paradigm of mechanistic determinism. 
Thus the herdsman Spider tells Lobey of regions of uncertainty 
and promise beyond the limits of reason. Gödel's findings break 
through the rationalist programme, whose final defender was Albert 
Einstein: 
Wars and chaoses and paradoxes ago, two mathematicians 
between them ended an age and began another for our hasty, 
our ghosts called (an. One was Einstein, who with his Theory 
of Relativity defined the limits of man's perception by 
expressing mathematically just how far the condition of the 
observer influences the thing he perceives... The other was 
Ödle (sic), a contemporary of Einstein, Who was the f it st GG 
the to bring back a mathematically precise ýtý ement about 
vaster real: beyond the limit.: ' Einstein had defined: In any 
cIsoed mathematical system - you may read 'the real world 
with its immutable laws of logic' - there are an infinite 
munber of true theorems - you may read 'perceivable, 
measureable phenomena' - which, though contained in the 
original system, can not be deduced from it -- read 'proven 
with ordinary or extraordinary logic'... There are an 
infinite number of true things in the world with no way of 
ascertaining their truth. Einstein defined the extent of the 
rational. G6del stuck a pin into the irrational and fixed it 
to the wall of the universe so that it held still long 
enough for people to know it was there. ' 
L. 
iii ýrnsle4n4 an i. iJCnse, 
humanity was able to reach she-- lmi. 
of the known universe with ships and projection forces that are 
Mill available to anyone who wants to use them... " But beyond the 
intersection point betwen Einsteinian and Gödelian conceptions, lies 
an area beyond the rational: 
when the 'line of Gödle's law eagled over Einstein's, its 
shadow fell on a deserted Earth. The humans had gone 
somewhere else, to no world in this continuum. ': 
In this way, The Einstein Intersection speculates on possibilities 
of breaking habits of rationalist closure through an exploration of 
difference. 
Random genetic mutations among the non-humans who took the place 
of the absent humans are increasingly producing people who are 
"different, " Lobey has an unusual talent for music, playing tunes 
which he is able to learn directly from the minds of people in his 
compariy. His lover Friza is able to make pebbles move without 
physical contact, However, as Spider suggests, the real nature of 
difference is more than this: 
It isn't telepathy; it's not telekinesis - though both are 
chance phenomena that increase as di fference increases. ' 
the differential world described by Spider is not governed by the 
fixed, immutable laws of the Newtonian universe that Einstein made a 
final effort to save. Rather, it is an open, indeterminate landscape 
in which old narratives and totalising myths may no longer apply. As 
Spider continues: 
We have taken over their abandoned world, and something new 
is happening to the fragments, something we Can't even 
define with mankind's leftover vocabulary. You must take its 
importance exactly as that: it is indefinable; you are 
involved in it; it is wonderful, fearful, deep, ineffable to 
your explanations, opaque to your efforts to see through it; 
- 25e - 
yet it deaand:; you take journeys, defines your stopping and 
starting points, can propel you with love and hate... 
This sense of potentiality, of the need 
s for drifting, open system, r 
provides the bases for Delany' s explorative science fiction. 
Lobey realizes that his journey to find Friza is a repetition of 
-0 rüheus': n failed quest for Euridice. rie comes to understand that 
this is the central issue of his life: whether the myths that his 
race use to structure their experience are useful in guiding 
behaviour, or whether they merely serve to constrict its 
potentiality. "Why can't you just ignore the old stories? " he asks 
Spider, who counters by pointing to the difficulty in avoiding 
repetition: "Myths always lie in the most difficult places to 
ignore. You shy at them on entering or exciting any endeavor. " 
The old stories provide a law, which, as Spider says, "you can 
either break or obey"; they set a goal, and "you can either fail 
that goal, succeed, or surpass it, ' ' Accordingly, in the Einstein 
Intersection, behaviour 
_s 
not locked in pre determined patterns, 
.. t_ the within a but ii" r'a, 
ý there 
c is `os. - ; ýi il1f v of f l: inOVat on 
variable, diverse field of action. 
To succeed in his quert, Lobey maust first deal with Kid Death, 
the murderous Billy the Kid figure. Lobey is thus forced to go 
through archaic motions. As the oracle PHAEDRA tells his, "I suppose 
you have to exhaust the old mazes before you can move into the new 
ones. It's hard. """ At the end of the novel, PHAEDRA advises that he 
is still in "the wrong maze, baby, " and that he must "seek somewhere 
outside the frame of the mirror. n In Delany's fiction, progress in 
made through this breaking of enclosures, producing creative 
difference. 
-26 - 
Yet the concept o difference appears both destructively and 
onstr ui tively, in the re-pective figure. of Kid Death and Green- 
eye. Kid Death is the "criminal genius, psychotic, and a totally 
different creature"'-' who repeats the myth of Billy the Kid. He 
kills Friza and Dorik out of fear, because "they were different. And 
I am more different than any of you. " Kid Death possesses near- 
omniscient powers of telepathic mind control, which enable him to 
destroy life at will: 
I saw through all the worlds' eyes -I saw what you and 
Fria saw, as I : gee what goes all over this arm of the 
galaxy. When what I saw frightened me, I closed the eyes 
seeing. '1 
Kid Death's difference is thus regressive, as his atavistic body, 
with its shark's teeth and gills, further suggests. He admires the 
'Western movies made by the former inhabitants of the planet, 
describing them as an "art-form the Old Race, the humans, had before 
we came. "'` Thi. violent, anachronistic art-form provides the model 
for the Kid's behaviour: he is a living re-run. 
The only character 
immune to Kid's destructiveness is Green-eye, 
who, as a variation of the Green Man myth, plays a role of potential 
saviour through love and an innovative use of difference. He is 
"chary of ritual observances, " "° breaking out of closed systems of 
repetition, and refusing to be tempted by Kid Death's offer of old 
forms of human wealth, technology and power which he could gain by 
joining the killer. Unlike Kid Death, Green-eye is able not only to 
c'tan e things, but to create the new. He thus use: his energies in a 
positive way, as Lobey does with his musical genius: 
Kid Death can control, but he cannot create, which is why he 
needs Green-eye. He can control, but he cannot order. And 
that is why he needs you (Lobey). '' 
ýn )_ 
in his desire to revenge the murder of Friza by killing Kid Death, 
Lobey engages in repetition, an attempt to kill death with more 
death, which, as Eric Mottram argues, remains as a fatal error that 
"stands at the centre of impotence in western culture. "' 
On the other hand, Green-eye's solution to the problem of 
archaic repetition and sacrificial killing is to step out of the 
enclosures of habit, in order to innovate. When Lobey articulates 
his hatred of the Kid, and his intention to kill him, Green-eye 
sings, "There is no death, only love, " a phrase which "he wouldn't 
repeat. "''=' For Green-eye, the ritual of killing can be ended, not by 
more death, but by transcendence of closed systems. 
However, Delany does not allow the bipolarity between Kid. Death 
and Green-eye, between destructivene:: a and creativity, to become a 
simple dialectic. For Kid Death is not stopped by love: he is 
viciously whipped to death by Spider, his mental powers having been 
made harmless by Lobey's music. His body is then eaten by a flower. 
This ambivalence between creativity and destructiveness is further 
dramatised in Lobey's machete, a knife with twenty hole.; along the 
length of the blade, which double:, as a weapon and as a musical 
instrument. When Green-eye is strung up by Spider on the orders o` 
Kid Beath, Lobey tries to resuscitate hihi, in the hope that he will 
help him bring Friza back to life. He starts by playing music, but 
when this fails, he strikes Green-eye in rage with his machete, 
delivering the blow that finally kills him. The difference between 
life and death, creativity and destructiveness, is thus a knife's 
edge: the deaths of both Kid Death and Green-eye are ambiguously 
poised between convergence with, and divergence from, the framework 
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of old myth, as the novel seeks, in the words of PHAEDRA already 
quoted, to exhaust the old mazes before it can move into new one:.. 
In an extract from his journal, Delany reveal:, what might be 
called the deconstructive design of his novel: 
still, the images of youth plague me... By the end of TEI I 
hope to have excised them. Billy the Kid is the last to 
go. _() 
But this desire to end repetition of outmoded images and forms of 
thought is followed by a quotation from Masters and Houston's 
The Varieties of Psyciedelic Experience, which states that: 
Throughout most of the history of man the importance of 
ritual has been clearly recognized, for it is through the 
ritual acts that man establishes his identity with the 
restorative powers of nature or makes and helps effect his 
passage into higher stages of personal development and 
experience. 
The usefulness of old forms, of ritual repetition, is thus 
paradoxically restated, at the start of the chapter in which 
Green-eye prepares for his return to the city, where he will be 
betrayed by Spider and strung up to die, in a ritualistic repetition 
of the myth of Judas Iscariot and Christ. 
The novel ic therefore open and ambiguous. The various myths 
weave in and out of the text, and are not used compulsively, but 
with choice, so that the closed, deterministic structures of the 
past are prised open, and subjected to historical critique. The 
Billy the Kid myth in particular, as Eric Nottram puts it, 
has been recognized as deadly, a deathly creation of men at 
a particular time and in a particular place, usable only if 
those circumstances are made to repeat themselves. There is 
no question of endless archetypes divorced from cultures so 
that they may be perpetuated as images of survival. 
in another extract from his journal, Delany states his awareness of 
the need to refuse totality and completeness: "Endings, to be 
- "1 2- 
useful, must be inconclusive. "'' At the end of 
The Einstein Intersection, Lobey's quest is deferred, as he learns 
that he must not repeat the story of Orpheus, and must rely on the 
innovative Green-eye to get Friza back. In the meantime, he decides 
to embark or. a second journey, drifting through the galaxy looking 
for work. When he returns to Earth, as Spider tells him, "It's not 
going to be what you expect... it's going to be... different. "" 
The short story, "Dog in a Fisherman's Net" (1966), further 
explores aspects of closure and transgression, ion, deploying one of the 
images central to Delany's work, that of the net or web. 
The story begins with the death of a fisherman. Fanos 
(Paniyotis) is mending a broken fishing net after a storm when a 
stray dog becomes entangled. The other fishermen, in trying to 
protect the net on which their livelihood depends, try to kill the 
dog, but in the confusion Panos is accidentally stabbed in the neck 
and killed. The rest of the story explores the efforts of the dead 
man's brother to come to terms with this catastrophe. 
Spyro's memories of his brother are presented as a deadly 
enclosure. The net is an image of entrapment in a repetitive, 
exhausted order: 
But all he had were memories of Panos. They clawed, would 
not loosen, even though he was exhausted with them: Panos 
yawning at dawn, cursing at noon, laughing in the evening at 
the cafe. The laughter, still on tipyro's face, only netted 
the beasts. But oh, they turned and tore and twisted., ''" 
As in TI, e Einstein Intersection, the way to survive debilitating 
closure is to break the net, to innovate and change, rather than 
staticise and repeat. Spyro recalls an incident from the past, in 
which the brothers returned from hunting rabbits in the mountains to 
- '7? -- 
find that their house had been badly damaged by an earth tremor. For 
Spyro, this catastrophic dislocation of security produces "the 
shattered familiar, the safety of his birthplace broken, " and 
prompts the question: "Fanos, what rust we do? " 
Panos' response to the rupture of the earth tremor is to break 
the normative code of consumption for his society. He gives away the 
rabbits he has caught, and a dar of wine, to his neighbours, as "a 
few little presents, " thereby disrupting the conventional, closed 
system of exchange in favour of a new open system of gifting. '-, 
After Panos' death, Spyro similarly gives away the fish he has 
caught that day: "The price to you is the work it takes to carry it 
hone! " Breaking the social code of exchange in this way releases 
Spyro's emotions from the obvious path of sorrow, as the closures of 
identity are temporarily dislodged: 
Something more powerful than sorrow, but propelled by it, 
erupted from him. The full sound clanged in his throat for 
seconds before he recognized his own laughter. 2'' 
Such Dionysian breakages of order also figure in the celebrations 
for the Christian festival of St. Barbara, which are disrupted by a 
group of goat herders, whose women dance "forbidden steps and 
rhythms. "--' This irruption of Dionysian rites, taking place in a 
torrential rainstorm, attracts Spyro's virginal sister Piope, who 
tears off the closure:, of taboo in another image of a broken ret: 
it was suddenly as if the lewdness had been ripped away 
revealing - evil or good, Spyro did not know, but it was 
vast as the secrets behind his Sister's unsettling stare. '; 
A_; in The Einstein Intersection, the simple bipolarity between evil 
and good, creative and destructive, is exploded. Piope runs off into 
the mountains for three days, and returns with scratches on her face 
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"that couldn't have been from brambles, for they were in ordered, 
parallel stroles, 'Ie"'' The transgression of order in Delany thus can 
entail areas of sado-masochistic permission, as an aspect of the 
duplicity of such trays cessions of normative security. 
The island in the story increasingly becomes an enclosure, from 
whose confines and daily repetitions escape is difficult, but 
necessary. Though Piope is later tied down to the closures of a 
humdrum marriage, Katina puts up more resistance, and finally 
succeeds in breaking away. At the end of the story, she and Spyro go 
swimming naked in the sea, looking for the submerged statue of the 
goddess to whom tie island fs dedicated. But they find the statue 
itself enclosed in lost fishing nets. This is for Katina the final 
impetus needed for her to break away from the island: 
"I do not like this place, this little island, " she began 
again. "It is somehow like we are all caught in like 
Panayotis. Then one dives below and discovers even She is 
bound in the net of men. """' 
Movement, a journey of displacement, thus becomes a necessary means 
of survival. Spyro decides to leave Milos for Piraeus: such leaving 
will not be hard, for "old, waterlogged nets tear easily. " Katina 
similarly decides to go immediately to Syros, and from there 
"anywhere! " In this story, catastrophic eruptions in the continuum 
of deathly static enclosure are sources of renewed energy. 
In Nova (1968), a desire for stasis and order is in play with a 
desire for movement and transgression. As an historical novelist, 
Katin watches for rupture:; in order and stability in the web or net 
-t of hi: ý ary: 
From star to star, Mouse; imagine, a great web that spreads 
across the galaxy, as far as man. That's the matrix in which 
history happens today... Each individual is a junction in 
that net, and the strands between are the cultural, the 
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economic, the psychological threads that hold individual to 
individual. Any historical event is like a ripple in the 
net... It passes over and through the web, stretching or 
shrinking those cultural bonds that involve each an with 
man. If the event is catastrophic enough, the bonds break. 
The net is torn awhile. ' ' 
Katin's task to "contemplate the flow and shift of the net. " 
The main protagonist who disturbs historical stability and 
continuity is Captain Lorq von Ray, whose drifting beyond static 
order renews energy, for both destructive and creative purposes. 
Lorq's charismatic leadership repeats key myths of technological and 
imperialist expansion, such as the Grail legends, Faust, and 
Prometheus. His quest for Illyrion, as a source of absolute energy, 
is part of a recurrent historical urge for a key to universal 
control. 
Ahab's hubristic boast in Roby-Dick, that he would ": strike the 
sun if it insulted me, "'= is in effect taken 
novel, as Lorq attempts to capture the atomic 
of a star that is turning nova. Like Ahab, he 
Prometheus, in seeking to "go into the rim of 
handful of fire. "`' 
The rebellious hero of nineteenth century 
literally in Delany's 
energy at the centre 
is identified with 
chaos and bring back a 
industrial science and 
technology, Prometheus is described by Michel Serres as a destroyer 
of closed limits, exploding stasis into motion, and transforming 
matter into energy by revealing indeterminacy at the heart of 
thermodynamic processes. His actions show that, 
beneath the for of matter, stochastic disorder reigns 
supreme. To smelt is to rediscover chance as fundamental. 
The furnace is the engine for going back toward chaos. The 
foundry is where creation starts over at zero. History is 
recast beginning with primitive matter. "'" 
in Delany's novel, the nova is a : _imiiar image of boundless energy: 
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"The whole continuum in the area of a nova is space that has 
beer! twisted away... Where we're going all law has broken 
down. " 
"Which law do you mean? Katin asked. "Man's, or the 
natural laws of physics, psychics, and chemistry? " 
Von Ray paused. "All of them. " : ': 
In contrast, Larq's enemy, Prince Red, is interested in preserving 
social balance within existing legal limits. As Lorq defines this 
ü Aýýition: 
You're for stasis, I'm gor movement. Things move. There's no 
ethic there. 
Lorq's Promethean rebellion thus destroys all inherited moral codes. 
In Delany, such Dionysian transgressions edge rota total permission, 
even for neo-fa eist expansion and totalitarian control. 
Lori a: ýserts his need for difference rather than ho ageneity as 
a survival tactic as he tells Prince's sister: 
You and I, Ruby, the worlds we've been through haven't 
really fit us for meanings... perhaps it is a game. They 
keep telling us we live in a meaningless society, that there 
is no solidity in our lives. Worlds are tottering about us 
now, and still I only want to play. The one thing I have 
been prepared to do is play, play hard, hard as I can; and 
with style... The way through is to make your own (rules). '' 
The breakdown of inherited orders in Delany's fiction thus opens up 
issues of sui v vaI sm, an issue which will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
Lorq's desires move beyond capitalist competition for profit 
into an apocalyptic world of survival through style, adventure and 
risk. He rebels against stasis and closure into a supernervous, 
psychotic gamble with life and death. The alienated opposer of 
Romantic tradition, Lorq commands the total obedience of the gypsy 
boy, Mouse, who is a more positive, less destructive example of a 
drifter between systems. As a petty thief and drifter, Mouse is a 
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areas within the socially forbidden. 
Mouse may be compared to Norman Mailer's "hipster, " which he 
explored in his essay "The White Negro" (1957). The hipster is a 
rebel who exists "without roots, " preferring to stability the risk 
of "that unchartered journey into the rebellious imperatives of the 
self. "30 Mouse volunteers immediately to join Lora'; search for 
Illyrion, enthusing that it will be a "real changey trip, " as his 
"voiced licked at the danger. " "" In this way, he revels in the 
vertigo of modern society, celebrating the present moment, without 
history or future, in an individualist act of rebellion that 
celebrates the intensities of personal experience. 
Mouse thus inhabits a landscape in which fear, disturbance and 
insecurity are lived as creative opportunities: 
I like today; that means I have to live scared. Because 
today is scary. At least I'm not afraid of being 
frightened. '' u 
Moreover, Mouse suggests McLuhan's sense of the all-at-onceness and 
tactile involvement of electronic culture, His "syrynx" produces a 
synaesthetic art, generating sounds, hologramic images, and smells, 
to invent, for communal consumption, simulacra of the 
instantaneousness and risk of his life: 
we can only go down to drink one place and it's called 
'now'. I play my syrynx, see, and it's like an invitation 
for everybody to come down and drink. When I play I want 
everybody to applaud. Cause when I play I'm up there, see, 
with the tightrope walkers, balancing on that blazing rim of 
crazy where my mind still works. 
The balance of the tight-rope walker relies on risk and movement, 
rather than static equilibrium. Like Mailer's hipster, Mouse exists 
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"in the present, in that enormous present which. is without past or 
future, memory or planned intention... "' He is an anomaly in the 
predictable, planned order of modern society, which he counters with 
an awareness of spontaneity, emotionality and drift. 
Yet the ambivalence of such drifting may be seen in the 
susceptibility of the drifter to control by others. In Nova's 
exploration of the nature of the obedience given to its Promethean 
leader, the crew find a common purpose in joining Lorq's quest for 
the Absolute. They all volunteer immediately for the voyage, as Lorq 
presents himself as a charismatic leader whose "voice was big"`4 
Lorq's followers are drifters, who show allegiance to the Captain's 
desire for movement and for his challenging of limits. 
Katin doe:, not question his own submission to the Captain's will 
until the ship is already close to the star. When he does, he 
explains that . orq has provided his crew with an aim, an object for 
desire: 
We were drifting, Mouse, you and I. the twins. Tyy and 
Sebastian, good people all of us - but aimless. Then an 
obsessed man snatches us up and carries us out here to the 
edge of everything. And we arrive to find his obsession has 
imposed order on our aimlessness; or perhaps a more 
meaningful chaos. What worries me is that I'm so thankful to 
him. i should be rebelling, trying to assert my own order. 
But I'm not. I want him to win his infernal race. I want him 
to win, and until he wins or loses, 1 can't seriously want 
anything else for myself. 
Katin's desire for teleological purpose, his wish for a glimpse of 
the Absolute, is thus isomorphic with Lorq's own. Accordingly, he 
cannot resist looking directly into the energy source: "I've rot to 
see it! " he says, to which Lorq replies that he "always thought you 
would be the one to understand. "°- 
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In this way, Nova does not condemn the Promethean ambitions of 
its major protagonist. Unlike Melville's Ahab, who in signified in 
terms of singularity and mechanical fixity - "naught's an obstacle, 
naught's an angle to the iron way! "" - Lorq plays a game of chance, 
and is finally allowed his victory. In his blindness, after gaining 
the Illyrion from the nova, he feels "no sin, " concluding that, "it 
must be that I am free and evil. ""' Delany's moral relativism thus 
finds no condemnation for Lorq's criminal megalomania. Instead, Lorq 
is an image of heroic: survival, his obse=ssive crossing of boundaries crossing 
combining chance and speed in total sensory involvement: 
I'm taking chances in this game, Ruby. I tried to play it 
through once with a computer plotting the moves... NOW I'm 
playing by hand, eye, and ear. So far I've come out no 
worse. And it's moving a lot faster. I've always liked 
speed. 
Such tactics of survival outside deterministic systems, playing by 
chance in an accelerating, fragmented environment, play a large part 
in Dha. Igren (l 75). Edging into areas of armed, violent survivali=; m, 
the novel continues Delany'. eyplorat ton of the processes by which 
myths are formed and perpetuated in a society where inherited 
patterns have broken down. 
The aI41nes ac, nameless pr otagonl =, t, initially known as "Kidd, c" 
-{-. become`=. L r. he 
Kid, " as he assumes a more prominent role in the iýr'+oup. 
V 
When Pepper asks Kidd his name: 
On a ludicrous impulse, Kidd stuck his thumb in his pocket, 
put his weight on one hip. "Some people have been calling me 
the Kid. `, 
So Kidd becomes Kid, "Kidd decided. `` Delany thus shows how myths 
can be arbitrarily chosen or repeated, on a "ludicrous impulse. " But 
myths can also be rejected, as in The Einstein Intersection. Lanya 
GHQ 
remarks that, "if people are busy living out myths you don't like, 
leave them do it. 
Dhalgren explores a drifting urban landscape, where old forms 
and structures have broken down, and new ones have to be invented 
for survival. Bellona is a city where radio and television 
transmissions no longer get through: 
Very few suspect the existence of this city. It is as if not 
only the media but the laws of perception themselves have 
redesigned knowledge and perception to pass it. Rumor says 
there is practically no power here. Neither television 
cameras nor on-the-spot broadcasts function: that such a 
catastrophe as this should be opaque, and therefore dull, to 
the electric nation! It is a city of inner discordances and 
retinal distortions, '"' 
The : re--down of code and law, perceptual and technological, 
produces a defamiliarised, dangerous; landscape, in which survivalisü 
becomes a major issue. Accordingly, Kid hears in the "unsettling 
tone" of Tak's voice, a "demand for relief from situations which 
were by definition unrelievable. ": As Calkins puts it, "Apocalypse 
has come and gone. We're just grubbing in the ashes. "14 
Out of this desperate situation, Dhalgrer, comes close to 
condoning the violence of the outlaw band of "Scorpions, " the 
novel's "slightly demonic heirs" of the sixties' flower-children. '" 
The energy of Beat rebellions has decayed into this anarchic 
v olen e, reminiscent of Manson' milt' a and the Hell' Angels, as 
the novel suggests that, "We can survive so much. Dhalgren enters 
areas of armed survivalism recently glamourised by epic, 
militaristic film such as Pfad Max II, and by The Survivalist novels 
by Jerry Ahern. in the opening novel of this on-going series, 
"Total War" (1981), the technology of armaments is relished in close 
detail, brand names included, as John Rourke, the C. I. A. -trained gun 
-281 - 
expert, survives in a post-holocaust world by conotiitting acts of 
violence against communist biker and drug -smuggler alike. From his 
perspective, 
"There are enough loonies loose in the world today to screw 
up the planet so bad that survivalism training is going to 
be the only thing that'll keep people alive -- maybe. "'`' 
Delany's Dhalgren avoids such paranoiac obsessions by a more 
positive exploration of the possibilities of drifting beyond 
teleological structures and fixed systems: 
The way anywhere in this city was obviously to drift; Kid 
drifted, on kinesthetic memory. To try consciously for 
destination was to come upon street signs illegible through 
smoke, darkness, or vandalism, wrongly placed, or missing, 
Delany's novel thus moves beyond the mania for fixed interpretation 
and total system that besets Thomas Fynchon's Slothrop in 
Gravity's Rainbow (1973), sitting in Säure Bummer's kitchen, 
"reading soup recipes and finding in every bone and cabbage leaf 
paraphrases of himself, " and recalling "days when in superstition 
and fright he could make it all fit. In refusing to succumb to 
such paranoiac desires for totalisation and singularity, Ubalgren 
adopts strategies similar to those explored by Ronald Sukenick, as 
discussed in chapter 1'9 of this thesis. 
Openness to the unexpected and to risk in Dhalgren brings 
e:: LJer ienjal rewards: "Across the damask of doubt and hesitation was 
unexpected _ioy 
like 1lver. "°`'' Lanya wants "to try out some things 
I'm afraid of, "`='' while Kid finds it "Odd that the elements of 
pleasure were so many greys, so much fear, so many silence,. "`' 
This awareness of the positive value of uncertainty, risk, fear 
and of the non-verbalised distinguishes Delany's speculative fiction 
from the preponderance of American science fictions, such as many of 
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those discussed in the previous chapter, in which the disturbing, 
anomalous or strange is appropriated or killed. In the American film 
The Thing (1951), the monster is not only killed, but totally 
obliterated: "we don't want any part of it left. " Dhalgren, in 
contrast, preserves its sense of the uncanny and unfamiliar, its 
fascination for monstrous difference, as it resists science 
fiction's habits of securely definitive explanation. 
Experience in the novel thus possesses undecidable elements 
beyond rational codification. Examining his own feelings, Kid 
realizes that, The articulate fear slips, while we try to measure, 
but come awa y with only the per e tual 
angle 
of dIs onion, the 
frequency of an amazed defraction. Heisenbergs uncertainty 
relation is here broadened in application to include problems of the 
dislocation of subjectivity beyond a priori securities, 
Moreover, unlike many science fictions, DhalFren does not assume 
the positivist myth of factual certainty. When the sun grows in size 
to take up half of the . -ky, it is suggested that it may have gone 
nova. But the final truth of the situation is never revealed, and 
interpretation remains unsteady. The immensity of the sun is a new 
fact that disrupts any context of intelligibility. Its hugeness 
I 3. Yi. 3 
_J 
1. iLlJ ittil -fi c3. n yýTTd 
y'. 
The new in Dhalgren is therefore not easily assimilated into 
signifying system:. Instead, drift in time and uncertainty within 
a Driori systems is acknowledged. Accordingly, the astronaut Kamp 
deocibes how u tandard information Patterns just broke down" when he 
was confronted with the moon Iands; dne. He came to realize that he 
was automatically interpreting the new landscape according to the 
2S3 
'preconceptions and pre-P_ : iatirig mental -t; =: of li'io astronautica! 
training on earth: 
We'd trained for prolonged free-fall by spending time 
underwater in diving suits. I remember when we actually hit 
sustained weightlessness, I broadcast back, 'Hey, it's just 
like being underwater! ' and yet as I said that into the chin 
mike, I was thinking: You certainly could never mistake the 
two conditions for one another. But I couldn't think of any 
way to say what was different about it, so I just described 
it the way everybody, who'd never been there themselves, had 
told me it was going to feel like., -"' 
Landingg on the moon was a new experience, breaking old habit 
structures, and bringing initially a sense of chaos, and then a slow 
regaining of the powers of interpretation and of cognition. Kamp 
describes the moon as: 
another world, and when you're there, you have no way of 
knowing what anything means. Physically. That whole 
landscape tells you nothing about itself, on any level, in 
the way that the most desolate stretch of sand on earth 
tells you about the winds that have blown over it, rains 
that have or have not fallen, or the feel it might have 
beneath your feet if you walked across it. 'An airless, 
waterless void.,. ' the way they say in all the science- 
fiction stories? No, that refers to some desert on earth, or 
what space between the stars looks like when you're safely 
tucked under the atmosphere. The moon is a different world, 
with a different order that you don't understand. `- 
Dh3lgren thus continues Delany's revision of science fictional 
habits, as he allows into his work an acceptance of difference and 
of chaos as a necessary part of ordering processes. 
Desires to interpret phenomena according to a single 
Signilicatcry system are thereby qualified in an acceptance Qf a 
lack of secure meanings: 
There is nothing safe about the darkness of this city and 
its stink. Well, I have abrogated all claim to safety, 
coming here. It is better to discuss it as though I had 
chosen. That keeps the scrim of sanity before the awful set. 
What will lift it"' .7 
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Yet the risk of insanity as a consequence of living outside secure 
structures leads to an interest in fixed order, to offset entropic 
chaos. As firm foundations are disrupted, there remains a need for 
renewed confidence: 
It is, a warm morning. I do not recognize any protection in 
this leafy blister. There is no articulation in the juncture 
of object and shadow, no fixed angle between fuel and flame. 
'Where would they put their shelters, foundations sunk on 
ash; doors and windows sinking in cinder,? There is nothing 
else to trust but what warms. ""` 
The need is for an enabling but non-coercive order. Similarly, in 
his poetry and journal-writing, Kid seeks to avoid placing a bogus 
coherence onto events, preferring fragmentation to a fraudulent 
order. His journal is therefore "a chronicle of incidents with a 
potential for wholeness they did not have when they occured; a false 
picture, again, because they show neither the general spread of my 
life's fabric, nor the most significant pattern points. `` 
algren thus explores at length relationships between order and 
chaos, in which a desire for disruptions of interpretation and 
system is in play with residual needs for the same. The title of the 
opening section, "Prism, Mirror, Lens, " reveals Delany's concern 
with shifting processes of mediation between self and other, within 
a discussion of the securities of representation and identity: 
ý -DIM thi Pa; of nigg. t, fighting, and leather, can I -let 
myself take identity? How can I recreate this roasted park 
in some meaningful matrix'? Equipped with contradictory 
visions, an ugly hand caged in pretty metal, I observe a new 
mechanique. I am the wild machinist, past destroyed, 
reconstructing the present. "' 
Order is provisional, a part of phenomenological processes, as the 
novel states that there is "no way to begin" and "no way to 
., _L1itý: lUüýc. 71 Never triEiess, c}'ýli,, linear order is restored at the end 
235 - 
of the novel, as the form of the book turns in an immense circle 
hack to the beginning, in an imitation of Proustian overall order, 
Obsessions with clarity, order and epic teleology thus remain in 
Delany's work, amid his fiction's questioning of the inheritance of 
such habits and strategies. 
The next chapter will relate Delany's novelistic practices to 
his pluralistic theory of science fiction, and will examine further 
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open systems, in response to the entropies of over-organisation. In 
this way, his work may be seen in a similar context to that of the 
Beat writers, inventing strategies in opposition to the technocratic 
state reinforced in America by the Second World War. This 
connection, made explicitly in Delany's reference to Michael M! +'. kre, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, may also be seen in Heavenly 
Breakfast: An Essay on the Winter of Love (1979), which describes 
tie anarchist commune in which Delany lived, on Second Street, in 
the Lower East Side, from November 1967 to its disbandment at the 
end of March 1968. The book is dedicated to "everyone who ever did 
anything no matter how sane or crazy whether it worked or not to 
Hive themselves a better ifs »' 
Delany places the commune within a wider context of the 1960s, 
seen as a complex cultural process which included "the radical 
revisions going on in our model of the relation of human being to 
human being across each individual's personal political space: 
female to male, male to female, black to white, white to black, 
private individual to politicized group, or group to individual. "' 
The "Heavenly Breakfast" rock group and commune were experiments in 
difference, explo'iing new way: -- o living and creating, based on 
mutual aid rather than on hierarchical organisation. 
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Fixed, doctrinal politics are therefore rejected in favour of 
iCt131+ tipl - revolutions in local, personal relatioriýlhl S. in response 
to the entropic over organisation of bureaucratic society, the 
Heavenly Breakfast commune was informal, and deliberately shunned 
organisation: 
We never had anything even resembling an organizational 
meeting. If you wanted something done, you did it; if you 
wanted people to do something, you asked them. The goad to 
do something someone wanted you to do was having to live 
with that person's discomfort and disapproval if you didn't 
do it. As close as we lived, that was quite a goad. - 
The Heavenly Breakfast was therefore not a collective, and "not 
particularly democratic. " The political basis was rather a 
libertarian respect for the sovereignty of the individual: 
The standard bohemian/liberal education teaches you quickly 
not to take offense at someone else's desire. If it pleases 
you, you move toward it; if not, you sidestep politely as 
your individual temperament allows. At the Breakfast I 
learned to move within the circle of other people's desire, 
and be at ease as I generated my own. And I would strike one 
of my senses before I would part with that knowledge. " 
The attempt is therefore made to create a society without Oedipal, 
authoritarian structures. So the "nuclear family" is replaced by 
communal child-rearing, as an exploration of the new and unfamiliar: 
"I think all of us at the Breakfast felt like adopted uncles or 
aunts, or perhaps some closer relation that hasn't been given a name 
° `' yet. 
Accordingly, another experiment in group living, January House, 
with its meal-timetable, separate rooms, and rota for cooking and 
washing up, is rejected as too bureaucratic and regimented. Lief, 
one of January House's occupants, describes other communes he has 
heard of: 
some of them could stand a little more organization. They're 
always breaking up so quickly. And of course that's what 
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critics of our kind of life-style are so fast to jump on. 
B'ut I feel something like a shining example. January House 
has been here for ten years now. `'' 
For Delany, the idea that "Communes can be made very stable with a 
little planning" misses the necessity of avoiding such assumptions 
of value inherited from established society: "Maybe an essential 
part of communes is their impermanence. Maybe communes just break 
up. of k., 
The Heavenly Breakfast is therefore a rhizomic, temporary, 
provisional order, which is not allowed to atrophy into a 
bureaucracy. Instead, order and spontaneity are found to be mutually 
enabling: 
It was learned in the same way we learned how and why the 
spontaneous happens so well, Go often, and so rewardingly, 
the more exacting (and the more familiar we were with the 
exactitudes of) the framing structure. ' 
The libertarian bases of Delany's work thus consider politics in 
terms of individual preference, beyond static ideology. In 
comparison, orthodox politics, represented by opinion polls- on the 
Vietnam War, are collusive: 
All political action within a given political system 
perpetuates that system if only because that system has 
defined which actions are and which actions are not 
political.... 
I am as sure that the young man with his clipboard is 
opposed to the war as he, no doubt, is sure that we are. Our 
differences are purely personal, as are all political 
encounters within the statistical matrix of a megalithic 
republic. '' 
The model for politics here resembles Boltzmann's molecular theory 
of gases, emphasising' local, individualised and atomistic deviations 
from general law. Politics is seen to consist in the irreducible 
complexities of personal experience and inter-personal collisions 
and encounters, beyond ideological simplifications and fixities. 
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Political innovation is therefore enabled by a breaking of 
established social codes and procedures. Like Buckminster Fuller, 
Delany rejects the ideological struggles between capitalism and 
socialism as archaic: 
The future may well decide that their shared inadequacy is 
that neither makes any changes in those variables - the 
actual spaces and objects between people - that govern the 
equations of community and communion which, when all is 
said, if not done, determine how well any system, from 
dictatorship to anarchy, will work, as well as what strength 
subsystems will be needed to enforce it. -' 
Consequently, politics involves the "texture and affectivity of life 
lived humanely, day by day. " 10 The Heavenly Breakfast thus explores 
new spaces and times that recall the mutually involving, tactile 
spaces of McLuhan's electronic age, the new age of modern physics, 
beyond Newtonian linearities: 
I do not believe in telepathy. I know your feelings through 
my eyes, through my ears. The information comes via light 
and sound: 
the square of the distance intervening between us 
must be a diminishing factor in cow much in#armation u. 
en ry1o ses on iii you ad hack. Put when you and I 
.e "ý _ osely 
that touch and smell are suddenly half of 
what we communicate, new laws govern the interchanges as 
different as strong and weak particle interactions. '' 
Delany here draws on the new paradigm of quantum physics, to explore 
a new social model that enables a relativistic, libertarian 
politics. 
This desire to clear away the damaging, limiting effects of 
Newtonian determinism from American culture also underpins Delany's 
theoretical conception of science fiction writing. In The Awr can 
Shore (1973), science fiction is asserted to take place within "that 
gravitically neutral space (free-fall) where imagination streaks 
between worlds, between stars. "'- Deploying a vocabulary reminiscent 
of Bu k üinster Fuller's essay "Total Thinking, " Delany extrapolates 
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from twentieth century physics to posit science fiction as a form of 
literature that rejects Newtonian hierarchies. Linear, up-down 
models, based on a universal law of gravity, or what Delany refers 
to as "Western thought... organized by (and restricted to) a 
primarily gravitic value matrix, " are apparently superseded. For in 
the basic narrative of science fiction, a rocket escapes gravity, 
and then acceleration ceases: 
with its cessation comes the release of the gravitic effect, 
which is replaced by the weightless state, free-fall, in 
which all prior gravitic organizations become malleable, 
trivial, a mere cross section of the complex locus of 
current objective trajectories within the ship's confines, 
Space is that topos not organized by up and down, day or 
night... 
The value template this cosmological matrix substitutes 
for the gravitic value system is a comparatively relative 
one, where the two directions are not up and down but rather 
central and periphieraI, a model where -shifting trajectories 
through a three-dimensional matrix determine which point is 
or is not center vis-a-vis surrounding trajectories. '''' 
In his interview with Charles Platt, Delany explains his interest in 
the convention of "space opera, " as part of this disruption of 
territorialised space into relativistic, plural. centre:,: 
i do like the basic 'space opera' construct, the basic field 
in which it takes place -a field which has many worlds and 
exists as a set of relative centres. There is a kind of 
linear, gravitic thinking that organizes so much of our 
thinking; I do think just that basic image of several worlds 
relating to one another undercuts this up-down, higher-lower 
metaphorical thing, so that, somehow, there 1s good in the 
space-opera construct per se. I like the freedom that it 
give:. tý 
Delany relates his interest in multiple centres to his upbringing, 
as a black child, migrating between "two cultures, " attending a 1 
white upper-class school at Park Avenue and 89th Street while living 
in the family home in Harlem: 
I had a chance to compare different cultures in a way that 
still influences what I do and what I write. In one sense 
I've always been writing about people making trips through 
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that kind of barrier - although not necessarily a racial 
barrier. ' `; 
In his science fiction, therefore, Delany attempts to break with the 
authoritarian singularities of earlier utopian science fiction, such 
as Bellamy's Looking Backward. Science fiction is for Delany, in 
contrast to such doctrinaire programmatics, a "literature of 
plurality, historical, theoretical and artistic, in that it explore, 
w ideas without chosing between them, "'" The emphasis on conflicting 
personal preference and on libertarian choice, evident in Heavenly 
Breakfast, thus plays an important role in Delany's theory and 
practice of writing. 
Louis Maria's Utopics: Spatial Play (1984) explores the presence 
of multiplicity within singular utopian texts in a way similar to 
Delany's theoretical writing, For Marin, utopian fiction's 
representation of the homogenous, closed space of classical science 
provides its own critique, as multiple, contradictory discourses are 
revealed within that totalising, singular impulse: 
Ideological discourse would hope to express historical 
reality by deadening and shaping it into a closed system of 
ideas aimed at presenting a justified and legitimated 
representation of it, Utopia as a figure inscribed within a 
fable-producing discourse puts ideological discourse and its 
representations into play in a double sense - implicitly but 
critically questioning them, and setting them apart in order 
to reflect upon the presuppositions of their internal 
systems. Rather than being confronted with a fixed system of 
ideological representation, utopia would offer the mobility 
of a figure acting in a dialogical stage built by a complex 
fable-producing discourse. 1/ 
Most utopian fiction conceals this open spatial play under a 
codified, ideological signifier of unity and cohesion, which 
attempts to repress the historical and theoretical assumptions upon 




utopia is similar to Delany's own fictional attempts to reveal this 
play of meanings previously repressed by the closed ,? stem of 
authoritarian science fiction. 
The basis of Delany's science fiction is therefore what he calls 
"Ambiguous Heterotopia" - the subtitle to &iton (1976) - as a 
rejection of the singular, prescriptive utopia, in favour of a more 
pluralistic, exploratory text. In his essay, "Critical methods/ 
speculative fiction" (1969), he rejects the various moral and 
ethical programmes argued for in previous fictional models of future 
societies, which conform to the simple bipolarity of utopia or 
dystopia. Writers such as Bellamy, Wells, Huxley and Orwell are 
considered to "exhaust themselves by taking sides in the terribly 
limiting argument" of whether the social organisations in their 
novels are "good" or "bad. " This matter is for Delany purely one of 
"personal preference, " predicated upon "splits in temperament, not 
a logical division at all. " "" 
This moral relativism informs a more complex fiction that 
refuses the secure linearity of a single, rhetorical point-of-view. 
Delany thereby challenges the authoritarian nature of many science 
fiction texts, in which blueprints for social engineering are 
presented with didactic clarity and simplicity of diction. On the 
other hand, his moral relativism, his reluctance to "take sides, " 
tends to show a liberal complacency, predicated on a notion of 
politics as an ideal contract freely entered into, that simplifies 
issues of power and exploitation. In Delany's fiction, total 
libertarian permission can include permission for totalitarianism, 
sadism and violence. 
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Delany delineates four basic fictional myths of the future, none 
of which is for him necessarily preferable to any other. There is 
the "New Jerusalem" myth, in which technological advance,; allow for 
the control and mastery of the natural world for the benefit of all 
humanity; the myth of "Arcadia, " a largely agrarian utopia, in which 
the human and the non-human live in non exploitative harmony; the 
"Brave New World, " in which technology has brought material 
advancements at the price of the impoverishment of the real quality 
of life; and the "Land of the Flies" myth, an uncontrolled landscape 
of terror, superstition, violence and disease. 
The "modern" works of science fiction advocated by Delany break 
out of these singular categories,. Instead, they may contain all 
these mythic views of the world in procesual interaction and mutual 
conflict: 
In most truly Utopian of New Jerusalems, sometimes you will 
find yourself in front of an innocuous-looking door; go 
through it, and you will find yourself, aghast, before some 
remnant of the Land of the Flies; in the most dehumanized 
Brave New World, one evening as you wander through the 
dreary public park, sunset bronzing fallen autumn leaves 
will momentarily usher you into the most marvelous autumn 
evening in Arcadia. Similarly, in either Arcadia or the Land 
of the Flies, plans can be begun for either Brave New World 
or New Jerusalem. `' 
For Delany, modern science fiction takes place within the "protean 
parameters" of "infinitely multiplicated worlds, " Single authorial 
point-of-view thus disappears in a multiple, open process of 
exploration, in which "the author's aim is neither to condemn nor to 
condone, but to explore both the worlds and their behaviors for the 
sake of the exploration. " The modern text opens up a space in which 
the reader can maneuvre, avoiding simplistic solutionary programmes 
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for the future, and refusing to fix the reader within a totalising 
moral position: 
Because all four visions are offered in the best modern s-f, 
no single one is allowed to paralyse us with terror or lull 
us into muddle-headed euphoria. "'' 
It is this complex, ambivalent landscape between terror and euphoria 
that is speculated upon in Delany's own fiction. 
Nevertheless, to discover a moment of individual Arcadia in the 
parks of the Brave New World is a survival tactic that should not 
obscure the complex power networks that sustain the Brave New World 
itself. To analyse Delany's moral relativism, and his criticism of 
the singular utopias, more closely, his work may be considered as 
part of the liberal or 'libertarian re-examination of political 
lternative, = in America since the Second World Var. One of the 
central texts of such investigations is Robert Nozick's 
Anarchy, State and Utopia (l974). 
Nozick designs a political model to reconcile utopian thought 
with possibilities for process and change, thereby avoiding the 
dangers of static, bureaucratic totalitarianism that ruined earlier 
statist utopias, such as Bellamy's. Nozick categorises such utopias 
in two ways, as "imperialistic" utopianism, which uses force to 
relocate human beings within a sing e community, and "missionary" 
utopianism, which attempts to convince them to accept the utopia 
voluntarily. Both of týese political strategies depend on one group 
or individual judging other human beings as corrupt. As Nozick puts 
it, "That my best world is not yours will seem to some to show the 
corruption and degeneracy of at least one of us. " ' 
2t5- 
No2ick wishes to supersede these singular utopias, based on 
force or persuasion, by a pluralistic utopia based on a liberal 
notion of free contract, as a means of respecting individual 
desires. Accordingly, dissent and change become a vital part of 
Nozick's programme: 
Imagine a possible world in which to live; this world need 
not contain everyone else now alive, and it may contain 
beings who never actually lived. Every rational creature in 
this world you have imagined will have the same rights of 
imagining a possible world for himself to live in (in which 
all other rational inhabitants have the same imagining 
rights, and so on) as you have. The other inhabitants of the 
world you have imagined may choose to stay in the world 
which has been created for them (they have been created for) 
or they may choose to leave it and inhabit a world of their 
own imagining. If they choose to leave your world and live 
in another, your world is without them. You may choose to 
abandon your imagined world, now without its emigrants. This 
process goes on; worlds are created, people leave them, 
create new worlds, and so on. ° 
In this way, behaviour deemed objectionable in one group will be 
tolerated in those groups who have freely chosen it: 
in a free society people may contract into various 
restrictions which the government may not legitimately 
impose on them. Though the framework is libertarian and 
laissez-faire, individual communities within it need not be, 
and perhaps no community within it will choose to be so. 
Thus, the characteristics of the framework need not pervade 
the individual communities, 
Nozick' c. programme depends on a "metautopia" to guarantee the 
independence of 
the smaller utopias, producing a society in which 
"people are at liter ;y to join together voluntarily to pursue and 
attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal 
COI munitj% but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon 
Others. It ,i 
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One problem for such a political theory, as Nozick admits, is 
the extent of centralised, state control in the metautopia necessary 
to guarantee the rights of each decentred community. Another problem 
is the liberal idealism of such explorations, predicated as they are 
on liberal assumptions of rationality and choice, based on a notion 
of an ideal social contract freely entered into by rational 
individuals. As such, issues of power, exploitation, control and 
irrationality in actual societies are elided. 
Moreover, these ideas also presuppose the availability of a 
constant supply of geographical space to move into. A new frontier 
will always be required. This is perhaps the specifically American 
character of ; ozick's vision of future possibilities. Ultimately, 
Nozick's dreams repeat the typically American myth of a new 
beginning, of a perpetually renewing Eden, which also dominates 
earlier utopian thought. Nozick admits that, "Sitting down at this 
late stage in history to dream up a description of the perfect 
society is not of course the same as starting from , scratch. u::.., 
The economist David Fr iedran finds an apparent solution to this 
problem in the colonisation of outer space, as reported in David 
Graham and Peter Clarke's The New Enlightenment (1086): 
some centuries hence, when we will have learned to construct 
space stations and anchor these new habitats at the so- 
called Lagrangian Points in the earth-moon system (where a 
body placed in a stable orbit will remain forever), or even 
further off in the asteroid belt... The economist David 
Friedman says he got the idea for a perfect 
'anarcho-capitalist' society from Robert Heinlein's 
The Moon is a Harsh Histrees, If Heinlein could imagine it, 
who could say it was not possible in a space habitat where 
you were free to start a new society without any limiting 
condition:. 'ade need more separate spaces to accomodate our 
diverse and various needs, ' says Friedman. 
(f 
. 'Anarcho capitalism" perhaps äeribe ; Samuel Delany's own 
"ambiguous heterotopias, " in which a similar on; ern is shown for 
libertarian. freedom predicated on assumptions of unlimited growth, 
and of needs as given and inevitable, rather than as : oc4ally- 
constructed. The rest of this chapter will di-: cuss this play of 
moral relativism and liberal pluralist politic: - in Delany's Stars In 
1A£v Pocket Like Grains of . and (1984). In this novel, libertarian 
permission becomes a strategy of survival in a technocratic society, 
where capitalist spectacle is both resisted and desired. Delany's 
ambiguous, relativistic handling of is=; ue: _ of technology and power 
may be prefaced with critical statements made by C. Wright Mills and 
Lewis Xumfor d. 
In a capitalist system that is perfecting its alibis of 
beneficence, the problem of freedom for X ills in 
The SocioiogicaI Imagination becomes t III e probt em of the "cheer fuI 
robot. " it has become evident that "all men do not natura l-) want to 
be free; that al men are not wiilirig or not able, as the case may 
be, to exert themselves to acquire the reason that freedom 
requires. " 
In The Transformations of fan, Lewis Yu-mford has Similar 
distopian fears: 
In time, the human being-, necessary to run post-historic 
culture will be provided at birth with built-in responses, 
subject solely to external controls: a more economic 
alternative to the wasteful methods now applied by the 
political commissar and the commercial advertiser. Under 
post-historic incentives, frontal lobotomy may be as widely 
performed on children, to ensure docility and encourage 
autonomy, as tonsillectomy now is. ='" 
These critical positions on electronic technology and power differ 
markedly from those explored in Delany's novels, in which the global 
culture of modern communications become: a scene of amoral 
fascination, and where such dread ca-exists with euphoria, pleasure 
and a desire for spectacle. Delany's texts present contradictory 
tendencies, in keeping with his notion of a multiple, open science 
-i Q(? 
- 
Thus the previous quotation shows Delanj' S ma. n-machine working 
on a "line" producing, mass production goods like model wore er for 
Henry Ford, or Frederick Taylor's Schmidt. The invention of neural 
plugs, from this point of view, implies a continuation of th e 
industrial organizational methods of the twentieth century. 
Moreover, the power relations of industrial society appear to be 
unchanged. For example, workers' control over the choice of objects 
being produced remains untouched. Moreover, as Andrew Gordon puts it 
in his essay on Mova, "If one man operates an entire factory, what 
happens to all the laid off worker? ": ': ' 
Similarly, old hierarchies of power and obedience persist on the 
spaceship Roc. The autonomy seemingly guaranteed to workers by the 
cyborg technology does not prevent Captain Lorq calling his crew his 
"puppets, " as cyborg studding is carried out "under the Captain's 
orders, " within existing hierarchies of military organisation. '' 
So twentieth century hierarchies of prestige and power 
apparently still apply. Before joining the crew of the Roc, Katin 
had drifted between a number of small-scale jobs, as a "glorified 
file clerk, " a phrase that does not suggest that libidinal 
satisfactions are distributed equally in this technological utopia. 
Moreover, Mouse is advised by a girlfriend to get neural plugs 
fitted so that he can enter the employment market: 
You'll get them eventually somewhere, and you might as well 
get some education on how to use them for something other 
than a factory job. You like to travel. Might as well run 
the stars as operate a garbage unit. 
The novel also complicates its utopian scene with evidence of 
political control and repression. The gypsies on Earth who resisted 
the insertion of plugs because, as Rouse says, "We never wanted 
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them, "" are run out of town, and sometimes brutally killed, The 
gypsies reveal tensions within processes of socialisation, and 
struggles over definitions of progress, thereby providing anomalies 
which the novel does not attempt to resolve or appropriate. 
Stars in my Pocket Like Grains of and is also a pluralist 
utopia, or "ambiguous heterotopia, " which similarly dramatises a 
play of relativistic moral evaluations, within a context of survival 
in a world of electronic extensions of the human body. As in Nova, 
an ambiguity is set up between individual autonomy and choice, on 
the one hand, and an engineered slave-mentality on the other . 
Like 
cyborg-studding, the brain operation "Radical Anxiety Termination" 
is presented as a morally ambiguous invention, placed within a 
shifting context of differential cultural expectations. 
For the meanings attributed to Radical Anxiety Termination 
change, according to time and to cultural circumstances. Japril 
explains that, at a certain point in the history of the planet 
. vesper, the technique emerges as a "medical method of dealing with 
certain social intractable_s. ":., However, the operation is also 
presented in other moral contexts, according to which Japril 
evaluates it as beneficent. it emerges on Rhyonon as a "political 
rite, " and their, as "an extremely violent art form" which gained 
great social prestige, before returning "as a gesture of public 
philanthropy. " This is the set of interpretations within which 
Korga volunteered for the treatment in the novel's Prologue. He had 
been offered, in . Japril's words, 
by a benevolent society, a chance at what had been up tili 
recently, on his world, the ave atque vale of artists and 
priests: the chance to have the paths in the brain through 
which worry forced us to grow closed over forever and 
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detours about those troublesome crossroads left permanently 
open. "' 
Characteristically, Jasr i. l' `. _. language of control, with its alibi of 
beneficence, is not directly countered or critici=sed in the novel. 
However, Mark Dyeth replies to Japril with an ambiguous gesture: he 
raises his chin, which is "a sign to continue in the language spoken 
in the west of Japril's home world, " but "in many languages of many 
others, communicates negation and/or doubt. " Delany's text thus 
suggests the existence of plural, flexible moral po. sition, s, and 
multiple interpr Cations of _, ns. in tfi: _, way, the Hore/ o . _, nut 
a moral scout a. osira+1iß . tea 
-, j-, . areeer e _plores a play of 
Because of this pluralism, questions of totalitarianism and 
exploitative power tend to be elided. The major ambiguity centres on 
conflicting evaluations of "The Web, " the "interstellar agency in 
charge of the general flow of information about the universe in many 
_ p a+e, i io -LS a MOno: 7_tüiC data lank onta: tnin an electronic 
encyclopaedia of all the known facts about the universe, to wich 
instantaneous access is permitted under the System of "General 
inltirmaLion ýi T 1ýE . ý. y: ý t2m Gi 17i5t an ua Zc r icVal a; b 
on a technollo-i -all extension of the human nervous S, 
the "neural plugs" which allow "cybors studdin " in Hove. Here, the 
operation i: that of "individualized synapse tailoring, " a sort of 
designer-brain, in Which state surgeon's insert neural receivers and 
tr ansmitter ö into the top five vertebrae of children, thereby 
enabling them to use "mentally-activatable equipment. ": " 
3,2_ JV_, 
Li! ^e "cyborg-studdin" in Nova, these techniques are evaluated 
ambivalently, Accordingly, Delany's fascination with the 
potentiality of such technologies shifts his science fiction away 
from the unequivocal condemnations of coercive control in, for 
example, Crichton's The Terminal Ilan. In Delany, the consent to mind 
control shown by :. raid, Beckerman, in his desire for addiction to 
electricity as "the biggest kick of all, " is stripped of its 
unambi uously negative implications. In so doing, he perhaps 
confirms C. Wright Mills' fears that, within a system that is 
perfecting its alibis of beneficence, obedience becomes second 
nature, and freedom 1t elf is no longer desired. 
In 1 tars it lUc et Like Grains of Sand, instantaneous data 
retrieval has positive connotations, in terms of enlightenment 
programmes of education and democracy. As in Tran, information is 
considered as magical potential, acting at a ci3tance. On Rhyanon, a 
metallic glove gives Korga access to a data bank of information, an 
experience which he evaluates as an exciting and pro re ssive 
development, replacing the internalised repress ion of his 
upbringing: 
The new condition was not so much an alternate voice loud 
enough to drown the voices of childhood as it was a web, a 
text weaving endlessly about him, erupting into and falling 
from consciousness, prompting memory and obliterating it, 
that was simply more interesting than the drumming voice 
asserting or denying ignorance or knowledge. 't 
the "web" image here suggests the open, productive potentiality of 
weaving, creating ü. iflerentials anima. diýtinctýL'ns like a ritten 
te`x": t. 
the monolithic technology of General 1nformatJ-on is described 
with similar enthusiasm: 
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if you want to know something - anything, anything, at all! - 
all you have to do is think about it, and the answer pops 
into your head. That's supposed to be how it works. 
However, these evaluations of the beneficent and productive side of 
the system of instantaneous information provided by the Web are 
countered by hints of the Web as repressive limitation and closure. 
in this context, it is the breaking of the web--enclosure that 
becomes a positive value. 
Accordingly, the Web official:, are known as "Black Widows, " an 
image which suggests murderous duplicity, rather than beneficence. 
Moreover, as a total surveillance system, in which, as Japril tells 
Mark Dyeth, "you know that the one thing we know is just how much 
,. know about dnytiing, ýý_L.: _ the Web circumscribes the you practically lamount 
of information to which it allows access. After the planet 
Rhyonon is destroyed, all information about it is made unavailable; 
Mark is threatened that, should he put in a request for data about 
the planet, "your security status automatically changes in your Web- 
dossier to one that, even if it doesn't get you killed, will 
probably make your professional life difficult, to say the least. ` 
In this way, the Web appears in a more dystopian context, as a 
highly sophisticated technical system of totalitarian control, in 
contrast to the suggestions elsewhere in the novel of its 
beneficent, educative role in people's lives. 
By refusing to unequivocally condemn the power arrangements he 
has invented for his fictional society, Delany explores Faustian 
permissions with an openness, or a complacency, that contrasts 
sharply with more anxious criticisms of hubris in the texts of 
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writers such as Crichton, and nineteenth century figures such as 
Poe, Hawthorne and Melville. 
Thus in the essay "Critical methods/ speculative fiction, '' 
Delany asserts that, "Not only can the human animal behave in any 
way, the human psyche can approve or disapprove of any behavior (as) 
laws of human nature are not universal... ""''' Underneath Delany's 
libertarianism, then, there is an evolutionist assumption of human 
adaptability to environmental change. Human beings, it is implied by 
Delany's science fiction, can adapt to anything. As in B. F. Skinner, 
survival thus becomes the ultimate criterion of value. in such a 
Darwinian context, totalitarianism becomes merely one option among 
others, no more nor less preferable. Delany's presentation of a 
complex and conflictual text, in which the reader is invited to 
consider moral, political and ethical implications relatively free 
from the direct intervention of an authoritarian-authorial voice, 
becomes an examination of survivalist tactics in highly controlled 
and technological societies. Such survival may consist in an amoral 
fascination with the spectacle, rather than in direct opposition to 
it. 
Accordingly, in Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand, when 
Mark Dyeth is threatened with death if he tries to bypass the 
informational blackout imposed on him by the Web, his first response 
is not one of anger or resistance, but of fascination with the 
technological means by which the blackout was effected. The "run- 
around circuit" which prevents him gaining information is, he says, 
"really quite clever. " He continues: 
They' re frowned on by the Web but sometimes are necessary 
with information the kind of commodity it's become, `-- 
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The tone of voice is a calmness that verges on complacency, the dull 
tone 
of mechanical operationality, familiar in science fiction, that 
confirms Norman Mailer's "horror" at the paucity of reverberation of 
events in modern technological society, as discussed in chapter 14. 
As well as fascination with the spectacle, survival is found in 
the apparent margins of the social, in appreciating the rare places 
that drift out of the Web security system. Such a place is Free- 
Kantor, where, as Clym confides with Mark, "Isn't it nice to know 
nothing you say here will be used against you? """ Free-Kantor is a 
"free data-transfer point"": in which information is stored in 
"macro-encyclopedias - encyclopedias of encyclopedias! "-': -' Yet for 
Mark Dyeth, this concentration of information and knowledge in a 
single centre only confirms feelings of ignorance and uncertainty. 
Accordingly, he experiences "disorientation": 
here I was in the center of the night - which now, while the 
water bobbed slowly over the huge, plastic sheets, changed 
to the conviction that, lost in darkness eternal, I was at 
least for the moment) nowhere at all ! 5- 
The existence of such regions of unknown and unknowable experience 
disrupts the ambitions of the General Information system for total 
interpretation and signification, and promotes thereby ambivalent 
emotions of terror and euphoria. 
As the securities of informational codification break down in 
this way, the universe is opened up for a freer play of meanings. 
Survival in Delany's totalitarian informational society thus- 
consists in asserting private individual experience outside imposed 
systems of signification. in the Epilogue, Mark Dyeth reveals the 
multiple significations he is able to attach to the concept of 
"Mornings. " Mark explains: "You see, 
besides the co-ordinates the 
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Web lays out for us, I have my own map of the universe. """ As the 
totalieing web of information technology changes sensory 
perceptions, it paradoxically release;; a new mental environment: 
The more we come to rely on GI, the more our daily 
consciousness becomes subservient to memory's 
wanderings... - 
Personal experience, although merely locked into the repetitions of 
memory, is nevertheless seen as incommensurable with the controlled 
information imparted by the Web, and is thus valued as a survival 
tactic, Mark Dyeth travels between a multiplicity of planets, 
experiencing the disorienting, relativistic and differential nature 
of space as pleasure and fascination, beyond the boundaries of 
codification and of imposed perceptual habits; 
To arrive on a world at dawn, despite GI's preliminary 
scatter of information, is to read the whale roster Of signs 
you are used to for morning over the expanse of what you 
see, and at the same time see those meanings start to 
transpare as one begins to see the possibilities -a world 
of possibilities - clear behind them. '.. 
Individualist survival is possible for Delany in the interstices and 
margins of the social. Such aesthetic pleasure in what is seen as 
private experience counters the public, utilitarian mechanisms, of 
the Web. Mark discovers his own information, 
some of it logical, some of it mythical, some of it in 
error, and much of it, yes, no doubt merely wrong or right. 
But it's information beautiful yet useless to anyone but me, 
or someone like me, information with an appetite at its base 
as all information has, yet information to confound the Web 
and not to be found in any of its informative archives. " 
Survival is predicated on a liberal myth of the "margins" as a place 
of freedom, apparently beyond the determinations of centralised 
power. 
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Yet Such thinking may ultimately be seen as supportive of the 
status quo, in that the "margins" are themselves part of the wider 
social network of power, and parasitical upon it. This conservative 
element in Delany's novel can also be seen in its conformism with 
the dominant myths of "electro-magic" that, as chapter 15 shows, 
form an important basis of technocratic mythologies, In Stars in My 
Pocket Like Grains of Sand, personal survival is a function of this 
establishment myth of electronic technology as a new form of 
mesmeric control and omnipotent fantasy, in the novel, space and 
time, manipulable by "mentally a tivatable" technology, are 
transformed into multiple, protean forms, replacing linear 
perspective with the cool, interactive, involving space-time of 
electronics. The city of Marare is an index of the potentialities 
for magical control extrapolated from the invisibility and speed of 
instantaneous communication. 
As in Jack Williamson's The Humanoids. taken to represent a wide 
field of science fiction, teleportation redesigns space and time. As 
Mark enters the underground house belonging to Santine, the inside 
of the house is instantaneously transformed into an outside scene in 
the hills several kilometers away: "At the horizon was Morgre, in 
which i had been only seconds before, """ Mark's own room is 
similarly in two places at once. This shifting environment recalls 
the magical space-time of the "Gödelian" universe described in 
The Einstein Intersection, a multiple dislocation of the homogenous, 
unitary space-time which since the Renaissance has been the fixed, 
panoramic view of power. Like William Gibson's image of cyberspace, 
the city of Morgr e is a procesual and undecidable environment, where 
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geometric , pace; explode and implode into spaces of Play. There s 
therefor = no complete, final image of the city, nor of dark's house: 
"Dyethshome is an archive of mentally activatable intricacies 
scattered about five courts, and nobody knows them all. "`" 
The land : mot ape is r: l tivistic, as polar distinction between 
positi've_ and negative, claustrophobia and ver'tivü, terror and 
eu hori. a, breaz dow-. i in the neutral light of fascination: 
11 -ýj: _: always been a strange place for me, " Santine said 
affably. "With a whole seven layers of city hanging above 
you in the dark, sometimes women here will be hit with 
intense claustrophobia. Yet standing on the upper level of 
the apartment ring, looking over the broken tiers of the 
million-year-old amphitheatre to the skene nearly two 
hundred meters down... many also experience sudden vertigo. 
As a young woman, I recall coming here and going from one to 
the other in the space of seconds. " 
The paradoxical, multiple spatial operators of the world described 
in Delany's fiction dissolve the real into the hallucinatory. His 
characters seek means of survival within this society of the 
spectacle, engaging in a fascination that may be seen to substitute 
a Narcissistic myth of survival for a Promethean myth of politer 
The narcosis and numbness of this world recalls what Jean 
Baudrillard calls the "cool" "ecstasy of communication, " that has 
replaced the "hot" public sphere in which political power has been 
contested; 
Something has changed, and the Faustian, Promethean (perhaps 
Oedipal) period of production and consumption gives way to 
the "proteinic" era of networks, to the narcissistic and 
protean era of connections, contact, contiguity, feedback 
and generalised interface that goes with the universe of 
communication. 
When Kona takes off the electronic rings that connect him to the 
data retrieval network, that is, when he chores to stand outside the 




which "what numbed finally sent the terror itself below perception's 
Timen. In Delany'S Science fiction, there is 
this desire to be 
both inside the mass media, and also in a world of private 
experience apparently outside the co-ordinates of spectacular, 
controlled perception. The fascination of this double play is 
Delany's version of so-called "post-political" survival techniques. 
Yet seduction by the spectacular image, in Delany and 
Baudrillard, tends to obscure the workings of power relations in 
modern society. Writing in connection with Jean-Luc Godard's 
explorations of the workings of power in the images produced by the 
electronic mass media, Colin McCabe relocates the capitalist 
spectacle in terms of power relations, exploitation and politics: 
The objects which the image presents to us and to which our 
only relation can be that of possession necessarily 
represses our being, our situation in the world. The 
libidinal investment in the image, an investment on which 
the economic investment turns, is profoundly narcissistic, 
an avoidance of the problem of the other. Our acquiescence 
in this pleasure is bought at the cost of ignoring the 
conditions Of existence of the image, conditions from which 
we suffer every day. `;, 
Similarly, for Paul Virilio in Pure Or (1983), survivalist 
rejections of a wider politics for the ecstasy of communication are 
born out of despair, and are ultimately programmes for the 
preservation of the status quo. Virilio senses that, as duration 
dwindle-, in an age of instantaneous communication, so do the 
possibilities for politics, in that, "Democracy, consultation, the 
basis of politics, requires time. °,., Nevertheless, Virilio seeks to 
restore politics to modern society, and is accordingly more critical 
than Baudrillard of the ramifications of the mass communications 
media: 
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All current technologies reduce expanse to nothing. They 
produce shorter and shorter distances -a shrinking fabric. 
Now, a territory without temporality is, not a territory, but 
only the illusion of a territory. The field of freedom 
shrinks with speed. And freedom needs a field. When there is 
no more field, our lives will be like a terminal, a machine 
with doors that open and close. A labyrinth for laboratory 
animals. `; _ 
Like Lewis Mumford and C. Wright Mills, Virilio is concerned about 
the way in which instantaneous electronic media are destroying the 
public domain in which political power may be negotiated. He does 
not suc , 
UiIIb to the seductions of a mystificatory electro-magic, or 
give permission for survivalist fascinations with submission to 
control. The laboratory animals at the end of the terminals, in the 
above quotation, have none of the duplicity that Delany provides for 
"cyborg-studding" and "Radical Anxiety Termination. " 
This chapter has shown how issues of power and control are 
handled. ambivalently in Samuel Delany's 
plural texts explore strategies of both 
modern scciet y, and this innovative use 
a: ü 1guG';. is etei-Otupia" counters the dr 
singularity in orthodox utopian science 
The following chapters will explore 
totalitarian singularity in the wort{ of 
fiction writers. 
fiction. Nevertheless, his 
resistance an. adaptation to 
of science fiction as an 
ive towards totalitarian 
fiction texts, 
issue;; of resistance to 
more contemporary American 
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CHAPTER 18. 
William Caddis. 
This chapter will consider the recent novels of William Gaddi:; 
as constructing epic narratives that examine the ambivalent 
possibilities of drift within systems, and strategies of survival 
within a highly technological society. 
JR (1975) explorer intersections of capitalism, technology, art 
law and education in contemporary America, F-Iysics teacher Jack 
Gibbs, whose name recalls that of J. Willard Gibbs, an early 
contributor to information theory in physics, is obsessed with the 
concept of entropy as the leaking away of energy from a closed 
system. He sarcastically explains to his class that the school 
curriculum is so over-organised as to he entropic. Knowledge has 
been reduced to information for testability: 
`ince you re not here to learn anything, but. to pass these 
to -k owledge has to be organized so it can be taught, 
and it has to be reduced to information so it can be 
organized do you follow that? In other words this leads you 
to assume that organization is an inherent property of the 
knowledge itself, and that disorder and chaos are simply 
irrelevant forces that threaten it from outside. In fact 
1t'5 exactly the opposite. Order is simply a thin, perilous 
condition we try to impose on the basic reality of chaos. ' 
Givü; ý' insight, that disorder and chaos are necessary aspects of 
order, is a vita, advance on notions of deterministic order, Yet, 
ironically, his own life and work suffers from entronic chaos and 
decay. 
Gibbs is writing a book on the reduction of knowledge to 
information in art, believing that the transformation of America 
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into a commercial, utilitarian culture has placed severe 
dif±icult1 on te creative artist. Consequent I he 
pessimistically and simplistically view. s industrial technology as 
wholly destructive of human potential. 
Gibbs' book locates the turning point for art, and music in 
particular, in 1920, with the invention of the pianola. This he sees 
as the Ford Plan applied to music. An automated machine for 
producing piano music through information stored on punch cards, the 
pianola is a machine for perfect reproducibility. As a result, the 
fallible human pianist is automated out of existence; hence the 
famous phrase heard in bars throughout America in the 1920s, "Don't 
shoot the pianist, he's doing his best. " For Jack Gibbs, "that 
phrase doing his best, (is) redolent of chance and the very 
immanence of human failure that century of progress was consecrated 
to wiping out once and for all. " Chance and failure, as signs of the 
"human, " are excluded by the rigid logic of mechanisation. Gibbs 
extends his analysis to a general levelling down of quality into 
quantity as a conseuuence of industrial mass production. Quoting 
Henry Ford's famous dedication to utility and progress-, he sees the 
pianola "open the arts to Americans for democratic action and leave 
history to bunk. "° 
Henry Ford and Frank Woolworth consolidate this process of 
capitalist democratisation, making available commodities for mass 
consumption, at the price of subjugating human beings to the 
sacrifices of energy expended in their production. For Gibbs, this 
is flying in the face of Aristotle's adage that "to be always 
seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls. '' 
-1 : 3- 
The modern atmosphere of "constant turmoil" is ultimately 
di's'I-i1;. t .i the " musical faculty, " of the "exquisite `J :? of and delicate 
sensibility" on which the creation of art depends. The "symmetrical 
motion of those great wheel. (of industry) homogenizing their 
difference" organises a passified society around the dictates of 
industrial production. 
In Gibbs' account, this organization of society is entropic, in 
that human energy is dissipated through a process of over-ordering 
that wastes the energy of chance and difference. However, entropic 
wastage extends to Gibbs' book itself, the writing of which is 
persistently interrupted, So that it exists only in incoherent 
fragments. Gibbs complains that he has "no God damned energy, " that 
"energy is leaking everywhere, " as his book remains unfinished, a 
further instance of the entr opi c processes it is trying to discuss. 
Edward Bast similarly struggles to create his own music, seeking 
to innovate within the repetitive structures and easily consumable 
Glicht=G demanded by capitalism, where "time is money money's 
the... "" Yet it should be said that Gibb's claim that, in the 
"noisiest country that ever existed, " "such constant turmoil must 
ultimately be destructive of the musical faculty, " fails to take 
into account the creative possibilities for art presented by 
electronic technology. John Cage and Milton Babbitt, and many 
others, have used computer technology to create music, while Conlon 
Nancarrow has written pieces for the pianola. "' 
Moreover, the despair of Past and Gibbs at the commodification 
of art is mitigated by the very existence of Gaddis' JR itself. JR 
fulfills Gibbs' desire to make a book as "Difficult as i can make 
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lt nr 7n order to subvert the easy transparency of commodity 
consumption. The reader is invited to participate in ordering the 
book, an order that is not allowed to become total. All the pieces 
will not fit together. JR is therefore in itself a confident reply 
to Gibbs' complaint: "Ask them to bring one God damned bit of effort 
want everything done for them. 
The act of reading the novel is itself an enactment of the 
process of imposing a "thin, perilous condition" of order onto a 
massive amount of information. In this way, the sheer size and 
complexity of the novel disallows the over-rigid control of energy 
that the novel itself sees as one of the most destructive elements 
in American society. JR guards those incomplete, uncontrollable 
elements that are indispensable to a truly dynamic and healthy 
conception of order. Moreover, the virtuosity and energy of Gaddis` 
prose belies Gibbs doomy view of the impossibility of art in modern 
industrial society, 
in U's 725 ý, ý 
's 726 there 
were are no chapter or even paragraph 
divisions. the text is an uninterrupted flow of mostly direct 
speech, with an occasional bridge passage of descriptive prose. 
There is, therefore, no position of stasis or security for the 
reader, and no obvious places to stop reading. Gaddis has in this 
way not written a novel that can be easily consumed according to the 
requirements of capitalist commodity production. Whereas human time 
and energy in industrial society are largely divided into work, 
commuting and leisure, the sheer size and weight of JR, as a 
physical object, makes it less than portable, and therefore a 
difficult book to read while commuting, for example. The novel is an 
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a. ct of resistance to the reductive compartmentalising of human life, 
presenting a fuller definition of democracy than that of 
quantitative uniformity. When Edward Bast is given a speed-reading 
course to help him get through the accumulating mass of business 
information concerning the JR corporation, Gaüäi -' joke may weil 
on his reader. 
The unmanageable, disorderly element in any s- -s tem, in lü l ig 
the 1 i2 t P- r; a c± ar weE2 v. riý e r, nova: rý, aa r. Iý fc: ; J'aa_I - 
source of energy. Total clarity and pragmatic communicative 
nom E; ec = as . _. ac ssed 
in chapter 14 of this thesis, are thus 
shown to be neither possible nor desirable. The lawyer Miter Cohen 
admits, at the start of the novel, that, "I seem to be having 
difficulty making myself clear. "- Similarly, the interruptions, 
puns, verbal misunderstandings, crossed-lines, "red herrings and 
blind alleys", " of the novel destroy simplistic faith in monolinear 
systems. Modern electronic technology is thus not seen as a 
monolithic, rigidly inflexible system, but is instead riddled with 
random, unpredictable factors. Consequently, totalising conspiracy 
theories do not interest Gaddis in this novel. 
JR may almost be seen as a commentary on htcLuhan's statement 
that in an automated society, "alp aspects of production, 
consumption, and organization become incidental to commun cations, " 
no that the ". abstract manipulation of information as a means of 
Creating wealth is to longer a monopoly of the . took br oker , 
"' ' In 
Gadiic' novel, the thirteen-year-old schoolboy JR is able to exploit 
the limitations and blind-spots of the electronic media of 
instantaneous information, to build up a multi-million dollar 
-3i ý5 _. 
business -- ým t child O. Horatio Alger, , trl -0 l into A of 
. ýJ1, 
indoctrinated nate; l early into 
the uuojr1eoa ethic, as mentioned in jack iL? DO IJL: Uni 
U's 
successful entry into the business world relies upon the limitations 
as much as to the possibilities of modern technology. 
For example, JR talks through a handkerchief on the telephone, 
to make his voice sound lower and more adult. As a result, his 
telephone messages are obscure and give wide scope for 
misunderstandings. In the terminology of information theory, they 
are low in the redundancy necessary for efficient, noise-free 
communication. Given the speed, panic and suspicious assumptions on 
which capitalist competitiveness is based, . IR's cryptic, largely 
ignorant messages are taken as hard-boiled business acumen, For Mr. 
3vi 
. 
off, ärt "goes right to the gut issue and sends through a 
directive some of 
them so blunt almost sound simple minded hardly 
understand him on the phone half the time, spend an hour afterward 
putting the pieces together get the feeling myself sometimes he does 
the grunting and we do the work. " But tail si, after a 11 _i, the "way 
the big boys think. 
The irrationality of the cap- . he system's reliance on Factors 
such as rumour, nervousness, confidence and caution, is shown to be 
not an aberration from the normal state, but the normal, state 
itself. Moreover, the technology of the telephone itself reinforces 
P_ntropic leakage Within communication systems, by enabling business 
to be carried on Without personal contact. As a result, the 
businessmen never niest 
i R, who is therefore immeiJiatel 
as an 
_iU5 
VF man, according to ypr ethic table business stereotypes. 
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When an unscrupulous newspaper fabricates an interview with him, his 
fictionalised character is further embellished. 
It is this element of invisibility and action-at-a-distance in 
modern electronic technology, especially telephones and computers, 
that allow: - JR to make money: 
I mean this here bond and stook stuff you don't see anybody 
you don't know anybody only in the mail and the telephone 
because that's how they do it nobody has to Gee anybody, you 
can be this here funny lookingest person that lives in a 
toilet someplace how do they know, I mean like all those 
guys at the Stock Exchange where they're selling all this 
stock to each other? They don't give a shit whose it is 
they're just selling it back and forth for some voice that 
told them on the phone why should they give a shit if you're 
a hundred and fifty all they... 
... I mean it's just different electric numbers on 
these 
checks and all which this computer read.; them it doesn't 
give a shit if you're three years old just if the money's 
there... - 
Mast of the novel is made up of interrupted telephone calls, often 
with several calls being made simultaneously. This is, in terms of 
information theory, the noise of entropic decline, yet in Gaddis, 
novel it is paradoxically a source of energy, as the discontinuous 
rhythms of everyday speech, disrespecting linear logic, provide the 
novel's fundamental dynamic. 
Gaddis' reinterpretation of entropy and information theory in 
teriTis of ; paradox and unpredictability ^ll 2' t: Ilya Prlgogine's work 
in 
non-equilibrium 
thermodynamiCs, in which "nonlineari jr 
instability, fluctuations" in open phys'icai systems are not merely 
superfluous noise, but are crucial elements in a dynamic con option 
of order. " JR suggests the need for open structures w,, iich include 
chance, randomness, paradox and errors, as Vital Counter-strategie 
±G ýi he homoLTenisinWy me haniSirl of Amer- 1, ýd11 L-= L1 ta-l _s J vy; ý1.12 U1 
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Yet Gaudis' reformulation ci entropy theory is ambivalent, as 
his work enters an area of turvivalism within a drifting, 
uncontrollable system that recalls the pessimistic nostalgia of nostalgia 
Pynchon. in Gravi y's Rainoow, the Great Serpent in Kekul2's 
dream, which suggests for him the shape of the benzine molecule 
vital to the future development of the plastics industry, becomes a 
signifier of a Fall from an original state of paradisal nature. 
History is for Pynchon a linear violation, through science and 
technology, of this initial state of plenitude. This "new serpent in 
our ruinous garden" means "No return, no salvation, no Cycle. "I 
Moreover, the "System" that violates the "Cycle" of an "eternally 
returning" universe is subject to entropic decline. It "sooner or 
later must crash to its death, when its addiction to energy has 
become more than the rests of the World can supply, dragging with it 
innocent souls all along the chain of life. "'" The religious tone of 
Pynchon's vocabulary - "innocent souls, " "chain of life, " etc. - 
reveals a nostalgia for an original state of continuity and 
totality, as well as a sense of tragic inevitability imparted to 
history. 
William Gaddis succumbs less to this nostalgia for an original 
"nature, " as his comedy faces technological disruptions less 
squeamishly than in i'ynch on. in JR, technology has itself become 
second nature, Go that JR thinks that the animal, the impala, is 
named after the car, rather than vice versa. In Gaddis, this 
disruption is not an area of unmitigated dread, but is rather an 
area of black comedy. Moreover, whereas the comic scene, in 
-'ynchon's work, are episodic, and comedy is seldom a11owed to domstur ü 
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the tragic tone of his e plorations into technology, politics and 
religion, such as the extract quoted above, in Gaddi=, ' novels comic 
disruptions are widespread, destroying the hold of nostalgia and 
de Tres for sxity that characterise Fynchan's epic constructions, 
Nevertheless, Gaddis' comedy occasionally does include a sense 
of despair at the possibility of universal entropic decline, as he 
explores strategies of survival within an uncontrollable 
environment. In JR, the irreversible, linear arrow of clock-time is 
anthropomorphised as deliberately vindictive: 
For time unbroken by looks to the clock the only sound was 
the chafing of an emery board, and the clock itself, as 
though seizing the advantage, seemed to accomplish its round 
with surreptitious leaps forward, knocking whole wedges at 
once from what remained of the hour. '"' 
The religious basis of such dread is summed up in Jack Gibbs' fear 
that the world may indeed be "God damned. " 
This sense of entropic decline as a universal unconditional 
makes the existence of politics problematic in Gaddis, as political 
strategies are themselves subject to entropic exhaustion. In his 
drunken despair, Gibbs affirms the nee for revolutionary change: 
11 -- I mean sometimes there are situations that just don't seem to 
have any solution in their own context do you, do you see what I 
mean? And the only way to, the only thing to do is step in and 
change the whole context... "''' However, the chances for such radical 
change in Ga dis are slim. The possibilities of non-conformism and 
rebellion in the movements of the 1G 0s have declined into a sense 
of desperation, exhaustion and loss. were survival i now dif ficult 
enough. JR, like Paul in arpeIte ýs Got i I-, ), tries to be 
succe, iii in terms of the present capitalist System, a the more 
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radical attempt, = to innovate and create, made by Jack Gibbs and 
Edwa-rd 
Last, end in fai lui e. 
Moreover, despi 
ie 
the damage =r eate. _ 
07 V 
J : 's foray into big business - the market collapse, ghost towns, 
flouted Indian land rights, and subsequent cover-up - capitalist 
dynamics are renewed and continue at the end of the novel. There is 
no sense of closure or solution, nor of radical change. Instead, the 
novel ends with JR'S voice on the telephone, saying that he has 
"this neat idea he y, you listening? Hey? You listening. .. 
In Carvent. er's Gothic, Gaddis further explores drift within both 
local and global system. As in JR, technological speed induce, 
panic, and the novel follows a growing complexity of events, as they 
slip out of human control. Though Gaddis names the names of the 
controllers, the businessmen and Christian missionaries who 
manipulate others, the situation escalates beyond even their ability 
to control it. 
Communicational acts, by telephone, mail, television and 
r. spap r', again provide a co tann assault on vulnerable human 
beings. Nothing functions according to utilitarian intention,, In 
the opening pages, Billy has already missed the toilet bowl, and 
urinated on the bathroom floor, and Paul's car has broken down. He 
then bangs his leg or the coffee. table, -"' Such accidents occur 
throughout the novel as comic disruptions of order and 
functionality. As in JR, such drift is duplicitous, constituting a 
source of hopeful survival as well as of pain and struggle. 
A Vietnam veteran, Paul tries to survive in the competitive 
system of American capitalism. But his attempts at planning and 
ordering his life are confounded by the complex and chaotic 
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multiplicity of events, Even sorting the mail is fraught with 
difficulties: 
Look, Liz, we've got to get a system. At least you brought 
it in, good. Now there's got to be a place for it. If I'm 
going to get any kind of an operation going here we've got 
to get a system, I've got to know where the mail is when I 
walk in, you've got to get a pad there by the phone so I can 
see who... 
He draws a plan of action on a piece of paper, but the diagram is so 
complicated that McCandless mistakes it for a map of the battle of 
Crecy. Pauls' plan looks like a child's "scribbled mess-. " 
Liz similarly finds that domestic order is impossible to 
maintain. The vacuum cleaner is broken, and she is unable to 
understand the French cleaning lady, who breaks the ornamental china 
dog. Suffering from nerves and asthma, Liz seeks reassurance in a 
sense of security and order. She notices a newspaper headline: 
LOSS OF $412 MILLION, 
RECORD, REPORTED 
BY GENERAL MOTORS 
vent erday' s headline or 
the day's before, of no more 
relevance then than now in its blunt demand to be read, 
building the clutter, widening the vacancy, driving it 
elsewhere, anywhere, the still embrace of the armchair there 
beyond the hearth to flee even that for the front door's 
glass; paneled symmetry.: 4 
Liz desires stillness and symmetry to stabilize uncontrollable 
movement and universal loss. 
The word "drift" occurs throughout the novel. The mailman 
appear: in the early morning mist like "the drift of a figure being, 
poled on water. "-`= This drift is mostly identified with irreverý; iule 
and uncontrollable procesnes in "natures" a drift to disorder given 
an a natural state of affairs. A lawn chair is overturned in the 
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'adrift of discoloured leaves on the terrace, '- and as the year 
decays into autumn, drift occurs on a universal scale: 
Out over the terrace the mist lay featureless as the day 
itself come into being and left adrift wit! no better than 
the clock to dispense its passage ... 
l ing ca enoe: ý i entif nature d; - a site of. inevitable Gad iss ial V1 
In; =, disease and death, moving linear y toward:, equilibrium and l 
indifference. Here the tragic tone recalls iynýhoný'ý elegiac long er 
paragraphs: 
.,. -he'd stood there, maybe three or four times since she'd 
lived in the house, looking down on the greens of the lower 
lawn and tie leaves before they'd cried out their colours, 
before they'd seized separate identities here in vermilion 
haste gone withering red as old sores, there bittersweet 
paling yellow toward stunted heights glowing orange in that 
last spectral rapture and to fall, reduced again to 
indistinction in this stained monotony of lifelessness at 
her feet where a dove carped among last testimonies blown 
down from somewhere out of reach, out of sight up the hill 
in its claim as a mountain, leaves of scarlet oak here and 
there in the blackened red of blood long clotted and 
dried. "': 
Against this situation, human beings enact desperate measures. Liz's 
desire for security is repeated in the old man who compulsively 
shovels dead leaves into a garbage can, in a futile attempt to 
reverse entropy. This yearning for security is fundamentally 
religious, a search for deliverance and salvation, as Gaddis' 
language 
suggests. 
On the corner opposite, the old man from the house above 
bent sweeping leaves into a dustpan, straightened up 
carrying the thing level before him like an offering, each 
movement, each shuffled step reckoned anxiously toward an 
open garbage can where he emptied it with ceremonial 
concern, balanced the broom upright like a crosier getting 
his footing, wiping a dry forehead, perching his glasses 
square and lifting his bald gaze on high to branches yellow- 
blown with benisons yet to fall. She fled for the kitchen. 
2: 3 - 
M Can ieso. enters the novel as the intellectual scourge of such 
ritual securities and superstition,. He is infuriated by the old 
man: 
every time I'd look up, see him out there every time i 
looked up pretending he's doing something worth doing look 
at him, ten dead leaves in his damned dustpan he's still 
trying to prove he was put here for some purpose? ="' 
Yet I'r_Candless is himself shown to be a fraud, as the novel examines 
possible claims to security, order and confidence in modern America. 
The house itself, like all the people in it, is similarly a 
fraudulent construct, a frail, derivative system imposed rin chaos, 
. It acLordin; ý to -ester, a "c1as: ýiýý piece of Hudson river 
_arpenter gothic": nAii designed 
from the outside, that tower tlets. 
the roof peaks, they drew a picture of it and squeezed the rooms in 
la der. As i" Cand1. e» ex; ii ains, 
it was built to be seen from outside it was, that was the 
style... yes, they had style books, these country architects 
and the carpenters it was all derivative wasn't it, those 
grand Victorian mansions with their rooms and rooms and 
towering heights and cupolas and the marvelous intricate 
ironwork. That whole inspiration of medieval Gothic but 
these poor fellows didn't have it, the stonework and the 
wrought iron. All they had were the simple dependable old 
materials, the wood and their hammers and saws and their own 
clumsy ingenuity bringing, those grandiose visions the 
masters had 'left behind down to a human scale with their own 
litte inventions, those vertical darts coming down from the 
eaves? and that row of bull's eyes underneath?... -a 
patchwork of conceits, borrowings, deceptions, the inside's 
a hodgepodge of good intentions like one last ridiculous 
effort at something worth doing even on this small scale, 
because it's stood here, hasn't it, foolish inventions and 
all it's stood here for ninety years... It's like the inside 
of your head McCandless... . 
The American talent for bricolage, for making-do, has produced an 
structure that has survived, yet is a derivative repetition and a 
deception. Carpenter's GotLic examines such inherited structures 
that have expired, or are persisting as dangerous archaism. 
-3'4- 
Thus the Reverend Ude is still repeating the fatal old 
narratives, building yet another Church, one more imposition of 
American carpenter's gothic. Though McCandless: appears at first as 
an authoritative spokesman against these damaging, archaic forces, 
by the end of the novel his own position has been undercut, and he 
is shown as a cynical, fatalistic, irresponsible fraud, a patchwork 
of "conceits, borrowings, deceptions" like his house itself. 
McCandless connects Christianity with a history of war and 
sacrifice that continues with the present exploitation of Africa for 
mineral wealth by multinational companies. In this bloody context, 
Enlightenment ideas of rationality and education have failed: 
talk about a dark continent I'll tell you something, 
revelation's the last refuge ignorance finds from reason. 
Revealed truth is the one weapon stupidity's got against 
intelligence and that's what the whole damned thing is all 
about... " 
in the name of "reason, " McCandless criticises the ignorance and 
stupidity of Christian fundamentalists, who censor books and teach 
creationism in schools. The liberal ideal of "academic freedom" in 
America has been turned into the freedom "to teach this rickety 
creationism. ": " As Paul puts it, on the telephone to tide's son, 'the 
US Constitution protects religious freedom, that's the right to 
enforce prayers in the schools you got that? " 
IcCandless's own novel continues his discussion on the end of 
rationality in America. Lester paraphra eo it back to him: 
your Frank Kinkead raving about scratching the surface of 
reason and there's this void right under it aching to 
believe anything absurd, where he wants to give out free 
chess sets like they give out free Bibles for endless cheaTD 
entertainment, anything to fill the emptiness any invention 
to make them part of some grand design anything, the more 
absurd the better, magic, drugs, psychedelics, Pan Koo and 
the Tibetans' prayer wheel-:, the assumption of the Virgin 
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and the three secret-, of Fatima, Moroni= golden tablets or 
just God, God, God. 
But McCandle=:: e is himself revealed as a fraud. Although he knows 
that the companies and politicians are fighting over land which is 
"nothing but bush, " he deliberately withholds this information, 
allowing the situation to deteriorate into war, letting them "all go 
out there and kill each other over something that's not even 
there. °'`' 
In this way, McCandle, ýi: _' former position in the novel as an 
authoritative spokesman of reason and enlightenment is undermined, 
and he in. revealed instead as cynical and fatalistic. Perceiving the 
global political situation drifting beyond control, ii(ccCandlees' will 
decays into an abnegation of responsibility. People have been 
killing each other for two thousand years, he says, 
and you think i could stop it? Go out to Smackover knocking 
on doors of those little frame houses and tell them there's 
been a big mistake? ... I told you, try to prove anything 
to 
them the clearer the proof and the harder they fight it..... 
So Lesterevaluation of i'cCandless' novel as "mean and empty... 
like all the people in it" appears to be justified. `°' Moral drift 
has produced for (cCandless a lo:: _ of will, and his subsequent 
collusion in global corruptive processes. 
Liz comes to realize that McCandless' reasonings are driven by 
his own irrational fear- and drives. She comes to understand, 
That you're the one who wants Apocalypse, Armageddon all the 
sun going out and the sea turned to blood you can't wait no, 
you're the one who can't wait! ... because they, because you 
despise their, not their stupidity no, their hopes because 
you haven't any, because you haven't any left... 
- Jc. C. ' 
MicandIes; =: Sears and despises the Simple technique: 
--. 
for survival and 
hope- witch some people invent to offset loss and pain. Liz includes 
hers, -- 1f among, 
all these sad stupid, these poor sad stupid people if that's 
the best they can do? their dumb sentimental hopes you 
despise like their books and their music what they think is 
the rapture if that's the best they can do? hanging that 
gold star in the window if, to prove that he didn't die for 
nothing? Because I, because I'll never be called Bibb:; 
again... 14. 
Yet Liz's survivalist desire for security amid damage still does not 
save her from catastrophe, as she trips and falls to her death at 
the end of the novel. QUenter's Gothic thus provides no 
possibility of secure bases in a local and global situation of chaos 
and deceptive order. 
Only the skill and complexity of the novel itself offers a 
confident and nor fraudulent order. In this way, Gaddis' fiction 
presents counter-strategies to its destructive Oedipal narratives in 
the act of fictional creation itself. His novels avert despair 
without surrendering to simple solutions, by proposing their own art 
as genuine creation in a fraudulent, ng society. Moreover, the 
epic necessities of Gaddi: s' plots are re: =-; fisted by the fragmented way 
in which they are presented. Each novel has to be pieced together by 
the reader from fragments of interrupted' conversations, so that the 
reader is invited to participate in the process of ordering the 
text. Gaddis therefore injects an actively democratic element into 
Ulis epic, total i sing -narratives, The novels are open, complex 
systems that resist the entropies of over-organisation, and the 
manias of technocratic society that constitute their material. At 
the same time, Gaddis provides insights into the survivalist appeal 
-327- 
of such totalitarian . systems. As Paul puts it in Carpenter's Gothic: 
," 




This chapter will discuss Fukenick's two later novels, in term 
of his critique of the rationalist and deterministic bases of 
orthodox mower . 
in those works, pr ov sionali ty and multiplicity 
power. 
become possible resources for movement out of the impasse of binary 
control favoured by technocratic interests. 
In MA `L197r, ýß Cloud rejects the dualistic "either/or" gc'. `, 
_jýýýýýý 
choices 
by which power bases maintain their control: 
For everything you pay. Why are things always doubled in 
contradiction this way. Either way you choose you lose, it's 
always this or that when you need both Cloud is beginning to 
think there's something wrong with the whole culture. Body 
or soul. Dream or reality. Reason or feeling. Vision or 
sanity. Love or power. 1 
in the interview that Ron Fives to the American newspaper, Sukenick 
parodies technocratic surveillance tactics and the quantifying, 
rationalist language of control. Tie utilitarian simplification of 
reality to "Yes or to, True or false" is satirised in a series of 
banal, programmatic questions: 
How manly meinbeers in your average mean family. 
Our families aren't mean. 
in 
your gross national product. on, t kid ar ound. What 
it's not gross. 
Cooperate. 
Do ý1ri. t want yt the quality o life or the .iV quantity of life. 
We want ; ardnticks. 
Lt tariar quart f atýon turrio u2 ý to uniform, aomogerýeou: o 
{or tüc pu rpo: oo; of manipulation and control, How%? ` o, 
recalling Charles i'or tý Sukenick implies ar2ä. of experience which 
remain uncoil ct-4 by act of ; yetematiz ti oi. 
- JG'7 
Ronald Sukenick, Private. 01 -20-C5ri4. .. 
Private. Private. 
Private. We are irrem jT working on the _gener al equations 
that would express happiness and unhappiness in terms valid 
for all individuals in all state=,.... A RADIO BROADCAST IN 
TEXAS WAS SUDDENLY RECEIVED FIVE YEARS LATER BY RESIDENTS OF 
LOND N. THREE LEGGED ALBINOS SEEN HOPPING AROUND IN THE 
MIDWEST. MEAT RAINS FROM THE SKY. AN EXTRATERRESTRIAL 
SATE., LITE DETECTED CIRCLING THE EARTH, STARS ARRANGED IN 
SEMAPHORE MESSAGES. There exists, a passion for comprehension 
which like a ; assion for music opens the possibility that 
therefore all the information was not present in the initial 
state of the universe implying a complementary universe when 
you are there it is not when it is there you are not 
axiomatically beyond prediction or even comprehension. 
The undecidaüiet beyond prediction aZiý'e v ei-NZ ý_'ic`Zi'_: ýyý. 
`ii ij :ý 
pcs .? ` üý v:. ici ck rao t -- -- 
° . - 
,. 
z, i ýr_ll. i: 
ýa'v !? = i3 .. c o... i... 
mu, 
ý. 1 .. 
that ['led iJut tl be part of ano t.. ýcr 
: '_, = murder i, o >11 out to 
b part o sorts:; of mass ü-, Q - 
. 
i. ý. ta. ý. 
the torts, se_i? 'ks forms of resis, i, B. Zii:; ir to 
the rep titive saci ifice of 
mass technological spectacle,. 
Inclut c; } it ese challenges is a Cl? 1r: _,, i3ning iii the erotic 
bases of desires for power and domination at the centre of modern 
scientific projects. The social context of such regimes is explored 
in the relationship with ebekahi, which passes through three 
"Phases" - of Cruelty, imagination and illumination. 
The Phase of Cruelty is isomorphic with empirical and 
rationalist science, in its substitution of linear abstractions for 
living bodies: 
Rebekah 1 _, an idea of which her breasts and buttocks are 
corrolar ies and her vagina the Fir oof you Might Gay a carnal 
idea that is an idea of carnality like a sexy ad a salacious 
hoto-; r as .. 
She is an idea for me . am an idea 
for her. 
ideas start in the head. They are analytic. They are 
discontinuous with the object. They are a priori in the 
sense that you lay them on the object she lays her idea on 
me lay my idea on her the mode is rape. This is the 
2npira', , rad tlon mind r api .; nature 3rilpu11 at lor: 
Ol d ion Qri rol. inevitable. Incredibly erotic. Rebevdtl 
-J 
a sl Make me do thin s. tort me. y penis is a 
itieeanon. baa su: `mits tG my power , 
sie comi_: s fixe a strins at 
iir_cracker .I have three. orgasms at a shot we make Iove 
all day we're insatiable. it occurs to me we're lookin at 
something the essence of meat, There is no essence of meat. 
That'; w1n,; we're insatiable. '' 
he objectification of thie other io thus identified With violence 
and, domination. Desire becomes fixate; ". ' on achieving an impossible 
unity between idea and obect, sellf and other the failure to 
achieve which leads to insatiability and disease. The next stage is 
given as "inevitable" "Since the closer we come to continuity the 
further we are driven from it the only way to achieve Union is 
for 
one of us to in effect, cease existing to b-come a Ure object a 
thing ecstasies of sedo-masochism e 1sue. "Neur osis and violence t us 
have 
. sex ai 
bass: "After coitus all men are sad. Naturally. With 
t hi kind 
of coitus. " 
In these passages, Sukec ick''s explorations of eroticism and 
a iiI c cCälý 'vr_ü-., e=, Batas e. i rL ErotCism, Sa a1 1 C2: ýcýr. üc'=. 
sacrificial a: -_.; as follows: the f==mal, e partner eroticism was 
cen as, te vi 'tim, the male as the sacrificer, both during the 
'ýýonsuPiu'Pation o; -ýiaR them: SP_. i v8: ß in the, continuity e : stablished by the 
first destructive act. "` The inevitability of violence in 'c GS ukeni t'' 
description of the Phase of Cruelty is an amplifi c3 tion of 
ataille's analysis, in which erotic ae; ire. for contlnulty through 
vioýence and death and an outcome of the bodily existence of human 
beim. as products of ._ Qual rct `- =: e. roau_ion. For Bala 
o u': FiG i icý iýH Of i----3Ilti, 2Z; DU= and 
which apparently' remain.; an unconditiona fact 
intolerable isciaLtOR ans _: u=term , and a 




Tin i'y, v }$' 5 is . i"u , Lü. ý .-C, üTiý. c errii nx 
t 
;. i h c. ' PC s' iTiýi. it 
to 
; ý1Tiý'.. i ý,. ý. c.. 
r_. i. _: tance to . t. _" : 'gase of . rue i ty. X=----over, ; ukenic , doe_: not 
guarantee the success or efficacy of any strategy explored in his 
novel.,. Instead, he sets up a relativistic and provisional text, 
that remains open to new possibilities of resistance to 
ine, -itaility an despair. 
9111.11goes on to explore Counter-strategies to sacrificial 
history in terms of contemplation and withdrawl: 
In the next phase we don't mane. love. We meditate, This i: t 
te Phase of the i''ag inert i on. We ante late one anot oller 
's 
-mD 
beauty we withdraw into ourselves i try to imagine what she 
feels like... 
Beyond this is the Phase of Illumination, in which 
or; : a. m is what I can only term a musical experience. In this 
phase we may say that after coitus all men laugh. Gently. ; 
-he consequeence of this ki ltd of orgasm i= harmony as opposed 
-, to the cacaphony inherent in the sadomasochistic type. 
Ye+ if a new Dar-adiJ,, of 
. 
social and sexual behaviour is being 
tent, ively developed here, L is not without Lr ony. 
°iý suggests 
love and Jleasure. 
he ilossi ilivies Ü. L loi. ndi ri tý. a iet-a , 
on 
rather Shan ors ýacri: ice, a:; part of art ironic exploration of 
Amer ican utiopia. s. Ia phis wa ;, ukenict is fi tion Enter.; areas of 
experience beyond the des re in 
determinist-LC for 
predicýc, ätbilit and totaiisi. ri, `, " shows ema+iSa+ tlo£z, and shows an iriterc? mot 
in undecidabi2, anomalous, and extraordinary phenomena which evade 
Iotai =ignifi dtor'y' control. Howeve , 
the irony an duplicity 
ever-pr2: _örit, urid'rrthninH the ideal i:; tic security and co üliýiacono of 
Romalb,.; 
, alternativ?: 
=; to ti1F_w rational is of the status quo, 
and endles, _, y deterrin g any sense of a_d . olut i oraary 
programme. 
- J, ý::, - 
Qü. t> nme 
I ca is noct et y 1s : n- ýn a. o a ineiý Laniöm 
that 1n 
rea'niri diwin escaping s control jr rnanica l`f a celoratin«' drift: 
racing l ke a wheel out of contact with the : '; round a loose 
flywheel pinning faster and faster till it tears the w Tole 
machine apart. He swears he's going, to slow down do 
r Verytnina slowly breathe deep stay Calm. Now look at him 
.. riving like a maniac horny as a toa that's part of the 
mania. 
Oil the freeway, hum a beings are dra v into Oarwinist competition 
against their better inteniticas, in order merely to urvive. 
Res 
ist al: cr_ 
to t, rii: 
=, ZIIechaill 
ti. r r}ýi? ±i4-'J: _ Eý y . S_-. 
±rm 
ýs 
Jiff icu n 
that Uit- a lot safe on this here + free-way ýo drive like a 
, onofa. 
Üitch get with it if you don' t wait to get wiped out. "' 
Hawe e- one possi: ii: iýtý for liberation may be in surrendering 
t iiö need for totai COntro- Tr: vP_iii n1 ITL a s'OiiCr', _; ÄütC-': iOWEFCd 
boat down 7th Avenue, "thrills of fear surge through him as the boat 
catches gusts of wind alnio`s: t out Qf control. Dangerous but 
exhilarating always teetering on the edge ci control he thinks. 
Dawn's advice to Eucaly tu when horse r ceding 
is th t "You're 
part of the horse you have to learn to think like the ihorse' : 
But Eucalyptus doesn't feel like the horse. She feel=: 1, ik, 
she's sitting on top of all this power that she doesn't know 
now Lo handle. She-'.. s not in control. And she doesn't want to 
be in fontrol. What's the sen_e of being astride all this 
living power ii It'. ý just goinýý' to be another thing she can 
contro . t° 
tili {cü_ Y. thus challenges: the mania for ontroi In technocrat,. s such 
as B. F. Skinner. In Walden Two, 1-; arlyiian "men of goodwill" will 
re., =, tore control to a ri tiny civilization by rromising a new starr. 
Dur civilization I5 running away ilne a frightened ore, 
her flanks fiasüing with sweat, her nostrils Orea LirF a 
frothy mist; and as she runs, her speed and her panic 
increase together. As icr your politicians, you professors, 
your wri er s_ met hen Wave their arias and bout as wildly 
as they +ßi 1, They can' t bring the frantic ýýieast under 
control. 
ýý JJ"J 
Lot her run till she drops from exhaustion. 
.. 
Meanwhile 
ion's see what we can do with her lovely volt. 
Skinner reasserts the necessity of Oedipal succession for the 
perpetuation of programmes of control. In Sukenick, on the other 
hand, the drift inside deterministic systems is treated more 
favourably, as potentially liberatory. 
Systems in Sukenick are therefore not considered in a context of 
ambitions for totality and incl sivity. instead, anomalies are seen 
as potentially creative breakages of fixity. Fragmentation is 
preferable to unity, in that "when you try to saw Orpheus back 
together what you get is Frankenstein. "'" The "science" of 
"p i chosynthe: =is" thus deals with farts in the absence of wholes: 
Psychosynthesis is the opposite of pm yohoanalysis but apart 
from that Cloud refuses to define it. Cloud feels that life 
is a lot like a novel you have to make it up, That's the 
point of psychosynthesis in his opinion to pick up the 
pieces and make something of them. Psychosynthesis is based 
on The Mosaic Law. The Mosaic Law is the law of mosaics a 
way of dealing with parts in the absence of wholes. ", 
A, an. 
his ide. is iron-e, aria relatic_se is, rather than presented 
to Tl si an eF_"_iuTi re tr ü tit `v'alue. lt i one invention ä liori ; 
many, ü product of the capacity for design in human beings. With his 
lack of what William Burroughs calls the "RIGHT-centre, " (see 
chapter 20, note l, )), there is in ýukeniok an unself righteousneczs 
and openness to new ideas, however apparently ludicrous, without 




time ilNen manne. S'3. v , Il`v'_, ýtl- üY_; ý 
the problems and 
possibilities of utopian renewal in America. AS in the work of 
Samuel Delany, assertions of dazalogical truth, grounded in a 
hi_: tor y of monologica1 utopias-, are avoided. The " hildren of 
334 
thus eck ai t_i nati es to the "vast culture i2c1UZ"2; 
ür FZiý gene -rations, " " ras a --mall group attempting to redio( over 
Eden in the American landscape, In their comune, behavioural habit: 
and cla: ures of identity are broken by mutual involvement: 
Everybody does everything to everybody. At the same time. 
Sometimes they forget who is who sometimes Blossom doesn't 
know who she is where she begins or where she ends she likes 
it. She doesn't think of them as names she thinks of them as 
one flesh apart from the others the first legitimate 
children of the big poppamomma. Mutants. Monsterspawn. The 
natural offspring of synthetic parents. The children of 
Frankenstein. Other people's problems seem trivial to them 
they have the solution. They are the solution. Branch tells 
Bud they've rediscovered Eden Bud tells Branch he likes his 
snake. Branch tells Bud he's nice everything is nice even 
the snake is nice. 'r 
Yet this benign "solution" is questioned and qualified, as the novel 
TFma-as open to iu1tl}^i2 w shout al owing any one to 
oe -encode the others, and become "the solution. " 
Like Delany 's Heavenly Breakfast commune, SuvE 1Ck o group is an 
unstructured, flexible system, thereby challenging the entropies of 
bureaucratic over-organization. The group does not even have a name, 
as the potentialities of silence, of the non-verbal and the unsaid, 
are respected as aspects of procesual experience beyond static 
definition: 
Ron ca I B. Jor. st but won't dehn it. Or can' t. Anyway 
they don't want anything that defined or cyntal i iZet3. What °S 
crytallizeä is Etat c and what's static is dead Not that 
they ever said as much but that's the reason nevertheless. 
You don't have to say everything. The more that can be left 
unsaid the better that's the way they all feel about it. 
ihey never -put hat into wo X1,1 either of course there are 
better things to do With Words than repeat what everyone 
already knows. And then you can always shut up of course, 
Tee: sre to innovate, rather than to merely repeat pa: ý; t failures, 
4. n±o ums 
the :i iitecture Of the building 1tiself which has been 
constructed "following the su, gFestion- in fact the capabilities of 
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the materials, " re:, ulting in a "flexibility that disallows fixed 
interior walls and that allows extension of the basic structure at 
need or whim. "' However, the domes and towers of the settlement are 
also "this jumbo poppamomma, "°: " suggesting the difficulties of 
avoiding inherited power structures, a problem that becomes one of 
the central issues in the novel. 
For withdrawl from modern American society is a solutionary 
programme whose 
success is uncertain: 
They want to be apart. They want to quarantine themselves. 
They want to stay away from the general infection and give 
themselves the chance to create something really healthy... 
The Antifrankenstein is going to be the salvation of 
Frankenstein that's the only way to do it it's the last 
chance they've thought about it. Anything born of 
Frankenstein is of the nature of Frankenstein the only thing 
to do is stay completely apart everything else has been 
tried it doesn't work. Maybe nothing works that's a 
po: lsihil ity, `I 
The attempt to disconnect from the past is 
duplicitous and 
contradictory, in that "there's a senses to their whole thing of new 
beginning and last chance even though in fact there are no new 
beginnings and no last chanc_s. 'r... This despair at the prospect of 
lnovitabllities underpins Sukenick'.; exploration of multiple 
strategies of resistance. No actions escape irony or ambiguity, as 
the text M MUS open in a creative scepticism. 
Di eaming that ne is a prisoner in a cell at the base of a (iayan 
pyramid, the protagonist contemplates various strategies of escape. 
But his faith in the unexpected and the extraordinary, as a 
salvationary metaphysic (recalling Yaxweii's singular points), turns 
out to be misplaced: 
He's given up trying to chip through the blocks of stone 
also surprising and murdering one of the guards changing 
costumes he's tried all that. Now he wonders if there might 
be some way out through magic. Or though dream. Or 
JJ ai 
acceptance. Or withdrawi. He decides the_ best thing would be 
to play his role through. To resist the torture and keep hi: 
mind alive and play his role through in the fullest 
consciousness. Waiting for the unexpected the abberation the 
extraordinary event the one chance in a million that will 
allow him if he's alert enough to slip through. Putting his 
faith in the unknown. When Cortez captures the palace and 
kills the priests he's not even surprised. He totters up the 
steep narrow steps to the courtyard where's he's immediately 
slaughtered by the white men along with every other male in 
sight he's Just another greaser to them. ' ' 
No strategy of resistance is guaranteed immunity from üukeniok's 
bathos and irony. 
This duplicity moves > .6 out of 'he militaristic singularity of 
utopian iotionr: such 
a static, mechanistic 
and breaking down, as 
alter in time: 
as Looking Backward. -Sukenick'S commune is not, 
inposition, but is tested, and shown changing 
expect tat i sons, needs and desires shift and 
Valley doesn't think much she's happy. When you're happy why 
think... When she thinks what she thinks is that everything 
is horizontal nothing is Ver'tic'al, title thinks that maybe 
vertical was always a mistake but sometimes she also thinks 
she wants to be alone. She thinks they're all like babies 
together she likes being babies. She wonders what happens if 
she starts to ;, row up. 
in this way, communality and individualism, the horizontal and the 
verb cai, are both questioned as implifi 'bons of an unresolvable 
complexity. 
in c. 6, kibcr ar ian it erecion even 7ecome a new form of 
ýonstraint, when 
Suck become; addicted to sex, "sensitized to erotic 
energy like a police dog to pot, ", , He sees energy police dog fucking as a cure: "He 
wants tae whole country reorganize- d into small towl basý--d on sexual 
+; j7.; t, 
, 
But " But -.. 1 ßü.. TV iüt: ; Ciüyý'uýl vi ýit+i aii solution yr iii 'J iai `y' repetition and, 
a disnipaticn of energy. Buck has a "permanent erection a real rifle 
barrel that goes off but never down. Get it on get it in get it off 
-3 "J 1 
ou 1iDe: n' 
t like his a Cloud is a'. ways changing Bu, -; k al ways Wants 
to do the same ttiling. ". '. -Sexual 
i iberation has here turned i. Tito a 
tor m of slavery: 
"There's been so much fucking going on around this 
pace that : obary can get hi = work one any more and instead of 
satisfying them it just makes everybody hornier . 
Similarly, the condition of "Pure fornines: =" is an endless 
Dionysian disruption of order, in which constant transgression 
itself becomes entropic: 
A transmutation occurs not unlike that in an atomic 
explosion the delicate balance of personal and social forces 
held in suspension that we call civilization explodes in a 
moment of frenzy rape cruelty murder and collapses into the 
lower level of organization characteristic of dead matter 
Hitler's Germany. Eros provokes Thanatos. Or so they say. 
it's tucking that opens Pandora's box, Orgasm is the first 
gasp the first gasp of insatiability that only ends by 
ending, the unbearable tension between matter and spirit 
between life and death. - 
Again, Sukenick draws on Bataille, facing the possibility that such 
scenes of violence and sacrifice are inevitable. The fear remains in 
his work that a combination of original sin and irreversible social 
change makes =; political intervention iGn futile. in William Gaddis, 
Sukenick recognizes that the irreversibility of history's arrow of 
time may preclude the possibility of radical social improvement. in 
98 6i "The s and fears , Mina notices that . Slaughter has started again, " anýa r 
t that the daiage may b permanent and irreversible: 
Before he had the poo ibiiity of its stopping to cheer him 
up even though it didn't stop. This time it's so bad that 
even if it stops forever tomorrow it will he Permanently 
revolting. And w, -gal if it doesn't stop And what if it stops 
but goes on in some other form. Wind Wants to organize a 
demonstration but the thought of a demonstration here in 





a. '-.. -of Fi'c. d'i aLyr an.. iü? v4 i,., c bl, _ Li-. äi lei _. r 1_, a 
üt, the heart of hinge, a fixed, unto ditiooai centre undeý""ieatý1 
th pr:.;;.; of chare: 
genes s :ý ,ýfi_, And it's pass-,, d in the th- the pareu. _. - to the 
hearts of 
the children. Except that Pau]. doe: =, n't have any children . _. o 
-hanse for a change of hear v. O ür p& k '-1 c there's still aT 
chain. But 1 sü t, Ever yone Pau i knows has a Change of hreiert 
two or three times a year some every weekend. And under 
e very ,; bange . ýtii The Great Depression. Joy doesn't get rid 
of it. pope doe i' t get rid of it, e_ doesn't get rid of 
it. Freedom does x' t get rid of it. Murder doesn't get rid of 
i t. Give up and die. Emptiness is the best you can hope for. 
The pause between the beats the clean slate the blank 
sspaca 
In DIac}' of , 
he rich rar rat 4veo of the liberal Eiil iüý. t e ilillF' i. ]i, ýt ii _ 
i'2 
now a lank ce "Wýiere the terror ic, " leaving only a uSadn 
of mour n_ng" for the , nndiesG eens of rebellion o.. o! ce_d in -7cies of 
Oedipal repetition: 
"s otv have mourning of hose who gave run away from hom-: a. 
the mourning of those who have run away from home as the, 
fror ho th _ who parents ran away ou me. 1T _ the mourning of `t t'v^. ýc W 
es=cape the past, who escape 
into the present. Again and 
again. Z the mourning of orphans in a country of 
orphans. 
ýýýý, ""_. t - tabi ;+ P_i ie Oedi al loser c 
uý. pe: s. ý miýýzc ýerýe c <revi , uýýl. Ly r .; a 1. ý th ý_ p 
of tho pout-war state in Fynchcn' Gravity'ý Rairbnw: 
The Oedipal situation in the Zone these days is terrible. 
Ther= is no dignity . The mothers 
have been IGascu1 ini , ed to 
old worn moneybags of no sexual interest to anyone, and yet 
there are their sons, Styli trapped inside inertias of lust 
that are 40 years out of date. The fathers have no power 
today and never did, but because 40 years ago we could rot 
kill them, we are condemned now to the same passivity, the 
name mascchi. ti,: fantasie_s the'y' cherished in secret, and 
worse, we are condemned in our weakness to impersonate inert 
of rower our own in ant children must hate, and wish to 
1 a urp t'r_ ; Diacp ci, and fais .. 
in Pýnchan, these inherited otruc euren are too i owertui to ahoy: any 
Eif CtiVý! p0 :1oibii±tr0f re ai ]oýi, G n8: a'iona1 inheritance ýa 
of uz; an i.. avi1a-l y, as U. : ý; ým toýü of an essential ly 
'1 1ý 
- 
ßI it:;. 1, ;. _idýy. tt- 
ca ; Ii angu::. e 
:; 
ý-i.. 3 ä 
. 311 
ii 11urai.. 1. 
t 
.. J ýT rv 
tota. l.; r w arid absolute: 
to break away from repotition of the fä 
into 4 nriovative and. creative behaviour, by killing the father, is 
hat 
something 
"_IOU will never quite manage, " as "we" inherit power 
the next generation "must" hate, seek to transcend, "and fall. " 
o l8" ar 
fatalism 2n , Cr: S liken, A's 
texts, but is offset 1y an 
explorative openness that refuses to allow it: seli to be ossified 
into a fixed te --s rr itor y. ounter trace -es to ü: itrol are ex lore 
t: less tu_. ii iO: > _±d 
for or. Sin : >]n iýld ig. 'R a1 u13dr, -h 
les Si the habi 
unmediated truth that characterises Pynch n' s werk. 
l 1': 
> , -. 
Z. OII 7ýyI2 Conditions Blues iUBS tAUS r8 l 
fus ýý Tü1ný Bad LeS SUriý? ri1iýI 
the epic, tragic scope of a Pynchon, and fights against nostalgia 
for determinism and order. °articuliarities are valued above the 
need for code, system and singular truth. 
Thi, rejection of the epic in favour of the "petty iconography 
of the uotidian ýý..,..., my c- se,, r by the apocalyptic or. 




awaiting revelation, the rocket ü cut to fall - with the las page 
a Lon Ta. 7ký n Bad Conde bons El ue, s, where Carl rear e` , the 
nuisance cauoed by thý= urban renewal _)rcgram that has led to the 
(iFi L_rII 1 oT. of th public t Oi1etc 
wi hing they iarln't e. uoli. ýh. _ä the old public toilets 
because he had to pieta a fact more fundamental than a fund 
of ephemeral epiphanies but reflecting that all things come 
to an end at the same time recognizing there was no point 
iüposin ,a se -GP- of 
tragedy on old public toilets and that 
thinJs didn't have beginnings and endings in that sense they 
ust . tart and then they : >top 
- 340 - 
. _ü1r_if1: ý3 o rc: 7con of 
ti. ":: _Q 
c 
_ciCOlügic 
l oti uý. -, 
tu 
_,., V 
work to drift an creative opportunity. iil this way, hi'; novel may be 
compared with Pynchon' s V. (l'6). 
Arriving in Norýolk, Virginia or. t hrist :ý eve, in fi e first 
sentence of Pynchon' e novel, the drifter Benny Profane is 
immediately placed within a context of beginnings and endings, of 
tragically impotent programmes of salvation and rebirth. When he 
meet:; Paola, Profane ýe endowed "with all manner of healing and 
sympathetic talents he didn't really possess, " , Sitting on an 
elevated spar, wearing a cowboy hat, Profane pretends to be God, 
directing ., 'he behaviour oL the Ga" ors below Sim. Ravin- "a"-d' 1-0 
pe'r'form such lar äe miracles, he t fers sets off as mar iv 
he üh i i' 
iüousetrap;; as 
he ca-in fin 
., 
`saving mice at . 
ink to hiiiýel 
, whe e 
he 
v 
cat, ches h'ýn fingers in the final mousetrap. Such small acts of 
compassion for the preterite are spontaneous, non hureauorati: e 
acts of resistance in Pynchon, which are -nevertheless "lased within ä' 
a nostalgic context of larger need's for religious . salvation. 
It is this desire for total, epic structure:: that is questioned 
in 3ukenick's Lang Talking Bad Conditions Blues. Carl is another 
drifter, one of the "coniirae, l goctoffs, " who had "no aims no 
eti:, ectation: no hopes and liked it that way Carl's own vague 
wanderings and meditations= aiml e_; s as they were fit into that 
category. ",, Yet Carl's drifting has less of the nostalgia for. 
±i ty + that of y. Py i o-a i than, u chop' !. 
Carl wanders pa:; architecture which is not ep. cally 
mnanipui at1V and totalitarian, but is instead "fascinating if 
unp etentiou' ." 
Living' on an island makes Carl feel "'afloat here 
-3,11 __ i 
detached adrift it Wan not tota. Ii jT unpleanor Dotal iy iilla=al-it 
c.. . ceä 
Similaz xyj being l_, ý-t C; ýo r. C, i: iiüiC . ýdi;. 
it 1t is Middle state between good an' bad, pleasure and pain, an 
area of Xcl-uhan_i to cool, that characterises release from mon !i thic 
. =leol, ogi cai structures 
in Sukenick's novel.. Carl forgets his 
original destination, "getting nowhere if not happily at leapt quite 
ab-- orbed, ýý ihi; = 
ii: GG_d tourist nap render i Useless by the rapidly 
Changing environment. 
much drift beyond certainties and closures is duplicitous, 
disruptive of neat categorisation. As such, there remain:; the 
possibility of "panic ,., ýý under the surface to which he pretended to be 
, so 
iIdiffere'nt. The conditions are of "general disorientation and 
underlying disquiet you might even say panic the uncertainty about 
t he future and maybe worse about the aöt. ýý`ý" In this accelerating 
environment, where old structures are unstable, survival becomes a 
vital ,, s, ue. 
Sukenick's novel rejects epic narratives in favour of attention 
to the "multiple velocities of phenomena circulating through the 
city otherwise going unattended in all their possibility, "` In 
place of grand narratives, localised phenomena, uncollected into an 
a Pion system, are valued. Accordingly. Carl is prepared to accept 
the " imitation.; of glinting facets of happy ambiguities of 
fascinating door knobs the texture of pirza::; the feathering of ear 
obe.; the se: er feetu e of sea anemones... II In a similar way, 
'veith"b . aP_3o sa are ".,.. ch It i l. -1"IliCd thinks . uaý ü:., i7J iUca 
The relevant model for these dispersions of totality is that of 
Lan ph Ji :ýin Which the observer ; )art, ýa teö in 
the o; nerv ;ýý 
- -12 - 
=; o that kr: o I i'o . evo be rý; "1ote or onclu5ive, 
Sukenick till. l s 
roiects cbsessions with singular truth, with what Pynchon calls the 
"Kute Korrespondences" that in Gravity's Rainbow would provide the 
deterministic security of absolute, finite interpretation: 
kicking endlessly among the plastic trivia, finding in each 
Deep Significance and trying to string them all together 
like terms of a power series hoping to zero in an the 
tremendous and secret Function whose -. amp-, like the permuted 
name, of God, cannot be spoken... to bring them together, In 
their slick persistence and our preteriticn.., to make sense 
out of, to find the meanest sharp sliver of truth in so much 
replication, so much waste... "" 
Here Gravity's Rainbow shows its nostalgic allegiance to a regime 
based on linear perspective, and its correspondence theory of truth 
in contrast, Sukenick challenges singularity and centrality in 
savour of multiplicity: 
it was almost impossible to come to a conclusion about one's 
own flow and that in fact this was a contradiction in term: 
since one was precisely one's own flow so that conclusion 
was impossible and even undesirable whatever the culture 
might recommend about being objective having perspective. A'` 
Total i'c.. n3 obsessions and Linear hies hieß arr_' ti urr ende'i ei. 
It becomes possible to "admit the mysteries the blanks in 
care, iousness... forget our fatuous infatuation with final fact and 
the Continuities thereof. u: rý Objectivist, linear perspective ha 
been replaced by a participative involvement in discontinuities and 
mu ltip1icition. 
Sukenick' extrapolation from modern physics crucially involves 
the formal constructions of hi text:. The entire text of 
Long Taukin, Bad Conditions Blues is an uninterrupted flow of words, 
without full stops or capital letters, in marked contrast to 
Li v 'o .- mania for ct3l ý 
'ic, lii i t.. F? r. i4tý .. i1. rJr ? =: ä i I1GoFl , ýTt? iLT, 
his 




i nificance. "? In this way the formal experimentation of 
-343- 
`liken r', writi t n challenge: New, an assumptions of c Ons_l 
er' pec_tive, hierarchy, completeness and continuity, Each of his. 
novels is designed on tu e_ page in a different way, as he uses b ank 
areas of the page to enIoy a sense of incom: letenes: s, discon iunuity 
and of necessary yaps and silences. These formal innovations may be 
compared to t ze relative formal conservatism of Pynchon, and also of 
Samuel Delany's science fiction, in which a theoretical 
acknowledgement of plural centres opened up by mo ern physics rarely 
affects the form of the writing itself, which, like Pynchon's, 
relies closely on narrative constructions which remain linear and 
epic. In contrast, Sukeni a, like Willies ,. 'Jaddi=, challenge; 
deterministic -order not only in the ostensible "content" of his 
novels, but also in the processes of formal construction themselves, 
kvoiding nostalgia for the securities of deterministic 
solutions, Long Talking Bad Conditions Blues proposes a sense of 
risk and openness. Like Henry Adams at the end of the nineteenth, 
century, deli 'e gor total order is courageously rejected: everything 
is "breaking u net it -3. "11 Although Sukenik occasionally 
describes modern society in terms of entropy, of "time drift energy 
leak irretrievable i! 7 sr -, toi1 JJ tas. 1: ßf - 
11.: 4. ýI this situation ýý ene'J rýLý 
in not 
erceived in Pynchon',, s, terms of tragedy and religious lo : =. Instead, 
a "new economy of limited resources thrifty collage and bricolage" 
Long Talking' Ead Conditions Blue;; places these acts of 
re. --I-stance within an examination of bureaucratic obsessions with 
codification and quantification. Bennett writes reports which reduce 
particuliarities and differences to a generalised level of codified 
- 344 - 
ii1liiü3 i =a. Actor, lii`i'ýf he tells Carl t hat 
he 
does not nee IG 
know anything about a subject in order to be able to write a report 
about it: 
it was all a matter of processing and you didn't want inert 
clots of knowledge impeding the information flow inert clots 
of knowledge furthermore could lead to the rigid form of 
humanistic intelligence known as wisdom which was nothing 
more than information frozen in traditional cliches which 
were completely inappropriate to the new conditions which 
were fluid atraditional and constantly changing and ossified 
the cybernetics of the mind which was a digital process 
dealing in a progressive minutia of yesno determinations ! 
yesno determinations according to Bennett could only 
function in a value free mental ambiance and nothing could 
be more antithetical to the bright yesno clarities of the 
new thought than the vague and foggy mea nderings of the 
O'D humanistic ... 
Writing reports is "our subs itut2 for god if you know of any other 
ead piea: ý; let me know... 11 , ';, 
Suken. ick's novelistic inrovationý; parody and challenge this 
technocratic reduction of language to code, by inventing multiple, 
and l non-hierarchical structures beyond singular truth and total 
systematisation. His writing is open to the positive potentiality of 
drift, yet the inadequacies of Romantic resistances to order are 




William Burroughs' work criticises technocratic useýe of language 
and power, and devises multiple strategies of resistance. The claim. 
of technocratic scientist:; to work within an area of value-free 
functionality, and the denial of responsibility which this implies, 
provides a point of departure for Burroughs' satire, as he parodies 
a iliac science fictional environments to reveal the workings of 
power often neglected by such narratives. 
In The Nall-ed Lunch (l959), the Reconditioning Center in 
Freeland, with its "long ward gleaming with stainless steel, white 
tile floors, glass brick walls, presents a veneer of professional 
technocratic neutrality, under which move flows of desire, vio ence, 
and power. 
.: r, e nwa y c: ptdie'- scientific research 
to the human body as bo-I-L 
surgeon and behaviourist experimnenter. He is introduced as a 
" an pulator and coordinator of symbol syste_ ps, an expert on all 
phases of interrogation, brainwashing and control, " brought in as 
"advisor" to the Freeland Republic.:. Benway thus works directly for 
the state as a technocrat seeking to perfect methods of behavioural 
control. 
when patents with irreversible Neural Damage break out of their 
ward, Benway refuse., responsibility for their care, using the using 
familiar alibi of "pure science. " The attendant asks Benway what he 
should do with them, to which Eenway replies: 
- ; ý6 - 
How the fuck should I know? I'm a scientist. A pure 
scienti. t. Just get them outa here. I don't hafta loolk at 
them is all. They constitute an albatross, 
The_ IND's are "Our failure, " but, according to Re_nway's catchphrase, 
"it's: all in the day's work. " In these routines, Bur roughs 
ýemystifiec scientific activity, placing it within a context of paid 
labour and its justificatory alibis. His scientists deploy the alibi 
of "pure" research to free themselves from responsibility for the 
practical applications of their work. When Dr. Benway and Dr. 
"Fingers" Schafer carry out a new operation on a human subject, 
Schafer has initial mi givin s: "I tell you I can't escape a 
feeling... well, of evil about this. " But Benway reasserts the credo 
of the irresponsible, amoral scientist, giving himself permission 
for a continuation of Faustian urges: 
"Balderdash, my boy... We're scientists... Pure scientists. 
Disinterested research and damned be him who cries, 'Hold, 
too rRuch! '. Such people are no better than party poops. 1" 
The pleasures that Benway find=; in control-work ensures the constant 
Jeve oypm-mnt of hIs : c-ience, often with dangerous consequences ffor 
of per human being: -. After Using a lavatory as an operating room, 
aided by his baboon assistant, Benway carries out an operation. : at 
has "absolutely no medical 'value. i° For enway, as or Hawthorne '. 
Aylmer, soles: ific control in an art form that moves beyond sere 
ýil; t7: 
"NC one knows wham the , ý; I: r o Qf i originally was or if it 
had a purose at all, Personally I hink it wan a pure 




u-_ as a fighter : 'JiiS and . ý1itoYlie(iýr- 
: tr_ _at: __ 
i _el fron ýanxer he i aý '. irreell invokes _ý in 
this operation the surgeon deliberately endangers his 
patient, and Then, with incredible speed and celerity, 
rescues him trom death at the last possible split . second, .. 
Did any of you ever see Dr. . etrazzini perform? I. ay 
- 247 - 
-e form advisedly bei-, aase his op-era tions were 
in Delany's Stars in y Pocket Like Grains of Sand, lobotomies are 
also considered as works of art. But Burroughs refuses the tacit 
permission given to such activity in the name of a morally 
relativistic science f Coon, chop ing not to Compromise on vital 
issues of power and domination in a highly technological society. 
In Burroughs' work, scientific experiments are mainly concer nod 
with a violent reduction of human beings to mere functionality, a 
+ 
of 
lrit efficiency ±±hr `ý To rigorou! application of Tyra ý to e min ball 
'Charmer, this is just "pl, a. in ol -fashio'1e surgery, " a subject on 
which he has many new ideas: 
The human body 
is scandalously 
inefficient. Instead of a 
mouth and an anus to get out of order why not have one all- 
purpose hole to eat and eliminate? We could eeai up nose and 
mouth, fill in the stomach, make an air hole direct into the 
lungs where it should have been in the first place.... 
At the "meeting of international conference of technological 
psychhiatr y, " , 'chafer turns on the "cold blue blast of his gaze, 
" as 
he reveals his ultimate- 3 ault on humanist v lues: 
"Gentlemen, the human nervous system can be reduced to a 
compact and abbreviated spinal Column. The brain, front, 
middle and rear must follow the adenoid, the wisdom tooth, 
the appendix.... I give you my Nia: eter Work: The Complete A- 
American Le-Anxieti ed Nan. ... rr r 
This i: not the "Radical Anxiety Termination" whose posoib: ie 
beneficence is played with by Samuel Delany. instead, the 
De-anxietioen Man is an unequi vo; _: ai product of evil, a .s 
be tu. n: s 
into a monstrous bl: ack centipede which JT,. 
repetition of the Frankenstein myth. Schafer, previously re. ýi_; ý ibl 
for "the unspeakable crime of brain rape" or "tors ble lohcto. r 




on le far nid of i ioc. y, " hi ng warehouoes with "helpless 
creature=; who must have their every want attended..,. 'The Drones' 
he call s them with a cynical leer of pure educate. evil. .... 1`1 The 
Drones are like characters in Delany's heterotopias, but with the 
power relations more thoroughly explored. 
'areover, Burroughs' central routines explore strategies of 
resistance to such totalitarian power. In The Place of lea' Roads 
!. 1'? 3he investigates the major American frontier myths of the 
nineteenth century gunslinger and twentieth century spaceman, as 
part of an examination of which narratives=: may be valuable, and 
which dispensab e, fo the future of humankind. A necessary part c 
this exercise, as in Delany's The Einstein Intersection, is an 
unsentimental rejection of obsolete and destructive myths, the "dead 
roads" of the novel's title; 
The guide traces the area on the map with his finger.... 
"The Place of Dead Roads, senor. This does not mean roads 
that are no longer used, roads that are overgrown, it means 
roads that are dead. You comprehend the difference? '" 
Bead roads cannot be nostalgically retraced or merely reformed. 
Accordingly, Burroughs' fiction examines major narratives of 
industrial society, to work out new strategies of resistance to 
power and exploitation. A vital aspect of this fiction is a paro: 3i 
demolition. or reapplication of some of the common themes o1 science 
fiction literature and 'film, especially hose of iien invasion, 
space and time travel, and species evolution. 
Power ýs for Burroughs an alien virus-. which invades the 'ýuma_n 
nervous system and replicates itself as patterns of habitual 
submission to authority Parasitic viruses control tiler hu Tian host. 
as Ala ve_ý, at a molecular revel : 
, i4c) - 
Now your virus is an obligate cellular parasite, and my 
contention is that what we call evil is quite literally a 
virus parasite occupying a certain brain area which we may 
term the RIGHT centre. The mark of a basic shit is that he 
has to be right. 
This reliance on truth-value is used as permission to exploit and 
annihilate as victims those outside the area of singularity. Such 
manipulative control wins consent for its rule by seducing the human 
body's capacity for pleasure. Thus the alien monsters on Venus are 
hideous parasitical forms, who exploit the erotic pleasures that 
their victims find in submission: 
they stick out from their mouths this long proboscis. 
which penetrates right to these special places in the 
nervous system and sucks all the soul and spirit right out 
of the target while he squirms and shrieks in the deadly 
pleasures of the proboscis. ... A young soldier who was 
rescued in time said it was like all the best comes he ever 
had all roiled into sweet liquid gold in his nuts. "She was 
killing me and I knew it and I loved it.... " 
Burroughs does not self-righteously distance himself fron the 
temptations and seductions of such control. As Kim Carsons says, 
want to visit this southern area. It sounds like my sort of 
th. nü. "'. Similarly, characters who resit tend to fall back into 
ways of control, as Nova Express makes clear; 
To l eve is to col labor ate Anybody is a coward when laced 
by the nova ovens - There are degrees of lying collaboration 
and cowardice - That is to say degress of intoxication -t 
.. is precisely a question of regulation, 
The complexity of Burroughs' writing thus disallows the fornation of 
a simplistic dogma, or the complacency of an assumed solutionary 
programme. 
The intention of the aliens in The lace of Dead Roads is to 
"destroy souls and so limit and monopolize immortality. " As an acr 
of resistance, Kim Carsons sets out to organise his band of outlaws, 
- 350 - 
the Johnson ami ly, into an "all-our worldwide 'pace program, " to 
bring about the "realization of our biologic and spiritual destiny 
in space. ""-' Space travel in Burroughs is a movement out of 
repetitive closure, a seizing of new potentiality through de- 
territorialisation. 
These areas of positive experience valued by Burroughs, and 
threatened by parasitical power interests, tend to be signified in 
ferne of "Soul, ', 'spirit, " "e-motion, " and "immortality, " an Romantic 
areas in opposition to mechanistic science. This is evident in the 
following extract from Nova Express (1968), in which the 
cybernetician inhabitants of the Crab ie_bu1a, in a parody Of the 
Selenltes in Wells's The First Men in the Noon 1901) are seen as 
repressively disembodied intelligences. 
They do not have what they call "emotion's oxygen" in the 
atmosphere. The medium in which animal life breathes is not 
in that souless place - Yellow plains under white hot blue 
sky - Metal cities controller by The Elders who are heads in 
bottles - Fastest brains preserved forever - Only form of 
immortality open to The Insect People of Minraud - An 
intricate bureaucracy wired to the control brains directs 
all movement - Even , co there is a devious underground 
operating through telepathic misdirection and 
camouflage -": 
Strategies of resistance to such bureaucratic control multiply in 
Burroughs' work. As in Gaddis and Sukenick, such strategies of 
resistance vitally include the act of writing itself, and the 
invention of new artistic forms for survival and health, if not 
he " telepathy, the mis; iirection.. of message=: in closed informational 
circuits is a crucial means of subverting the power of ü:: iFau. =: a`. __ 
control. Language is therefore central to Burroughs' explorations o 
power and control in modern technological society, 
-- J"J i 
Ir:, Job (1' _ (' ; the i it SUyýF? rvisor reads a -ut--up parody m it t_ e 
ý_ý tj 1. _uc 
Di. - vt 
D CV e ne is language, iiom which he removes 3ýi images and 
14 co 'our " for purposes of strict operativity. Burroughs adds: 
These jewels gathered from one of the periodicals admittedly 
subsidized by the C. I. A. If you see the function of word as 
extension of our sense to witness and experience through the 
writer's eyes then this may be dubbed blind prose. It sees 
nothing and nether does the reader. Not an image in a 
cement mixer of this word paste. As a literary exercise I 
pick up the Penguin translation of Rimbaud and select images 
to place in congruent juxtapositions with this colourles=s 
vampir e prose which having no colour of its own must steal 
colour from the readers. " 
Burroughs' fictional activity thus finds ways of countering the 
parasitical discourses of power, In Nova Express, the Technical 
Deposition of the Virus Power links image-as-virus to scientistic 
regimes of binary codification, including the deterministic 
implications of DNA-theory: 
'Gentlemen, it was first suggested that we take our own image and examine how lt 
could be made more portable, We found that simple binary coding systems were enough 
to contain the entire image however they required a large amount of storage space 
until it was found that the binary information could be written at the molecular 
level, and our entire image could be contained within a grain of sand, However it was 
found that these information molecules were not dead matter but exhibited a capacity 
for life which is found elsewhere in the form of virus, Our virus infects the human 
and creates our image in him, 
"We first took our image; and, put it in code, A technical coda üevelopeü by the 
information theorists, This coca was written at the molecular 1'2Ve1 to save space, 
säte waten it was found that the image material was not 'ead matter, but exhibited the 
t lifer CyCllti a'"+ aý+C vii'; LiS, 
Tills 'Jii'lý'ä i'8 le a58a ý Up or, + 
tý 
ia W'vr 
ld +ý wVUI+ý 1ný a eC. 0. ý2 _ 
+. t i 
population and turn them into our replicas, it was not safe to release the Virus 
until we Could be sure that to last group; to go replica would not notice, To tnis 
end we invented variety in wary form's, variety that is of information content in a 
molecule, which, en'1fi11, is always a permutation of the existing material, Information 
speeded. up, slowed down, permutated, changed at random by radiating the virus 
material with high energy rays from Cyclotrons, in short we have created an iMinity 
of variety to information Ask ". I 
sU lý 
ffiirýi; 
ývp so-called 511eI1o-. ý t.: sys 
busy 
ý; variety f' at ý ýi' 
1o to hefor 
ever exploring the 'richness of nature, ' 
It was important Al this time that the possibility of a human ever oncei ng 
of being without a body should not arise, Remember that the variety we Wanted we; 
permutation of the eieCtromagetic structure of matter energy intersection; which are 
not the raw material of nonbody experience, "'' 
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The concept of binary codification is here e 'tended to include 
biochemical control at a molecular level, enclosing human potential 
in a repetitive nature. For Burroughs, beyond these limited, 
material codings, with which science is concerned, are non-bod, 
experiences, the imaginative de-territorialisations of the Beats, 
which enter areas of experience suppressed by rationalist 
structures, and are suggested as forms of escape from regimes of 
codified limitation. 
Such resistances include countering the perpetuation of 
dualistic conflict structures. As part of its satire on technocratic 
science fiction, <3Tova Express exposes the vogue for cybernetic 
"feedback" as an alibi for the continuation of manichean dialectics 
and, competitive struggle. The basic "nova mechanism" is to, "Always 
create as many insoluble conflicts as possible and always aggravate 
existing conflii ts... /1: 
At any given time recording devices fix the nature of 
absolute need and dictate the use of total weapons - Like 
this: Take two opposed pressure groups - Record the most 
violent and threatenin statements of group one with regard 
to group two and play back to 
and take it back to group one - This process is known as 
feed back" - You can Gee it operating in any bar room 
quarrel In any quarrel for that matter - Manipulated on a 
global :;,,: ale feeds back nuclear war and nova - These 
conflicts are deliberately created and aggravated by nova 
c. urinals _ 
Strategies of resistance to maniý-hean closure involves the breaking 
o` repetitive 11ngusitýc nets, for "`f there is one ; hing that 
carries over fron one human host to another and esta;, ll hes ier 
of the coIitroller lt i.. ab1 t. 
Creative writer's and artists therefore j lay vital roles ýt ýuC 
oppositional practiýýes, as "Bioloeio Counselors" These ýýru. t he 
- "? F4 , ß. J, 1 
wrlt, r? r o ; 3. t _., only : ^. ri 
t er s _an qual ýy oino- tie junction of a 
Counselor is to create fact:; that will ten to open biologic 
Potentials of his lent. .. 
"ý. The fr audulent r: neutrality of 
technocratic 
science is thus challenged by an explorative and 
creative imagination, as a Romantic challenge to scientific power. 
Burroughs texts finds resources to counter language as a 
vampiric force in the work of Alfred Korzybski, whose lectures 
Burroughs attended at the University of Chicago in the 10301s, 'in 
The Job, Burroughs takes up Korzybski's attack on Aristotelian 
binary divisions as an archaic, neurotic form of thought, one of 
those "formula:.,, word-locks, which will lock up a whole civilization 
for a thousand years. " Burroughs follows Korzybski in. rejecting 
Aristotle's is of identity: 
this is a chair. Now, whatever it may be, it's not a chair, 
it's not the word chair, it's not the label chair. The idea 
that the label is the thing leads to all sorts of verbal 
arguments, when you're dealing with labels, and think you're 
dealing with objects. 
In Burroughs' work, Western myths of mimesis and referentiality, as 
bases of imperialist power, are replaced by a sense of language and 
art as a creative making. In this way, language and art become 
technological counters to neurotic power. 
The techniques of cut-up and fold-in are such counter-strategic=, 
to linguistic control. In The Job, Burroughs considers these 
literary technologies as scientific experiments, possibly leading to 
"a precise science of words, " by slowing "how certain word 
combinations produce certain effects on the human nervous systemi. t 
Burroughs thus invents new forms o control within non-authoritarian 
structures, replacing conditioning by others within a power 
_ o5 -1 
a iii with dciconl iti oni ß, and r nditic inb undo r 
one' n own terms, to produce thereby what Burroughs call` (in a 
paradox; cally anti-Kort ybskian phrase? ,a "self that one i, ý, apart 
from imposed thinking. "- 
Borrowing from Hubbard', Dianetics the idea of the "Reactive 
Mind, " Burroughs explores the "Artifically constructed and highly 
disadvantageous regulatory system grafted on to the natural 
regulatory centre, "`, whereby control becomes as automatic and 
involuntary as the body's metabolic reactions. Burroughs' methods of 
counter-control involve using behaviouristic methods against 
themselves, týo promote c_; 1f-COZýitiru. o, ni rather than susceptibility ±_ .. ý., 
authoritarian control: 
Anxiety reactions can be removed as they were implanted, by 
punishment and reward. It is now possible to decondition man 
from the whole punishment-reward cycle which has held him on 
an ani: al level for 500,000 years by rewarding the 
manifestations of deconditicn ng and punishing the old 
automatic responses. Only those dedicated to suppressive 
control will oppose this deconditioning process.: "° 
In this way, Skinnerian methods are used against themselves, as a 
means of moving beyond the utilitarian pain-pleasure enclosure upon 
which positive reinforcement programmes, such as those in 
kTalden Two, are predicated, 
There are in Burroughs, therefore, unlike in Pyncr! on and. "hailer, 
po :, ibilities for a liberatory technology, taking the form largely 
of an interest in ideas and instruments rejected by eý, entifio 
_stahl shment , such an 
the E-meter, and Reich's Orgone box, 
Concernins Hubbard and Reich, "in all probability discoveries have; 
been suppressed Jy Qif ic ai agencies to ma; ýk secret experImentr 
along the same IiIl s. Thus rather 'tiara hoi"ldng a Romantic re1i_. 
_ 
_ J. J "ý 
against chrology, Burroughs asks vital question: of control. 
triff: =: knowieti e in the best hands"? `::::: 
The control" of knowledge and information by global technocratic 
power interests is therefore seen as a central strategy for their 
perpetuation. Burroughs claims that vested Jr. -11 er is of 
y 
e: c-,, wer and 
money have suppre---.: =-, ed new discoveries and products that threaten the 
status cuo, and provides several , ample, of such control. He cla,.,; 
that the- American medical k"pr ofo; e on ha' 11üß 
only _isnetý and ie« Abc v, but also Reich's orgcne accuun; latc - 
and the use of m s: sive uses of ßv'1'. amiun for the prevention of 
hear. 
_ 
disease, aä of Vita mir. A gor curing, common cold, as well as 
the administration o apomorphine for heroin azddicts. The ýedicat 
trofes ion, in sum, has "a vested interest in illness, " and so 
suppresses any discovery that strike at t he root of illnemss. '' 
0n a global level this monopolisation of technology and 
knowledge by power elite;; has been exacerbated by the fictitious 
alrb c of Cold War, which have given spurious permission for otricai 
-iýCrets acts: 
Vested l Iterest: Whether operating through pry -, ate, capital 
or of official agencies, up re: ses any s: : over-;, product or 
way of thought that threatens its area of monopoly, The c"1; ß 
war is used as a pretext by both America and Russia to 
Conceal and monopol ize r e_searcih, confining knowledge 'to 
ofýý_iai a envies. It is no exaggeration to say that all 1 
important research is now, top secret, until someone Lots 
rat out of the bad.. 
important research that coin be used to free the human 
spirit is Being monopolized by paltry intellects in the na e 
of 'national security. " 
UC üiea raut. conservatism is 
for Burr_1.7gäs a product of rye 
Ind rl Rev o ution, according to the logic of Which industrial 
manager s, instead of +? eýng open to innovation and imirove_ment, 
sF iý __ JJ".. 
prefer to market the same in the guise of the new. Burroughs gives V 
the example of the Tucker car, which would have forced other 
companies to change their dies, and accordingly created so much 
antagonism that the inventor was forced nearly to Jail, 
in The Place of Dead Roads, the Industrial Revolution, in "its 
overpopulation and emphasis on quantity rather than quality, " is 
. peen to have "given them a vast reservoir of stupid bigoted 
uncritical human hosts. " Kim : -arson's d_clar ation of intent promises 
t'o reverse theese tendencies, in favour of decentralisation: 
We will endeavour to halt the Industrial Revolution before 
it is too late, to regulate populations at a reasonable 
point, to eventually replace quantitative money with 
qualitative money, to decentralize, to conserve resource--. 
The Industrial Revolution is primarily a virus revolution, 
dedicated to controlled proliferation or identical objects 
and persons. You are raking soap, you don't give a chit who 
buys your soap, the more the soapier. And you don't give a 
shit who rakes i', who works in toný e: -, Just so the-; 
make soap, .. _ 
Onc oh central engines of mechanistic, industrial control In the 
We 11 . entury i; c 
Hoii7woodi 
neuroses of repetitive nod1al] 




for Burroughs enforce 
need. Such technocratic 
habituall structure:; onto 
their. human vict1'fl 
How do you make someone peel stuf id? -- You present to m 
all the times he talked and acted and felt stupid again and 
again any number of times fed into the combo of the soft 
calculating machine geared to find more and more punch card: 
and feed in more and more images of stupidity disgust u 
propitiation grief apathy death - The recordings leave 
electromagnetic pattern: - That is any situation that 
causer rage will magnetize rage patterns and draw around ha 
rage word and image recordings - Ir some disgusting se: i 
practice once the connection is made is childýood when er 
the patterns are magetized by sex desire he same word and 
image wi. li be presented And so forth 
QP7 - 
Hollywood repeats its epic plots of warring powers and factions as 
archaic, linear narratives - Western, gangster and science fiction, 
in opposition to such strategies, Nova E press questions its own 
narratives of outer space colonisation and exploitation as 
destructive, Faustian urges in a society of "total emergency. .I 
Moreover, these epic conflict narratives are presented not linearly, 
but as layered episodes, parodies, routines, and plot fragments. 
This mutipli city, in the absence of a final unity, mitigates against 
the sense of overall, deterministic manipulation suggested by 
Hollywood and by most science fiction. 
In Burroughs, therefore, as in Sukenick and Gaddis, the. 
invention of novelistic forms iS itself a process of resistance to 
deathly repetition. in particular, film techniques, such as cuts, 
flashbacks, inserts and montage, constitute positive resources for 
Burroughs' writing, a models of resistance that disrupt 
monological, linear control-images. "Phckmontage" makes a statement 
in "flexible picture language, " encouraging the reader to think in 
"association blocks instead of words. "' 
The Subliminal Kid thus undertakes a series of film and 
tape-recorder e:. periments, which disrupt orthodc_, lin uýýti. 
mediations by reinventing history as a comic, non-linear collage: 
He set up screen: on the walls of his bars opposite mirrors 
and took and projected at arbitrary intervals shifted from 
one bar to the other mixing Western Gangsters films of all 
time and all places with word and image of the people in his 
cafes and on the streets his agents with movie camera and 
telex pope lens poured images of the city back into hie 
projector and camera array and nobody knew whether ne wan in 
a Western movie in Hongkong or The Aztec Empire in Ancient 
Rome or Suburban America whether he was a bandit a commuter 
or a chariot driver whether he was firing a "real" gun or 
41 watching a gangster movie and the city moved in... and 
- 35S - 
3 
_. any tornadoes of image expioý3ive hio-advance out of 
:; . doe to neon - 
The repetition of Western gangster and cowboy myths throughout 
sacrificial history is countered by this layered anti-chronology. 
For Burroughs, this subversion and restructuring of technical 
mediations may liberate human subjectivity, opening up practical, 
creative acts of resistance which the reader is encouraged to 
explore: 
The counter move is very simple This is machine strategy 
and the machine can be redirected - Record for ten minutes 
on a tape recorder - Now run the tape back without playing 
and cut in other words at random - Where you have cut in and 
re-recorded words are wiped off the tape and new words in 
their place - You have turned time back ten minutes and 
wiped electromagnetic word patterns off the tape and 
substituted other patterns - You can do the same with mind 
tape after working with the tape recorder - (This takes some 
experimentation) - The old mind tapes can be wiped clean - 
I'iagnetic word dust failing from old patterns - Word falling 
- Photo falling -' 
In this creative counter-technology, the machine I7iuot be. 
44 redirected, " an experimental process that involves randomeso and 
novelty as challenges to Uriher ted order. 
But the ultimate form of resistance to linguists control in 
Burroughs is silence, as a refusal of the continual perpetuation of 
i 
,_ con 
do leave the recorders running and get your heavy metal as: - 
in a space ship - Did it - nothing, here now but the 
recor ings Shut the whole thing right off Silence When 
you answer the machine you provide it with more recordings 
to be played back to your "enemies" keep the whole nova 
machine running, - The Chinese character for "enemy" ýüean= to 
b- similar to or to answer - Don't answer the machine -- Shut 
it off, - 
Yet despite the res istances, there remains in Burroughs' work, as 
n Ga, di: -: and Sukenick, a Iat ali: 5tic sense of irreversible damage. 
In The Jots, the Academy, an alternative, liberatory technological 
-3 FD - 
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thus doe:; not allow his science, fiction to degenerate into a 
lý -becomes" of cons '+ory "what i± that evades +e ' "what o or "what 
present society: 
Light years away the academy that never was and never could 
have been. The Brain could not let it happen or it would 
have happened thousands of years ago. The Brain will not 
allow you to find out how easy it is to solve problems. Once 
Problems are solved the brain artifact become:; obsolete.:: 
However, despite this sense of inevitability, Burroughs' humour, 
like that of Sukenicr and Gaddas, is always disorientating, and 
works to undermine the formation of fixed doxas. The disruption of 
archaic orders, and the finding of new ones, is an open process that 
counters the static entropies of orthodox, parasitical power with 
the resources of de-territorialisation and experimentation. 
Fl)-- 
GOATC usT, OST. 
This thesis has explored many instances of negative or reactive 
power, in which science and technology are signified as forces of 
authoritarian manipulation and control, based on an over-reliance on 
mechanistic models of determinism and totaiisation. 
In Sade Fourier Loyola (19)? 1), Roland Barthel . summarises these 
desires for singularity and system: 
The system being a closed (or monosemic) one, it is always 
theological, dogmatic; it is nourished by illusions: an 
illusion of transparency (the language employed to express 
it is purportedly purely instrumental, it is not a writing-) J 
and an illusion of reality (the goal of the system is to be 
applied, i. e., that it leave the language in order to found 
a reality that is incorrectly defined as the e>teriority of 
language); it is a strictly paranoid insanity whose path of 
transmission is insistence, repetition, cathechism, 
orthodoxy. ' 
biting the "sensual pleasure in classification... "= of his book's 
three subjects, Barthel locates the erotic bases of desires for 
total order. in this thesis, the narrative of Hollingsworth's 
control over Priscilla in Ha;, thorne's The BJitLedale Romance stands 
as a powerful nineteenth century critique of such totalitarian 
Controls. 
:n many of the fictions discussed in this thesis, including 
those of Hawthorn 1ý2ýville and 
Poe, such abuses of scientific and 
technological control have tended to be criticised in terms of 
Christian hubris, the scientist or technologist appearing as a 
Fausti as transgressor of divinel -ordained human limits. Signif`y'inz 
processes of this kind may suggest nostalgic desires for an original 
unity, in a paradisal utopia beyond technological transformations. 
Such broadly Romantic tendencies may also be felt in some twentieth 
Jt i- 
_entury reactions. to technological change, including those of Lewie 
iumford, for whom the "organic, " as a repo: itorJ of humanist Values 
such as of s ontaneity, feeling and imagination, is a resource in 
opposition to the "machine" of industrial monopolisation. 
Following Nietzsche, the work of Deleuze and Guattari makes an 
important break with Romantic nostalgias for totality and plenitude, 
as Anti-Oedipus (1983) makes clear: 
We no longer believe in a primordial totality that once 
existed, or in a final totality that awaits us at some 
future date. We no longer believe in the dull gray outlines 
of a dreary, colorless dialectic of evolution, aimed at 
forming a harmonious whole out of heterogeneous bits by 
rounding off their rough edge:.: 
in Niet the and Philosophy, Deleuze explores the Nietzo can basis 
of his destruction of organici=; t arguments from an apparent- y y 
unconditional "nature" : 
All force is appropriation, domrtination, exploitation of a 
quantity of reality. Even perception, in its divers aspect 
is the express-ion of forces which appropriate nature. That 
i. to say nature ýtseýf has a histor 
in tül.; way, Deleuze removes the unequivocally negative implication: = 
of words euch as "appropriating, possessing, subjugating, 
dominating" implications that have hindered many r owes into 
science, technology and culture. As Delp-uze restates the io. ý 'ýT J 
üQý: O 
appropriate means to impose forms, to create formL's by exploit ng 
cir'cum`stances. 
Having thus rejected Romantic nastalgias for a vague, 
aiii' torioai hunni;; m, DeieuzG_ and Guattari: ý work Oýens th way fo r 
speculation on sore lihe_ratory 
forms of science and technology, in 
the absence of dogmatic solutionary programmes. Accordingly, for 
Guattari, in Hoiocular Revolution, modern science promises a 
- 362 - 
trar; irldiviiuai pof -non-referential signs, e<_terdlnV^' rather than play 
repressing the desire of the scientist: 
The schizo scientist individually produces 
de-territorialized signs alongside a collective machirre. The 
cutting edge, so to say, of the machine is here the desire, 
or perhaps the madness, of the scientist, His desire has 
become a sign of power by coming into contact with the 
machiniom. The collective agency of utterance that connects 
things with people does not crush 'human values'. What gives 
the scientific machine its super-power is the super- 
humanness that carries desire to the heart of being. Far 
more powerful than any physicisto's Cyclotron is the desire 
that produces de-territorialized signs - super -par ti lesss 
capable of exploding 'natural' particles into a 
multiplicity, and so it a Seme forcing them to be on the 
defensý ýe. 
Archaic obsessions with Unity , stability and singular 
ty ar e tills 
replaced by joul lance: "With its shift to a Tnon-signifying 
semiotics, the subjectivity of thi_e utterance ; OIQeO be in 
an Or yi lis Ss body connected to a multiplicity of desiring 
i ilt'e Tc hies. 
In such terms, the scientist and technologist can be seen as 
vital figures of active power, Noiaado1o-q y therefore celebrates the 
v. 1 
"ambulant ientýs ýý as a breaker of orders, whom state scientist: 
are "forever fighting or integrating or allying pith, even doing s0 
far as to propose a minor position for them within the legal system 
of science and technology. ":: In such exploration-=, Deleuze and 
vüattari provide vital, yet provisional alternatives to those 
orthodox mania- for stability and rational order that beset tüte or 
technocratic science, weile crucially refusing a näivel-y anti- 
scientific view. 
Nevertheless, despite such work, political problem: = r e-aSin that 
serve to prevent a wider transformation of society based on such a 
'berätorJ, free-play of science and technology, In The Xeohünicai 
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B. r deg 'iia. r nihai . 
ic. Luhan 
, =bows 
how ca pi tai isv sociEty works h, y 
ez plott ng "ordinary human appetites fOr con iOrt, Ares igeý and 
power. " in a market economy, technological developments move beyond 
their positive role in alleviating drudgery from human labour: 
Accelerated change and planned obsolescence constitute the 
basic principle of an induetrial power-economy built on 
applied science. Production for use? Ye-. But for the 
briefest possible use consistent with the rigging of the 
market for the pyramiding of profits. 10 
Such a society is perpetuated by what William Burroughs calls the 
"A1 7 of "ZT1 "the face ýehra a Need, in ý1: e Na red Lunch, he ace o eJil.. is al: vays 
the face of total need, " as Burroughs locates heroin as the 
archetypal capitalist product, in its creation of need and 
dependency in its victim: 
The junk merchant does not sell his product to the consumer, 
he sells the consumer to his product. He doe's not improve 
and simplify his merchandise. He degrades and simplifies the 
client. '' 
in such a context, assumptions that politics have moved "beyond ief t 
and right, " and that political change can be administered by a 
reformed technocracy, as in the work of Buckminster Fuller, perhaps 
neglect to take into account the reluctance of those who benefit 
from the old mechanistic, industrial regime of manipulated needs to 
relinquish their privileges. In the absence of such moves, a global 
history of sacrifice, damage and exploitation is being per et' ate ä. i 
A central Question raised by this thesis is therefore that Of 
the role and extent of state power in moderte : moo: iet>%, a question 
asked in the 1930s by Wilhelm Reich's The J 'faoo Psychology of 
Fascism: 
slat- function: what part of it relates to its original 
function of executing social tasks, and what part of it 
>f54- 
rc ät, to ; he aLer_acQair fi . ction of up%r ng the 
freedom of Lti2 membero of of 1Et -ý? 
10 i h? ie of Wright Xi IS, the modern state would have a 
positive function, depending on the future possibilities of it - 
proper rationalisation. The social damage of twe-atiatlh century 
totaiita ianisü, war a: d bureaucracy is thereby traced in ham; wore, 
to an imperfect application of Enlightenment project; of reason, 
education, progress and emancipation. 
Yet t in 1 era ýu 
iali t_näencie of such an approach have 
ri rrencli rYr:. te, rs, reacting again-st, the 
st=ri_ity and failure of French Iar. ýJsm. In Lyotard's Priftwoý? r: ý 
the r? ft within systems : should be seized as a creative opportunity 
to ; abolish, rather than merely reform, the orthodox regime of 
rationality and dialectics: 
And we don't want to de troy kapital because it isn't 
rational, but because it is. Reason and -power are one and 
the same thing. You may disgui e the one with 'ýiaie.; tics or 
prn: eýeot ene: ý= but you . ýilý stil- have the other in ail 
its cr udene_ss: 
. 
jails, taboos, public Weal, selection, 
genocide. 
Tn place of an Enlightenment politl c. _, ., yotard provides a 
the oretical basis for strategies of res stance to technocratic- , mower 
thi ugh a. multiplicity of artistic practices: 
all the deconstruction; which could appear as aesthetic appear 
"avante--garde" research, etc. , actually mare up 
the only type of activity that in effective, this ecau, ei it 
is functionally - the word is very bad, ontologically would 
be better and more straightforward located outside the 
.,: stem; and, by definition, its function in to decons=truct 
everything drat belongs to order , to snow ; at all this. 
order" conceals something else, tha 
In thi respe t, Lyotard recalls 
_calls 
McLuhan`s idea, in Through the 
C1i; t i-of art as a ýCJI7`? rcriviýorlii: 8ilý to the 
invisibility of technological change: 
5J - 
All the art s might be considered to act a1 
ouster environmen to or counter gra dient., Any en vironmen taI 
form whatsoever saturates perception so that its own 
character is imperceptible; it has the power to distort or 
deflect human awareness. Even the most popular art. can 
serve to increase the level of awareness, at least until 
they become entirely environmental and unperceived. "' 
In this thesis, the formal innovations and explorations of recent 
American novelists, especially Gaddis, Sukenick, and Burroughs, 
have been seen to provide probes and oppositional strategies to 
technocratic impositions of totality, determinism, functionality and 
pragmatic communication. 
Such moves must be seen in an historical context of radical 
exploration that includes the crucial nineteenth century figures 
discus ed in thin thesis. Accordingly, the thesis will conclude with 
a quotation from The Education of Henry Adams. Adams for; eaw the need 
for an openness to multiplicity, moving beyond nostalgic desires i"r 
totality and the consolations of a singular solutionary 
programýsatic, in his call for a genuinely contemporary education to 
prepare human beings for the accelerating and disruptive 
technological changes of the twentieth century: 
Images are not arguments, rarely even lead to proof, but the 
mind -raves 
them, and, of late more than ever, the kcený_ t 
experimenters find twenty images better than one, especially 
if contradictory; since the human mind has already learned 
to deal in contradictions. 
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